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ABSTRACT
Freedom of expression is regarded as indispensable in modern representative
democratic societies. The will of the people is said to be the basis of the authority of
government in such societies. Freedom of expression thus ensures that citizens are
able to make responsible political decisions and participate effectively in public life.
In order to do this, a free flow of information and ideas is essential to enable citizens
to make informed decisions. The mass media play a crucial role as purveyors of
information and ideas, and a platform for the exchange of ideas. Democratic societies
therefore have a duty to guarantee and ensure the enjoyment of freedom of expression
and media freedom. In addition, they have an obligation to ensure that the mass media
disseminate a wide range of information and ideas to a diverse audience.
This thesis is a comparative study of the measures taken by the states of Botswana
and South Africa to guarantee and ensure the enjoyment ofmedia freedom. It further
examines the steps taken by the two states to promote the dissemination of a wide
range of views and information in the media. The measures taken by the two states are
compared to international law requirements, which arguably, establish minimum
standards below which no member of the international community should fall.
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"In a democratic society ...the mass media play a role of undeniable
importance. They bear an obligation to provide citizens both with information
and with a platform for the exchange of ideas which is crucial to the
development of a democratic culture. As primary agents of the dissemination
of information and ideas, they are, inevitably, extremely powerful institutions
in a democracy and they have a constitutional duty to act with vigour,
courage, integrity and responsibility"}
1.1 Topic and Motivation for the Study
The importance of media freedom in sustaining a democratic society has become
something of an unchallengeable dogma. In 1991 UNESCO convened journalists
from across Africa in Windhoek, Namibia, at a seminar whose theme was the
establishment of a free, independent and pluralistic press in Africa. At the end of the
seminar on 3ld May 1991, the participants adopted a document, the Windhoek
Declaration on Promoting an Independent African Press.2 The Windhoek Declaration
affirms that the establishment, maintenance and fostering of an independent,
pluralistic and free press is essential to the development and maintenance of
democracy in a nation. The Declaration encourages African states to take positive
measures to guarantee the enjoyment of media freedom. It further provides guidance
for the development of independent and pluralistic media in Africa.
The UNESCO General Conference endorsed the Windhoek Declaration at its twenty-
sixth session in 1991.3 The Declaration has also been adopted by the Information
1
Per O'Reagan J in Khumalo and others v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 at 417 para. 24.
2 See: [http://www.unesco.org/webworld/com_media/development_rel_policies.htm!].
3 Resolution 4.3, adopted on the report of Commission IV on 6th November 1991.
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Ministers of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).4 SADC has
further adopted a Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport, which among other
things, gives recognition to the Windhoek Declaration, and calls upon states to ensure
the development of media that are editorially independent and conscious of their
obligations to the public and greater society.3 It has however been observed that
despite the adoption and ratification of the above instruments, coupled in most cases
with c onstitutional g uarantees o fm edia freedom, m any governments i n S ADC p ay
only lip-service to their obligations to media freedom.6
Instances of violations of media freedom in the SADC region have been monitored
and recorded since 1994 by the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA). MISA is a
non-governmental organisation founded in 1992 by media advocates and defenders,
with the objective of promoting free independent and pluralist media in the region, as
envisaged in the Windhoek Declaration.7 The organisation publishes annual reports
on the state of the media in the region. A perusal of these reports reveals that in all
SADC member states covered by MISA, there have been, and continues to be,
violations of media freedom. While the nature and extent of the violations differ from
one country to another, the general pattern is one of non-fulfilment by states of their
obligations to ensure the enjoyment of media freedom, which challenges the essence
o
of the freedom.
The current study seeks to critically examine the extent to which the state of
Botswana respects, and has taken measures to ensure the enjoyment of media
freedom. It may be recalled that as a member of SADC, Botswana has proclaimed its
4 See G. Lister, So this is Democracy? Report on Media Freedom in Southern Africa 1994 (MISA,
1995) p. 2. (SADC is a regional organisation that comprises fourteen states in southern Africa. Its
objectives are inter alia achieving development and economic growth; evolve common political values,
systems and institutions; and promote and defend peace and security in the region. Members include:
Angola; Botswana; Democratic Republic of Congo; Lesotho; Malawi; Mauritius; Mozambique;
Namibia; Seychelles; South Africa; Swaziland; Tanzania; Zambia and Zimbabwe. See:
[http://www.sadc. int]).




Lister, n 4 above p. 2.
7 See MISA website at: [http://www.misa.org].
8 Cf. P.N. Takirambudde, 'Media Freedom and the Transition to Democracy in Africa' (1995) 7
African Journal ofInternational and Comparative Law 18 at 25.
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commitment to media freedom through the adoption and ratification of the Windhoek
Declaration and the SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport, respectively.
In view of the fact that media freedom is valued for its importance in a democratic
society, it is appropriate to begin by considering the concept of democracy. There is
consensus among the institutions that enforce major international and regional human
rights treaties that freedom of expression is one of the fundamental cornerstones of
every democratic society.9 The question that immediately arises is: what is meant by a
democratic society? There may be no one authoritative definition of democracy, but
international law has made significant steps towards establishing minimum
requirements for the concept to be realised. All major human rights treaties spell out
in some detail the minimum content of democracy, which is understood to be the right
of all citizens to participate in the political life of their societies.10 Article 25 of the
UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that
every citizen has a right to take part in the conduct of public affairs directly or through
freely chosen representatives. The Article grants citizens inter alia the right to vote
and to be elected at genuine periodic elections conducted on the principle of universal
and equal suffrage, and by secret ballot in circumstances that guarantee the free
expression of the will of the electors. The major regional human rights treaties have
similar provisions, which basically provide that the will of the people should be the
basis of the authority of government." For the purposes of this thesis, I adopt this
definition of a democratic society.
Every person has basic rights in a democratic society envisaged under international
law. These rights, which are commonly referred to as civil and political rights, are
12
generally derived from the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.
Nowak characterises civil and political rights as falling into three categories:
9
For example, see UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 25(25) of 12th July 1996; Article I
of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa and Lingens v Austria (1986) 8
EHRR407 at 418 para. 41.
10 J. Crawford, 'Democracy and International Law' (1993) 64 The British Year Book of International
Law 113.
" See Articles: 13 - African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; 23 - American Convention on
Human Rights; and, 3 - Protocol 1, European Convention on Human Rights.
12
A. Eide, et al (eds.) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary (Scandinavian
University Press, 1992) p. 6.
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i) Political rights, which include the right to vote, to equal access to
public service and to take part in the government of one's country;
ii) Civil rights, which range from the protection of the individual's
physical, spiritual, legal and economic existence (such as rights to life,
privacy, dignity, property, freedom of thought, opinion, religion, etc)
to procedural safeguards relating to fair trial and the rule of law; and
iii) Political freedoms, which include the freedoms of expression, media,
information, assembly, and association.13
He further argues that civil and political rights are the legal expression of two
different concepts of freedom: the ancient democratic concept of achieving collective
freedom through active participation in the political decision-making process; and the
modern liberal concept of achieving individual freedom by creating a private sphere
for every human being which is protected against any undue interference by the state
and other powerful actors. Political freedoms serve to advance both democratic and
liberal freedom, and thereby constitute the link between civil and political rights.14
Political freedoms are therefore not only valued as an end in themselves in that they
advance private interests by warding off state interference, but they also perform a
wider social function by rendering meaningful public participation in the democratic
process. In modem states, democracy usually operates through representative
participation. Thus the political right to vote is very important as it enables the public
at large to participate in the democratic process by indicating their will through the
ballot box. In order for citizens to exercise their will effectively, free communication
of information and ideas about public and political issues is essential, hence the
importance that international law attaches to freedom of expression. As the South
African Constitutional Court observed in the Khumalo case, quoted above, the mass
media play a critical role in disseminating a range of infomiation and ideas that
influence how citizens exercise their political choices. The media therefore perform
an important informative function in a democratic society. In addition, the media are
expected to act as a watchdog in relation to the elected representatives, ensuring that
13
M. Nowak, 'Civil and Political Rights' in J. Symonides (ed) Human Rights: Concept and Standards
(Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd, 2000) pp. 69 - 70.
14 Ibid.
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there is independent criticism and evaluation of the established power or other
institutions that may usurp democratic power. These two functions performed by the
media are referred to as the media's democratic role or democratic mandate in this
thesis. The success of the media in fulfilling their democratic mandate depends to a
large extent on their ability to access information, especially information held by the
state. If the media are unable to access relevant information, they will be impotent.
The political freedoms of expression, media and information are important for
ensuring that governments are based on the will of the people, and are therefore
guaranteed by the major international human rights treaties. The latter two freedoms
are considered components of freedom of expression. States have a duty to respect all
rights guaranteed by international human rights treaties. This obligation of respect
entails the traditional duty of states to refrain from restricting the exercise of rights.16
This, however, does not mean that civil and political rights are absolute. International
law allows the exercise of rights to be restricted in the interests of other important
social interests such as national security and in order to protect the human rights of
others. Clauses that limit the rights guaranteed by international human rights treaties
nevertheless require that restrictions on those rights must be reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society.
States also have duty to ensure the enjoyment of civil and political rights by their
citizens. The HRC has held that this obligation in principle imposes a duty on states to
17
take positive measures to guarantee these rights in their domestic laws. In addition
to the guarantee of these rights, the obligation to ensure their enjoyment requires that
states: (i) enact domestic laws and adopt the necessary administrative and judicial
measures to give effect to each right; (ii) provide for effective judicial and other
remedies against violations of rights; and (iii) safeguard certain rights institutionally
18
by way of procedural guarantees or the establishment of relevant legal institutions.
15 Cf. Gauthier v Canada (633/95) para. 13.4, decision of the HRC, reproduced in: S. Joseph et al
(eds.) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary
(Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 398.
16
Nowak, n 13 above at 73.
17 HRC General Comment 10(19) of 27th July 1983.
18 See Nowak, n 13 above at 73.
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The legal system of Botswana recognises the right to a democratic representative
government. Section 61 of the constitution deals with qualification requirements for
election to the National Assembly, while section 67 deals with matters relating to the
franchise. These provisions spell out the minimum content of democracy as the right
of all citizens to be governed according to their will and to participate in the political
life of their societies.19 Civil and political rights, including the political freedoms of
expression and information are enshrined in a Bill of Rights in the constitution
established at independence, which has enjoyed an uninterrupted existence as the
supreme law of the land since 1966. Media freedom is implicitly guaranteed as a
component of freedom of expression.20 Further, the state of Botswana has ratified the
ICCPR and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. Treaties that have
been ratified by the state do not, however, take effect automatically in municipal law
unless incorporated by an act of the legislature, and neither of the two treaties has yet
been incorporated into domestic law.
Since independence, Botswana has had an impressive record regarding observance of
the rule of law, and its citizens have generally enjoyed most of the rights guaranteed
under t he c onstitution.21 B otswana h as p erhaps, not b een s o s uccessful i n e nsuring
that its citizens enjoy media freedom. Notwithstanding the protection that the freedom
is accorded in the constitution, the media in the country face legal, institutional,
22
economic and infrastructure barriers in performing their democratic mandate. These
problems arise from both the failure by the state to observe its obligations to refrain
from restricting the exercise of rights, and to take positive measures to ensure the
enjoyment of rights. Direct restrictions by the state on the exercise of rights are rare,
but the state does occasionally employ laws such as the National Security Act 1986,
and its power over the placement of public advertising in the private media can be
used to interfere with media content.
19 See generally, O. Tshosa, National Law and International Human Rights Law: Cases ofBotswana,
Namibia and Zimbabwe (Ashgate Dartmouth, 2001) p. 185.
20 B. Otlhogile, 'The Constitutional Rights of the Mass Media in Botswana: An Academic's View' in
M. Leepile (ed) Botswana's Media and Democracy: Selected Papers from the Seminar on the Media in
a Democracy (Mmegi Publishing House, 1996) 53 at 55.
21 See United States Embassy Stockholm, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001,
Botswana, available at: [http://www.usemb.se/human/2001/africa/botswana.html].
22 See T. Balule, 'Botswana' in R. Galant, J. Minnie and Z. Wales (eds.) So this is Democracy? Report
on State ofthe Media in Southern Africa 1999 (MISA, 2000) 45.
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Botswana has generally failed to take positive measures to ensure the realisation of
media freedom. There is no law giving effect to the right of access to information held
by the state, a lacuna compounded by the government's failure to promote a culture of
openness and transparency. This impacts negatively on the media's ability to perform
their democratic role, as they find it difficult to access information. The government
has a lso b een r eluctant tor eform e xisting a rchaic 1 aws t hat s everely repress m edia
freedom. The most notorious of these laws are, firstly, the National Security Act 1986,
which is used by the government to deny the media access to a wide range of
information under the pretext of the protection of national security, and, secondly, the
civil law of defamation, which holds media defendants strictly liable for publication
of d efamatory s tatements. F urthermore, t he government h as failed, a fter o ver t hree
decades of democratic rule, to guarantee the independence of the public service
media.23
In 1997 the government of Botswana approved a document, Vision 2016, which takes
stock of the country's achievements after thirty years of independence, and in addition
formulates aspirations for the future.24 The document is regarded as a national
manifesto for the people of Botswana and is intended to guide policymaking. One of
the aspirations espoused in Vision 2016 is the enhancement of democracy by
25
encouraging open and transparent governance. In order to achieve this, the
document argues that the government will have to ensure that citizens understand the
reasons for its decisions and policies. It also emphasises the need for free and
informed political debate that subjects every decision and policy to careful
consideration. The realisation of these aspirations will depend to a significant extent
on the media performing their democratic mandate effectively. Vision 2016
recognises that an independent, diverse and pluralist media, adhering to high ethical
standards is crucial for the attainment of its goals.26
The role that the media is expected to play in the attainment of the goals set out in
Vision 2016 has inevitably led to debate focusing on the question: how friendly is the
23 C. M. Fombad, 'The Protection of Freedom of Expression in the Public Service Media in Southern
Africa: A Botswana Perspective' (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 649.
24






prevailing legal environment for the exercise of media freedom and the media's
democratic mandate? The current study is intended as a contribution to this on-going
debate. It critically examines the laws regulating the media in Botswana with a view
to determining the extent to which they are supportive of the exercise of media
freedom and the effective performance by the media of their democratic role. In
particular, the study assesses the extent to which the laws giving effect to media
freedom ensure media pluralism and the provision of diverse information. It also
considers whether restrictions on media freedom are applied in a manner consistent
with the international law standard of necessity in a democratic society.
1.2 Methodology and Delimitation ofthe Study
The study considers the situation of the three traditional news media: the printed
press, radio and television broadcasting. In addressing the question of the extent to
which the legal environment in Botswana is conducive to the performance bv the
media of their democratic mandate, the study adopts a comparative approach. Firstly,
international law standards are considered and the position in Botswana is assessed
for conformity with them. The approach is premised on the assumption that
international law provides minimum standards of human rights below which no
member of the international community should fall. International law standards that
guarantee media freedom and seek to enhance the perfonnance by the media of their
democratic role are therefore regarded as the minimum standards that each member of
the international community must incorporate into its municipal law in order that
media freedom be realised.
Secondly, the situation of the media in Botswana is compared to that of their
counterparts in South Africa. The latter has also proclaimed her commitment to media
freedom by the adoption and ratification of the Windhoek Declaration and the SADC
Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport, respectively. A comparative law
approach is of particular interest in this context due to growing internationalisation
and concomitant export and import of social, cultural and economic manifestations
8
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across n ational b orders. Botswana and S outh A frica m ay t herefore 1 earn v aluable
lessons from each other that may enhance democracy in both states. The choice of
South A frica h as b een i nfluenced b y t wo factors. F irstly, b oth t he c ommon 1 aw o f
Botswana and that of South Africa are based on Roman-Dutch law. Thus, some of the
laws that affect the media, such as the law of defamation should, in principle, be the
same. South Africa has also ratified both the ICCPR and the African Charter, but as in
Botswana, treaties must be incorporated before they can have direct application in the
municipal law. Secondly, while Botswana is arguably the oldest democracy in the
Southern African region, South Africa is regarded as the youngest.
South Africa became a democratic state in 1994 after many years of apartheid rule by
the minority white South Africans. The evils of the apartheid policy are well
documented.28 Black South Africans were generally denied the enjoyment of civil and
political rights. It is in the light of the injustices that occurred in the past that the new
constitution of South Africa establishes a society based on democratic values, social
justice and fundamental rights.29 The constitution thus requires the government to
respect the principle of democracy, defined in the preamble as a society in which
government is based on the will of the people and where every citizen is equally
protected by the law. Section 1 of the constitution further provides that the state is
founded, inter alia, on the values of 'universal adult suffrage, a national common
voter's roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness'. The political freedoms of
expression, information and media are expressly guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which also guarantees other civil and political rights.
The South African post-democratic courts have consistently acknowledged the
importance of freedom of expression as a guarantor of democracy and the special role
that the media play as purveyors of information and public watchdog. Consequently,
27
D. Goldberg et al (eds.) Regulating the Changing Media: A Comparative Study (Clarendon Press,
1998) p. 9.
28 F or e xample, see Culhane, D.S.K. ' No E asy T alk: S outh Africa a nd t he S uppression o f P olitical
Speech' (1994) 17 Fordham International Law Journal 896.
29 Preamble to the Constitution of South Africa of 1996, Act 108 of 1996.
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they have demonstrated their willingness to ensure the enjoyment of these freedoms.30
The South African government has also taken elaborate positive measures to enhance
the enjoyment of media freedom and the performance of the media's democratic
mandate. For example, the government has enacted access to information legislation
that gives the public a right of access to information held by the state, and it has also
guaranteed the independence of the public service broadcaster.
This study is divided into five parts. Part I discusses the theoretical background to the
concept ofmedia freedom, particularly its relationship with freedom of expression, so
that one can appreciate the nature of the freedom under discussion. This is
necessitated by the fact that media freedom in international human rights treaties is
guaranteed as a component of freedom of expression and there is a tendency to treat
the two freedoms as synonymous.
Part II provides an overview of the news media currently available in Botswana and
South Africa. It focuses on whether these sources provide a sufficiently diverse range
of information and ideas, whether they are accessible to the general public and seeks
to identify the major problems faced by the media in both countries. Pari II then
addresses the protection of media freedom in international human rights instruments
and the relevance of these instruments in the municipal laws of Botswana and South
Africa. Finally, it examines the protection of media freedom in the municipal laws of
Botswana and South Africa and how the protection compares with international law
standards.
Part III of the study examines the regulatory environment of the media in both
countries. It scrutinises the regulatory objectives, methods and institutions, as
provided in the laws and official policies of the two states, with a view to ascertaining
the extent to which they provide for diversity and pluralism in the various media
sectors. The assumption here is that a plural and diverse media sector will provide a
diverse range of information and ideas, thereby enabling citizens to play an effective
part in the democratic process. Further, since the ability of the media to perform their
30
For example see: South African National Defence Union vMinister ofDefence and another 1999 4
SA 469; Government ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa v Sunday Times Newspaper 1995 2 SA 221 and
Khumalo and others v Holomisa, n 1 above.
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democratic mandate effectively depends to a large extent on whether they are able to
access relevant information, part III also examines whether Botswana and South
Africa have put in place adequate measures to ensure that the media have access to
information.
In part IV I consider the impact of two restraints on media freedom, which, based on
interviews with news media editors and MISA records, appear to pose the most
serious threat to media freedom in Botswana. These are restrictions based on the
protection o f n ational s ecurity a nd t he r eputation o f o thers. It m ay b e r ecalled t hat
under international law, restrictions on media freedom are justifiable only if they are
shown t o b e n ecessary i n a d emocratic s ociety. Part IV t herefore e xplores w hether
restrictions on media freedom in Botswana and South Africa in order to protect
national security and the reputation of others comply with the international law
standards.
There is a close relationship between issues of access to official information discussed
in Part III and national security. Access to official information may be denied if the
disclosure will compromise the security of the state. Thus, in order to avoid a
repetition of issues addressed in the chapters on access to official information and
national security, the former focuses on the general principles that would give a
meaningful right to the public to access official documents, while the latter
concentrates on the impact of national security on the enjoyment ofmedia freedom.
The thesis ends with a general conclusion. This evaluates the legal environment in
both countries with a view to determine whether it is conducive to the performance by
the media of their democratic mandate. Where the legal environment is found
wanting, t he c onclusion m akes s uggestions t hat, i f implemented, w ould 1 ead t o t he
enhancement ofmedia freedom and the performance of the media's democratic role.
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PARTI
A THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO MEDIA FREEDOM
CHAPTER 2
MEDIA FREEDOM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH FREEDOM OF
SPEECH
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the theoretical background to media
freedom. It explores the nature of the freedom and its relationship with freedom of
speech or expression.1 Theoreticians and contemporary advocates of media freedom
defend the freedom and freedom of speech in the same stroke, with the implication
that the two freedoms are inseparable, probably equivalent, and equally fundamental.
Furthermore, an examination of the most famous arguments for media freedom
reveals that they do not differ from those of freedom of speech generally. These
observations clearly indicate that media freedom is intimately connected with freedom
of speech.
In the light of the fact that the general arguments for freedom of speech are advanced
to support media freedom, it will be convenient to start by looking at the main
arguments for freedom of speech before examining the nature ofmedia freedom. This
chapter therefore begins by looking at the main arguments for freedom of speech and
then goes on to examine the relevance of these arguments to media freedom, and the
relationship between the two freedoms.
1 The terms freedom of speech and freedom of expression are used synonymously for purposes of
discussion in this chapter.
2
J. Lichtenberg, 'Foundations and Limits to Freedom of the Press1 in J. Lichtenberg (ed.) Democracy
and the Mass Media (Cambridge University Press, 1990) p. 102.
3 For example, even though John Stuart Mill's discussion in On Liberty begins by asserting the need for
'liberty of the press' he however proceeds to enumerate arguments for freedom of expression in general
in support of the latter. See J.S. Mill, On Liberty (John W. Parker & Son, 1992) chapter 2.
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2.2 Main Arguments For Freedom ofSpeech
There is a vast body of literature on the theory of freedom of speech and this chapter
is by no means an exhaustive discussion of a topic that has been the subject of many
distinguished scholarly dissertations. Instead, this chapter attempts to summarise the
main arguments for freedom of speech in order to highlight the importance of the
right. Before embarking on a discussion of the main arguments for freedom of speech,
some brief observations on the nature of the right are apposite.
Freedom of speech can be an individual or a social right, and also an intrinsic or an
instrumental right.4 The right is individual if it is construed as being for the benefit of
the right holder. It may be of benefit either because the individual has an interest in
the freedom of speech for its own sake, in which case it is an intrinsic individual right,
or because the right holder wants the right in order to protect or pursue further
interests, in which case it is an instrumental individual right. Freedom of speech is a
social right if one person's right is justified by the benefits that accrue to other people.
A social right may be intrinsic, for example, where the beneficiaries of the right
derive information for its own sake and it may also be an instrumental social right,
where the recipients desire the communication for ulterior purposes, such as the
protection of their political interests. The right can also be a public good where its
benefits cannot be restricted to identifiable persons, but promotes a progressive
economic culture or a tolerant political pluralism.3
There is also a debate over whether the right is a liberty-right or a positive claim-
right.6 On the one hand, liberals consider the right to be a liberty-right, that is, they
define it in terms of absence of legal prohibitions on speech. Liberty-rights of free
speech are usually closely associated with a number of negative claim-rights in terms
of which one person's freedom of speech correlates with other people's duties to
refrain from interfering with that speech in specified ways. On this view, government
intervention is regarded with suspicion and freedom of speech is depicted as an
4
See T. Campbell, 'Rationales for Freedom ofCommunication' in T. Campbell & W. Sadurski (eds.)
Freedom ofCommunication (Dartmouth, 1994) pp. 19 - 20.
5
Ibid., pp. 21 - 22.
6 See generally, D. Kelly and R. Donway, 'Liberalism and Free Speech' in Lichtenberg (ed.), n 2 above
p. 66 and R. Suttner, 'Freedom of Speech' (1990) 6 South African Journal ofHuman Rights 372.
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absolute right. On the other hand, some argue that the right is also affirmative or has
positive claim-rights in that it involves correlative duty holders who are o bliged to
empower the right holders to participate in successful communicative activities. For
example, a government may b e r equired t o i ntervene and c urtail e xpression b y t he
majority to enable the minority to be heard. Thus this approach, unlike the former,
does not consider the right to be absolute.
There may be several distinct theories for freedom of speech, but there are three
traditional theories. These are:
(a) Freedom of speech is essential as a means of assuring individual self-
fulfilment;
(b) It is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering
truth; and
(c) Freedom of speech facilitates participation in decision making by all
members of the society.
These theories constitute what i s popularly referred to as the 'classical trio' o f the
arguments for freedom of speech, and below follows a brief discussion of each.
2.2.1 A rgumen t For Self-Fulfilmen t
The argument here is that it is of overriding importance that a person be able to think
for himself/herself, that whatever his/her 'outer' condition, he/she should not be
intellectually or psychologically subjugated to another's will. The argument sees
speech as an integral aspect of each individual's right to self-development and
fulfilment or individual autonomy. Autonomy so understood requires freedom of
speech because of the close connection between thought and language. One needs to
speak and listen to others to develop one's thoughts. Restrictions on what a person is
allowed to say and write, or to hear or read inhibit the growth of his/her personality.
15
Therefore the fundamental interest in freedom of speech is an interest not only in
freedom to think for ourselves, but also in communicating our thoughts to others.7
The argument for self-fulfilment is a speaker-oriented approach to freedom of speech
and has both intrinsic and instrumental individual aspects. It protects the right to self-
determination in cases where individuals are expressing themselves for the sake of it,
the intrinsic aspect, and cases where individuals are using the opportunity to express
themselves in order to protect their interests or further their projects beyond mere self-
expression, the instrumental aspect. Campbell refers to these as the 'self-expression'
and 'self-projection' arguments, respectively. The argument seems to be based on the
theory that protection of free speech is grounded on fundamental background rights to
human dignity and to equality of concern and respect.9 Freedom of speech is justified
by the intrinsic values of authentic self-expression and frank communication. And
because of this, it has been argued that this rationale has the advantage of empirical
impregnability (if we ignore its harmful side-effects), a position that cannot be
extended to the other rationales that are based on alleged consequential b enefits of
freedom of speech. Freedom of speech as an individual's right to self-development
would therefore appear to be an absolute right even though it may be inimical to the
welfare and development of society.
Although it has been said that the self-expression argument is not defeasible, the same
cannot be said of the self-projection argument. The latter is defeasible in the face of
evidence that particular exercises of that freedom are not protective of that person's
interests or interests of the community at large, and in the light of the quality of the
objectives adopted by the communicating person. Thus the freedom of speech of a
person who wishes to protect his/her activities as a fraudster may have some intrinsic
significance, but it is vulnerable to curtailment in the light of the uses to which that
freedom is put in a way that would not apply in the case of a person who chooses to
pursue goals approved by society.10
7
Lichtenberg, n 2 above p. 108 and T.I. Emerson, 'Towards a General Theory of the First Amendment'
(1963) 72 Yale Law Journal 877 at 879.
8
Campbell, n 4 above p. 34.
9 E. Barendt, Freedom ofSpeech (Oxford University Press, 1985) chapter 1.
10
Campbell, n 4 above pp. 35 - 36.
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The self-projection utility of speech has greater importance in societies that minimise
organised social concern and depend on individual responsibility. However, in this
type of society, freedom of expression cannot be expected to realise its self-fulfilling
function in an equitable way if there are major inequalities of capacity, education and
access to communicative means. In individualistic societies, instrumental arguments
for freedom of speech may ultimately defend the interests of the articulate and
powerful sections of society. Given this scenario, one may think of remedial
measures, at least to allow the minority access to communicative means and therefore,
against this background, the right to freedom of speech cannot be regarded as a purely
negative right.11
Some critics resist this argument for self-expression because anything one might wish
to do can be considered a mode of self-expression, thus rendering the argument one of
liberty in general that fails to make speech special. Lichtenberg counters this criticism
by arguing t hat freedom o f s peech p rotects e xpression t hat i s e ssentially symbolic.
And that symbolic expression is special because it is the primary means by which we
communicate beliefs, ideas, feelings, etc and its success requires distinctively human
12
responses, and not mere reaction. The importance of freedom of speech has also
been questioned because of a lack of clear evidence that it is conducive to personal
happiness or that it satisfies more basic needs and wants: why is free speech more
important to a person's fulfilment than the right to education? It is said that speech is
afforded constitutional protection because it is primarily a liberty against the state, a
'negative freedom' and is therefore more capable of judicial interpretation and
1 T
enforcement than positive rights.
It has also been noted that the argument for self-fulfilment tends to be sidelined in
political contexts.14 The argument is founded on intrinsic individual right, while free
speech in the political domain is grounded in the idea of instrumental individual
rights. However, as has been indicated above, there is an instrumental form of the
argument for self-fulfilment, self-projection, which sees speech as a means to further
the well being of the speaker.
"Ibid-
12
Lichtenberg, n 2 above p. 110.
13
Barendt, n 9 above p. 15.
14 See Campbell, n 4 above p. 34.
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2.2.2 Argument For Truth
The argument for truth is associated with John Stuart Mill who argues that a free press
can guarantee an abundant supply of facts and arguments about facts, thus cultivating
the habit of questioning and correcting opinions and ensuring the victory of truth over
falsehood.1^ Mill pursued a case for the education and improvement of individuals for
the ' necessity to t he m ental w ell-being o fm ankind' (on w hich a 111 heir w ell-being
depends). He offered three reasons for the guarantee of freedom of the press:
(i) Any opinion that is silenced by government or civil society because it
is allegedly false may prove to be true, in the sense that it may conform
to the facts and survive vigorous counter-arguments about those facts.
Those who seek to censor potentially true opinions naturally deny its
truth;
(ii) Though an opinion turns out to be false, it often contains an ounce or
two of truth. The prevailing opinion on any matter is rarely the whole
truth. This means that it is only by confronting it with other, contrary
opinions that the full truth can be attained; and
(iii) Even if an opinion is the whole truth, it will soon degenerate into
prejudice - into a dead dogma, not a living truth if it goes
unchallenged.
The point here is that unrestricted speech is the only basis for justified truth-claims.
The argument epitomises the liberal conception of freedom of speech. A central
element of the argument for truth is the depiction of freedom of speech as an absolute
right without limits. The value of this approach is in conformity with the dictates of
the capitalist market. The argument for truth has an individualistic dimension with
both instrumentalist and intrinsic forms. It may be vindicated as enhancing the
speaker's grasp of the truth for its own sake, and as a means whereby the individual
may acquire useful information that enables him/her to protect his/her own interests.
13 See generally, Mill, n 3 above chapter 2.
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The argument may also be seen to put forward a social right which benefits the public
good for it enhances the distribution of reasonable belief within a community.
The argument for truth relies on a number of assumptions. First, that truth is objective
or discoverable, i.e., truth is able to outshine falsity in debate or discussion only if
truth is there to be seen. Second, it assumes that people are basically rational, that they
possess the capacity correctly to perceive truth or reality. For this assumption to hold:
(i) a person's personal history or position in society must not control the manner in
which he/she perceives or understands the world; (ii) people's rational faculties must
enable them to sort through the form and frequency of message presentation to
evaluate the core truth in the messages, otherwise the market place of ideas would
only promote acceptance of those perspectives that were best packaged and promoted
effectively; and (iii), that the discovery of truth must be desirable, for example,
because truth provides the best basis for action and thereby uniformly promotes
human interests.16
It has however been argued that this approach is weakened by the failure of the above
assumptions.17 Truth is not objective; those values to which people personally give
allegiance provide the necessary criteria for judging between competing theories.
People individually or collectively choose, or create, rather than discover their
perspectives, understandings and truths. And it is not clear that the market place of
ideas is the only or best realm in which to create truth, as truth can be created by other
activities. The theory further assumes that people's reason enables them to
comprehend a set reality and test assertions or propositions against that reality. The
argument is also affected by the rejection of truth as objective, for people cannot use
reason to comprehend a set reality where no set reality exists for them to discover.
People's perspectives and understanding are greatly influenced by their experiences
and their interests both of which reflect their various locations in a historically
specific socio-economic structure. Dialogue cannot completely eliminate conflicts and
divergences between people's perspectives as long as the social structure causes
people to have very different experiences and conflicting interests.




Moreover the theory also depends on rationality, that people will be able to use their
rational capacities in order to eliminate distortion caused by the form and frequency
of message presentation and find thereby the core, relevant information. This view
cannot be accepted, as it is inconsistent with psychoanalytical and behavioural
theories that people consistently respond to emotional or 'irrational' appeals.18 It has
therefore been argued that freedom of expression is not a sufficient condition for the
emergence of truth, and that the argument for truth supports the claim that diversity of
expression and openness to deviant views are necessary conditions of intellectual
progress or that it helps the advance of knowledge.19
The a rgument for t ruth has b een s ubjected t o a n umber o f criticisms. M uch a ctual
speech has little if any potential truth-value in that it is either not directed at the
expression or vindication of justified belief or is not the sort of speech that is capable
of having a truth-value. If the freedom were to be restricted to 'truth-oriented' speech,
a great deal will be excluded especially expressions of opinion about matters which
are not capable of truth or falsity. It will therefore appear that the argument for free
speech here applies strongly in favour of truth-oriented expressions where the truths at
issue are of intellectual significance or have beneficial uses. On this basis it can be
argued that this theory sees freedom of speech as far more than just a liberty right. In
the interests of truth, special weight could be given to communications of those who
are in a position to contribute significantly to the search for truth such as
knowledgeable experts or skilled analysts and therefore modern governments must
support those engaged in scientific and other research in the quest for truth.
The argument for truth seems to assume that in all circumstances the publication of a
possibly true statement is the highest possible good and that speech does not cause
90
harm. The observation stems from the argument that, although harm may result
from speech, the results are normally produced non-coercively in that their eventuality
depends on others adopting certain attitudes. The speaker is therefore not responsible
for the harm unless he/she has been coercive. However, it has been argued on the
contrary t hat t his d istinction b etween words and a ctions i s fallacious a nd t hat M ill
18 Ibid.
19
Campbell, n 4 above p. 26.
20 Ibid. See also Barendt, n 9 above pp. 8-9.
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himself does not see an act as logically detached from its circumstances, for he
qualifies freedom of speech to exclude 'mischievous' acts. Mill cites an example that:
'An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is
robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may
justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the
house of a corn dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a
placard. Acts of whatever kind, which without justifiable cause, do harm to others,
may be, and in the most important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the
unfavourable sentiments, and when needful by the active interference of mankind.'21
It will therefore appear that speech that causes harm, on this view, is excluded from
protection.
2.2.3 Argument For Democracy
22The famous p roponent of this theory i s AlexanderM eiklejohn. According to this
argument, because democracy means popular sovereignty, the citizens in a
democracy, as the ultimate decision-makers, need full (or at least extensive)
information to make intelligent political choices. It stresses two functions of freedom
of speech and press in a democracy:
(i) Informative function; i.e., free speech permits the flow of information
necessary for citizens to make informed decisions and for leaders
(public servants) to stay abreast of the interests of their constituents;
and,
(ii) Watchdog function; the press in particular, serves as the people's
watchdog by ensuring independent criticism and evaluation of the
established power of government or other institutions that may usurp
democratic power.
Democracy means not only that people are collectively self-governing, but also that
they are equal in an important sense. Equality bears on free speech in two ways.
21 H.B. Acton (ed.) Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government: Selections from Auguste
Comte and Positivism (Dent, 1972) p. 114
22 See generally, A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (Harper
and Brothers, 1960).
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Firstly, democracy functions as it should only when each person's interests are
represented in the political forum; freedom of speech and the media enhances
opportunities for representation. The scale of modern society does not allow more
than a relatively small number of people to be physically co-present, the mass media,
especially television networks, newspapers, journals and magazines have become the
chief institutions in the dissemination of information, ideas and opinions. Secondly,
we show that sort of respect for persons associated with democracy both by
acknowledging that anyone (regardless of race or colour) may have a view worth
expressing, and by assuming that people can be open-minded or intelligent enough to
judge alien views on their merits. The democracy theory envisages that the nature of
an acceptable democratic process will include:
a) A majority election of rulers;
b) The equal distribution of power among the citizens;
c) Acceptance of the outcome of the democratic process;
d) The recognition of diversity; and,
e) A process of deliberation.
Calls for absolute freedom of speech under this theory are strong in the political
sphere because it is here that the danger of abuse of any legitimate restrictions of the
freedom is thought to be greatest. The argument from abuse has a more positive form
- namely that freedom of speech about activities of government is a necessary means
of control. It is said that taken in this context, the argument is an application of an
instrumentalist version of the argument for truth, that public knowledge of what
politicians are up to keeps them on the straight and narrow.24
It is further argued that extensive discussion is required to make the elected leaders
more accountable and this has implications for access to information. From this
perspective, freedom of speech as an instrumental social right converges with the
25
arguments for access to information as well as the opportunity to disseminate it.
There is yet another form of the argument for democracy which focuses on the idea of
23
Lichtenberg, n 2 above p. 111.
24
Campbell, n 4 above p. 38.
23 See 2.3 below.
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discussion with a view to reaching agreement as basic to the democratic process. On
this view, discussion is inherently democratic since the opinion of each person is
given equal weight, thus maximising autonomy in the political arena.
A problematic issue with the argument is whether freedom of speech should on this
basis be seen as absolute. One view is that sometimes the values of a democracy,
including its long term commitment to free speech, can best be preserved by the
temporary suppression of some speech, where the exercise of such may be contrary to
the public welfare. A contrary view is that the maintenance of a confident democracy
is best guaranteed by the protection of freedom of speech in all (or almost all)
circumstances, for temporary regulations may induce political unrest or undermine the
acceptability of other laws.26 However, in light of the socio-economic and political
inequalities in the modern state, there may be a need to restrict the freedom of some
citizens in order to enable others to participate in the democratic process.27
Furthermore, the government may be required to take affirmative steps to enable the
latter to utilise such an opportunity. In this context, the notion of an absolute right is
incompatible with the democracy argument and it also shows that there may be
positive claim-rights involved in this argument.
The democracy theory rests, to a considerable extent, on the values and commitments
embodied in a particular constitutional structure rather than on the more abstract
philosophical theorising that characterises the arguments from truth and self-
fulfilment. For example, a democratic theory that sees electoral procedures as a way
for individuals to protect their self-interests by giving them leverage over the actions
of the elected politicians will require the maximal flow of information about the
details of governmental activity and its effects. Whereas a theory that sees politicians
as being elected for their personal capacities and representative qualities, as persons to
be entrusted with complexities of government, will be more focused on the passage of
information about candidates than conduct of government business.
26
Barendt, n 9 above p. 21.
27 For example, the broadcast media's freedom of speech is normally subjected to some measure of
control to ensure that news broadcasts are presented in a balanced manner.
28 Cf. Campbell, n 4 above p. 38.
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The democracy theory appears to be based on democracy as it was seen in ancient
times where all citizens (albeit a limited class) were able to participate in the
legislative process, which passed only general laws that had an equal impact on all
because everyone was in roughly the same economic and social position. In the
modern state there is no equality among the citizenry, with wide disparities of wealth
and i nfluence. T he rich and p owerful, b ecause oft heir p osition, areabletoa ccess
important information and will therefore play a leading role in the decision making-
process, while the influence of the poor will be minimal or non-existent. Because of a
lack of equality, critics point out that for this theory to work, inequalities and
oppression in the democratic process must be removed. This should include, among
other things; (i) promotion of equal access rights to the media; (ii) education for self-
expression; (iii) and ensuring dominance of civic over commercial values in
advertising.29
2.2.4 Connections Between Arguments For Freedom ofSpeech
A closer examination of the classical trio of arguments for freedom of speech reveals
some interconnections between them. There is a connection between the arguments
for democracy and truth. Under the democracy argument, it is suggested that, ideally,
any person may have a view worth expressing, and that assumes that others should be
open-minded and judge such views on their merits, this connects with the argument
that freedom of speech is an indispensable means to the attainment of truth. The belief
that anyone might make a valuable contribution to the search for truth or for better
ways to do things does not mean that we think anyone is likely to. It means: (i) there
is no way of telling in advance where a good idea will come from; (ii) valuable
contributions to arriving at truth come in many different forms, speaking the truth
being one of them; and, (iii) much of the value of a person's contribution to the
market place of ideas is its role in stimulating others to defend or reformulate or refute
their ideas, and that value may be quite independent of the merits of the original
view.30 Thus equality of the citizens, which is a key concept in a democracy, and
fallibilism, a central assumption in the argument for truth, are mutually supportive.
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and the latter bids us question the views of experts and elites in order to arrive at the
truth.
There is a further connection between these arguments. The argument for truth
supports the claim that diversity of expression and openness to deviant views are
necessary conditions of intellectual progress or that it advances knowledge in the
society. On the other hand the argument for democracy emphasises citizen
participation in the decision making process. The two theories overlap in that an
informed citizenry will make informed choices leading to an enhanced decision
making process.
The argument for democracy is also connected to the argument from self-fulfilment in
its instrumental form in that political expression can be used to make others aware of
one's views or demands. Democracy can therefore be defended as a way of valuing
aggregate individual choices as ends in themselves independent of the worth of the
choices made.31
The argument for truth also overlaps with the argument for self-fulfilment. For a large
area o f h uman i nterests, t hese a rguments a re s o c losely related a s t o b e p ractically
inseparable because where morals, religion, politics, social relations, and business life
are concerned, truth must be something inseparable from the process of arriving at it,
and has therefore a great deal to do with virtues of intellect and character central to
self-development. Mill argues that truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so
much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites that there are very few
minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach
to correctness, so that it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between
combatants fighting under hostile banners. Therefore, the nature of truth in these
matters determines the nature of wisdom, which is an element of enlightenment and
self-development/
The interconnections between the arguments for freedom of speech are an indication
that the arguments are not mutually exclusive. Rather, the arguments should be seen
31
Campbell, n 4 above p. 39.
Lichtenberg, n 2 above p. 113.
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as supportive of each other, and taken in this context they support a strong free speech
principle. We want free speech for many reasons. Some involve essentially
individualistic interests, others the public interest or the common good. Others have to
do with intellectual values while others deal with the promotion of certain values such
as tolerance, etc. It is therefore not surprising that each of the theories may be seen as
strongly advocating certain values rather than others. For example, the argument for
truth is said to be strong in regard to truth-oriented speech, while the democracy
argument is said to be important in the political sphere. The three theories should be
treated as cumulative, thus complementing each other. A monistic theory of speech,
emphasising only one of the values, would fail to do justice to the variety of our
interests in free speech.33
An examination of these rationales reveals that they do not justify an absolute right to
freedom of speech. Although the argument for self-expression as an intrinsic
individual right is said not to be internally limited by its own premises, it appears that
the freedom may be curtailed in the face of evidence which shows that its side-effects
are not acceptable in terms of other values. However, in all the theories, it seems one
may make a strong case for an absolute legal right to participate in certain types of
speech subject to the qualification that such does not cause harm, or at least causes
little harm to the public good.
All the theories portray the right of freedom of speech as more than just a mere
liberty-right against the government. The socio-economic and political imbalances in
the modern state arguably place obligations on governments to take affirmative steps
to promote and ensure the means for the development of knowledge, access to
technology for effective communication and the disclosure of politically relevant
information.
33 There are some conflicts between the theories of free speech, however such an exercise is considered
beyond the concerns of this study, and also given the limited space available, a discussion of the
conflicts between the theories may render this chapter unnecessarily long.
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2.3 Freedom ofSpeech and Freedom ofInformation
In the discussion of the democracy argument above, it has been indicated that freedom
of speech plays a watchdog function by ensuring independent criticism and evaluation
of the established power. For this function to be effectively performed, the public
must be fully informed of the activities of government, hence the conclusion that
freedom of speech as an instrumental social right, converges with the argument for
access to information. Here we look at the nature of the access to information right.
Freedom of information as a fundamental human right began to take shape in the
international environment as early as the first session of the UN General Assembly.
Resolution 59(1) of 14 December 1946 asserted its importance in terms that:
'Freedom of information is a fundamental right and is the touchstone of all the
freedoms which the United Nations is consecrated'.34 The right has been informed by
liberal theory. At the forefront of the liberal justification, is the democratic rationale
that freedom of information will enable the public to find out what its government has
done, and to participate in what it proposes to do.33
There is a debate on the nature of this right, the question being whether the right is or
is n ot a n e lement o f t he c onstitutional r ight t o free s peech. B arendt a rgues t hat, i n
principle, it is difficult to subsume a broad 'right to know' under the free speech
clause because it will be invoked most often where there is no willing speaker. He
regards the right to information as resulting from a mere liberty to receive information
imparted willingly by a speaker.36 He evaluates the claim that freedom of information
is a component of free speech by assuming that consideration of the speaker's interest
should govern the weight of the claim. Such interests seem paramount, although he
acknowledges that recipients' (or the public's) interests are relevant in the case of
information in contradistinction to opinion and ideas. He further argues that
restrictions on the free flow of political information are suspect because they invade
the audiences' interests in having enough material before it to make informed choices
34
For an account of the development of the right, see C.G. Weeramantry, 'Access to Information: A
New Human Right. The Right to Know' (1995) 4 Asian Yearbook of International Law 99.
35 P. Bayne, 'Freedom of Information and Political Free Speech' in Campbell & Sadurski (eds.)
Freedom ofCommunication, n 4 above p. 199.
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and to participate fully in the democratic process. However, he denies that there is a
free speech right to compel the government or anyone to disclose information which it
or he/she wishes to keep secret, arguing that it would be a distortion of a free speech
principle to invoke it where there is no willing speaker at all.
Bayne, on the other hand, argues that freedom of information is an element of the
constitutional right to free speech.38 In response to Barendt's argument, he argues
that, first, if we accept that the claim for freedom of information should be evaluated
in terms of the speaker's interest, it is necessary to ask who, in this context, is the
speaker whose interests are paramount. The person seeking information from the
unwilling party may also be seen as a speaker too, for the seeking of information
precedes the formation of an opinion by the person who seeks the information, and
consequently also of its expression.39 The question then becomes whether the interest
of the speaker who desires to speak prevails over that of the speaker who created the
information. He acknowledges that Barendt's argument has weight where some
person other than the government is the speaker who created the information. Where
government holds the information, he argues that it will be a distortion to consider it
as belonging to the government for information is held, received and imparted by
governments, their departments and agencies to further the public interest.
Bayne further argues that the claim that freedom of information is an element of
freedom of speech need not rely only on the interests of the speaker. One or other
variant of the citizen participation theory of free speech also supports the claim. He
argues that the right to read, to listen, to see, and to otherwise receive
communications, and the right to obtain information as a basis for transmitting ideas
or facts to others, together constitute the reverse side of the coin from the right to
communicate, and that the coin is one piece, namely the system of communication.40
Freedom of infonnation is therefore regarded as an element of the greater right to
freedom of speech. There is evidence of support for this view from commentators on
the First Amendment. Cox argues that the recognition of the right to information in









continue to serve the basic function of keeping the people informed about their
government.41
The UN has argued that freedom of information is not merely a corollary of freedom
of opinion and expression, but a right in and of itself.42 Some countries now give
constitutional recognition to freedom of information as an independent right from
freedom of expression. South Africa is one such country, and the provision in its
constitution that guarantees the right has been said to be a novelty and perhaps gives
rise to a fourth generation right.43
Access to information is important in modern democracies as it provides individuals
with the greatest opportunity for self-development and self-fulfilment.44 Information
is necessary to make sensible or wise judgements. Democracy is said to rest upon the
consent of the governed, and consent is never real unless it is informed consent.
Citizens have a right to participate in the government of their country, and as a result
thereof, they have the right to the information that is necessary to enable them to
make up their mind on matters pertinent to government. Information therefore
enhances the public's ability to participate in the decision making process. The media
normally play an important role in imparting information and thereby informing the
general public of all the events to their interest.
Information is also a safeguard against governmental power. In the words of
Bentham, 'without publicity, no good is permanent, under the auspices ofpublicity no
evil can continue.'45 Information on the elected governors puts them under public
scrutiny and will keep them straight, thus making them more accountable to the
governed.
41 A. Cox, 'Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court' (1980) 94 Harvard Law Review 23.
42 See Report of the UN's Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom
ofOpinion and Expression 1999, Doc.E/CN.4/2000/63 (18th January 2000) para. 42.
43 Davies et al (eds.), Fundamental Rights in the Constitution (Juta & Co Ltd, 1997) p. 147.
44 Cf. A.C. Mason, 'The Relationship Between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information' in
J. Beatson and Y. Cripps (eds.) Freedom ofExpression and Freedom ofInformation: Essays in Honour
ofSir David Williams (Oxford University Press, 2000) 225 at 230.
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J. Bentham, 'On Publicity', Works ofJ. Bentham (1843, ed. J. Bowring) reproduced in P.
Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information, The Law, The Practice and The Ideal, (Butterworths, 1996) p.
19.
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Information to which we apply our faculties of judgement and decision-making is far
from immutable. It is subject to change, historical development or distortion. These
factors make it necessary to lay certain ground rules in the use of information and its
employment in human communication. According to Harbermas,46 the process of
communication between human beings, ofwhich information is an essential, if not
exclusive component, is only possible on the basis that certain ground rules
representing an underlying consensus are accepted. These cover such features as:
assertions are made on the basis that they are believed to be true, or that the facts that
we a llude t o i n o ur speech are c orrect. R ational d iscourse i s p remised upon n orms
such as these. Through discourse, the only form of pressure that is allowed to operate
is t he force o f t he b etter a rgument. W hat d iscourse p resupposes i s a n i deal s peech
situation where all participants must be given the same opportunity to debate and
justify according to reasoned argument without external pressure or domination. He
further argues that all assertions and norms and claims are subjected to examination
and appraisal in discussion.
However, the ideal speech situation in the modern state is frustrated by a number of
factors such as the systematic distortion of communication in order to manipulate
public opinion, misinformation, lack of full information on which to exercise a proper
freedom of choice, economic and political domination, etc. The consumer of
information has a right to a free flow of information, rather than information that is
tainted at its source and selectively channelled to suit the interests of the information
supplier. The media is a powerful influence for good and evil, it can turn a liberty that
was originally meant to save the public from despotism into a form of despotism over
the public.
There are several principles that need to be promoted to ensure an ideal speech
situation in order to keep the media in check thereby ensuring dissemination of
reliable information. These include:47
46
J. Hebermas, Towards a Rational Society (1971), reproduced in Birkinshaw, n 45 above pp. 15 - 16.
47 See Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression 1998, Doc.E/CN.4/1999/64 (January 1999) para. 16.
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(a) A monopoly or excessive concentration of ownership of the media in the
hands of a few is to be avoided in the interest of developing a plurality of
viewpoints and voices;
(b) State-owned media must have a responsibility to report on all aspects of
national life and to provide access to diversity of viewpoints;
(c) State-owned media must not be used as a communication or propaganda
organ for one political party or as an advocate for the government to the
exclusion of all other parties and groups;
(d) Laws g overning the registration of media and allocation of broadcasting
frequencies must be clear and require a balance between competing
interests; and
(e) Any regulatory mechanism, whether for electronic or print media, should
be independent of all political parties and function at an arms-length
relationship to government.
Like freedom of speech, freedom of information is not absolute. The right must be
reconciled with other social interests. There are spheres of our personal and public
lives that are a legitimate object of secrecy. There appears to be consensus in
international legal instruments, at least, that freedom of information may be restricted
to protect national security, law enforcement, individual privacy, commercial secrecy,
40
public safety and the integrity of government decision-making processes.
2.4 Freedom ofSpeech and Media Freedom
In the introduction to this chapter, an observation was made that the general
arguments for freedom of speech discussed above, are also raised in support of media
freedom, which has resulted in the implication that the two freedoms are identical.
This part of the chapter addresses the question whether the tendency of treating the
two freedoms as the same is correct. In tackling the issue, an attempt is made to
ascertain the nature of media freedom and assessment is made of the extent to which
the general arguments for freedom of speech are relevant to media freedom.
48
See, Article 19(3) - ICCPR; Article 13(2) - ACHR; and Article 10(2) - ECHR.
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In the USA, where the First Amendment to its constitution guarantees freedom of
speech and freedom of the press in the same provision, the two concepts are accorded
distinct meanings. It has been argued that if the free press guarantee meant no more
than freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy.49 Further support
for the view that the two freedoms are not the same is also seen in the arguments that
see the media as a fourth estate, i.e., the constitutional guarantee of a free press was to
create a fourth institution outside government as an additional check on the three
official branches of government.50
In Britain courts tend to treat freedom of speech and freedom of the press
indiscriminately or as interchangeable terms.51 Dicey, whose works are very
influential in the UK, regarded the identical treatment of freedoms of speech and the
52
press as a matter of constitutional principle. English law did not recognise any
special body of press law and therefore press freedom was 'no more than the right to
publish in a newspaper what one could scribble on a gate'.53 Press freedom was
simply the right of proprietors and editors to speak freely in their newspapers - a
particular exercise of a generally held right.54
The traditional view, which treats freedom of speech and media freedom as identical,
is based on an assumption concerning the character and scope of freedom of speech.
The assumption is that freedom of speech is entirely concerned with individual rights
of expression and that these must be protected against government intervention.
Media freedom is seen simply as the right of proprietors and editors to speak freely in
their newspaper or the right of broadcasters to air their views. The traditional view is
however flawed. Firstly, the traditional approach fail to appreciate that the modern
press consists largely of vast and complex institutions that differ in essential respects
both from individuals and from the early press, around which the concept of freedom
49
P. Stewart, 'Or of the Press' (1975) 26 Hastings Law Journal 631 at 633-4.
50 Ibid.
51 See for example, Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (No.2) [1990] AC 109.
32 A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 1961) at 246 -
247. See also E. Barendt, 'Press and Broadcasting Freedom: Does Anyone Have Any Rights to Free
Speech?' [1991] 42 Current Legal Problems 63.
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54 Cf. Channing Arnold v Emperor [ 1914] AC 116 at 117.
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of the press grew.55 Secondly, considerations internal to the theory of free speech
itself may provide reasons for treating media freedom differently from freedom of
speech. The contemporary mass media may suppress information and stifle ideas
rather than promote them. As has been observed by one commentator, the media in
their modern incarnation, mass media in mass society, works not only to enhance the
flow of ideas and information but also to inhibit it. Nothing guarantees that all
valuable information, ideas, theories, explanations and points of view will find
expression in the public fora. Which views get covered, and in what way depends on
the economic and political structure and context of press institutions, and on the
characteristics of the media themselves.56
Some of the factors that characterise the modern media and impact on news and
information dissemination are:
(i) Increasingly, contemporary news organisations belong to large
corporations whose interests influence what gets covered and how;
(ii) News organisations are driven economically to capture the largest
possible audience, and thus not to alienate their readers, viewers or
listeners, coverage that is too controversial, demanding or too
disturbing will be avoided;
(iii) The media are easily manipulated by government officials and others
for whom the press can become a simple mouthpiece by reporting
unfiltered press releases and official statements; and,
(iv) Characteristics of the media themselves constrain or influence
coverage, for example, television is said to lend itself to action-
oriented, unanalytical treatment of events that can distort their meaning
or importance.57
If the media tends to suppress diversity and impoverish public debate, the arguments
meant to support media freedom turn against it. Lichtenberg therefore argues that,
55 G. Marshall, 'Press Freedom and Free Speech Theory' (1992) Public Law 40 at 49.
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unlike freedom of speech, to certain aspects of which our commitment must be
virtually unconditional, freedom of the press should be contingent on the degree to
which it promotes certain values at the core of our interest in freedom of expression
generally.58 The argument sees media freedom as an instrumental good. Barendt
supports this view, arguing that media freedom is valued because it fosters free speech
by providing fora for vigorous and uninhibited public debate.59 Media freedom is
therefore seen as a derivative or instrumental freedom, subordinate to the more
fundamental right to freedom of speech.
I now turn to the issue of the relevance of theories of freedom of speech to media
freedom in the light of the observation that the same arguments are usually raised in
support of both freedoms. It is submitted that while arguments for media freedom are
arguments for a m ore general freedom o f s peech, i t d oes n ot follow t hat w hatever
supports the latter also supports the former freedom. The arguments that support
freedom of speech for individuals or for small publications do not necessarily support
similar freedoms for the mass media. For example, theories of self-fulfilment and
personal development which focus on the interests of the speaker are irrelevant to
national newspapers and journals, though they may play some role in supporting the
rights of smaller publications. It has been observed that nowadays many media outlets
largely distribute the speech of others, r ather than communicate their own ideas or
information.60 Mill's argument for truth is also not particularly pertinent to
newspapers. The manner in which the modern press covers news is more likely to be
influenced by certain considerations such as, pursuing particular political agendas and
manipulating material for commercial reasons. The problem is further compounded
by the emergence of monopolies and oligopolies in media ownership with the result
that a few players dominate the media. Monopolies and oligopolies threaten diversity
in the expression of views and opinions.
The democracy argument may suggest that the press should be given special status
and rights in view of its responsibility to keep the public informed. Thus freedom of
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opinions, but may also entail certain duties of investigation, and rights of access to
public institutions.61 In some cases it may be legitimate for practical reasons to extend
certain privileges to the media that would not be extended to individuals. For
example, access to some government institutions like prisons and courts of law. In
some instances it may be impossible to allow access by individuals to these
institutions, but the media may be allowed access on behalf of the public because they
are in a better position to communicate the information to the public.
Another objection to the traditional view of media freedom as simply the application
to the media of individual free speech rights relates to the question of whose rights of
speech are protected? Is it the individual journalist's, the editor's or the proprietor's?
There is here a likelihood of right claims to free speech conflicting, for example, does
a newspaper editor enjoy immunity from dismissal for writing articles that the
proprietor does not like? To avoid such potential conflicts, it is argued that media
freedom should be seen as an institutional right, rather than a set of individual free
speech rights. What is crucial is that newspapers are free to foster the values of free
speech not who exercises rights in this context.62
From the discussion of the nature of media freedom and its relationship with freedom
of speech, we can draw the following conclusions:
a) Media freedom is not identical with freedom of speech. Although
the arguments for media freedom also support a more general
freedom o f expression, i t d oes n ot follow t hat w hatever s upports
freedom of speech also supports media freedom. In some cases it
will be in the interest of the greater freedom of speech to curtail
media freedom. And the character of the modem press is different
from the early press around which the concept of media freedom
grew;
b) Not all theories of free speech, especially those focusing on the
interests of the speaker are that relevant to the media or sections of
the media; and,
61
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c) Media freedom is an instrumental good and its exercise must
promote the goals of free speech, i.e., having an informed
democracy a nd u nhindered d iscussion o f a v ariety o f v iews. T he
protection of media freedom therefore should be contingent on the
degree tow hich i t p romotes v alues at t he core of o ur i nterest i n
freedom of speech.
In tenns of the relationship between media freedom and freedom of speech discussed
above, the ideal media in a democratic society will be those that serve the democratic
expectations o n w hich freedom o f s peech i s p remised. C ommunications m edia c an
facilitate the objectives identified in the arguments from truth, self-fulfilment and
democracy. The media exercise great power in our lives for we rely to a large extent
on both the broadcast and print media as communicators of politics, culture and
information. The argument from truth rest on a faith in the efficacy of a competitive
market in speech or ideas, while the argument from self-fulfilment requires that
people must be free to formulate beliefs and political attitudes through discussion and
criticism. And the argument from democracy rest on the belief that people must be
able to understand political issues so that they can participate effectively as cfrizers
within the process of democracy. All three theories share an underlying belief in the
value of allowing individuals and groups to have access to a wide range of
information, a role that the media in modern democratic societies is expected to fulfil.
The media also plays a vital part in support of democracy by acting as a
counterbalance or watchdog to the state, facilitating the calling to account of
government.
2.4.1 Justifying Regulation of the Media
We have seen that media freedom is expected to foster the values of freedom of
expression by disseminating a diverse range of views and opinions. Diversity of
media product is viewed as a function of a well-informed public equipped to
participate effectively in society, or as a function of a citizenry endowed with a
36
maximum of choice as an end in itself.63 It has, however, been observed above that
features that characterise the modern mass media tend to suppress diversity and
thereby impoverish public debate. The constraints within the media market that tend
to compromise diversity are therefore used as justification for the regulation of the
media i n o rder toe nsure t hat t he m edia fulfll t heir d emocratic m andate. T here are
arguably four distinct rationales for the regulation of the media.64
The first rationale relates to social regulation of content, i.e., certain categories of
speech are prohibited for fear of individual or social damage. Programmes which are
considered obscene, racist, an affront to religious sensitivities or likely to damage
children are generally prohibited. The type of regulation involved here also extends to
restrictions on television advertising.65
Secondly, regulation for competition. There are two aspects to this form of regulation,
structural and behavioural. Structural regulation focuses on the corporate structure,
seeking to avoid the anti-competitive consequences of media markets being
dominated by one or a few major players. Behavioural regulation on the other hand,
aims at limiting how property can be used in relation to its impact on actual or
potential competitors, i.e., it seeks to prohibit market distorting practices or abuse of a
dominant position.66
Thirdly, regulation is also necessary to ensure plurality and diversity in the media on
democratic grounds. The argument has particular importance in the context of news
and current affairs, attempting to secure that different political and social viewpoints
are fully represented. It is also applied across programming as a whole in order to
ensure that such programming covers a range of interests r ather than offering only
content which is cheap to produce or designed to appeal only to audiences most likely
to attract advertising. This is referred to as 'internal pluralism', and is normally
regulated for by imposition of programme requirements into broadcasting licences
such as political impartiality and balance. Closely related to internal pluralism, is
63 M. Feintuck, Media Regulation, Public Interest and the Law (Edinburgh University Press, 1999) p.
64.
64 See D. Goldberg et al. (eds.) Regulating the Changing Media: A Comparative Study (Clarendon
Press, 1998) chapter 1.
65 R. Craufurd Smith, Broadcasting Law and Fundamental Rights (Clarendon Press, 1997) p. 220.
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'external pluralism', which is concerned not with the content of a particular service,
but with the maintenance of a range of different services.67 External pluralism is
related to the competition goals of regulation in that it is used to justify controls on
concentration of ownership.
And fourthly, in modern democratic societies, the enjoyment of the right to freedom
of expression and information depends heavily upon access to the mass media.
Attempts should therefore be made to provide media services to all members of the
society to avoid a society divided between 'information haves' and 'information have
nots' resulting in social division. Thus regulation may be required to ensure universal
access to media services by the citizens. Regulation here may aim at ensuring an
extensive geographical coverage by the media and may also include 'must carry' rules
under which new forms of delivery, such as cable or digital broadcasting, must
provide viewers with access to public service channels as part of the service. It also
relates to the question of allocation and management of spectrum resources, especially
in broadcasting, to ensure order in the industry and representation of a wide range of
interests and groups in the society.
Of the above four rationales for regulating the media, the last three are pertinent to the
media's role in a democratic society. A regulatory regime pursuing these rationales
should be able to prevent monopolies in media ownership, thus ensuring a plurality of
voices and at the same time giving access to media services to a majority of the
citizens. Regulating for internal pluralism should arguably provide choice in terms of
product, political viewpoint and cultural diversity.
Regulation of the media is, however, criticised by libertarians who believe in the
efficacy of the market forces to respond to the wishes of individuals and provide a
range of products that they wish for. Market liberals argue that a genuine
communications market requires, at a minimum, that consuming individuals be able
to effectively and directly register their preferences, and that producers willing and
able to finance their costs of production should have effective freedom of entry into
67
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the market-place.68 This, they argue, will result in diversity of views, ideas and
information. However, contrary to the liberal market theory, it has been observed that
media markets appear to show a peculiar predisposition towards monopoly or
oligopoly, increasing in size and global reach.69 If commercial imperatives drive the
media to a monopoly or near monopoly of control, this may result in a restricted range
of information or views being made available. Further, it has also been observed that
unrestricted c ompetition d oes n ot n ecessarily e nsure freedom o f e ntry o f p roducers
into the market place. Markets are often non-contestable because the levels of
investment required to enter the market are too high or risky due to an existing
70
stranglehold by companies that have already 'creamed off the market potential.
Opponents of the market liberals further point to the failure by the latter to appreciate
the constraints within the media market itself that tend to compromise diversity even
if t here m ay b e d iversity i n t he o wnership o fm edia o utlets. T he a rgument follows
from the observation that globalisation of the media has also resulted in
commercialism, and with it, the resulting centrality of advertising. Media markets
have shifted the definition of information from that of a public good to that of a
privately appropriable commodity.71
The m arket failure a rgument i s t aken further b y F iss, w ho s tarts b y o bserving t hat
public debate is dominated by television networks and a number of large newspapers
and magazines, and that the competition among these institutions is far from perfect.
He argues that a market, even one working perfectly, is itself a structure of constraint.
A fully competitive market might produce a diversity of programmes, but it will be
79
the diversity of 'a pack going essentially in one direction'. In his opinion, the market
constrains the publication of public interest content in two ways.
Firstly, the market privileges select groups by making programmes, journals and
newspapers especially responsive to their needs and desires. One such group consists
of t hose w ho h ave t he c apital t o a cquire o r o wn a t elevision s tation, n ewspaper o r
68 J. Keane, The Media and Democracy (Polity Press, 1991) p. 68.
69
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journal, another consists of those who control the advertising budgets of various
businesses, and a third group consists of those who are most able and most likely to
respond enthusiastically to advertising. Although market liberals claim that the market
maximises individual freedom of choice, this is doubtful. In an unrestricted market
competition in fact tends to work strongly against the choices of certain citizens,
especially the poor and minorities. It produces a growing division between the
relatively information rich and information poor. Citizens with stable employment
and high disposable income can better afford and better access space and time in the
media. They can also better access new communications gadgets, products and
services. Furthermore, media owners know that when they compete for audiences, the
best way to maximise their audience share is to jostle for the heartland of viewers by
offering mass appeal programmes. This leads to insufficient diversity in programming
which fails to cater for the needs of some sections of the society, especially
minorities.
Secondly, t he m arket b rings t o b ear one ditorial a nd p rogramming d ecision factors
that might have a good deal to do with profitability or allocative efficiency, but little
to d o w ith t he d emocratic n eeds o f t he e lectorate. T he c osts o f p reduction a nd t he
revenue likely to be generated are highly pertinent factors in determining what shows
to run and when. There is no necessary relationship between making a profit or
allocating resources efficiently and supplying the electorate with information they
need in order to make free and intelligent choices about government policy.
Fiss concludes by arguing that the market may be splendid for some purposes but not
for others, especially the media. He therefore sees state intervention in the form of
regulation as inevitable, as a measure to counteract the skew of public debate
attributable to the market, and thus to preserve the essential conditions of
7->
democracy.
Bollinger introduces yet another dimension to the argument. He argues that
libertarians proceed from an erroneous premise that the only rationale for public




having public regulation of the media as long as the total number of actual or potential
outlets in the media rises above a certain threshold. In his view, regulation of the
media is justified by the risks associated with power over access to the market place.
Power here being the ability to command an audience more or less exclusively. To
this, he adds the point that we should also be concerned with the nature, or character
of our own behaviour in the discussion of public questions, a concern with the nature
of our demands in the market. He identifies in humankind troublesome tendencies to
jump to conclusions from partial evidence without waiting to hear or read the other
side, to want to hear only what we are predisposed to believe, and to shelter from our
attention ideas and opinions that differ from and challenge our own political values.
Such tendencies, he concludes, have bad effects for society, not just in yielding
misinformed and closed-minded citizens, but also creating subgroups within society
that feel alienated and excluded.74
In the light of what he identifies as the troublesome tendencies in human beings
alluded to above, Bollinger argues that the public may be concerned about how they
are behaving and about what choices they are making in the society. The public may
therefore accordingly decide together, through public regulation, what they would like
and to alter or modify the demands that they find themselves making in the market.
We have seen that the argument for democracy requires well informed citizens to
make intelligent choices, so even if citizens may have the opportunity to acquire all
relevant points of view, in the absence of agreed-upon structures or methods for
deciding questions, they may very well end up with poorer decisions than they would
otherwise have.75
Regulation of the media is thus justified by the threats to the values of freedom of
speech. T he 1 ibertarians' c ase against r egulation i s w eakened, a s w e h ave s een, b y
evidence that shows that modem media markets restrict freedom of speech by
generating barriers to entry, monopolies and restrictions upon choice.76 The media are
regulated in almost all countries in the world to ensure that they perform their
democratic mandate effectively. Regulation usually involves the state and it varies
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from direct government control to powerful state authorised agencies. Market liberals
however oppose state intervention in the form of regulation of the media, except that
relating to competition, arguing that such intervention stifles rather than promote the
ideals of freedom of speech. They believe in the efficacy of market forces or self-
regulation within the industry by the market players themselves. As regards the first
option, it is not viable due to the market failures discussed above. The second option
has also been criticised as a breeding ground for unaccountable exercise of power.77
It has been observed that during the twentieth century, networks of private sector
organisations performing functions for government through negotiations, grants and
contracts have become commonplace. A substantial number of decisions of public
consequence are taken, not by executives, or through legislation or markets, but by
bargains struck between these civil society groups and the state itself. The
intertwining of state and civil society has allowed the growth of 'corporatism', or
'government by moonlight', in which government and powerful private entities reach
accommodations and symbiotic relationships in a secret world, hidden from public
scrutiny and outside the scope of traditional mechanisms of accountability. The
withdrawal of the state from regulatory roles in favour of these groups of civil society
is therefore seen as a replacement of public, overt regulatory activity by hidden,
unaccountable coiporatist influence, and the secret furthering of symbiotic interests
78
by government and media establishment.
State regulation of the media is therefore justified on the ground that government
employees are subject to a different set of constraints from those who run the media.
Public officials are supposed to be accountable.79 Critics of state regulation insist that
the state will also become a victim of the same forces that dominate media markets. It
is however arguable to the contrary, that elements of independence possessed by the
state are real and substantial.80 Although the state may not be wholly independent of
the forces that dominate media markets, some agencies of the state are more
independent of these market forces than others and can be allocated more power to
monitor the regulatory process. The courts, for example, although not wholly
77
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independent from the same forces that shape and dominate our social life, are likely to
achieve a greater measure of independence from particularised political pressure or
social demands than the legislature or administrative agencies. Judges are subject to
well-established professional norms and are required to justify their decisions publicly
on the basis of principle.
2.4.2 The Double Standard in the Regulation of the Media
The arguments advanced to justify regulation of the media apply to the media in
general. However, in practice, radio and television are subjected to a significantly
greater degree of regulation than that applied to newspapers. Broadcasters are
normally required to be impartial and cover news and some serious programmes,
whereas the print media is free to publish what it wants, subject only to the constraints
O 1
of the criminal and civil law. The basis for this double standard in the regulation of
the media has been a subject of vigorous debate in academic literature.
Four arguments are generally advanced for the strict regulation of the broadcast
media. Firstly, it is said that airwaves are a public resource and that governments are
entitled to license their use on terms they see fit. Secondly, regulation is also justified
by the scarcity of broadcast frequencies. Since it is not possible for everyone to
acquire licences to broadcast, governments may reasonably require licensees to share
their privilege with other representative members of the public. Licensees may be
compelled to present a balanced range of programmes in the interests of listeners and
viewers. Thirdly, regulation of broadcasting is also justified on the basis of its
character. Television and radio are said to be more influential on public opinion, as
they intrude into the home, are more pervasive, and are more difficult to control than
the print media. And fourthly, the double standard in regulation of the media has
further been justified on the ground that society is entitled to remedy the deficiencies
of an unregulated press with a regulated broadcast system. It is further argued that
since regulation poses danger of government control, the risk is reduced if one branch
82of the media is left free.
81 See E. Barendt, Broadcasting Law (Clarendon Press, 1993) p. 4.
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The arguments for the strict regulation of the broadcast media have been criticised.
In relation to the first argument, it is said not to be convincing for it infers that it is
right for a government to regulate broadcasting from the fact it has the opportunity to
do so. It would also presumably be possible for a government on this basis to allocate
frequencies without programme conditions by means of a competitive tender and
allow their resale by the purchaser. The scarcity argument is also rejected on the basis
that it has been overtaken by events, the advent of cable and satellite and digital
broadcasting has significantly increased the number or potentially available channels.
Regarding the third argument, it has been noted that broadcasting does not intrude in
the home unless listeners and viewers want it to. And further that, from the point of
view of constitutional principle, it is not easy to justify the imposition of greater limits
on the audiovisual medium on the ground that it is more influential than the written
word. And finally, the fourth argument, like the other three, is dismissed as lacking
coherence as it attempts to justify the unequal treatment of the liberties of
broadcasters and print editors, when in all material respects, their position is identical.
It will therefore appear that there is no convincing explanation for the regulation of
the broadcast media in contrast to the liberal regime enjoyed by the print media.
It seems that regulation of broadcasting is largely contingent upon historical
circumstances rather than resting upon clearly defined principles. Craufurd Smith
observes that in Britain and continental Europe, regulatory choices had little to do
with elevated issues of human rights or fundamental freedoms, but were motivated
more by a desire to further the national electronics industry, or by concerns over
OA
radio's social and political influence. She further notes that by the inception of
regular radio broadcasting in the early 1920's, the other form ofmass communication,
the newspaper, was emerging in many countries after the battles of the nineteenth
century, free from the worst excesses of enforced government censorship. By the time
radio broadcasting became a reality, the 'free press' model was being dismissed in
established circles as pandering to vulgar tastes and sensationalist comment.
Politicians were therefore increasingly anxious to exert at the very least a degree of
85control over the new mass media. The new media had played an important role as a
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propaganda tool during World War II, and governments realised just how influential
the new media were and thus were reluctant to leave them in the hands of free
enterprise.
The dichotomy in the regulation of the media does not rest upon any constitutionally
recognised principle. Media freedom is an instrumental good and its exercise must
promote the ideals of the greater freedom of speech. Regulation is justified only to the
extent that it enables the media to play their role effectively. Threats to the media's
role affect all sections of the media, so that if regulation is thought necessary at all,
then it must apply to all media indiscriminately. The maintenance of the double
standard in the regulation of the media is also weakened by the results of the
technological revolution that is going on, resulting in the convergence of
telecommunications, media and information technology. Convergence calls into
question the traditional approach to broadcasting regulation because convergence
opens up scope for regulatory by-pass; for example, one can download a television
programme or look at a newspaper via the Internet.
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PART II
OVERVIEW OF THE MEDIA AND PROTECTION OF
MEDIA FREEDOM
CHAPTER 3
OVERVIEW OF THE NEWS MEDIA IN BOTSWANA AND SOUTH AFRICA
3.1 Introduction
In t his c hapter, I p rovide a b rief i ntroduction t o t he m edia i n B otswana a nd S outh
Africa, setting out the available media sources and the interests or sectors that such
sources cater for. This is done by way of giving a profile of the mainstream media in
the two states. The chapter also addresses the question of accessibility of the available
services to the general public. Finally, I look at some political and economic factors
that impact on the enjoyment of media freedom in the two countries. The chapter
consequently sets the scene for the more detailed examination of key regulatory issues
that follows.
3.2 Profile ofthe Mainstream Media in Botswana
3.2.1 Prin tMedia
One of the most striking features about the press in Botswana is its brief history and
small size. At the beginning of the year 2003, they were about nine newspaper titles in
circulation.1 The main reason for the small scale of the press in the country is
demographic. Botswana has a population of approximately 1.6 million and one of the
lowest population densities in the world, ranging between 1.6 and 3.1 persons per
kilometre. Given the population of the country, the nation has difficulty in sustaining
a national media network of scale. The easy access to both print and broadcast media
from neighbouring South Africa and Zimbabwe has also acted as an impediment to
the development ofBotswana media. Media audiences in Botswana seem to like these
1 See Table 1 for full details of the mainstream newspapers.
2 National Development Plan 8 1997/98 - 2002/2003 (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning,
1997) pp. 10-11.
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foreign media, for they consider these to be more sophisticated in terms of content and
presentation than the local media.3
The state owned Daily News is the oldest publication in circulation in the country. It
was founded in 1965 by the British Protectorate administration as the Bechuanaland
Daily News. It changed its name to the Daily News at independence in 1966. The
paper is published by the Department of Information and Broadcasting (DIB), which
is controlled by the ministry of Communications, Science and Technology. Prior to
the establishment of this ministry in 2002, DIB was controlled by the ministry of
Presidential Affairs and Public Administration in the Office of the President. The
main objective of the Daily News is to inform and educate Batswana on government
policies and development programmes. It supplies government with feedback from
the communities and districts on how policies and development programmes are being
received.4 The paper reports mostly on development issues such as agriculture,
economics, education, environment, health and national and rural developments. The
Daily News is published in English and Setswana, and targets both rural and urban
audiences.5
Although the government of independent Botswana did not hinder the development of
a private press, it was not until the 1980's that one emerged. First on the scene was the
Guardian in 1982, followed by Mmegi/The Reporter and Gazette in 1984 and 1985,
respectively. The owners of the Guardian launched another publication, the Midweek
Sun in 1990 and the owners of Mmegi followed suit with Mmegi Monitor in 2000.
Three more titles were launched in the 1990's, The Voice (1993), Mirror (1997) and
Sunday Tribune (2001).
All the independent titles appear in a tabloid form. In terms of content, their coverage
concentrates on politics, business, economics, sports and entertainment. T he papers
also provide coverage of cultural and educational events.6 The Midweek Sun is an
exception, its target audience is the youth and it focuses largely on entertainment. The
3 A.P.N. Thapisa & E. Megwa, Situation Analysis and Profile ofMass Communications in Botswana.
(A Consultancy Report prepared for the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1998) p. 8.
4
Ibid., pp. 13 - 14.
5 Interview with the editor, L. Leshaga (Gaborone, 12th October 2001).
6
Thapisa & Megwa, n 3 above pp. 11-12.
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other publications are directed at the educated adult urban audience. Save for Mmegi,
all the papers publish in English. Mmegi carries an insert in Setswana and Ikalanga,
the two most widely spoken indigenous languages. In 2002 a bi-weekly Setswana
newspaper called Mokgosi was launched. The content of this paper is similar to that
provided by the other newspapers.
Since its emergence, the private press has provided a necessary alternative voice in a
set-up generally dominated by the government. Before that, public opinion was
inevitably largely shaped by official information disseminated by the state owned
media.7
It is estimated that local press circulation in the country amounts to around 192 830
copies, which translates to about 10% of the total population. The Daily News
accounts for one third of this figure. The Daily News is the only daily in the country
with a circulation figure of about 65 000 copies a day. The largest circulating weekly
is Mmegi, with a circulation figure of 27 000 copies. The Guardian and Gazette,
closely followed by the Midweek Sun, have circulation figures of 21 000, 20 000 and
19 000 copies respectively. The size of Botswana, its small and sparsely distributed
population makes the distribution of newspapers throughout the country uneconomic.
More than 60% of the population live in urban, semi-urban and large villages. Most
newspapers therefore target these areas and English-reading audiences.9 These are
located mainly in the eastern part of the country. The circulation of the Daily News,
Gazette and Mmegi has been increased through the use of the Internet.
3.2.2 BroadcastMedia
The history of the broadcast media in Botswana is dominated by state owned
broadcasters. In radio, the state owned Radio Botswana enjoyed an absolute
monopoly from independence till 1998 when two commercial radio broadcasters were
7
S.T. Sechele, 'The Role of the Press in Independent Botswana' in W.A. Edge & M.H. Lekorwe (eds.)
Botswana: Politics and Society (J.L. Van Schaik Publishers, 1998) 412 at 415.
8
Thapisa & Megwa, n 3 above p. 11.
9 S.T. Sechele, 'Deepening Democracy or Creeping Authoritarian Rule? Media-Government Relations
in Botswana in Historical Perspectives' (Unpublished Master of Public Administration dissertation,
University ofBotswana, June 2000) p. 97.
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granted licences. The only national television station in the country, Botswana
Television (Btv), is also owned by the state.
Radio Botswana started as a pilot project in 1965 known as Radio Bechuanaland. It
was used by the British Protectorate administration to prepare Botswana for self-
government just before independence.10 After independence, Radio Bechuanaland
became Radio Botswana (RB). RB, together with the Daily News and Btv, are
controlled by the DIB. The bulk of RB's post-independence programming is geared
towards educating people and informing them of government policies and activities.
Programme content is largely made up of contributions from various government
ministries and parastatals."
RB has two channels, RBI, a public service channel and RB2, a semi-commercial
channel. RBI offers educational and informational programming targeted at
educational institutions, particularly primary and secondary schools and development
programmes for the rural audience. A large part of this programming is geared
12 •towards agriculture, health and environmental protection. RBI broadcasts m English
and Setswana. About 36.9% of its programme content per week is devoted to news
and current affairs, 30.1% on educational issues, 25.2% to light entertainment
broadcasts and the remaining 4.9% to cultural issues.13 RB2 is fundamentally an
entertainment channel. It was introduced in 1992 following pressure from the business
sector, which wanted to advertise on radio.14 RB2 was also intended to cater for the
demands of an expanding youthful audience as RB1 was concentrating on
development programmes, which left out the youth.13 RB2 broadcasts in English and
Setswana.
Broadcast signals for RB are accessible to 80% of the population terrestrially through
FM and SW frequency bands. Only the south-western parts of the country still have
10
Draft Performance Management System (PMS) Strategic Plan 2001 - 2010 (Department of
Information and Broadcasting, May 2001) p. 9.
" Interview with B. Segwe and M. Gabakgore, Chief Broadcasting Officers (Gaborone, 10th October
2001).
12
Thapisa & Megwa, n 3 above p. 27.
13 Ibid.
14 See 'RB2 Celebrates 10 Years in Style' Daily News, 5th April 2002.
15 Ibid.
50
no access to these services.16 RB is also accessible to the whole country via satellite.
However, it is estimated that only 66.6% of the total population has access to a
17radio.
The monopoly that RB had been enjoying since independence came to an end in 1998
when the first commercial radio station was granted a licence. Ya Ronci FM, owned by
Copacabana Investments (Pty) Ltd, started operations on 22nd August 1999. The
station hosts mainly talk shows and devotes 36 minutes per day of its broadcasting
1R • •
time to news and current affairs. The station's targeted audience is the youth and it
broadcasts in English and Setswana. It broadcasts from the capital city, Gaborone, and
covers a radius of 50 kilometres. It is estimated that the station has an audience of
between 150 000 - 250 000 per day.19
Gabz FM, owned by Your Friend (Pty) Ltd, was the second commercial radio station
to be granted a licence and it began its operations in November 1999. The station's
targeted audience is the urban upmarket adult.20 Its broadcasts are predominantly in
English. Like Ya Rona FM, it also broadcasts from the capital city and covers an 80
kilometres radius from the city.
The only national television station in the country is the state-owned Btv, which was
launched in July 2000. The television service is intended to compliment the mandate
of both the Daily News and RB. At the time of writing, the organisational structure of
the service was still being worked out. However, the station provides news and
current affairs and entertainment programmes for the nation. It also provides
advertising facilities for the business sector.21 The current geographic coverage of the
service i s 4 0% t errestrial (the u rbanised e astern part o f t he c ountry) a nd 1 00% v ia
satellite.22 By the end of the year 2000, a mere 21.1% of the population had access to
a television set.
16 Interview with Chief Broadcasting Officers, nil above.
17
Botswana Multiple Indicator Survey 2000 (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 2001).
18 Interview with the Station Manager, Percy Raditladi (Gaborone, 7th October 2001).
19 Ibid.
20 Interview with radio station's news editor, G. Segwati (Gaborone, 13th October 2001).
21
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3.2.3 Political and Economic Factors that Impact on Media Freedom
In 1988 it was observed that Botswana provided a fairly secure environment for media
freedom 'that can only exist in an open democratic society, which does not believe in
imposing controls on the media or in abridging the right of freedom of information ',24
Despite some occasional harsh criticisms of the media by leading politicians, a form
of co-existence between the government and media seems to have been achieved. The
main constraint on media freedom, especially the private media, was not political but
financial.25 A few years later Zaffiro warned that while necessary conditions for
media freedom existed in the country, it was too early to celebrate its
institutionalisation. Until important social, economic and political traditions were
present in sufficient force, including a national, economically viable private press, he
suggested that media freedom would remain a precarious thing.26 Ten years later, it
appears that economic factors are still the greatest threat to media freedom, even
though of late there has been a growing tension in the relations of the government and
the media.
Since their establishment, the private media have adopted the role widely expected of
them, serving as a power bloc operating against other blocs, by influencing the
formulation of public policy and by acting as a mirror of Botswana society
27
independently from government. It is probably in its watchdog role that the media in
the country has distinguished itself. The role of the private media in this regard is well
articulated by the editor of the Guardian:
"The media in Botswana is the last line ofdefence against excesses committed
by government, non-governmental organisations and the business community.
Botswana, while not a one party state, is a one party dominant state. The
political opposition is fragmented and weak. The Parliamentary watchdog
role h as b een e roded by t he o verwhelming m ajority ofthe r uling B otswana
Democratic Party members of Parliament in the House, the civil society is
small and still developing andplaces more of the watchdog role on the media,
24 S. Grant & B. Egner, 'The Private Press and Democracy' in J. Holm & P. Molutsi (eds.) Democracy
in Botswana: Proceedings ofa Symposium held in Gaborone (Macmillan Botswana Publishing Co,
1989) 247 at 260.
25 Ibid.
36 J. Zaffiro, From Police Network to Station of the Nation: A Political Histoiy ofBroadcasting in
Botswana 1927 - 1991 (Botswana Society, 1991) p. 96.
27
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than would generally be. the case with societies with more developed
>> 28
institutions .
The private media resorts to investigative journalism in the performance of its
watchdog role. It has over the years exposed corruption in government,
mismanagement, human rights abuses and other miscarriages of justice. A classic
example was the revelation by the Gazette in 1994 that the then president and almost
half his cabinet, were owing millions of Pula in loan arrears to the National
29
Development Bank (NDB) which was on the verge of bankruptcy. Barely a week
after the revelations, the president paid up his arrears.30 Some of the reports carried
by the media have resulted in the appointment of presidential commissions of enquiry,
which were eventually helpful in bringing culprits to book for their misdeeds and in,
31
some cases cabinet ministers were even forced to resign.
The state owned media, in particular RB and the Daily News, have also enjoyed some
freedom to criticise government policies, furnishing airtime and coverage to members
of functioning opposition parties. In addition, they have served the needs of rural
32audiences with programmes and information in tune with their real life problems."
Rifts between the media and government began to surface in the late 1980's.
Politicians in the ruling party started making calls for legislation to control the
media.33 In the wake of the NDB scandal, one minister, in reference to the private
press, warned: "We are breeding and nurturing a monster that threatens to gobble us
as a nation... "34 This was understood by the press to mean that the government had to
take steps to 1 imit media freedom.35 At about the s ame time, government b egan to
publicly admonish state owned media for engaging in investigative journalism and for
criticising government policies. Government journalists were warned that RB and the
28 Outsa Mokone, Guardian, 7th January 2000, p. 4.
29
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"'4 Dr G. Chiepe, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, quoted in M. Leepile, 'The Contribution of the
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Daily News could not be allowed to operate like the private media since they were
vehicles through which the government of the day communicates with the people that
brought it to power.36 The government's position is that official media purveys
official information. Civil servants who work for the state owned media are controlled
by civil service conventions, which restrict their freedom to report news because they
are expected to toe the official line in their reportage.37
Despite calls for regulation, the government did not take any formal steps to regulate
the media. However, it became extremely difficult for the media to access information
from government d epartments and ministries. The fall-out b etween the government
and media coincided with a deteriorating security situation in the region. The
government of the then apartheid South Africa was sending its army commandos to
raid neighbouring states which were suspected of harbouring anti-apartheid activists.
One such raid was carried out on Gaborone on 14th June 1985. The editor of the
Guardian, who was a South African refugee, was deported shortly thereafter under
•jo
the Immigration Act. At the time of his deportation, he had asked the commander of
the national army to explain why the country's defence force personnel had stood off
during the raid, and on the entry and departure points used by the South African
commandos.39
The period between 1986 - 1990 saw a further four South African refugee journalists
deported from Botswana under the same legislation. It is widely believed that the real
reasons behind the deportations were that the government felt that the journalists were
too critical of its foreign policy regarding apartheid South Africa, and also that they
were too inquisitive into what government perceived to be national security matters.40
The government and its officials have shown themselves to be highly sensitive to
critical reportage and vibrant inquiry into public policy by the media. And this has
lead to a c ulture where g overnment officials arrogantly refuse to answer legitimate
36
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37 See C. M. Fombad, 'The Protection of Freedom of Expression in the Public Service Media in
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questions from the press or ask for questionnaires, which are normally not responded
to until the paper has gone to press.41
The long anticipated move to control the media finally arrived in 1997 when the
government published a Mass Communications Media Bill. The Bill sought inter alia
to establish a broadcasting board, newspaper registration, accreditation of journalists
and a press council. Each of these bodies was to be appointed and managed by the
government through the minister responsible for broadcasting and information.42 The
government was however forced to withdraw the controversial Bill after national and
international protests. An agreement was reached with media stakeholders whereby
government proceeded to enact legislation relating to broadcasting, while the
provisions relating to the press were shelved.43 On 30th November 2001, the
government published a 'new' Mass Communications Media Bill. The Bill, save for
the broadcasting section, is exactly the same as the one that was rejected by the media
a few years ago.44 At the time ofwriting, the Bill was still to come before Parliament
amidst protests from the media and civil society organisations.
If the Mass Communications Bill is eventually passed into law, it will add to the
number of statutory enactments that limit media freedom already on the statute books.
Most of the current statutory limits to media freedom relate to national security and
sedition. In addition to these statutory enactments, there are also common law rules,
which limit media freedom, such as contempt of court and defamation.4:1 While
statutory limits to media freedom pose harsher punishment, these are hardly used. The
law of defamation poses the biggest threat to media freedom.46 Editors of the private
media are constantly harassed by threats to sue, especially from public figures. In
November 2001, Mmegi was ordered to pay a High Court judge P250 000 in damages
for defamation.47 And more recently, in May 2003, Mmegi also had to pay P225 000
in an out of court settlement to the deputy Attorney General of Botswana after
41
Sechele, Deepening Democracy or Creeping Authoritarian Rule? n 9 above p. 120.




44 MISA Botswana Alert Update, at: [http://www.misanet.org/alerts/20011204.Botswana.0.html].
43 For a list and commentary on the laws that limit media freedom in the country, see T. Balule & B.
Maripe, Laws and Regulations that Inhibit Media Freedom in Botswana (MISA-Botswana, 2000).
46 This view is based on the writer's interviews with the editors of the private press.
47 Dibotelo v Sechele and others Civil Case 1511/2000, High of Botswana (Unreported).
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publication of defamatory stories about the latter.48 The paper is also said to be facing
approximately ten more defamation suits.49 The Guardian is also facing a lawsuit
from t he v ice p resident over ana rticle i n w hich i t a lleged t hat h e w as a busing h is
office.50 The paper is also facing another defamation suit which has been pending
before the High Court since 1999 by two Members of Parliament. One is a former
minister of finance and the other is the treasurer of the ruling party. The paper had
published a story questioning a P51 million-government grant to an Indonesian
investor who had bought the latter MP's textile factory.51
The private media in Botswana is financially weak. It is not eligible for government
financial assistance programmes and has difficulty in raising loans from the
conservative, foreign dominated financial sector. Government policy planners do not
view an independent media as a viable industry, capable of producing employment
52and generating exports. If advertising were to be eliminated from the private media,
it will be forced out of business. The private media in the country depend to a large
extent on advertising revenue from the government and public sector. This renders the
industry vulnerable in the sense that if these revenues are withdrawn, the industry
cannot rely on the private sector for advertising since this sector is relatively small
compared to the public sector.
Reliance on advertising revenue seriously compromises the editorial independence of
the media. If the media publish stories critical of major advertisers, they are often
threatened with withdrawal of adverts. In 1999, after the Guardian had published the
story concerning the two MPs, the paper received threats to starve it of advertising.
The ruling party went on to instruct its secretariat not to place any party adverts in the
paper.53 Recently, the government instructed all government departments and
parastatal organisations to withdraw advertising from the Guardian and Midweek Sun
newspapers.54 The instruction came after the two papers had published a series of
48 See 'Mmegi to Pay Tafa', Daily News, 22nd May 2003.
49 Interview with Mmegi Managing Editor, Titus Mbuya (Gaborone, 17th October 2001).
0 Interview with the editor, Outsa Mokone (Gaborone, 1st November 2001).
51 R. Galant, J. Minnie & Z Wales (eds.) So this is Democracy? State of the Media in Southern Africa
1999 (MISA, 2000) p. 49.
32 Media Concentration and its Impact in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, (Report
produced by Freedom of Expression Institute for IFEX meeting in New York, 20 May 200) p. 21.
33
Galant, Minnie & Wales, n 51 above p. 49.
34 MISA Botswana Alert Update, at: [http://www.misanet.org/alerts/200110604.botswana.0.html].
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articles critical ofboth the President and the Vice President. The decision was taken in
order to put pressure on the two papers to conform to a reportage that falls within
what government considers to be the parameters of editorial freedom. Advertising
from government and parastatal organisations allegedly account for up to 40% of the
two papers' advertising revenue. The papers launched an urgent application with the
High Court to challenge the decision to starve them of government adverts. The court
held that it was unlawful for the government to withdraw advertising from the papers
as a punitive measure.55
What is however disturbing about the decision of the court is the conclusion that:
"...I must reiterate that government like anybody else cannot be forced to
advertise or buy advertising space in any paper or media. Even where it has
been advertising or has bought advertising space in any paper or media for
any given period of time, it is, as a general ride entitled to withdraw s uch
patronage at will ",56
The implication of the decision is that the media must subordinate their democratic
mandate to commercial interests. Given that the private media relies heavily on
advertising revenue for survival, if for example a newspaper steps on the toes of big
advertisers, it may find itself short of advertisers, which may have dire consequences
for its continued existence. Economic factors therefore have a serious impact on the
enjoyment of media freedom in the country. Its impact is probably greater than the
self-censorship imposed on the media by harsh laws such as those on national
security.
It has been observed that the commercial media today are characterized by an
increasing concentration of media ownership and growing cross-media ownership
nationally and globally.57 Botswana is no exception, although the media industry is
relatively young and small, there are already developments towards concentration and
cross-ownership. Dikgang Publishing Co, the owners ofMmegi and Mmegi Monitor




57 J. Duncan & M. Seleoane, Media and Democracy in South Africa (Human Sciences Research
Council and Freedom of Expression Institute, 1998) p.18.
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own 51% of CBET (Pty) Ltd, the owners of the Guardian and Midweek Sun.58
Dikgang Publishing Co also holds a 10% take in Gabz FM. On the other hand, News
Company (Pty) Ltd, the owners of the Gazette also hold a 6% stake in Yarona FM.
3.3 Profile oftheMainstream Media in South Africa
3.3.1 Priit tMedia
Until the early 1990's, the South African newspaper industry was dominated by two
main groups: the Afrikaans language press, owned by Nasionale Pers (Naspers) and
Perkskor, which supported the apartheid government, and the English language press
owned by the mining and industrial conglomerate, Anglo-American Corporation
(AAC), and supportive of liberal white opposition parties. The AAC controlled two
companies that dominated the English market for many years, namely the Argus
Group and the SA Associated Newspapers (Saan), later Times Media Limited (TML).
The duopoly was vertically integrated at the level of print, distribution and product,
with restrictive practices existing to ensure that distribution and, to a lesser extent,
printing, was contained within the duopoly.59 A few newspapers independent of the
duopoly existed,60 but for news outside their areas, they relied heavily on the news
service provided by the South African Press Association (Sapa), which was owned by
the duopoly.61
Important changes in the press took place during the transition to democracy.62 In
1987 a black-empowerment group, Mandla-Matla, bought the bi-weekly Zulu
language Ilanga from the Argus group. The group also sold a controlling stake in the
country's biggest daily circulation, the Sowetan, to a black-empowennent group, New
58 The Guardian and Midweek Sun were initially owned by Media Publishing (Pty) Ltd, a company that
was owned by a British national, William Jones. At the end of 2001, Jones relocated to Australia and
sold off the two papers to CBET (Pty) Ltd on 1st November 2001.
59 C. Emdon, 'Ownership and Control of Media in South Africa' in Duncan & Seleoane (eds.), n 58
above at 137.
60 The most famous were the Daily Dispatch in East London and the Natal Witness in Pietermaritzburg.
61 The Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) Position Paper 2001 (Government
Communications and Information System) p. 13. Available at: [http.//www.gov.za\.
62
Ibid., p. 17. See also, Emdon, n 59 above at 141 -145.
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Africa Investment Limited (Nail). Nail joined the National Empowerment Consortium
(NEC) in 1996, which then bought Johnnie (owners of TML) from ACC. TML owns
the biggest circulation Sunday paper, the Sunday Times. On the eve of the first
democratic elections, the Argus group sold its remaining titles to the Irish-based
Independent Newspapers Group (ING).
Kagiso Trust Investment (KTI), another black-empowerment group, took over
Perskor, the publishers of the English daily, the Citizen. However, they soon
relinquished this and Perskor merged with Caxton. Similarly, in 1997, Naspers sold
its English Sunday paper, City Press, to a black-owned group, Dynamo Investments.
However, two years later, Naspers resumed ownership. Naspers has acquired full
ownership of the Afrikaans language newspaper, the Rapport, leaving it as the sole
owner ofmainstream Afrikaans newspapers.
There are approximately thirty-one newspapers in circulation in South Africa today.
Over half of these are daily papers and the rest, save for Ilanga, which is a bi-weekly,
are weekly newspapers.63 The majority of these papers are published in English. Four
are published in Afrikaans language while Ilanga is the only paper published in an
African language.64 Most publications appeal to the tastes of middle to upper income
readers of all races. The Sowetan and City Press ' readership is predominantly black of
all incomes.63 The Afrikaans language newspapers target the Afrikaans speakers and
seek to preserve their culture and language.66 The content of the papers vary, but most
focus on politics, public affairs, education, culture, business, sports and
entertainment.67
The role of the media in a democratic South Africa was defined by its High Court in
the following terms:
'The press is in the frontline of the battle to maintain democracy. It is the
function of the press to ferret out corruption, dishonesty and graft wherever it
63 MDDA Position Paper, n 61 above p. 59. See also Table 2.
64 The Afrikaans language publications are, Die Volksblad, Die Burger, Rapport and Beeld.
63 Refer to Table 2 for a profile of the mainstream newspapers in the country.
66 See Faultlines: Inquiry into Racism in the Media (South African Human Rights Commission, August
2000) p. 22, available at: [http://www.sahrc.org.za].
67
Thapisa & Megwa, n 3 above p. 40.
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may occur and to expose the perpetrators. The press must reveal dishonest,
mal- and inept administration...It must advance communication between the
governed and those who govern. The press must act as the watchdog of the
governed. '68
The courts recognise that in a system of democracy dedicated to openness and
accountability, there is need for robust criticism of the exercise of power, and that for
the criticisms to be effectively voiced, there must be a strong and independent
media.69 T he p ress i n t he c ountry h ave b een s aid t o b e r elatively s uccessful i n t he
performance of their democratic mandate.70 In this regard, the Mail & Guardian and
the Sunday Times are leading the pack.71 Because of their tough stance against the
government, these papers have often been accused of racism. The inquiry into racism
in the media conducted by the Human Rights Commission in 1998 was triggered by
complaints against the two papers. The Mail & Guardian is seen as the voice of
independent journalism in the country because of its investigative, fearless in-depth
reporting of government activities, corruption in government and in the private
72
sector. The Sunday Times on the other hand, aims at exposing corruption and
criminality in all sectors of the society, assisting with the growth of a culture of
tolerance and debate and ensuring respect for the constitution.73
With just over thirty newspaper titles and a population of approximately 43 million,
South Africa is said to have the second lowest number of titles in the world in relation
to population size, and the circulation of newspapers in relation to population is the
fifth 1 owest in the w orld.74 It i s e stimated t hat there a re about 3,5 m illion i liberate
adults in the country with the majority based in rural areas. Distribution of the press is
biased towards urban areas. All national newspapers (City Press, Sowetan, Star,
Business Day & Sunday Times) have almost 50% of their circulation in one province
alone, Gauteng. South Africa is divided into nine provinces for administrative
purposes. Gauteng, though the smallest in size, is the powerhouse of South Africa and
68 Government of the Republic ofSouth Africa v Sunday Times Newspaper 1995 2 SA 221 at 227.
69 Holomisa v Argus Newspapers 1996 2 SA 588 at 609.
70
Y. Burns, Communications Law (Butterworths, 2001) p. 301.
71 See Faultlines: Inquiry into Racism in the Media, n 66 above p. 7.
72
Thapisa & Megwa, n 3 above p. 41.
7j Faultlines: Inquiiy into Racism in the Media n 66 above p. 25.
74 J. Duncan, Broadcasting and the National Question: South African Broadcast Media in an Age of
Neo-Liberalism (Freedom of Expression Institute and Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, 2001)
p. 1.
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the heart of commercial business and industrial sector.75 In the other provinces,
newspapers tend to be found mainly in the urban centres.76 Newspapers therefore do
not service adequately the estimated 46.3% of the country's rural population.
3.3.2 BroadcastMedia
During the apartheid era, broadcasting was effectively a state monopoly. The state
owned South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), which was established in
1936 was the main broadcaster in both radio and television. The SABC was used as a
propaganda tool by the apartheid government and its services therefore reflected the
government's policy of separate and unequal development.77 The only private
broadcasting services were provided by M-Net, a pay television service established in
1986, but was not allowed to broadcast news. And there were two radio stations
• 78licensed by the then 'homeland governments' ofBophuthatswana and Transkei.
Major changes in the broadcasting sector took place in the run-up to the first
democratic elections with the enactment of the Independent Broadcasting Authority
Act 1993.79 The Act established an Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) to
regulate the broadcast media. The role of the IBA was to open up the broadcast media
and to give voice to as large a variety of South Africans as possible.80 This was to be
achieved through encouraging the historically disadvantaged ownership of the media,
diversifying ownership and programming and encouraging South African
Ol
programming. In order to achieve these objectives, the Act provides for the
development of three kinds of broadcasting licences: community broadcasting, private
or commercial broadcasting and public service broadcasting.
The obligation of providing public service broadcasting is tasked to the revamped
SABC. In terms of the Broadcasting Act 1999,u the SABC is mandated to provide in
75 MDDA Position Paper, n 61 above p. 23.
76 For example, in the Western Cape province the Cape Times, Cape Argus and Saturday Argus have
more than 90% of their respective sales in the Cape Town metropolitan area.
77 MDDA Position Paper, n 61 above p. 13.
78 Radio 702 and Capital 604, respectively.
79
Act 153 of 1993, available at: [http://www.iba.org.za.actaaa.htm].
80 Section 2, IBA Act.
81 Ibid.
82 Act No. 4 of 1999: [http://www.parliament.gov.za/acts/1999/act4-99.htm].
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its radio and television services, programmes that inform, educate and entertain.
Such programming must make services available in all official languages and reflect
the diverse cultural and multilingual nature of the country and of all its cultures and
regions to audiences.84 The SABC is also required to provide commercial
broadcasting services to subsidise the public services, however, this service must
comply with the values of public service broadcasting.
In a bid to fulfil its mandate, the SABC runs nineteen radio stations. Eleven of these
provide full-spectrum public service programming in eleven different languages
targeted at specific audiences.86 The provision of services in eleven languages is in
compliance with the constitution, which recognises eleven official languages.87 The
remaining stations provide commercial services. The programme content of the full-
spectrum radio stations is 50% music, 20% talk shows and documentaries, 12% news
and related programmes and the remaining 18% is shared between religious, formal
88
education, sport and environmental and conservation programmes. The commercial
radio stations' schedule is 90% music with the remaining 10% devoted to talk shows,
news and current affairs.89
In addition to its radio services, the SABC also owns three television stations to
further its public service and commercial mandates. SABC1 is a full-spectrum channel
aimed at younger views and broadcasts in five languages.90 SABC2 is also a full-
spectrum channel aimed at the whole family and broadcasts in the remaining six
official languages including English. SABC3 is an entertainment and information
channel aimed at cosmopolitan viewers and broadcasts in English.91
83 Section 8 (d).
84 Section 10(a) & (b).
85 Section 11.
86 See Table 4(a) for profile of SABC broadcasters.
87 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, section 6( 1). The official languages
are: Sepedi; Sesotho; Setswana; siSiswati; Tshivenda; Xitsonga; Afrikaans; English; isiNdebele;
isiXhosa and isiZulu.
88 This is the SABC (SABC Corporate Communications Department, 2000) p. 13.
89 Ibid.
90 It broadcasts in English, isiZulu, isiXhosa, isiNdebele and siSwati.
91 This is the SABC, n 88 above p. 14.
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92The IBA licensed about fourteen private commercial radio stations. These are
regional stations and their format is mainly talk shows and music. They broadcast in
English and Afrikaans. These stations serve the interests of a varying audience
ranging from black middle income to predominantly white audiences.93 In addition,
over eighty community radio stations have been granted licences. In general, the IBA
accepted four distinct groups of community radio stations: ethnic, religious, student
and development oriented stations.94 Most of the community radio stations serving
ethnic interests are based in the rural disadvantaged areas, with the others located
mainly in the well-resourced urban areas and broadcast predominantly in English.93
In commercial television, the only free-to-air television station was granted a licence
in 1998. The station, e-tv, broadcasts nationally and depends on advertising for its
survival. It is required to provide a range of programming addressing a wide section
of the South African public. While e-tv is mainly an English language channel, it is
required to include other official languages in its broadcasts.96 There is also M-Net, a
9"7
private subscription television service launched in 1986. The launch of television in
South Africa in 1975 gave rise to fears that newspapers would lose advertising
revenue. The government sought to offset this by allowing newspapers ownership of a
pay television service on the condition that the service did not carry news.
Consequently, the dominant newspaper groups, Argus, Naspers, Perskor and TML
launched M-Net. Its services are aimed at up-market viewers and focuses on movies,
sport, entertainment and magazine programmes. In 1995, M-Net, through its sister
companyMulti-Choice, launched its digital satellite television.
Radio enjoys a penetration rate of 93% of the country's population, with television
reaching approximately 69.6%.98 SABC radio and television services reach specific
targets via terrestrial transmitter network and are available nationally via satellite
receiving system. These command over three times more listeners and viewers than
92 See Table 4(b) for profile of private broadcasters.
93 MDDA Position Paper n 61 above p. 60.
94
Emdon, n 59 above at 147.
95 MDDA Position Paper, n 61 above p. 16.
96 Section 30(a) & (b), Broadcasting Act 1999.
97
MDDA Position Paper, n 61 above p. 13.
98
Duncan, n 74 above p. 1.
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all the other broadcasters combined." Private broadcaster services are available
terrestrially in their regions of operation. The private television service, e-tv, reaches
75% of the population terrestrially, but commands a viewership of only 10%.100 By
the end of the year 2000, there were approximately 18.6% South Africans who could
not receive television and radio signals. In addition, even in areas where signals do
exist, many more do not have the means to access them.101
3.3.3 Political and Economic Factors that Impact on Media Freedom
Although there has been some irritation and sensitivity by government in response to
criticism in the media, it appears the government remains true to its commitment to
109
freedom of expression, information and a free media. The democratic government
brought to office in 1994, and which retained power in the following elections in
1999, committed itself to a programme of social reforms.103 The programme would
arguably have brought the country into line with the old welfare states i n terms of
delivery of social services. Once in power, the government had to reconcile its reform
policy with the realities of globalisation. The government brought in the Growth,
Employment and Redistribution Plan (GEAR), a macroeconomic framework that
seeks to achieve its social reforms by adjusting the economy to the needs and
priorities of global markets. The plan shifts the bulk of service delivery onto the
private sector through privatisation and other business friendly policies.104
After almost a decade of democratic rule, debates around government's delivery on its
promises on social reforms are gaining prominence, with the media leading the
debate. This has inevitably caused an uneasy relationship between the media and
government. The latter often complains that its messages, its perspectives and its
concrete decisions do not receive adequate media coverage.105 In 1997, the then
99 MDDA Position Paper, n 61 above p. 15.
100 US Embassy Stockholm, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001, South Africa:
[www. usemb.se/human/200l/africa/south_africa.htmP\.
101 MDDA Position Paper, n 61 above p. 21.
102 Communications 2000: A Vision for Government Communications in South Africa (Report of the
Task Group on Government Communications, 1996) p. 3.
lcb The programme is called the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and was
developed by the ruling African National Congress (ANC).
104
Duncan, n 74 above, p. 10.
105 Communications 2000, n 102 above p. 8.
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president, Nelson Mandela, accused the country's press of being embittered,
conservative people who are out of touch with black society.106 He further accused
black journalists of writing to appease their white masters by undermining his
government. Further attacks on the media were m ade by the current president who
accused them of dwelling on negative things and distorting developments in the
country.107 A more threatening act designed to undermine media freedom by a senior
government official was a visit by the minister of defence to the offices of Die
Volksblad in the company of uniformed senior army officials where the minister
confronted the editor, accusing him of distorted reporting. The minister later made a
108
scathing attack on the media in Parliament accusing them of abusing their freedom.
Media freedom is further threatened by the fact that many apartheid censorship laws
still remain on the statute books.109 Despite a recommendation by the Task Group on
Communications that these laws should be repealed, nothing has yet been done.110
There have already been indications that certain elements in government are not
averse to using some of this legislation. For example, in February 1996, the ministry
of health asked all employees to sign declarations of secrecy to prevent them from
leaking information in the wake of a scandal involving a R14 million tender for an
AIDS awareness play. The move was justified in tenns of the Protection of
Information Act of1984 u 1
Even though there have been some sporadic attacks on the media by some leading
politicians, the government acknowledges and appreciates the importance ofmedia
freedom. Mandela's criticism of the media prompted a meeting with black journalists,
and he later appeared on national television assuring the public that the differences
had been resolved, and that media freedom was not under threat. The reassurance was
later repeated in his final days in office when he warned that any democratic
112
government that interfered with the freedom of the press would destroy itself.
106 Minnie & Mwape, n 42 above pp. 75 - 76.
107 B. Mwape & J. Minnie, So this is Democracy? State ofthe Media in Southern Africa 1998 (MISA,
1999) pp. 87-88.
108
Galant, Minnie & Wales, n 51 above p. 126.
109 See Burns, n 74 above, chapter 3.
110 Communications 2000, n 102 above p. 22.
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D. Siboneo & D. Lush, So this is Democracy? Report ofState of the Media in Southern Africa 1996
(MISA, 1997) p. 33.
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The government has, consistent with the former president's warning, taken important
measures towards ensuring the enjoyment of media freedom and freedom of
information. In 1998 it set up a Government Communications and Information
System (GCIS). The mandate for the establishment of the GCIS is drawn from the
freedom of expression clause in the constitution. The aim of the GCIS is to enable
citizens not only to receive information about their government, but also to allow
them to communicate their views to the government.113 Parliament has also passed an
access to information law giving effect to the constitutional right of access to
information.114 The Act applies to the exclusion of any other law that prohibits or
restricts disclosure of infonnation or that is materially inconsistent with the objects of
the Act.115 The Act is very crucial given that the government has hitherto failed to
amend or repeal censorship laws passed by the former apartheid government.
The SABC seems to be enjoying editorial freedom from government. A task team
appointed by the SABC to examine its editorial independence found that there was no
evidence to support allegations of infringement of editorial independence or bias
towards any political organisation.116 A report by the IBA in 1999 also concluded that
in terms of editorial coverage, reporting by the SABC was free and fair, and that even
though the government and the ruling party received most coverage, such reports were
not necessarily positive.117
The biggest threat to media freedom and access to information in South Africa is
posed by economic factors. Newspaper ownership is highly concentrated, most titles
118
are owned by three groups, and only Ilanga and the Mail & Guardian fall outside
their ambit. There is both vertical and horizontal integration among the major media
groups. Increasingly, media groups are operating on a multi-media basis by
assembling a mix of mass and targeted media. The mix allows them to spread their
bets by affording them the opportunity to attract a spread of revenue streams,
including above the line and below the line advertising. The ideal multi-media group
llj See GCIS website at: [http://www.gov.za],
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is seen as having a mix of content-creation and distribution platforms, so that costs of
content can be amortised across a spread of media."9 These groups are exploring
synergies between different components of their operations, and are also forging co¬
operation agreements with one another in order to bring costs down.120 In the process
they create structural barriers to entry to the media industry, for the more they
integrate with one another, the more they raise barriers to entry.
Leading media groups have centralised editorial content across titles. Stories are
produced centrally, like a news agency and distributed across the titles. A common
pool of reporters has been established to cover different subjects, which then supply
all titles with copy.121 The SABC has also, in a move aimed at cutting costs, gone the
bi-media route, merging the radio and television news and current affairs operations
122into a freestanding news division.
123The ownership of broadcasting licences is regulated by law. The law allows for any
one entity to control a maximum of two FM and two AM radio licences, and not more
than one television licence. However, the same entity can have non-controlling
financial interests in an unlimited number of licences. Cross-media control between
the broadcast and print media is also limited. For example, a person who is in control
of a newspaper cannot have control over a radio or television licence in an area where
the newspaper has an average circulation of 20% of the total readership in the area if
the licence area of the broadcast licensee substantially overlaps with the circulation
area of the newspaper.124 At the time that the cross-media rules were introduced in
1999, some media houses had already acquired a dominant position in both sectors.
For example, Nail, the parent company of the publishers of the Sowetan and Sunday
Times, which have over 50% of their circulation in the Gauteng Province, also,
through another subsidiary, have a controlling stake in Jacaranda FM radio station,
which also broadcasts in Gauteng.
'19
Duncan, n 74 above p. 7.
120 Ibid.
121 Media Concentration and its Impact in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, n 52 above
p. 16.
122 Ibid., p. 13.
,23 Section 49, IBA Act1993.
124 Section 50.
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Advertising is regarded as the lifeblood of the commercial media. It therefore has a
real impact on the form and content of the service offered in that it ensures that
service is geared to delivering audiences to advertisers. Unemployment is rising in
South Africa and domestic markets for goods and services are shrinking, which in
turn is impacting negatively on advertising levels. As a result, competition for an
ever-decreasing pool of high-income earners is increasing, which has profound
implications on content of media reliant on advertising. Currently ad spend in the
country is heavily skewed against media that primarily serve black consumers, despite
their readership and listenership figures. The largest daily paper in the country, the
Sowetan, is finding it difficult to attract advertisers compared to smaller traditionally
1 T C
white publications such as the Business Day and the Star. In the broadcast sector, a
survey conducted in November 1999 showed that Highveld Stereo, a private radio
station with a then listenership of 797 000 received R13.7 million in advertising
income, while Ukhozi fm, which had the biggest listenership in the country of 5 990
000, received R 10.26 million. High Stereo has a predominantly white audience while
Ukhozi fm is one of the SABC's public service stations targeting isiZulu speakers.126
The SABC relies heavily on advertising, which accounts for approximately 80 % of
its income with the licence fee accounting for a mere 13 %.127 When the SABC was
re-launched in the democratic South Africa, the overall audience figures remained
unchanged, but the proportion of white viewers fell while the proportion of black
viewers rose. As a result thereof, the SABC began to lose advertising revenue as
128white and Afrikaans viewers proved to be more attractive than black viewers.
3.4 Conclusion
The profiles of the press in the two countries demonstrate that the number of titles in
both countries is small compared to their population sizes. Even though the
newspapers in circulation in both countries disseminate a broad range of news and
opinions, their distribution is skewed in favour of the urban affluent audiences. The
125 MDDA Position Paper, n 61 p. 15.
126 Ibid., p. 24.
127
Duncan, n 74 above p. 114.
128 MDDA Position Paper, n 61 above p. 15
68
rural population is not adequately serviced by the newspaper industry. There is also a
shortage of titles published in indigenous African languages, as most titles prefer
publishing in English, which creates a language barrier. High levels of illiteracy
further hamper the accessibility of newspapers to the citizens of both Botswana and
South Africa. The newspaper industry in South Africa is highly monopolised with a
growing tendency to centralise editorial content across titles thus posing a serious
threat to editorial pluralism. In Botswana, although the industry is still relatively new,
there are already developments towards concentration of newspaper ownership.
Concentration of ownership in the newspaper industry has led to the demise of a
number of titles independent of the big media groups in South Africa. The situation
has led to a monopoly or oligopoly of information dissemination by big media houses.
In addition to concentration, there is also a growing incidence of cross-ownership in
the newspaper and broadcast media. In South Africa, cross-ownership even extends to
content production.
Radio and television are the most accessible media in terms of both geographic
coverage and language in both countries. In South Africa, the SABC, private and
community broadcasters offer a wide range of programming in various languages to
the public. In Botswana the broadcast media are still dominated by state owned
broadcasters and are prone to government interference.
The media in both countries play a crucial watchdog role in relation to their
governments and other powerful institutions in society. The media's style of
investigative journalism has created an uneasy relationship between the media and
their respective governments. In South Africa the poor relationship between the
government and the media does not seem to have jeopardised the enjoyment ofmedia
freedom and access to information. By contrast, in Botswana the picture is gloomy.
The government is very secretive and often refuses to deal with the media and is also
not willing to grant state owned media editorial independence.
The law of defamation further poses a serious threat to media freedom in Botswana.
The law is mostly resorted to by political and public officials to thwart criticism by
the media. Economic factors pose another serious threat to media freedom in both
69
countries. The media in both countries depend on advertising revenue for their
survival. Economic considerations therefore play an important role in determining
content, format and audience ofmedia services. It is hardly surprising that most media
services target middle to upper income urban audiences, because this is the bracket
that can give advertisers significant revenue returns. The struggle for audiences tend
to result in the homogenisation of content and format of media services thus
threatening diversity.
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Table 1: Profile of the mainstream newspapers in Botswana.
Title Ownership Frequency Circulation* Language Audience
Daily News Government Daily
(Mon-Fri)







21 000 English Urban
educated
adults













































8 000 English Adults
Source: Adapted from, Thapisa & Megwa, Situation Analysis ofMass Communications in Botswana.
"■Circulation figures are based on the writer's interviews with editors of the various newspapers.
(October, 2001).
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Table 2: Profile of the mainstream newspapers in South Africa.
Title Ownership Frequency Circulation Language Audience
Sowetan New Africa
Publications









ING Weekly 338 000 English Broad market
non-racial











ING Weekly 397 000 English Broad market
Sunday Argus
Weekend
ING Weekly 304 000 English Broad market










Saturday Star ING Weekly 503 000 English Non-racial
The Mercury ING Daily 249 000 English Middle
income non-
racial






Pretoria News ING Daily 202 000 English Broad market
Pretoria News
Weekend
ING Daily 73 000 English Broad market




1 440 000 &
1 313 000
Zulu Zulu speaking










Daily 146 000 English Non-racial
decision
makers







Weekly 192 000 English Non-racial
middle income
Die Volksblad Naspers Daily 127 000 Afrikaans Afrikaans
speakers
Die Burger Naspers Daily 600 000 Afrikaans Afrikaans
speakers
Rapport Naspers Weekly 1 762 000 Afrikaans Afrikaans
speakers
Beeld Naspers Daily 459 000 Afrikaans Afrikaans
speakers
City Press Naspers Weekly 2 381 000 English 97% Black
readership
Source: Adapted from the MDDA Position Paper 2001.
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Table 3 (a): Profile of state owned broadcasters in Botswana.
Station Language Audience
RBI English and Setswana N/A
RB2 English and Setswana N/A
Btv English and Setswana N/A
N.B. At the time of writing, the Department of Information and Broadcasting was in the process of
commissioning a survey to determine the audience of the state owned broadcasters.
Table 3(b): Profile of private broadcasters in Botswana.
Station Proprietor Language Format Audience
Ya Rona FM Mopani Media English and Music and Talk 150 000-250






















Music and Talk N/A
N.B. Mopani Media Ltd and Makana Media are South African companies.
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Table 4(a): Profile of South African Broadcasting Corporation broadcasters.
Station Language Audience
Ukhozifm Zulu 4 534 000
Umhlobo Wenene FM Xhosa 3 066 005
Metro FM English 2 865 000
Lesedi FM Sotho 2 284 000
Motsweding FM Tswana 1 689 000
Thobela FM Sepedi 1 522 000
Radiosondergrense Afrikaans 1 069 000
Mungana Lonene Tsonga 826 000
Ikwekwezi FM Ndebele 665 000
5FM English 1 011 000
Ligwalagwala FM Swazi 670 000
Phalaphala FM Venda 455 000
Good Hope FM English 652 000
Radio Bop English 286 000
CKI Stereo English 342 000
Safin English 369 000
Lotus FM English, Tamil & Hindi 352 000
Radio 2000 Simulcast 141 000
SABC1 English, Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele
& Swati
13 166 000
SABC2 English, Afrikaans, Sotho,
Tswana, Sepedi, Tsonga &
Venda
9 175 000
SABC3 English 5 430 000
Bop-TV English 316 000
Source: Adapted from the MDDA Position Paper 2001.
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Table 4(b): Profile of the mainstream private broadcasters in South Africa.
Station Proprietor Language Format Audience
Classic FM Classic FM (UK),
Liberty Life &
Ingoma Trust
English Music 122 000
Highveld Primedia English Music 778 000
Cape Talk Premedia English Talk 73 000
Radio 702 Premedia English Talk 257 000
East Coast Radio Kagiso Media English Music 782 000
Jacaranda FM Kagiso Media &
New Africa
Media (NAM)




English Music 295 000
Radio Algoa AME English Music 235 000
Punt Geselstadio AME Afrikaans Talk 58 000
P4 (Durban) Makana English Music 100 000
P4 (CapeTown) Makana English Music 150 000
Kaya FM Makana & NAM English Music 398 000
YFM HCI English Talk 772 000
Kfm NAM English &
Afrikaans
Music 530 000
e-TV Sabido Multilingual Television 5 112 000
M-Net Naspers English &
Afrikaans
Subscription TV 2 871 000
Source: Adapted from the MDDA Position Paper 2001.
76
CHAPTER 4
PROTECTION OF MEDIA FREEDOM: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
4.1 Introduction
Freedom of expression is a universally recognised human right, and as such it is
protected in a number of United Nations human rights instruments such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and in regional human rights treaties such as the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), the American Convention
on Human Rights (ACHR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
This chapter introduces the treaties and other international instruments that provide
protection for the rights of freedom of expression and infonnation. It proceeds to
discuss the relevance and/or application of these international instruments to the
municipal laws of Botswana and South Africa. Finally, the chapter explores the
constitutional protection that media freedom and freedom of information are accorded
in the two states, and whether such protection is consistent with the international
standards set out in the international human rights instruments.
4.2 Protection ofMedia Freedom in International Human Rights Instruments:
4.2.1 Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights (UDHR)
Even though freedom of information and of the media are not specifically mentioned
in the Charter of the UN, the importance of these freedoms was recognised by the UN
from its very beginning through Resolution 59(1) of the General Assembly at its first
session in 1946. The resolution states, inter alia, that freedom of information:
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a) Is a fundamental human right, and the touchstone o f all the freedoms to
which the UN is consecrated; and,
b) Implies the right to gather, transmit and publish news anywhere and
everywhere.1
After the adoption of the UN Charter, the international community started a process
towards specifying human rights and fundamental freedoms. Further to Resolution
59(1), the General Assembly recommended that the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) establish a Commission on Human Rights and include in the work of this
Commission all problems concerning freedom of information. At its first session, the
Commission, realising that information questions were complex and needed deeper
analysis, decided to establish a Sub-Commission on Freedom of Infonnation and the
Press. The work of the Commission and the Sub-Commission culminated in the UN
Conference on Freedom of Information, which met in Geneva from 23ld March to 21st
April 1948. The conference adopted and forwarded to ECOSOC three draft
Conventions and also adopted forty-three resolutions and some draft articles for the
proposed International Bill ofRights concerning information.
The proposed International Bill of Rights was adopted by the General Assembly on
10th December 1948 as the UDHR. The Declaration was seen as a simple statement
defining human rights and fundamental freedoms and its force was to be of a moral
rather than a legal nature. It was taken to indicate goals rather than impose precise
obligations upon states. Article 19 of the LTDHR provides:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includesfreedom to h old opinions without interference and to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers."
Article 19 is very broad and protects both the right to freedom of opinion and
expression. The Article refers to 'freedom of expression', and it is generally accepted
that the term 'expression' includes both speaking orally or writing whether ordinarily
' Yearbook ofthe UN 1946-1947 (United Nations, 1948) p. 176.
2 See generally, A. Eide et al (eds.), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentaiy
(Scandinavian University Press, 1992).
3 See W. Kleinwachter, 'The Birth ofArticle 19 - A Twin Concept of the United Nations' (1989) 10(3)
Media Law and Practice 93 at 99.
78
(i.e., in a private context) or in the print or electronic media.4 Media freedom is
therefore protected and the last part of the article, '...impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers', is pertinent to the media. The media in
a democracy are expected to ensure a well-informed citizenry through discussion of a
variety of views, and this therefore calls for the protection of media freedom to ensure
that the media are not hindered in the dissemination of information and ideas to the
public.5
Freedom of information is also protected under Article 19, which provides that
freedom of expression includes the right to 'seek, receive and impart information'.
The right as protected here is not only passive, but active too. This may require states,
which consider the Declaration to be binding on them to take active measures to
ensure access to information, especially that held by government or its agencies.6 In a
leading commentary, Article 19 is said to aim at establishing a world where receiving
and imparting infonnation is seen as an individual right, the main objective behind the
article being to promote an unobstructed flow of information in all directions and
regardless of frontiers.'
At face value, this Article appears to grant an absolute right to the freedoms of
expression and information. The formulation of the provision has been criticised for
its failure to balance the twin concepts of freedom and responsibility as laid down in
Resolution 59(1). Under Resolution 59(1), the exercise of freedom of expression and
information is subject to the following responsibilities:
a) Willingness and capacity to exercise the freedoms without abuse; and,
b) The moral obligation to seek facts without prejudice and to spread
knowledge without malicious intent.8
4 P. Nnaemeka-Agu, 'Freedom of Expression and of the Press and the African Charter' (1993) 19 (4)
Commonwealth Legal Bulletin 1761.
5 See chapter 2 at 2.4.
6 E. Evatt, 'The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Freedom of Expression and State
Security', in S. Coliver et al (eds.), Secrecy and Liberty: National Security, Freedom ofExpression and
Access to Information (Kluwer Law International, 1999); this is a comment on a similar provision in
the ICCPR, however, this has not yet been tested in communications.
7
Eide, n 3 above p. 278.
8 Yearbook of the UN 1946-1947, n 1 above p. 176.
79
Article 19 must however be read in conjunction with Article 29, which provides for
the unity of freedom and responsibility. Article 29 permits restrictions on the
freedoms of expression and information solely for the purpose of securing respect for
the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. Furthermore, the rights
set forth in the Declaration may not be exercised contrary to the purposes and
principles of the UN.9
Although the UDHR is not binding on states, it has had a tremendous impact on the
development of both international and national human rights law. It is used as a
yardstick by which to measure the content and standard of observance of human
rights, and almost all human rights treaties adopted by UN bodies since 1948
elaborate principles set forth in the Declaration.10
4.2.2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
The ICCPR is an elaboration of the civil and political rights set forth in the UDHR
and aims at transforming the rights spelt out in the latter into legally binding
obligations. The ICCPR was adopted by the UN and opened for signature, ratification
and accession on 16th December 1966,11 and entered into force on 23rd March 1976.
Freedom of expression and information are protected under Article 19(2):
"Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas ofall kinds,
regardless offrontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form ofart,
or through any other media ofhis choice. "
The text of this Article is based on Article 19 of the UDHR, and as such, it also uses
the term freedom of expression to denote the freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas. The forms of communication protected under this Article are
broad and varied, it mentions not only oral, written and printed communication, but
9 Article 29 (b) & (c) of the UDHR.
10 S. Coliver, The Article 19 Freedom ofExpression Manual: International and Comparative Law,
Standards and Procedures (Article 19, 1993) p. 9.
" General Assembly Resolution 2200A(XXI).
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also 'other media', and this is important for both radio and television.12 Media
freedom is therefore expressly protected under this Article.
Freedom of information is also covered by this Article, which not only protects the
right to receive and impart information, but also an active right to seek information. A
question that arises here is whether the right to seek information obligates state parties
to guarantee with positive measures access to state or private information. A
subjective r ight t o b e i nformed i s s till 1 argely unrecognised i n t he c ase law o n t he
Covenant, but it has been observed that the rapid development of the modern
information and communication society is leading in many states to progressive
statutory duties to provide information, particularly on the part of the public
administration.13
The exercise of freedom of expression and information carries with it duties and
responsibilities. Under Article 19(3), these freedoms may be restricted to ensure
respect for the rights or reputations of others and for the protection of national
security or of public order or of public health or morals. Where a state party imposes
certain restrictions on the exercise of the freedom of expression and information,
these must not put in jeopardy the right itself. Such restrictions must satisfy the
conditions laid in Article 19(3), that is, (i) the restriction must be provided by law; (ii)
must be imposed for one of the purposes set out in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b); and,
must be justified as necessary for that state party for one of those purposes.14
4.2.3 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR)
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the ACHPR on 27th June 1981 and
it entered into force in October 1983. The Charter's protection of freedom of
expression is set forth in Article 9(2) which provides:
12 See M. Nowak, UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights: A Commentary (N.P. Engel, 1993) p.




Report of the Human Rights Commission to the General Assembly, 38th Session, Supp. No. 40, 1983
(A/38/40) Annexe VI, General Comment 10.
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"Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions
within the law."
A notable anomaly with the text of this Article i s that it does not expressly cover
expression and dissemination of information, which is probably the main concern of
the media. Some commentators on the Charter have however argued that expression
and dissemination of information is implied.15 Assuming that argument to be correct,
media freedom can therefore be said to be guaranteed under this implication.
Freedom of information is protected under Article 9(1) albeit in a more restricted
form. The provision reads, 'every individual shall have the right to receive
information'. What is protected is the right to receive information, and unlike the
ICCPR, it does not mention the right to seek nor duties to impart information. Another
peculiar feature of the Charter is that Article 9 does not include any express
restrictions on freedom of expression and information. Article 9 must however be
read subject to the restrictions set forth in Articles 27 -29, the most pertinent ofwhich
requires the individual to exercise protected freedoms 'with due regard to the rights of
others, collective security, morality and common interest'.16
4.2.4 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)
The Convention was adopted by the Organisation of American States on 22nd
November 1969 and entered into force on 18th July 1978. Article 13(1) sets forth the
positive protection of the right to freedom of expression in the following terms:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right
includes freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless offrontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of
art, or through any other medium ofone's choice ".
The Article is identical to Article 19 of the ICCPR, save that it also protects freedom
of thought. The arguments on the extent to which both media freedom and freedom of
information are protected under the ICCPR, are equally applicable here.
1
Nnaemeka-Agu, n 4 above at 1763.
16 Article 27(2) of the ACHPR.
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The ACHR goes further by expressly prohibiting any form of prior censorship of the
media. It further prohibits indirect methods of restricting expression, such as unfair
allocation of newsprint or broadcasting frequencies, and prohibits such methods by
private persons as well as by government.17 Restrictions on freedom of expression are
only permitted by way of subsequent imposition of liability. Such restrictions must be
expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure: (i) the respect for the
rights or reputations of others; or, (ii) the protection of national security, public order,
10
or public health or morals. Article 13(4) however permits prior censorship of 'public
entertainments' for the sole purpose of protecting the morals of children and youths,
provided such is prescribed by law. States parties are also required to prohibit war
propaganda and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred.19
Another novel provision in the ACHR is Article 14, which protects the 'right to
reply'. Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements and published by the
mass media has a right to reply or make correction using the same media organ.
4.2.5 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(otherwise known as the European Convention on Human Rights) was signed by the
contracting parties of the Council of Europe on 4th November 1950 and entered into
force on 3ld September 1953. It is the oldest of the human rights treaties discussed
here and its implementation procedures are the most developed. Article 10(1)
guarantees freedom of expression in the following terms:
"Everyone has the right to freedom ofexpression. This right shall include the
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
Article shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises. "
The phrase 'freedom of expression' as used in the Article extends to all types of
expression, which impart or convey opinions, ideas or information, irrespective of
17 Article 13(2) & (3).
18 Article 13(2) of the ACHR.
19 Article 13(4) of the ACHR.
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content or the mode of communication. This therefore means that media freedom,
even though not expressly mentioned, is covered. Further, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) has held in several landmark judgments that the principles of
freedom of expression are of particular importance as far as the press and other media
are concerned. The Court has stressed the importance of media freedom in a
21democratic society to ensure proper discussion ofmatters of public interest.
The Convention applies a double standard in its treatment of the print and the
broadcast media. The position is justified by reference to the third sentence in Article
10(1). This therefore means that, while on the one hand any form of censorship of the
press is likely to amount to a breach of Article 10, on the other hand, broadcasting
may be subjected to some form of censorship or controls without breaching Article
2210. In confirming this double standard, the Court in Informcitionsverein Lentia and
others v Austria stated:
"...Technical aspects are undeniably important, but the grant or
refusal of a licence may also be made conditional on other
considerations, including such matters as the nature and objectives of
a proposed station, its potential audience and the obligations deriving
from international legal instruments. "2
States do not have an unlimited margin of appreciation concerning the licensing of the
broadcast media. The Convention requires states' licensing systems to respect the
requirements of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedncss, which are essential in a
democratic society. Any licensing system that is manifestly arbitrary or
discriminatory will be contrary to the principles of the Convention and thus in breach
of Article 10.24 In regulating broadcasting, a state is also not allowed to infringe the
25
right of a person to receive information.
20 Lord Lester, 'Freedom of Expression' in (1995) 6 Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence: The
Domestic Application ofInternational Human Rights Norms (Commonwealth Secretariat) 122 at 124.
21
Sunday Times (No.l) v U. K. (1979) 2 EHRR 245.
22 F. Jacobs & R. White, The European Convention on Human Rights (Clarendon Press, 1996) chapter
12.
23
(1993) 17 EHRR 93.
24 See decision of the European Commission on Human Rights: No. 10746/84, Verein Alternatives
Lokalradio Bern and Verein Radio Dreyeckland Basel v Switzerland, Decision of 16th October 1986,
D.R. 49, p. 126.
25 Autronic AG v Switzerland (1990) 12 EHRR 485.
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The right to receive information and ideas is also protected under Article 10. The right
is not protected simply as the converse of the right to impart information, but in its
own right and the Court has emphasised that the broad public interest in receiving
information and in the quality of political and social debates lies at the heart of
freedom of expression.26 This right however appears to be dependent upon there being
27
a willing speaker. In Leander v Sweden, the Court recognised the right of access to
infonnation and that it basically prohibits a government from restricting a person from
receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him. However,
the right does not impose positive obligations on the state to gather and disseminate
information.
Freedom of expression under Article 10, as in other human rights treaties, is not
absolute. The exercise of the right carries with it duties and responsibilities. Article
10(2) allows restrictions on the exercise of the freedoms of expression and
information, and these restrictions can broadly be classified into:
(i) Those designed to protect the public interest (national security, territorial
integrity, public safety, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or
morals);
ii) Those designed to protect other individual rights (protection of the
reputation or rights of others, prevention of disclosure of information received
in confidence); and,
iii) Those that are necessary for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary.
Not only must a restriction be justified on the basis of any of the above categories, it
must also be prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic society. In order to
meet the requirement that the limitation is prescribed by law, the Court has held that
the law need not be written, but must be expressed with sufficient clarity to enable the
26 A. Lester, 'Freedom of Expression: Relevant International Principles' in (1988) 1 Developing
Human Rights Jurisprudence: The Domestic Application ofInternational Human Rights Norms
(Commonwealth Secretariat) 23 at 33.
27
(1987) 9 EHRR 433.
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citizen to know with reasonable certainty the consequences a given action would
entail.28
On what is 'necessary in a democratic society', the Court has stated that Article 10
protects material that is likely to offend, shock or disturb a sector of the population
within the bounds of pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness, which are features of
29 • ... ' c '
a democratic society. Consideration of this issue involves a margin of appreciation
for the contracting state, and this is important especially in matters involving morals
where there is a likelihood of wide differing views among contracting states. The
margin of appreciation goes hand in hand with the Court's supervision, which ensures
that the national margin of appreciation is circumscribed by the interest of democratic
society in ensuring and maintaining a free media.30
4.3 Comparison of the Protections Afforded by the Human Rights Treaties and
Instruments to Media Freedom
All the human rights instruments discussed above, with the exception of the ACHPR,
employ the term 'freedom of expression' to denote the freedom to 'seek, receive and
impart information'.31 The UDHR, ICCPR and ACHR go further to indicate that the
freedom extends to oral, written and printed communication and also to other media.
The ECHR and ACHPR do not go to the extent of specifying what types of
communication are protected, but it is generally accepted that the protection of
freedom of expression under the two treaties extends to all types of expression, which
impart or convey opinion, ideas or information irrespective of the mode of
communication.
The protection granted to communication in all the instruments, save for the ACHPR,
is guaranteed 'regardless of frontiers'. This shows the international character of
freedom of expression and information and it is particularly significant with regard to
satellite communication. Regarding the substance of the communication, the UDHR,
28
Sunday Times (NoA) v United Kingdom (supra) n 21 above.
29
Handyside v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737.
30 Worm v Austria (1997) 25 EHRR 454 at para.47.
31 The ECHR however omits the work 'seek'.
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ICCPR and ACHR protect 'information and ideas of all kinds'. Some commentators
have concluded that these three instruments protect every communicable type of
subjective idea or opinion, of news and information, of commercial advertising, art
works, political commentary regardless how critical, pornography, etc, subject only to
the provisos in the Articles guaranteeing the freedom.32 The ACHPR provides that the
expression and dissemination of opinions must be within the law, while the ECHR
does not have an equivalent qualification. However it has been argued that the two
treaties could be interpreted so as to withhold protection from undesirable content
such as pornography or blasphemy by restrictively defining the scope of protection
afforded by the provisions on freedom of expression.33 The ACHPR's protection of
freedom of expression and information has been criticised for ambiguity, as the
phrase within the law is a clawback clause restricting the right from the start and
further opens wide doors for governments to enact draconian laws specifically
designed at silencing media critical of governments.34
Freedom of expression and information under the UDHR, ICCPR and ACHR is
protected not only against interference by the public authorities, but also against that
by private parties. These instruments recognise that private financial interests and
media monopolies are just as harmful to the free flow of information as censorship
measures by governments. State parties are therefore subjected to a duty to prevent
excessive media concentration with positive measures such as anti-monopoly laws or
state subsidies to the media.35
The E HCR g enerally p rotects freedom o f e xpression a gainst i nterference b y p ublic
authorities. However, the ECtHR has held that due to the importance of freedom of
expression as one of the preconditions for a functioning democracy, genuine
effectiveness of this freedom does not depend merely on a state's duty not to interfere,
but may require positive protection, even in the sphere of relations between
individuals.36 In determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard is had
32
Nowak, n 12 above p. 341.
33 Ibid.
j4 See C.E. Welch,' The African Charter and Freedom of Expression in Africa' (1998) 4 Buffalo
Human Rights Law Review 103.
35 See General Comment on Article 19 of the ICCPR by the Human Rights Committee; Adopted by the
Human Rights Commission at its 461st Meeting on 27th July 1983, UN DOC. A/38/40.109.
36
Ozgur Gundem v Turkey (2001) 31 EHRR 1082 at paras. 42-43.
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to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the community
and the interests of the individual. The protection against interference with freedom of
expression under the ECHR does not prevent states from requiring the licensing of the
broadcast media. In practice, states are not only allowed to interfere in the form of
imposing licensing requirements, but may also regulate matters such as the nature and
objectives of a proposed station, as we saw in the case of Informationsverein Lentia
and others v Austria (supra).
The UDHR, ICCPR and ACHR protect the right to 'seek, receive and impart
information and ideas'. These instruments protect the right to actively seek
information, which goes beyond mere passive reception. State parties have an
obligation to take positive measures to ensure the enjoyment of this right. The ECHR
does not protect an active right to seek information and therefore state parties to the
Convention do not have an obligation to gather and disseminate information, but they
have an obligation to protect the dissemination of information where there is a willing
information provider. It has been observed that since the UDHR, ICCPR, ACHR and
ECHR give rise to a right o f the p ublic to receive i nformation from a d iversity o f
sources, a corresponding obligation is imposed on the contracting states to ensure
media pluralism. The same can also be said of the ACHPR, the Charter recognises
that every person has a right to receive information even though, like Article 10 of the
ECHR, it does not protect the right actively to seek information. As long as there are
willing parties who want to provide information, it must be the duty of a government
in a democratic society to ensure that everyone has a chance to impart information in
an orderly way which respects the values of democracy such as pluralism, tolerance
and broadmindedness.
In dealing with permissible grounds for restricting freedom of expression and
information, all the instruments set forth essentially the same three-part test for
determining the legitimacy of restrictions: First, any restriction must be prescribed by
37
Coliver, n 10 above p. 77. The author reaches this conclusion despite that the ECHR, unlike the other
three instruments, does not protect an active right to information.
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law; secondly, it must serve one of the legitimate purposes expressly enumerated in
TO
their text; and finally, it must be necessary.
There is some variation among the UDHR, ICCPR, ACHR and ECHR concerning the
legitimate purposes for which the freedom of expression may be restricted. Article 29
of the UDHR permits restrictions to freedom of expression and information only to
secure 'due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others...the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare'. The ICCPR is more
detailed, adding such matters as national security, and public health. The ACHR
follows the language of the ICCPR. The ECHR, on the other hand, provides a longer
list of permissible restrictions, which includes protection of territorial integrity,
confidentiality of information received in confidence and the authority or impartiality
of the judiciary.
Save for the ACHPR, the above international human rights instalments provide solid
protection to freedom of expression and information. The ECHR's protection is a bit
weaker in that it does not protect an active right to seek information and allows
censorship o f t he broadcast m edia, wbich poses d angers o f abuse b y governments.
However, the dangers are alleviated by an efficient monitoring system in the form of
the ECtHR, which tries to interpret the Convention generously in line with the
provisions of the UDHR and ICCPR. The ACHPR gives the weakest formulation and
protection of freedom of expression and information. The weakly worded treaty is
also hampered by a lack of political will to interpret the wording of the Charter
broadly.39 The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights has acknowledged
and expressed concern at the weak protection of the right to freedom of expression
under Article 9, and has now developed principles to inform the application and guide
the development of Article 9.40 The principles are drawn from a comprehensive range
of international standards and jurisprudence, to elaborate and expand the nature,
content and extent of the right to freedom of expression under the Charter.
The grounds for permissible restrictions under the ACHPR are formulated differently, but
interpretation of Articles 27 -29 should impose similar requirements in practice.
39
Welch, n 34 above.
40 Declaration ofPrinciples on Freedom ofExpression in Africa (Adopted by the Commission at its
32nd Ordinary Session, 17th - 23rd October 2002).
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4.4 Relevance of International and Comparative Law in the National Courts of
Botswana and South Africa
International human rights law exists mainly as conventional law, i.e., in the form of
international legal instruments (treaties, conventions, declarations, etc). These provide
the main source of international human rights law. Some aspects of international
human rights law find their origin in customary international law.
The relationship between international law and municipal law is usually reflected in
the opposing theories known as monism and dualism. In terms of the monist theory,
the international legal order and the national or municipal legal orders of various
states belong to a single universal system in which the municipal legal orders occupy
a subordinate position. The theory is said to be connected with natural law theories
with the view that individual human beings, rather than the states, are the real subjects
of international law. Municipal courts are therefore obliged to apply rules of
international law directly, even in matters concerning individual citizens, without any
act of adoption by the municipal courts or transformation by the legislature. On the
other end of the spectrum is the dualist doctrine, which maintains that international
law and municipal law are entirely separate systems of law, originating from different
sources and dealing with different subject matters. The doctrine is said to be
connected with positivist theories of law and it views states, rather than individuals, as
the primary subjects of international law. Rules of international law according to this
theory only become part of the municipal law if they have been adopted by the
national courts or transformed into local law by an act of the municipal legislation.41
It has however been observed that in practice, states do not always accord with the
above doctrinal division. This is because, first, the effect of international law
generally, particularly treaties, will always depend on a rule of municipal law. The
fundamental principle in most legal systems is that domestic constitutional law
governs the internal application of treaties. Second, between the extreme versions of
monism and dualism, there lies a whole range of intermediate relationships, which do
41 See J.G. Starke, 'Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law' (1936) 17 British Year
Book ofInternational Law 66 and T. Maluwa, 'International Human Rights Norms and the South
African Interim Constitution 1993' (1993/4) 19 South African Yearbook ofInternational Law 14.
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not lend themselves to easy classification. Finally, a strict distinction between monism
and dualism may conceal the fact that the practice of the courts even in monist
systems may fail to give effect to treaties that are binding under international law, and
conversely, in dualist systems the courts may sometimes give limited effect even to
unincorporated treaties, by subjecting their domestic legislation to the principle that
such legislation should, wherever possible, be so construed as not to conflict with the
international obligations of the state.42
This part of the chapter briefly examines the status of international law in the
municipal legal systems of Botswana and South Africa, especially the status of the
international human rights instruments discussed above, which protect the right to
freedom of expression and information.
4.4.1 Botswana
The constitution of Botswana does not assign international law any special status in
the municipal law. The domestic status of international law therefore continues to be
governed by the common law, which Botswana inherited from the United Kingdom.43
a. Treaties
International human rights instruments, in principle, have no automatic operation in
Botswana's domestic law unless incorporated by an act of the legislature. The
dualistic position has been confirmed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Dow v
Attorney General of Botswana, where it held that treaties and conventions do not
confer enforceable rights on individuals within the state until Parliament has
legislated their provisions into law 44
Of the international human rights treaties protecting freedom of expression discussed
above, Botswana has ratified the ICCPR and ACHPR,45 but neither has yet been
42
Maluwa, n 41 above at 29.
43 See O. Tshosa, 'Giving Effect to Treaties in the Domestic Law of Botswana: Modern Judicial
Practice' (1997) 10 Lesotho Law Journal 205.
44
[1992] LRC (Const.) 623 at 654.
45 Botswana ratified the ACHPR on 17th July 1986 and the ICCPR on 8th September 2000.
91
incorporated into the domestic law and in consequence they are not directly
enforceable in the country. Judicial activism, has however, gone some way towards
altering the strict dualist position in the country. Over the years, courts have in some
cases used, as an aid to the interpretation of constitutionally entrenched rights,
emerging international human rights norms located in conventions to which their state
is or even not a party. In Botswana, the legal basis for invoking unratified and
unincorporated human rights treaties to interpret, not only domestic legislation, but
even constitutional provisions is section 24 of the Interpretation Act 1984, which
states that, as an aid to the construction of the enactment a court may have regard to
any relevant international treaty, agreement or convention.46 In addition to this canon
of interpretation, the Court of Appeal has also emphasised that courts must interpret
domestic laws in a way as compatible with the state's responsibility not to be in
breach of international law as laid down by law creating treaties, conventions,
agreements and protocols within the UN and OAU.47
Even though the ICCPR and ACHPR have not been incorporated into the domestic
law and therefore are not directly enforceable, there is evidence that the jurisprudence
on the two treaties serve as a useful guide to the interpretation of similar provisions in
the laws of Botswana as evidenced from the case ofDow v A.G (supra). There is also
evidence that courts at times seek guidance from the jurisprudence developed under
both the ACHR and ECHR, even though not binding on Botswana, the two
48instruments guide and inspire national courts.
b. Customary International Law
The rules and principles, which govern the status of customary international law, just
as for treaties, are the same as those that govern the relationship between customary
46
In Dow v Attorney General (supra) n 44 above, the Court of Appeal sought guidance from the
provisions of the ACHPR which although ratified, is not incorporated into the domestic law and the
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women to which Botswana
was not then a party in order to interpret some provisions of the Constitution and the Citizenship Act of
1984. The court ultimately declared the provisions in question ultra vires the Constitution as they
allowed sex based discrimination, which the Court said, was prohibited by the Constitution.
47
Per Aguda JA in Dow v AG (supra) n 44 above at 674.
48
For example, in Petros and another v State [1985] LRC (Const.) 699, in determining the
constitutionality of a sentence to four strokes to the Appellants, which was to be administered in
instalments, the court declared such punishment as inhuman and degrading. The court made references
to Article 5(2) of the ACHR, Article 3 of the ECHR and also to some decisions of the ECtHR.
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international law and the municipal law in the United Kingdom. A monist approach is
adopted with regard to customary international law.49 Customary international law
consequently forms part of the law of Botswana, subject to certain qualifications.
First, in the event of conflict between customary international law and legislation, the
latter prevails. However, this is subject to a presumption of statutory interpretation
that the legislature does not intend to violate customary international law. Second, due
to the common law doctrine of stare decisis, courts will follow their own precedents
even if such precedents do not reflect the true state of customary international law.
Third, in accordance with the 'act of state' doctrine, courts will give effect to acts of
state and acts of recognised foreign entities even if such acts are in conflict with
customary international law.50
There is a view that the provisions of the UDHR have crystallised into customary
international law.51 Subject to the qualifications discussed above, a court in Botswana
should be able to directly apply the provisions of the UDHR, which are accepted to
have crystallised into customary international law in determining freedom of
expression issues.
4.4.2 South Africa
The relationship between municipal law and international law is governed by the
constitution.32
a. Treaties
The position of treaties is governed by section 231(4) which provides:
"Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted
into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an
49 See J.G. Collier, 'Is International Law Really Part of England?' (1989) 38 ICLQ 924. And for a more
detailed treatment of the position in Botswana, see O. Tshosa, National Law and International Human
Rights Law: Cases ofBotswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Ashgate Dartmouth, 2001) p. 157.
30
Maluwa, n 41 above at 32.
31
Ibid., at 24 and A. Cunningham, 'The European Convention of Human Rights, Customary
International Law and the Constitution' (1994) 43 ICLQ 537 at 542.
52 Act 108 of 1996.
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agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless
it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act ofParliament
The provision embodies a dualistic approach to the incorporation of treaties into the
municipal law of South Africa. Only those treaties incorporated by an Act of
Parliament form part of South African law. The constitution, however, makes an
important proviso, that a 'self-executing' provision of a treaty ratified by the Republic
becomes law unless it is inconsistent with the constitution or an Act of Parliament.
The concept of self-executing provisions of treaties is far from settled, but it appears
that to be self-executing, a treaty must: (a) reflect either in language or its drafting
history that its clauses are intended to be directly applicable in domestic courts, and
(b) impose obligations which are specific, mandatory and capable of implementation
without further acts of the legislature. There is a view that the civil and political rights
clauses of the main human rights treaties are self-executing. 53 South African courts,
however, are still to produce their own jurisprudence on this subject.
South Africa, like Botswana, has ratified both the ICCPR and ACFLPR.54 These two
treaties have not yet been incorporated into the domestic law, so that in accordance
with the strict dualistic approach, they are not directly enforceable in the municipal
courts. It must be noted, however, that the civil and political rights clauses of these
treaties, as observed above, may be directly enforceable if the South African courts
consider them to be self-executing.
Even if the provisions of these treaties are not recognised as self-executing, the
treaties still play an important role as an aid to the interpretation of South African law,
more especially, the Bill of Rights. The constitution shows a desire to achieve
harmony between South African law and international human rights jurisprudence.
Section 39(1) requires courts, tribunals, or other forums, when interpreting the Bill of
Rights, to inter alia, consider international law. The provision is mandatory, and it
further urges courts to consider foreign law in permissive terms. Furthermore, section
233 requires a court when interpreting legislation, to prefer any reasonable
interpretation that is consistent with international law over any alternative
5j
Coliver, n 10 above at 25.
54 South Africa ratified the ACHPR in June 1996 and ICCPR on 10th December 1998.
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interpretation that is inconsistent with international law. The combined effect of these
sections ensures that the municipal courts are guided by international human rights
norms and the interpretation placed upon those norms by international courts and
other institutions, in interpreting the Bill of Rights. The Constitutional Court has held
that in applying section 39(1), a court should examine both non-binding as well as
binding law as tools of interpretation, but that it is not bound to follow them.
The jurisprudence developed under the ECHR and ACHR, even though not binding,
also play an important role as an aid to the interpretation of similar South African
provisions. The South African Courts have had occasion to rely upon norms set by
other international tribunals, especially the ECtHR, in a number of cases.56
b. Customary International Law
In terms of section 232, customary international law is part of the municipal law of
South Africa unless it is inconsistent with the constitution or an Act of Parliament.
The constitution adopts a monist approach with regard to international customary law.
What is more important regarding this constitutional provision is that it elevates the
status of customary international such that it is no longer subject to subordinate
legislation, as was the case under the common law.57 The status of customary
international law is further enhanced by section 233 of the constitution, which urges
courts to prefer interpretations that are consistent with international law. The
provisions of the UDHR, to the extent that they have crystallised into rules of
customary international law, should be directly enforceable in South African
municipal law.
The discussion of the status of international law in the municipal legal systems of
Botswana and South Africa reveals three ways in which international law may be
applied bymunicipal courts. F irst, a municipal court may b e required to apply the
provisions of a treaty where such has been ratified and incorporated into the domestic
55 5 v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 at 413 - 14.
56 See generally, R.C. Blake, 'The World's Law in One Country: The South African Constitutional
Court's Use of Public International Law' (1998) 115 South African Law Journal 668.
57
Maluwa, n 41 above and D.J. Devine, 'The Relationship Between International Law and Municipal
Law in the Light of the Interim Constitution 1993' (1995) 44 ICLQ 1.
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law. At the moment, neither of the two states has incorporated either the ICCPR or
ACHPR into their domestic laws so that these treaties are not directly enforceable in
the municipal legal systems. However, in South Africa, courts will directly enforce
some provisions of these treaties, which are recognised as self-executing.
Second, a court may be asked to apply customary international law as this
automatically forms part of both states' municipal legal systems. There are strong
views that certain provisions of the UDHR have crystallised into rules of customary
international law, so that courts in Botswana and South Africa may therefore be urged
to apply Article 19 of the UDHR, as customary international law, in determining
freedom of expression issues.
Third, a municipal court's attention may be drawn to pertinent international and
comparative law and urged to consider these in construing provisions of national law.
This appears to be the most common way in which international and comparative law
is used in the municipal courts of the two states. Perhaps this is because the two states
have not yet incorporated treaties dealing with freedom of expression into their
domestic laws, and are therefore not directly enforceable. Further, reliance on
customary international law may prove problematic, as a party will first be required to
prove that a custom that he/she is relying upon has indeed crystallised into customary
international law.
It may also be observed here that, while the courts in South Africa have demonstrated
a willingness to use international and comparative law to build up their jurisprudence,
especially in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, their counterparts in Botswana do
not seem to share the same enthusiasm. This could probably be due to the fact that the
status of international and comparative law in Botswana is not as clear as is the case
in South Africa, since the former's constitution is silent on the status of international
law in the domestic legal system. Lawyers and judges in Botswana may therefore be
conveniently sidestepping arguments involving international law, unless it becomes
absolutely necessary to address them, due to this uncertainty. The problem is further
compounded by what has been called a 'doctrine of avoidance' by the courts, i.e., the
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tendency of the courts to avoid dealing with constitutional issues before them if the
SR
dispute could be resolved without reference to the constitution.
4.5 Constitutional Protection ofMedia Freedom in Botswana and South Africa
African states came to independence at diverse periods with varied constitutions.
Those that attained independence in the late sixties and early seventies inherited
constitutions, which did not specifically guarantee media freedoms. These were
subsumed under the freedom of expression clause. It was only in the eighties that
constitutions recognised media freedom as separate and distinct from freedom of
expression.59 This pattern remains true to date and is reflected in Botswana's
independence constitution of 1966 and South Africa's democratic constitution of
1996, respectively.
4.5.1 Protection ofMedia Freedom under the Constitution ofBotswana
Section 12(1) of the constitution provides:
'Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of
his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions without
interference, freedom to receive ideas and information without interference,
freedom to communicate ideas and information without interference (whether
the communication be to the public generally or to any person or class of
persons) andfreedom from interference with his correspondence
The constitution does not expressly guarantee media freedom, rather, it refers to
freedom to communicate ideas and information without interference. In a recent case,
the High Court in obiter dictum held that media freedom is an aspect of freedom of
expression.60 However, no authorities were cited to support this conclusion. It is
submitted that given the importance of comparative international law in the
interpretation of the law in the country, the court's conclusion is correct. In a leading
authority on constitutional interpretation in the Commonwealth, the Privy Council
58 B. Otlhogile, A History of the Higher Courts ofBotswana (Mmegi Publishing House, 1993).
59 See B. Otlhogile, 'Media Law Reform - Towards Proactive Strategies' a paper presented at the
Southern African Media Lawyers' Conference, Windhoek, Namibia, 27th August 1999.
60 Media Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Attorney General and others MICSA 229/2001 (Unreported) at 21.
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declared that a constitution is sui generis, calling for principles of interpretation of its
own, suitable to its character.61 The court further held that, in interpreting the
provisions o f a c onstitution, ' respect m ust b e p aid t o t he 1 anguage w hich h as b een
used and to the traditions and the usages which have given meaning to that
language'. 2
The case was cited with approval by the Court of Appeal of Botswana in Dow v A.G.
(supra), where the court held that in determining the intentions of the framers of the
constitution, a court must determine the 'ethos, the environment, which the framers
thought Botswana was entering into by its acquisition of statehood, and what, if
anything, can be found to have contributed to the formulation of their intentions in the
constitution that they made'.63 The court further held that the B ill o f Rights in the
constitution of Botswana was greatly influenced by the ECHR, which the U.K. had
ratified and applied to its dependent territories, and that the ECHR itself, was in turn
influenced by the UDHR. These antecedents, the court concluded, called for a
generous interpretation of the provisions of the constitution suitable to give to
individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
constitution.
Following the jurisprudence developed under the ECHR, the High Court was correct
to conclude that even though section 12(1) does not expressly guarantee media
freedom, the freedom is implicitly guaranteed.64 Media freedom under the constitution
is protected against any interference, and it is submitted that in distinction to the
position under the ECHR, this refers to interference from both public authorities and
private parties. It is important to contrast the language used in section 12(1) and that
employed in Article 10 of the ECHR, the former does not include the qualification,
'by public authorities', hence the conclusion that section 12(1) should be interpreted
along similar lines to the UDHR, ICCPR and ACHR on this point. As a result thereof,
the state is placed under an obligation to take measures to prevent media monopolies
61
Minister ofHome Affairs & another v Fisher & another [1980] AC 319 at 329.
62
Per Lord Wilberforce, Ibid.
6' Per Amissah JP in Dow v A.G. (supra) n 44 above at 654 - 5.
64 See Sunday Times (No. I) v U.K. (supra) n 21 above, where the ECtHR held that the principles of
freedom of expression are of particular importance as far as the press and other media are concerned.
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or oligopolies by private parties, which are a threat to media freedom in that they
compromise diversity in the provision of information.
Section 12, as Article 10 of the ECHR, applies a double standard in its treatment of
the print and broadcast media. In terms of section 12(2)(b), the legislature is
empowered to enact legislation regulating the technical administration or the technical
operation of broadcasting or television. Although the language of this proviso appears
to be forbidding any form of censorship of the broadcast media, except that which
relates to technical aspects, the courts are more likely to adopt the approach taken by
the ECtHR.65 The courts in Botswana will probably recognise that a broadcasting
licence could a lso be made c onditional upon considerations such a s the nature and
objectives of the proposed station or its targeted audience to enable the state to fulfil
its obligations deriving from the constitution and the international legal instruments
discussed above. These obligations include, inter alia, ensuring diversity in
information sources and maintaining a plurality of voices.
Freedom of information is expressly guaranteed under section 12(1), which provides
that freedom of expression includes 'freedom to receive information' and 'freedom to
communicate infonnation without interference'. The provision employs the term
'communicate' rather than 'impart', which is used in the international human rights
instruments. The two terms however have the same meaning. The constitution only
protects a passive right to receive information along similar lines to the ECHR. The
courts in the country have not yet had opportunity to proclaim the extent of this right.
In spite of this, the courts are more likely to be influenced by the decisions of the
ECtHR, given the similarity in the language used in the constitution and the ECHR.
The right under the constitution depends on there being a willing speaker and the state
has no obligation to gather and disseminate information. The Court of Appeal has
however held that the primary duty of judges is to make the constitution grow and
develop in order to meet the just demands and aspirations of an ever-developing
society.66 Given the importance of freedom of information, especially in enabling the
citizenry to make informed choices in the democratic process, one can only hope that
the courts, consistent with the Court of Appeal's opinion, will recognise an active
65 See Informationsverein Lentia & others v Austria (supra), n 23 above.
66
Per Aguda JA in Dow v A.G. (supra) n 44 above at 668.
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right to government held information, subject to the well recognised exceptions, such
as, national security, public order, protection of reputations of others, etc.
The guarantee ofmedia freedom and freedom of information under the constitution is
not absolute, their exercise is subject to section 12(2) which is in the following terms:
'Nothing contained in or done wider the authority ofany law shall be held to
be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the
law in question makes provision —
(a) that is reasonably required in the interests ofdefence, public safety,
public order, public morality orpublic health; or
(b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the
reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons or the private lives
ofpersons concerned in legal proceedings, preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, maintaining the authority and
independence of the courts, regulating educational institutions in the
interests of persons receiving instruction therein, or regulating the
technical administration or the technical operation of telephony,
telegraphy, posts, wireless, broadcasting or television; or
(c) that imposes restrictions upon public officers, employees of local
government bodies, or teachers,
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done
under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society'.
The proviso incorporates the three-part test found in the international legal
instruments on human rights in the determination of the legitimacy of restrictions to
media freedom and freedom of information. First, the restriction must be done under
the authority of any law. The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe has held that the phrase
under the authority of any law, although worded differently from such equivalent
phrases as provided by law, prescribed by law or in terms of the law, used in other
constitutional and human rights instruments, carries substantially the same meaning.67
The court went on to apply the decision of the ECtHR in Sunday Times (No.l) v U.K.
(supra), and concluded that, to satisfy the test, done under the authority of any law,
the law must be adequately accessible and formulated with sufficient precision to
67 Chavunduka & another vMinister ofHome Affairs 2000 4 SA 1.
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enable a person to regulate his/her conduct. The courts in Botswana are still to decide
on the meaning of this phrase, but it is submitted that given the similarity in the
wording of the two countries' constitutional provisions on freedom of expression, and
their close relationship with the ECHR, they should reach the same conclusion.
Second, a restriction must serve one or more of the purposes enumerated in sub¬
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) above. It is pursuant to this provision that the legislature
has enacted laws relating to the prohibition of publication of defamatory matter,
treason, sedition, national security, etc.68 What is striking about the history of
Botswana is that, after over thirty years of independence, no court has ever decided on
the constitutionality of any law relating to media freedom or freedom of information.
Although the constitutionality of some of the laws is in doubt, the courts have denied
themselves the chance to consider such laws by avoiding engaging in the
interpretation of constitutional provisions (doctrine of avoidance alluded to above)
while in other cases, the state withdrew charges in cases involving these laws.69
Third, any restriction must also be shown to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society. Once again, in the absence of guidance from local case law on the. subject,
guidance must be sought from comparative law. The determination of a restriction,
whether it is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society, involves a balancing
exercise, whether the benefits to a democratic society resulting from the specific
restriction demonstrably outweigh the detriment caused to a democratic society by the
specific restriction. The ECtHR has held that the demands of pluralism, tolerance and
broadmindedness, without which there is no democratic society, require the protection
not only of information and ideas that are favourably received or regarded as
inoffensive, but also to those which offend or disturb the state or sector of the
population.70 The influence that the ECHR had on the drafting of the constitution of
Botswana, and also in the interpretation of its other fundamental provisions, should
68 See generally, T. Balule and B. Maripe, A Quick Guide to Laws and Practices that Inhibit Freedom
ofExpression in Botswana (MISA-Botswana, 2000).
69 For example, on 28th February 1995, the High Court dismissed charges against two journalists
working for Mmegi newspaper who were charged under the National Security Act for unlawfully
receiving an official document marked 'secret' and publishing classified information. And on 25th May
1998, the Attorney General withdrew charges against a journalist charged under section 59 of the Penal
Code for publishing false statements.
70
Handyside v U.K. (supra), n 29 above at para. 49.
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persuade the courts to adopt a similar approach to the ECtHR on the determination of
what is 'reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society'.
4.5.2 Protection ofMedia Freedom under the Constitution ofSouth Africa
Media freedom is expressly guaranteed by the South African constitution under the
freedom of expression clause. The relevant part provides that:
'Everyone has the right to freedom ofexpression, which includes —
(a) freedom ofthe press and other media; '71
The Constitutional Court has pronounced on the importance of the rights guaranteed
by section 16(1) holding that 'the constitution recognises that individuals in the
society need to be able to hear, form and express opinions and views freely on a wide
range ofmatters',72 hence the need to protect freedom of expression. The constitution
does not limit its guarantee to the freedom of the press, but specifically extends the
freedom to other media of communication. The guarantee extends to, inter alia, radio
• • 73and television.
With regard to the broadcast media, the guarantee ofmedia freedom must be read
together with section 192, which provides for the establishment of an independent
authority to regulate broadcasting in the public interest, to ensure fairness and
diversity of views broadly representing South African society. The section imports the
double standard in the treatment of the press and broadcast media found in ECHR and
the constitution of Botswana into South Africa. While a reading of section 16(1)
seems to prohibit any form of censorship of the media, section 192 pennits some form
of censorship of the broadcast media in order to enable the state to fulfil duties
imposed on it under the latter section.
Media freedom is protected not only against interference by the state, but also against
interference by private parties. Section 8(2) of the constitution provides that the Bill
71 Section 16(1) of the Constitution.
72 South African National Defence Union v Minister ofDefence & another 1999 4 SA 469 at 477.
73
Dotcom Trading 121 (Pty) Ltd t/a Live Africa Network News v King & others 2000 4 SA 973.
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of Rights binds natural and juristic persons if, and to the extent that a provision is
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty
imposed by the right. Since media freedom imposes upon the state a duty to ensure
diversity and a plurality of voices, it must take steps to ward off any threats to the
freedom by private parties.
Freedom of information is also expressly guaranteed in two provisions. Section 16(1)
protects the 'freedom to receive, impart information and ideas', and further, section
32(1) proclaims:
'Everyone has the right ofaccess to -
(a) any information held by the state; and
(b) any information that is held by another person and that is required
for the exercise orprotection ofany rights
The Constitutional Court has proclaimed the importance of freedom of information to
the general freedom of expression in the following tenns:
'Firstly, my right to express myself is severely impaired if others' rights to
hear my speech are not protected. And secondly, my own right to freedom of
expression includes as a necessary corollary the right to be exposed to inputs
from others that will inform, condition and ultimately shape mv own
. 74
expression .
The dictum shows that freedom of expression, which includes media freedom and
freedom of information, is impoverished if it does not embrace the right to receive,
hold and consume expressions transmitted by others. Section 16(1 )(b) provides for a
passive right to information, while section 32(1) provides for an active right to
information held by the government and a qualified right to information held by
private parties. The latter section also makes provision for the enactment of legislation
to give effect to the public's right to information.75 Pursuant to this provision, the
legislature has enacted the Promotion ofAccess to Information Act 2000, which gives
effect to the constitutional right of access to information.
74 Case vMinister ofSafety and Security; Curtis v Minister ofSafety and Security 1996 BCLR 609 at
622.
75 Section 32(2) of the Constitution.
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Consistent with international human rights instruments, the constitution recognises
that media freedom and freedom of information are not absolute. The exercise of
these freedoms does not extend to propaganda for war, incitement of imminent
violence or advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion.76 In
addition, t he p rovisions g uaranteeing t he t wo freedoms m ust b e r ead t ogether w ith
section 36(1) of the constitution, which is a general limitation clause on the exercise
of rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights. The limitation clause reads:
'The rights in the Bill ofRights may be limited only in terms of law ofgeneral
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom,
taking into account all the relevantfactors, including -
(a) the nature ofthe right;
(b) the importance ofthe purpose ofthe limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relationship between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive, means to achieve the purpose. '
The application of the limitation clause involves a process of weighing up of
competing values and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality, which calls
for the balancing of different interests.77 Each particular infringement of a right has
different implications in an open and democratic society based on dignity, equality
and freedom. The proportionality of a limitation therefore, is assessed in the context
of its legislative and social setting, and as a result, courts have said there can be no
absolute standard for determining the reasonableness of limitations to rights, but that
the reasonableness of a given limitation can only be done on a case-by-case basis with
70
reference to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. It has also been said
that the five factors expressly itemised in section 36(1) are not presented as an
exhaustive list, but that they are included in the section as key factors, to be used in
76 Section 16(2) of the Constitution.
77 Dotcom Trading 121 (Pty) Ltd t/a Live Africa Network News v King & others (supra) n 73 above at
989.
78 5 v Monamela 2000 3 SA 1 at 20.
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conjunction with any other relevant factors, in the overall determination whether or
not the limitation of a right is justifiable.79
The constitution does not follow the traditional three-part test in the determination of
the legitimacy of restrictions to media freedom and freedom of information, instead, it
sets a two-part test. First, the limitation must be in terms of law of general application.
The determination of this issue should be the same with the approach taken in the
80
interpretation of similar phrases. Secondly, a limitation must be shown to be
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom. This is based on an assessment of proportionality, which calls
for the balancing of different competing interests, and is done on a case-by-case basis.
4.6 Conclusion
International treaties are said to enshrine minimum standards of human rights below
O 1
which no member of the community of nations should fall. Fundamental human
rights guarantees under national law should therefore be no less extensive than those
provided for in international human rights instruments. The constitutional provisions
of Botswana and South Africa guaranteeing media freedom and freedom of
information appear to provide reasonably satisfactory protection to the two freedoms
consistent with standards set in the international human rights instruments. The
protection guaranteed by the constitution of Botswana is similar to that offered by the
ECHR. A notable difference though, is that the protection of the freedoms under the
former extends beyond interference by public authorities to interference by private
parties.
Under the South African constitution, the freedoms are protected in a similar manner
to t he p rotection found in t he UDHR, ICCPR a nd A CHR. T he freedoms a re m ore
explicit than in the constitution of Botswana. An important distinction between the
South African constitution and the international human rights instruments is found in
80 Ibid'See Chavunduka & another v Minister ofHome Affairs (supra) n 67 above.
81 J. Stevens, The Interpretation ofFundamental Rights Provisions: International & Regional
Standards in African and other Commonwealth Jurisdictions (Article 19, 1998) p. 15.
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the manner of determining the legitimacy of restrictions to media freedoms. The
former employs a two-part test instead of the traditional three-part test in that it does
not expressly enumerate the grounds on which freedom of expression may be
justifiably interfered with. The two-part test is attractive in that it puts emphasis on
the right and that any limitation thereto is only an exception, which must be justified
in the light of existing facts. It can however be argued that the test does not provide
for certainty in the law that the three-part test may be said to offer since restrictions
are determined on a case by case basis, and as a result thereof, one cannot reasonably
foresee whether in a given case the courts will or will not sanction a restriction on the
freedom of expression.
The entrenchment of media freedom in a state's constitution alone is not enough. It
also requires backing by an efficient enforcement mechanism, which will ensure that
the freedom is observed and exercised without interference. The enforcement
mechanism, in the context of the two states, is provided by the courts of law, which
are charged with the responsibility of upholding the constitution by ensuring that the
executive and legislature comply with the constitution. The courts must therefore be
independent of both the executive and legislature and must demonstrate their
eagerness to uphold the constitution by expounding its provisions so that citizens
should know what the guaranteed freedoms entail. While the South African courts
have demonstrated an eagerness to expound the provisions of the constitution, it is sad
to note that courts in Botswana are disappointing in this respect.
There is however a problem that seriously compromises the effectiveness of the
enforcement mechanism. In the tradition of the common law, courts do not give
advisory opinions, they give opinions on real lawsuits. A person may not approach the
courts to seek a ruling as to whether or not a proposed law is constitutional or how it
will work in practice. This therefore means that constitutional provisions are
interpreted in a way that is only relevant and limited to the controversy in question.
Consequently, constitutional provisions guaranteeing media freedom have not been
expounded in a methodological way to show with clarity the extent of the freedom.
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PART III
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF THE MEDIA: ENHANCING
DIVERSITY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION
CHAPTER 5
MEDIA REGULATION IN BOTSWANA AND SOUTH AFRICA
5.1 Introduction
In chapter two I argue that media freedom is an instrumental good and that its
exercise must promote the goals of free speech. Pluralism and diversity in the media
are considered indispensable to democratic communication. Regulation of the media
is therefore justified in so far as it aims at ensuring diversity in media output, which is
viewed as necessary to enable a well-informed public to participate in the decision¬
making process. Media regulation in western democracies has to a large extent been
shaped by the social and political value accorded to a free media in particular, and
freedom of speech in general.1
Pluralism in the media has two facets: internal pluralism, concerned with ensuring
that media content responds to a range of interests and meets diverse tastes rather than
offering content which is offered simply because it is cheap or appealing to
advertisers; and external pluralism, concerned with the maintenance of a plurality of
autonomous and independent media services.
A central public interest principle in broadcasting is that of universal access, i.e.,
ensuring the availability of broadcasting services to all citizens. In developing
countries, such as Botswana and South Africa, where the majority of the population
cannot afford television sets, and with the emergence of new and expensive
technologies such as cable and satellite, the question of access must also focus on the
affordability of these. Genuine access to alternative channels depends not only on
their existence, but also on their effective distribution, availability and affordability.
In addition to geographic coverage, it is also important in the context of the two





countries, given their low literacy rates, to provide broadcasting services in languages
familiar to their citizens.
In this chapter, I discuss the regulation of both the print and broadcast media in
Botswana and South Africa with the above considerations in mind. Focus is on the
legislative measures in place in the two states and the extent to which these are
designed to ensure both external and internal pluralism in the media sector, and access
to media services, especially, broadcasting. An attempt is also made to evaluate the
success and/or failure of the regulatory regimes in the two countries in the light of the
present state of the media as depicted in chapter 3. I conclude by comparing the
regulatory regimes in the two countries and how they compare with other regimes,
especially, those in the developed western democracies, and what lessons, if any, the
former can learn from the latter's experiences.
5.2 Regulation of the Print Media
5.2.1 Botswana
a. Regulatingfor External Pluralism
In terms of the Printed Publications Act 1968,5 no newspaper shall be printed or
published in Botswana unless it has been registered at the General Post Office with
the Registrar of Newspapers.4 To secure registration, the proprietor of a newspaper is
required to launch with the Registrar a return, containing: the title of the newspaper,
name and place of residence of the editor and name and place of business of both the
publisher and printer.5 There is no discretion to refuse registration. Registration is
intended to provide a source of information on a newspaper's owners, and not as a
means of censorship. The registration of newspapers in Botswana is said to have






rather, an application for concessionary mailing rates with the Post Office.6 The
proposed Mass Communications B ill 2 001 h owever s eeks t o i mpose c onditions for
registration of newspapers. If the bill is enacted into law, newspaper proprietors will
be required to provide a statement of account setting out the financial resources
available to them to engage in the printing and publishing of the newspaper and
payment of a registration fee.7
The Printed Publications Act 1968 does not restrict the number of titles that any one
entity can own, nor does it impose limitations on foreign ownership of the print
media. The Mass Communications Bill 2001 also does not propose to limit ownership
of titles, however, it proposes to limit foreign ownership of the press to 20% of the
equity shares of a company that owns a newspaper.
Botswana does not have competition legislation to address problems of concentration
of ownership in the media industry or in any other sector. The government is currently
working on a policy that will culminate in the enactment of such legislation.9 Once
enacted, problems of concentration in the media sector will be addressed under the
general framework of competition law. There appears to be no intention on the part of
government to include any specific provisions for the press.10
b. Regulatingfor Internal Pluralism
The private press is not subject to any legal content obligations to ensure internal
diversity. The content of a newspaper is greatly dependent on the tastes of its
readership with most papers tailoring their editorial content to meet or coincide with
the views of its readers. A newspaper that ignores this reality does so at its own peril
because loss of readers will result in loss of advertising revenue to which the private
press relies for its continued existence. There is currently no press code in force in the
6 B. Otlhogile, 'The Constitutional Rights of the Mass Media in Botswana: An Academic's View' in
Leepile, M. (ed) Botswana's Media and Democracy: Selected Papers from the Seminar on the Media
in a Democracy, Gaborone February - March, 1994 (Mmegi Publishing House, 1996) 53 at 56.
7 Section 6 (f) & (g). The impact that the registration fee may have on the issue of external pluralism is
discussed under the section on the evaluation of the regulatory structures: 3.2.1 (b).
8 Section 7(2).
9 The Ministry of Commerce and Industry released a Draft Competition Policy in Febmary 2000.
10 Interview with Ms Tebelelo Seretse, then Minister ofCommerce and Industry. (Gaborone, 22nd
October 2001).
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country t hat m ay i rnpose s ome c ontent o bligations o n t he p ress. A v oluntary press
council was registered in October 2002, but it has not yet adopted a code of practice.
It must however be noted that one of the objects of the Mass Communications Bill
2001 is to establish a press council. The governing body of the envisaged council will
be appointed by the minister of Communications, and will be charged with the
responsibility of promulgating a code of practice and its enforcement.11 Since the
industry has now established a voluntary press council, the question is whether the
government will still go ahead with its plans to legislate for a press council or will
give recognition to the newly established one, and abandon its plans.
The state owned Daily News is however subject to some content obligations. These
obligations derive from the mandate of its publishers, the Department of Information
and Broadcasting (DIB). The DIB was formed to inter alia: explain policies and
12actions of government to the people, and advise government on public opinion. The
department therefore use the Daily News and other state owned media to
communicate government policies to the people and to give feed back from the people
to the government.13 The Daily News is supposed to give coverage to developmental
news; however, it has been observed that, at the moment, its emphasis tends to be
coverage of official speeches (with no critical commentaries), and the comings and
goings of top national political leaders, particularly the president.14
c. Evaluation ofthe Regulatory Structures
Even though the regulatory regime provided by the Printed Publications Act 1968 is
quite liberal (at least in so far as allowing new players into the market is concerned),
there are only nine mainstream publications in circulation in the country. The reason
for the small number o f p ublications i s not due to c ensorship, but to the country's
peculiar economic and social circumstances.15 The situation may become worse under
" See sections 19 and 22(2)(e).
12
Draft Performance Management Strategic Plan 2001 - 2010 (Department of Information and
Broadcasting, 2001) p. 10.
13 L.M. Mpotokwane, 'Government Media as Promoters ofDemocracy: An Examination of Three
Cases' in J. Holm & P. Molutsi (eds.) Democracy in Botswana: The Proceedings ofa Symposium held
in Gaborone Is' - 5th August 1998 (Macmillan Botswana Publishing Co, 1989) 245.
14
J. Zaffiro, From Police Network to Station of the Nation: A Political Histoiy ofBroadcasting in
Botswana 1927 - 1991 (Botswana Society, 1991) p. 84.
'5 See chapter 3 at 3.3.1.
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the proposed new law. If the financial requirements and the registration fee are set
high, this may disqualify many potential new players from breaking into the market.
The p ossibility o f s uch a d evelopment i s n ot w ithout p recedent. In 1 998 w hen t he
government liberalised the airwaves, the licensing authority invited tenders for eight
FM radio licences. At the end, only two applicants were awarded licences. The other
applicants who submitted tenders were unable to meet the excessively high financial
requirements set by the licensing authority.16
Lack of controls on ownership of newspaper titles is slowly leading towards
ownership concentrations in the sector. The acquisition by Dikgang Publishing Co of
a controlling stake in the Guardian and Midweek Sun in November 2001 dealt a heavy
blow to external pluralism in the sector. The acquisition gives the company control of
about 45% of the general newspaper circulation in the country and 67% of the private
press. It is therefore not surprising that the move has resulted in calls for government
to promulgate rules to limit ownership in the print media.17
Diversity in the press has several components. These include, among others,
intellectual and ideological diversity, regional diversity, cultural diversity and
1 o
diversity of format. Applying these standards to the press in Botswana, they reveal a
serious lack of diversity. All the publications in the country are tabloids. There are no
quality papers (broadsheets). It has been observed that the press in Botswana lacks
diversity i n b oth e ditorial s tyle a nd c ontent. Tod emonstrate t his s hortcoming, i t i s
said that, if one has read the Guardian, there is no need to buy Mmegi, as the issues
covered will generally be identical.19 Save for the Daily News, the content and
distribution of the other publications are biased in favour of affluent urban audiences.
Rural audiences are generally neglected and there is also a shortage of publications in
indigenous languages.20
16 See T. Balule, 'When Money Becomes a Freedom ofExpression Issue' (1999) 2 (1) Southern Africa
Media Development Fund News 3, available at: [http://www.misa.org],
17
See, 'Government Must Introduce Media Ownership Rules' Mmegi 1st - 10,h January 2002, p. 18.
18 P.J. Humpreys, Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe (Manchester University Press,
1996) p. 72.
19
A.P.N. Thapisa & E. Megwa, Situation Analysis and Profile of the Mass Communications in
Botswana (Report prepared for the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1998) p. 66.
20 See chapter 3 at 3.2.1.
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Given the problems of diversity of content, distribution and the fact that there is no
private daily newspaper in the country, the government justifies the continued
existence of the Daily News on the basis that it fills the vacuum left by the private
press. It therefore means that, so long as the private newspapers are limited in their
frequency and geographical coverage, there remains a role for the Daily News to play,
especially, in servicing the rural communities.21
5.2.2 South Africa
a. Regulatingfor External Pluralism
During the apartheid era, newspapers printed and published in South Africa had to be
22
registered under the Newspaper Imprint and Registration Act 1971. Before a
newspaper could be registered under the Act, it had to be cleared under the Internal
Security Act 1982.23 The latter was used by the apartheid government to curb
newspapers t hat w ere c ritical o f i ts p olicies.24 H owever, u nder t he n ew d emocratic
dispensation, the Newspaper Imprint and Registration Act 1971 has been repealed and
replaced by the Imprint Amendment Act of 1994.25 Under the new Act, the press is no
longer subject to licensing. The new law regulates matters such as the protection of
names of existing newspapers, the identity of printers and addresses at which
newspapers are printed.26
There are no limits imposed on ownership of titles or on foreign ownership of the
print media. Monopolist trends that tend to prevent diversity and pluralism in the
media have always been regulated by the state. First, these were regulated under the
Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act 1979 21 The objective of the Act was
to maintain and promote competition by, among others, the prevention ofmonopolies.
The Act did not have any special provisions applying to the print media. However,
21 National Development Plan 8 1997/98 - 2002/03 (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning,
1997) p. 448.
22 Act 63 of 1971.
23 Act 74 of 1982.
24 Y. Burns, Communications Law (Butterworths, 2001) p. 299.
25
Act no. 18 of 1994, available at: [http://www.parliament.gov.za/acts/1994/act94.018].
26 Section 1.
27 Act 96 of 1979.
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there is evidence that in the seventies and eighties, the competition board created
under the Act, was able to intervene in certain cases to prevent monopolies in the print
media industry.
The Maintenance and Promotion ofCompetition Act 1979 has now been repealed and
9Q
replaced by the Competition Act 1998. The new Act provides for the establishment
of a Competition Commission,30 which is an independent body31 responsible for
investigating, controlling and evaluating restrictive practices, abuse of dominant
position,33and mergers and acquisitions. 4 The Act applies to all economic activity
within, or having effect within the country.33 This therefore means that the Act applies
to the press industry. Like its predecessor, the Act leaves the question of monopolies
within the print media industry to be referred to the Competitions Commission, to be
dealt with under the broad framework of competitions policy. The Act stipulates
specific thresholds beyond which mergers must be notified to the Commission. These
are classified as: 'a small' merger, an 'intermediate' merger and a 'large' merger.36
Thresholds are worked out on the basis of the value of the combined annual turnover
37
or assets involved in any merger."
Companies considering a merger that falls into the intermediate or large categories
must notify the Commission before it is implemented. Small mergers do not need to
be notified to the Commission and may be completed without approval, unless it
28 Y. Burns, 'Freedom ofExpression under the New Constitution' (1997) 30 Comparative
International Law ofSouthern Africa 264 at 273.
29 Act 89 of 1998.
30 Section 19. The Commission consists of a Commissioner and one or two deputy Commissioners,
appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry.
jl Section 20.
32 Section 4 deals with restrictive horizontal practices and section 5, with vertical restrictive practices.
33 Section 8.
j4 Sections 11 - 18.
Section 3(1).
Section 11(5).
"'7 A small merger refers to a merger or proposed merger where the combined annual turnover or assets
of the buying firm and the target firm are valued below R200 million or where the annual turnover or
asset value is under R30 million. An intermediate merger is where the combined annual turnover or
assets of the buying firm and the target firm are valued at or above R200 million but below R3.5 billion
or if the annual turnover or asset value of the target firm equals or exceeds R30 million but less than
R100 million. And a large merger is one where the combined annual turnover or assets of the buying
firm and the target firm equals or exceeds R3.5 billion or if the annual turnover or asset value of the
target exceeds R100 million. See Notice by the Minister of Trade and Industry published in




appears within six months that the merger may substantially prevent or lessen
competition, or cannot be justified on public interest grounds.39 Whenever required to
consider a merger, the Commission must decide whether or not the merger is likely to
prevent or reduce competition in the particular market. This is achieved by assessing
the strength of competition in the relevant market and the likelihood that the
companies in that market will behave competitively after that merger.40 The Act
stipulates several factors that have to be taken into consideration in determining this
issue.41 After considering and assessing the above factors, the Commission must
further consider two matters: (a) whether anti-competitive effects are outweighed by
technological, efficiency or pro-competitive gains which would occur as a result of
the merger and which will be greater than the prevention or lessening of competition;
and (b) whether the merger can or cannot be justified on substantial public interest
grounds by assessing such factors and the effect it will have on, a particular industrial
sector or region, employment, the ability of small or black/emerging business to
become competitive and the ability of national industries to compete in international
markets.42 The latter consideration is important in the media sector, as pluralism and
diversity are important public interests issues that the Commission will have to try to
protect when considering mergers or proposed mergers. The Commission is yet to
consider a merger in the print media industry under the new law.
b. Regulating for Internal Pluralism
The press in South Africa is not subject to any legal content obligations. Newspapers
are free to publish anything subject only to the general law. In practice, however, their
readers and advertisers determine the content of the papers. It has been observed that
advertisers in the country choose newspapers that reflect their political, socio-
Section 13.
40 Section 12A(1) & (2).
41 These include, the actual and potential level of import competition in the market; the ease of entry
into the market, including tariff and regulatory barriers; the level and trends of concentration, and
history of collusion, in the market; the degree of countervailing power in the market; the dynamic
characteristics of the market, including growth, innovation, and product differentiation; the nature and
extent of vertical integration in the market; whether the business or part of the business of a party to the
merger or proposed merger has failed or is likely to fail; and whether the merger will result in the
removal of an effective competitor. (Section 12A(2).)
42 Section 12A(3).
115
economic and cultural viewpoints, and that editors and journalists generally adhere to
these viewpoints to ensure continued financial support.43
South Africa has a press code that all newspapers in circulation have voluntarily
elected to abide by. The code arguably imposes some content obligations on the press.
It requires newspapers to, among others, report news truthfully, accurately and fairly;
present news in context and in a balanced manner; seek the views of the subject of
serious critical reportage in advance of publication and make amends for publishing
or comment that is found to be harmfully inaccurate by printing a retraction,
correction or explanation.44 These obligations, to a certain extent, do determine the
content of newspapers. A Press Ombudsman and an Appeal Panel enforces the code.
In making their decisions, they must provide full reasons for their findings and the
decisions are public records and are kept at the institution's headquarters.45
c. Evaluation ofthe Regulatory Structures
The scrapping of newspaper registration requirements has, unfoitunately, not resulted
in the entry into the market ofmany new players. In fact, as noted in chapter 3, South
Africa has the second lowest number of newspaper titles in the world compared to its
population size. Even though the newspaper industry has always been subject to
competition law, this seems to have failed to prevent concentration of ownership in
the sector. The newspaper industry is dominated by three media groups, who, between
them, own over 90% of the mainstream newspaper titles in circulation in the
country.46 The monopoly created by the three groups has raised entry costs into the
newspaper i ndustry, m aking i t d ifficult for n ew c omers t o b reak i nto t he m arket.47
Such a high level of ownership concentration can arguably lead to homogenisation of
information, resulting in the denial of citizens to diversity in information sources.
4j
Burns, 'Freedom of Expression under the New Constitution', n 28 above at 275.
44
Para. 1 of the Press Code, available at: [http://www.u-paris2.fr/ifp/deontologie/afriqueSud. html].
43 See paras. 5, 6 & 11 of the Constitution of the Press Ombudsman and Appeal Panel, available at:
[http://wwwsuntimes.co.za/sitemap/ombudsman.asp\. Due to difficulties in accessing the records, I was
not able to establish what leading decisions have been made by the institution to date.
46 See chapter 3 at 3.3.3 for a detailed discussion of this point.
47 Media Concentration and its Impact in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (Report
produced by Freedom of Expression Institute for IFEX meeting in New York, 20th May 2000) p. 15.
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Sadly, the post-democratic period has also witnessed the demise of the 'alternative
48
press'. Donors, who withdrew their support after the first democratic elections,
leading to their closure, financed these newspapers 49 The demise of the alternative
press was a great loss to diversity.
Despite concentrations in ownership of the print media, the mainstream newspapers in
South Africa offer a reasonable measure of diversity of format and content. The
content of the papers focus mainly on: politics, public affairs, culture, business,
entertainment and sports. The presentation of these matters differs across titles, each
adopting a style suited to its targeted audience. The Mail & Guardian and the Sunday
Times are quality papers, and these are complimented by the other titles, mostly
tabloids. The content of the majority of these papers however caters for the interests
ofmiddle to upper income earners. Distribution of newspapers is skewed in favour of
urban areas, which means that the rural population is not adequately serviced by the
newspaper industry. The interests of the poor black South Africans, who are in the
majority, are not fully represented in the mainstream newspaper titles.50
In a country that has eleven official languages (nine of these African), lack of
newspaper titles in indigenous African languages is quite conspicuous. Currently
there is only one title published in an African language. Most titles are published in
English and a few in Afrikaans. There is also lack of regional diversity i n that the
mainstream newspaper titles are all based in the rich industrialised provinces.
The government of South Africa has realised that market forces, the liberalisation of
entry requirements into media markets and the changes in ownership involving black
empowerment groups, on their own, cannot fully achieve transformation within the
media sector to secure pluralism and diversity. The government has adopted a policy
on media development and diversity to remedy the deficiencies in the media sector in
order to bring about diversity and pluralism within the sector.51 The policy forms the
basis for the Media and Diversity Agency Act 2002, aimed at promoting pluralism and
48
These are newspapers that emerged during the 1980's, outside the then duopoly of the English and
Afrikaans press, which gave platform to the voices of the resistance movement.
49 The Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) Position Paper 2001 (Government
Communications and Information System) p. 14.
50 See chapter 3 at 3.3.3 on factors that generally determine content of newspapers.
51 The MDDA Position Paper, n 49 above.
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diversity in the media sector. The primary purpose of the policy is to help create an
enabling environment for media to develop and meet the diverse needs of all South
Africans. In particular, the policy targets those marginalized because of factors such
as gender, race, disability, geographic location, class or income, as well as
marginalized schools of thought.33
An independent statutory body, the Media Development and Diversity Agency
(MDDA), which acts through a board, implements both the policy and the Act. The
board consists of nine members, six are appointed by the president on the
recommendation of the National Assembly and three directly by the president. In the
case of the latter members, one must be from the commercial print media and another
from the commercial broadcast media. Members of the board must be people
committed to fairness, freedom of expression, openness and accountability. When
viewed collectively, membership of the board must be representative of a broad cross
section of the population of the country and must possess suitable qualifications,
expertise and experience in the fields such as community media, social, labour and
development issues, media economics, financial management and funding,
advertising and marketing, journalism and broadcast programming, media research,
media training, literacy and education, media law, information and communication
technology policy.54 The MDDA is required to operate at arms-length from the
government, the private sector and any donors.35 In terms of sections 6 and 8 of the
Act, members of the board are appointed for a renewable term of between three and
five years and can only be removed from office by the National Assembly. The
MDDA is accountable to parliament through annual reports submitted to the minister
responsible for government communications, who in turn, must table such reports
before parliament.
The mandate of the MDDA is to promote diversity and development of freedom of
the press and other media through, inter alia, encouraging ownership and control of,
and access to, media by historically disadvantaged communities as well as by
32
Act No. 14 of 2002, available at: [http://www.gov.za/docwnents/02Sublist.htmitM].
53 The MDDA Position Paper, n 49 above p. 4.
54 Section 4, MDDA Act.
55 Section 2.
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historically diminished indigenous language and cultural groups.56 The main
beneficiaries of the policy are community media, as well as small commercial media,
including radio, television, print and new media. The nature of support offered to
these media will include: direct subsidies that are cash grants, emergency funding
aimed at strengthening and ensuring the survival of media projects, capacity
development, training and conducting media research.37 The guiding principle in
making recommendations for support is the contribution that projects would make to
media development and diversity. The MDDA is prohibited from interfering in the
editorial content of the media.59
Funding for the implementation of the policy is provided by government through
appropriation in parliament and from donors.60 The estimated cost of implementing
the policy is in the region of R500 million over a five-year period. It is envisaged that
expenditure will progressively decline after five years due to a significant decline in
the need for support to community radio.61 Government has pledged to raise about
two-thirds of the funding needs of the MDDA in the short term, with the hope that
once the agency is firmly established, it will be possible to mobilise donor funding
that will reduce the demand on government.62
The policy seeks to address a serious defect in the South African media market. If the
policy can be implemented properly, it should go a long way in catering for the
interests of the millions of South Africans currently marginalized by the mainstream
newspaper titles. A proper implementation of the policy has the potential of ensuring
entry into the media market of new community voices; especially publications in
indigenous African languages and regional titles from the poorer regions, thus
enhancing plurality and diversity in the press sector.
56 Section 3.
57 Section 17.
78 MDDA Position Paper, n 49 above pp. 8 -9.
39 Section 2(5).
60 Section 15.
61 MDDA Position Paper, n 49 above p. 48. The assumption here seems to be that, after five years,
community radio stations will have established themselves and will be able to survive without need for
support. During the first five years, the policy aims at assisting, among others, 28 existing newspapers
for 2 years; 25 new newspapers for 5 years; 57 existing community radio stations for 4 years and 67
new community radio stations for 5 years.
62 Ibid.
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5.3 Regulation of the Broadcast Media
In chapter 2 I observed that the broadcast media, worldwide, has been, and continues
to be, subjected to a significantly greater degree of regulation than the print media.
Various reasons have been advanced for this double standard.63 Whatever the validity
of these reasons, the double standard is also applied in Botswana and South Africa.
Regulation of broadcasting in the two countries is underpinned by the belief that
airwaves are a scarce resource that belongs to the people and must be used for their
benefit.64 The use of the spectrum is considered a privilege, and therefore the public
interest requires frequencies to be allotted in such a way that broadcasting is available
universally and caters for the diverse needs of the total population.65 The argument
that frequencies are a public resource and should be used for serving the needs and
interests of the public underlies the idea ofpublic service broadcasting (PSB).
The concept of PSB is arguably associated with 'Keynesianism',66 where state
intervention in the market was deemed necessary to ensure the fulfilment of public
interest obligations.67 Duncan argues that John Reith. who identified information,
education and entertainment as 'non-negotiables', inspired the core mandate of PSB
in 'welfare states'.68 Feintuck on the other hand argues that different models of PSB
have existed across Europe, thus indicating that the Reithian model is not the only
manifestation of public service ethos. He, however, observes that the lowest common
denominator across the various models of PSB appear to be commitment to delivering
a wide-ranging, quality service to the whole population.69
6j See chapter 2 at 2.4.2.
64 South African White Paper on Broadcasting Policy (Department of Communications, 1998)
para.1.3.3: [http://docweb.pwv.gov.za/docs/policy/broadcastingwp.html] and Botswana's Draft
National Broadcasting Policy of2003. para. 1.2.4, p. 24.
65 South African White Paper on Broadcasting Policy, n 64 above, para. 1.3.3.
66 The theory is named after the economist, John Maynard Keynes, and is associated with state support
for a range of goods and services, including the media. See generally, J. Duncan, Broadcasting and the
National Question: South African Broadcast Media in an Age ofNeo-Liberalism (Freedom of




69 M. Feintuck, Media Regulation, Public Interest and the Law (Edinburgh University Press, 1999) p.
47.
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There is no one clear definition of PSB, however, writings of various scholars reveal
an overlapping consensus on a set of core criteria.70 These have been refined and
summarised by Born and Prosser71 as follows:
i. Universal access or availability, ensuring that all services and
programme types can be received by all;
ii. Universality of genres: that is, mixed programming, a broad and varied
range of programmes within the same schedule that cater for a variety
of tastes and interests;
iii. Provision of high quality programmes in all genres, and thus a
benchmark for quality in all genres, by being well resourced, requiring
high ethical, technical and production standards, and showing the
capacity for innovation, creative risk-taking, pluralism, originality,
distinctiveness, and for challenging viewers;
iv. A mission to inform, educate and entertain and thus enrich the lives of
the audience;
v. Provision of programming that supports social integration and national
identity;
vi. Provision of diverse programming to minorities and special interest
groups to foster belonging and counteract segregation and
discrimination;
vii. Provision ofprogramming that reflects regional interests and identities;
viii. Provision of independent and impartial news and fora for public debate
and plurality of opinions;
ix. Commitment to national and regional production and to local talent;
x. A mission to complement other broadcasters to enrich the broadcasting
ecology;
xi. Affordability: services either free at the point of delivery or at a cost
which makes it affordable to the vast majority of people; and
70 For various definitions of PSB see, among other works, E. Barendt, Broadcasting Law: A
Comparative Study (Clarendon Press, 1993) p. 52; M. Raboy, 'Introduction: Public Service
Broadcasting in the Context of Globalisation' in M. Raboy (ed.) Public Service Broadcastingfor the
21s' Centuiy (Luton University Press, 1996) p. 6, and M. Tracy, The Decline and Fall ofPublic Service
Broadcasting (Oxford University Press, 1998) pp. 26 - 32.
71 G. Born & T. Prosser, 'Culture and Consumerism: Citizenship, Public Service Broadcasting and the
BBC's Fair Trading Obligations' (2001) 64 Modern Law Review 657 at 671.
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xii. Limited, if any, advertising carried on services.
The above summary of the core criteria of PSB, although by no means authoritative,
serves as a very useful guide to its mandate. Public service broadcasters require three
elements to effectively execute their mandate: they must be free and independent,
have sufficient resources to provide quality programming, and be accountable to the
72
public for the way in which they fulfil their mandate and utilise public resources.
Public service broadcasters can only properly serve the public interest if they have full
creative and editorial freedom to present news and other programming to the public
without interference by the government, political institutions or by powerful private
interests. While PSBs should be independent of government interference, they must
be accountable to the public, and mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that they
remain true to their mandate. Funding arrangements for PSB should not render the
broadcaster susceptible to interference with its editorial freedom or institutional
autonomy.
Given that airwaves are regarded as a natural resource and their use must benefit
society as a whole, regulation of the broadcast sector must aim at ensuring that every
citizen has access to broadcasting services, either free at the point of delivery or at an
affordable price. The provision of infrastructure whereby citizens who wish to, can
receive broadcast signals, regardless of their geographical or social location is
necessary for ensuring universal access to broadcasting sendees. The question of
access to broadcasting services is important in the background of the rapid
technological changes brought about by digitalisation, and the potential of powerful
7-3
private i nterests toe reate b arriers t o a ccess. It i s a lso important t hat v lewers a nd
listeners receive programmes in languages that they comprehend. There are various
ways in which universal access to broadcast services can be achieved. Some of the
most common are:74
72 T. Mendel, Public Service Broadcasting: A Comparative Legal Survey (UNESCO, 2000) p.50.
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Digitalisation means that those receiving broadcasts must do so via decoding equipment, with the
possibility of incoiporating facilities for charging either a subscription fee or on the basis of pay-per-
view. In addition, if technological gateways are not kept open, undue power to control who can
transmit will be handed to those corporate interests controlling the gateways. (See Feintuck, n 69 above
p. 200.)
74
Ibid., p. 201 and, Department of Trade and Industry, A New Future for Communications, Cm 5010
(2000) pp. 27 -28 para. 3.4.
122
Provision of publicly funded services, free at the point of delivery,
made available to all citizens regardless of geographical location,
provided they have receiving equipment;
Specifying minimum areas of coverage when granting licences with
the aim of ensuring that all parts of the country receive broadcast
signals;
Imposition of carriage obligations of public service television channels
on all delivery platforms;
Granting priority access to networks of limited capacity to services that
are free at the point of delivery; and
Imposition of language obligations on service providers.
The guarantee of the existence of a wide range of independent and autonomous
players, providing a diverse and high-quality range of programming to all, lies at the
heart of regulation of the broadcast media. It is therefore imperative to have a
mechanism in place to ensure that the ideal is achieved in practice. The ideal is
achieved through the licensing process and imposition of positive obligations
regarding programming. A regulator of the industry, to license and enforce licence
obligations, becomes an absolute necessity. For such regulator to properly carry out
its functions, it must be independent of the government, other organs of state and
powerful private concerns. The regulator should also be accountable to the public to
ensure that it remains true to the public interest. A number of mechanisms are
commonly employed to ensure the independence and accountability of regulators.73
These include:
Explicit guarantee of the independence of the regulator and prohibition
of interference with activities of its members in the legislation that
establishes the regulator or in the state's constitution;
Setting out the policy objectives underpinning broadcast regulation in
legislation establishing the regulator;
75 See Access to the Airwaves: Principles on Freedom ofExpression and Broadcast Regulation (Article
19, 2002) Article 4: [http://www.articlel9.org/docimages/!293ditm], and Council of Europe,
Recommendation Rec (2000) 23: On Functions ofRegulatory Authorities for the Broadcasting Sector.
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Ensuring that the process of appointing members of the regulatory
body is open and democratic to minimise the risk of political or
commercial interference;
Providing security of tenure of office for members of the body;
Accountability of the regulator to a multi-party body such as the
legislature or a committee thereof; and
Provision of the regulator with adequate funding to enable it to carry
out its mandate and at the same time ensuring that the funding process
does not influence decision-making by the body.
5.3.1 Botswana
The Broadcasting Act 1998lb provides the legal framework for the regulation of
broadcasting in Botswana. The Act is a mere skeleton that provides for the
establishment of a National Broadcasting Board (NBB), which is responsible for
awarding broadcasting licences as well as the control and supervision of broadcasting
activities.77 A brief history of regulation of broadcasting in the country may help the
reader to appreciate the current issues concerning regulation of the sector. Since
independence in 1966 until 1998, when two private radio broadcasters were granted
licences, broadcasting was monopolised by the state owned RB, which has been
operating without a licence. Licences for the private broadcasters were issued under
the Botswana Telecommunications Authority Act 1996™ Prior to the enactment of this
Act, the power to issue broadcasting licences was vested in the Botswana
Telecommunications Corporation (BTC).79 However, due to uncertainties in the
procedures, BTC never issued a licence. BTC used to forward all licence applications
to the Office of the President (OP) for clearance, which the latter never did. The
reluctance of the OP to give clearances to applications, according to Zaffiro, was due
76
Act no. 6 of 1999, available at: [http://www.bta.org.bw/publications.html].
77 Section 10(1). The Act came into force on 29th June 2001 and the first Board was created on 1st
August 2001.
78
Act no. 15 of 1996, available at: [http://www.bta.org.bw/publications.html]. The Act establishes a
telecommunications authority to regulate the industry and to issue licences to providers of
telecommunications services.
79 BTC is a state owned enterprise incoiporated under the Botswana Telecommunications Act 1980 to
provide public telecommunications services.
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to reasons of national sovereignty. It was believed that given the weak business
infrastructure and advertising base in the country, serious interest from commercial
sponsors would come mainly from people intending to aim their messages at the then
OA
apartheid South African audience.
In 1996, the High Court ruled that BTC alone, had power to issue broadcasting
licences and that its practice of referring applications to the OP was improper.81 The
decision coincided with the preparation of new legislation on the telecommunications
sector, the Botswana Telecommunications Authority Act 1996. This Act divested BTC
of its licensing powers in the telecommunications sector in favour of a new
telecommunications regulator, the Botswana Telecommunications Authority (BTA).
The power to issue broadcasting licences was also transferred to BTA, even though
the telecommunications policy,82 which formed the basis of the legislation, did not
mention broadcasting at all. It seems by granting BTA powers to issue broadcasting
licences the government was merely giving in to public pressure to liberalise the
airwaves, which was fuelled by the decision in Gunda and Radio Gaga (supra). BTA
subsequently licensed the first private broadcasters in 1998. The authority never
83
developed a policy to give guidance for regulation ofbroadcasting in the country.
In 1998 the government hurriedly passed the Broadcasting Act 1998, which stripped
BTA of its powers to issue broadcasting licences. The move was allegedly in response
84
to complaints from media organisations that BTA had no expertise in broadcasting.
The Botswana Telecommunications Authority Act was thus amended to exclude
RS
broadcasting from the jurisdiction of BTA. The Broadcasting Act was enacted in a
vacuum, as there was no policy setting out the objectives of regulation of the sector.
One of the tasks assigned to the newly established NBB was therefore to come up
with a draft national policy on broadcasting, which will form the framework for
regulation of the sector.
80
Zaffiro, n 14 above pp. 48 - 49.
81 Gunda and Radio Gaga v Botswana Telecommunications Corporation & another M1SCA No. 376/96
(Unreported).
82 Telecommunications Policyfor Botswana (Ministry ofWorks, Transport and Communications,
1995) available at: [http://www.bta.org.bw/publications.html].
BTA initiated a draft policy in 1999, but that was never finalised.
84 See Effective Regulation Case Study: Botswana (International Telecommunications Union, 2001) p.
4, available at: [http://www.itu.intl/ITU-D/treg/].
83 Section 25, Broadcasting Act 1998.
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After a long consultation process, the NBB finally released a draft policy for public
consultation in May 2003.86 The draft policy will be submitted to the government for
approval after public consultation, and if approved, it will lead to major amendments
to the Broadcasting Act 1998. The broad objectives of the draft policy are to establish
a new broadcasting system for Botswana that will seek to ensure: universal access to
broadcasting services; diversity of choice for audiences; equality for new entrants into
the broadcasting market; balance of opinion and fairness; citizen empowerment; and
R7
promotion of economic growth.
The discussion of the regulation of the broadcast media that follows examines the
status quo under the Broadcasting Act 1998, and proceeds to look at the changes that
the draft policy would bring, if it were to be approved in its present form, and given
effect to by law.
a. Regulatingfor External Pluralism
In relation to the question of external pluralism, the Broadcasting Act requires the
NBB to allocate the available spectrum in such manner as to ensure the widest
RR
possible diversity of programming. In order to achieve this, the Act provides for a
three-tier system of broadcasting licences, differentiated on the basis of ownership.
These are: public, community and private broadcasting services. The draft policy
89recommends the maintenance of this three-tier system for broadcasting.
Public broadcasting service is defined in the Act as 'a broadcasting service provided
by any statutory body which is funded either wholly or partly through state
revenues'.90 The Act does not spell out the mandate of PSB. The draft national
broadcasting policy addresses this lacuna. It provides that PSB must inform, entertain
86 The draft policy is available at: [http://www.bta.org.bw.news.htmI],
87 Para. 1.2.4, p. 25.
88 Section 10(l)(c).
89
Para. 2.3 Rec. 1, p. 32.
90 Section 2.
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and educate the public, and identifies the following obligations for ensuring that PSBs
perform their mandate effectively:91
i. Provision of a diversity of programmes for all, in which everyone will
find material to inform, entertain and enrich;
ii. Provision of a forum for democratic debate by offering news and
current affairs reporting that is impartial, independent, explanatory and
pluralist, which stimulates debate and clarifies issues;
iii. Provide a showcase for culture by promoting the various cultures, as
well as the intellectual and artistic life in the country in general;
iv. Provide a vehicle for development by running extensive promotional
campaigns for development in areas such as health, agriculture, civic
education, environmental protection, etc;
v. Provide unrestricted public access to events of significance by offering
extensive live coverage of important events in politics, culture, sports
etc;
vi. Provide a reference point for quality programming to commercial and
community broadcasters;
vii. Stimulate and support local production; and
viii. Provide a continuous service to the public.
One of the core mandates of PSB, relevant to external pluralism, is the provision of
independent and impartial news. This mandate, as we have seen, can only be fulfilled
if the organisation providing PSB is independent from both political and economic
influences, has sufficient resources to provide quality programming, and is
accountable to the public it serves. The Broadcasting Act does not address any of
these issues. In terms of the definition of PSB in the Act, the three state owned
broadcasters, RBI, RB2 and Btv, are generally regarded as public service
broadcasters.92 However, a government department controls these broadcasters, and
they are not guaranteed editorial independence. The government has made it clear that
it expects state owned media to act as its mouthpieces by purveying official
91 Para. 3.4, pp. 36 - 38.
92 National Development Plan 8 1997/98 - 2002/03, n 21 above p. 448.
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information rather than as independent sources of information for the public.93 In their
current form, the state owned broadcasters in Botswana are therefore not PSBs,
judged in terms of the generally recognised criteria for such broadcasters.
The draft national broadcasting policy recommends that the state owned broadcasters
should be transformed into PSBs that will be controlled, and be accountable to the
public they serve.94 In order to achieve this, the government will have to transform the
DIB, which is currently running these services, into an independent entity that will be
run by a pluralistic and independent governing board. Such an entity will have to be
directly accountable, through its governing board, to the public for the manner in
which PSBs discharge their public mandate and use of public resources. The draft
policy argues that PSBs should be adequately financed. It does not make any specific
recommendation regarding the funding of PSBs, but urges the consideration of a
combination of a number of tried and tested funding mechanisms. These include:
licence fees; state grants; levies on commercial broadcasters and services such as
electricity and telephone; sponsorship; and donations. Whichever mode or
combination is adopted, the draft policy emphasises that it is crucial to ensure that
PSBs are protected against undue interferences.95
The second type of licence provided for under the Broadcasting Act, community
broadcasting, is defined as a service that is fully controlled by a non-profit entity and
carried on for non-profitable purposes. Such a service must serve a particular
community. A community is defined as including a geographically founded
community or any group of persons or sector of the public having a specific,
ascertainable common interest.96 Community broadcasters are to be funded from
donations, grants, sponsorship or advertising and membership fees.97 The idea behind
community media is the empowerment of local communities in the process of
sustainable development. By representing a diversity of opinion and experience,
93 See chapter 3 at 3.2.3.
94 Para. 3.8 Rec 3.2, p. 50.
95 Para. 3.5.1, pp. 38 - 39.
96 Section 2, Broadcasting Act 1998.
97 Ibid.
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community media has the potential to build a participatory democracy through
QO
empowerment of communities at a local level.
There is currently no community broadcaster in the country. In 1998, BTA turned
down an application by World View Botswana, an NGO, which had applied for a
licence for a community based radio station for the empowerment of Basarwa
(Bushmen) local communities in the western part of Botswana. BTA felt that
programmes provided by RB, even though the station does not air any single
programme in the languages of the people concerned, met the needs of community
broadcasting."
The draft broadcasting policy recognises that there is a special need for community
radio broadcasters to be set up in the rural and remote areas of Botswana due to lack
of communication facilities in those areas. The majority of these areas have no access
to telephones, and the reception of other broadcasting services is generally poor. The
draft policy takes notice of communication barriers, as most people in the remote
areas speak the local languages only, it recommends that community-broadcasting
services should reflect the language needs of their audiences.100
Finally, the third category, private broadcasting, is defined as a service operated for
profit and controlled by a person who is not a public or community broadcaster.101
The two radio stations licensed by BTA in 1998, fall under this category. As in the
case of PSB and community broadcasting, the Act does not specify the mandate of
private broadcasters. The draft broadcasting policy fills this vacuum by providing that
private broadcasters in the new broadcasting system will be expected to promote and
facilitate a diverse broadcasting landscape by offering a variety of different formats of
broadcasting services.102
98 K. Thome, 'Community Media - A Price We Can Afford?' in J. Duncan & M. Seleoane (eds.)
Media and Democracy in South Africa (Human Sciences Research Council and Freedom of Expression
Institute, 1998) 211 at 213.
99
B. Mwape & J. Minnie (eds.) So this is Democracy? Report on State ofthe Media in Southern Africa
1998 (MISA, 1999) p. 24.
100 Para. 5.1, p. 61.
101 Section 2, Broadcasting Act 1998.
102 Para. 4.3, p. 53.
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The Broadcasting Act does not impose any explicit limitations on ownership of
broadcasting licences. It is however arguable that such limitations can be implied
from section 10(l)(c), which requires the allocation of the available spectrum to
ensure the widest possible diversity of programming. Consequently, the NBB may
refuse to grant a licence to an applicant who already holds another licence on the
ground that the issuing of a further licence will not be compatible with the provision
of a diversity of programming. Any proposed changes to the proprietorship of a
broadcasting licence must be brought to the attention of the chaiiperson of the NBB.
Where the chairperson is of the view that the proposed changes will be detrimental to
the development of the broadcasting sector, he/she shall refer the matter to the NBB
for its decision.103 The provision enables the NBB to block any development in the
broadcast se ctor t hat i s likely t o 1 ead t o u ndesirable c oncentration o f o wnership.104
There are no limitations on foreign ownership of the broadcast media. In awarding
licences, however, the NBB is required to give preference to enterprises that are
owned by citizens or in which citizens have a significant shareholding.10:1
Cross-media ownership between the broadcast and print media is not addressed in the
Broadcasting Act. This is a serious loophole and may undermine pluralism and
diversity in the provision of information by allowing a single player to dominate both
sectors. Dikgang Publishing Co, the owners of both Mmegi and Mmegi Monitor,
which is also the majority shareholder in C-BET (Pty) Ltd, owners of the Guardian
and Midweek Sun, harbours ambitions of expanding into the broadcast sector. In 1998,
its tender for a broadcast licence was disqualified by BTA for late submission.
The loopholes left by the Broadcasting Act in regard to issues of ownership and
control of the media are addressed in the draft broadcasting policy. The draft policy
acknowledges that media concentration may impinge on the media's democratic role,
and that a diverse and pluralistic media cannot be achieved by leaving the
development of the media industry to market forces alone. It thus recommends that
regulations should be introduced that will limit ownership in broadcasting services in
a way that will ensure that no one entity would be in a position to exercise control
103 Section 15(1), (3) & (4).
104 This provision is likely to create a concurrence ofjurisdiction between the NBB and the envisaged
competition authority, on mergers of companies involved in broadcasting activities.
105 Section 10(2).
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over more than one broadcasting service.106 Further, the print media would not be
allowed to have a controlling shareholding in broadcasting services, and, presumably,
vice versa. The draft does not, however, expressly provide that entities that own
broadcasting services will not be allowed to have a controlling shareholding in the
print media.107 Exemptions to the above restrictions would be allowed where there
was evidence that it would lead to the creation of a pluralistic and diverse
broadcasting landscape.
The draft broadcasting policy endorses the position espoused in the Broadcasting Act
that preference in the awarding of licences should be given to enterprises owned by
citizens or those in which citizens have significant shareholding. The draft policy
recommends that the expression 'significant shareholding' should be interpreted to
mean a shareholding of at least 55%. The regulator will be allowed to licence
enterprises in which foreign shareholding is higher where it is established that it will
be in the interest of the development of the broadcasting industry. However, wholly
owned foreign entities will not be licensed for as long as the national industry is not
fully developed.108
b. Regulating for Internal Pluralism
The Broadcasting Act empowers the NBB to impose such conditions and restrictions
on a licence, as it may consider necessary.109 The provision enables the NBB, inter
alia, to impose conditions on licensees to ensure that programming in the sector
represents and reflects the interests of society as a whole. However, due to the failure
of the Act to spell out the various mandates of the different categories of broadcasters,
there are currently no specific obligations imposed on the existing broadcasters to
ensure internal pluralism in their programming. The state owned broadcasters, as has
been noted, are still operating without licences. They are therefore not yet subject to
the provisions of the Act. The programme content of these broadcasters is currently,
like the Daily News, derived from the mandate of the DIB.110
106 Para. 8.4 Rec8.1,p. 83.
107 Cf. Ibid., Rec 8.2.
108 Ibid., Rec 8.4.
109 Section 13(2).
110 See discussion on mandate of the DIB at 5.2.1 (b) above.
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The commercial radio broadcasters, unlike the state owned broadcasters, are already
subject to the provisions of the Act."1 In licensing the two radio stations, BTA was of
the view that the promotion of a vibrant broadcasting market requires a regulator that
does not demand commercial broadcasters to make high and costly public service
112contributions. In the light of the country's low advertising base, it decided to apply
a light touch regulation, which it felt was suited to a broadcasting environment that is
required to grow and prosper. The two commercial radio stations are required to
allocate thirty-six minutes of their programming time per day, to the provision of
news. They are expected to cover news and information 'accurately, fairly and
impartially'.113 In addition, they are expected to provide public services such as public
announcements and emergency and disaster announcements.
One of the objectives of the draft national broadcasting policy is the development of a
diverse broadcasting system that will reflect the public's diverse opinions, beliefs,
views, interests and tastes, regardless of their holder's social or geographic status.'14
The attainment of this objective entails the provision of diverse and quality
programming by all broadcasters. The draft policy thus recommends the imposition of
specific obligations on the three categories of broadcasters in order to ensure internal
pluralism and quality in their programming.
PSBs will be expected to provide programming in which everyone will find material
to inform, entertain and enrich."5 They will also be expected to play a crucial role
during election campaigns by way of providing news, current affairs and special
election programmes. In particular, they will have to provide general voter education,
a platform for political parties, candidates and campaign issues."6 There are currently
no rules in place regulating the behaviour of the state owned broadcasters during
election periods. The broadcasters have been using their discretion in granting
political parties and candidates access to their facilities. Given the fact that the
111 Section 24 (1) of the Broadcasting Act provides that the Act does not affect the validity of any
broadcasting licence issued by BTA, immediately before its commencement.
'12 BTA's Draft National Broadcasting Policy of 1999 at p. 17.
113 Interview with Percy Raditladi, Ya Rona FM station manager. (Gaborone, 7th October 2001).
1,4
Para. 1.2.4.2, p. 26.
115
Para. 3.4.1, p. 44.
116 Para. 3.6.3, p. 45.
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broadcasters are not guaranteed editorial independence, it is thus not surprising that
their behaviour during election periods have been a subject of controversy over the
past years, with opposition parties accusing them of pro-government bias.117 A report
of the Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries on the last general elections
in 1999, observes that, while news of both the ruling party and opposition parties'
election campaigns were systematically included in the news bulletins of the state
118owned broadcasters, the former enjoyed more coverage. The introduction of
regulations that will ensure fair treatment of all political parties during election
periods is therefore welcome. Today, a free and fair election is no longer considered
only in terms of the manner in which votes are cast, but also, whether there is
adequate and reliable information about political parties to enable voters to make
informed choices. PSBs should play a leading role in this respect, as the draft policy
correctly argues.
The draft policy also recognises that internal pluralism in the programmes provided
by P SBs c ould b e a chieved b y t he u se o f 1 ocal content. It r ecommends that P SBs,
especially television services, should provide more local programme content and out¬
source a substantial part of their local productions to independent producers.119 Out¬
sourcing of programmes would arguably help in the promotion of an independent
production industry, thereby enhancing opportunities for the provision of diverse
programming in the broadcast sector.
Private b roadcasters w ill b e obliged too ffer n ews and c urrent affairs p rogrammes,
which must be comprehensive, unbiased and independent.120 Like PSBs, they will
also be expected to play an important role during an election period by ensuring that
all political parties are treated equitably. The draft policy assigns the NBB the task of
developing regulations that will provide for equal opportunities for political parties
and candidates in the use of broadcasting facilities.121 Internal pluralism in the
programmes provided by private broadcasters will also be promoted by encouraging
117 See generally, C.M. Fombad, 'The Protection of Freedom of Expression in the Public Service Media
in Southern Africa: A Botswana Perspective' (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 649 at 665 - 666.
118 Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC, Botswana Elections Observer Mission Report (Electoral
Institute of Southern Africa, 1999) pp. 16 - 17.
1,9 Para. 3.7.1, p. 46.
120
Para. 4.7 Rec, p. 59.
121 Para. 4.5.3, p. 57.
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local content and out-sourcing programmes from the independent production
sector.122
Community broadcasters will be required to offer distinct services, dealing
specifically with community issues that are not normally dealt with by other
broadcasting services covering the same area. They will be expected to reflect the
needs of the people in the communities they serve, and focus on the provision of
programmes that highlight grassroots community issues, such as development, health,
environmental affairs, general education etc.123 In addition, community broadcasters
will be obligated to promote local content more than PSBs and private
broadcasters.124
All the three categories of broadcasters will be expected to meet high professional
quality standards in their programming. PSBs and community broadcasters in
particular, will be required to reflect, without bias, and as comprehensively as
possible, the range of opinions and of political, philosophical, religious, scientific and
artistic trends in the country and the communities they serve, respectively.'2" Private
broadcasters on the other hand will be required to ensure fairness in their
programmes.126 In order to maintain high professional standards in the broadcasting
industry, the draft broadcasting policy recommends self-regulation within the industry
through the adoption of a code of ethics that will regulate matters such as taste and
decency, the reporting of news and the protection of privacy. It further encourages the
establishment of a public complaints procedure that will be easily understood by the
public.127
c. Regulatingfor Access
The Broadcasting Act does not have elaborate provisions dealing with the question of
access to broadcast services. Access obligations can however be inferred from the
provision that empowers the NBB to issue licences 'subject to such conditions and
122 Para. 4.6, p. 58.
123 Para. 5.4, p. 64.
124 Para. 5.7.1, p. 66.
125 See paras. 3.6 and 5.8 Rec, pp. 40 and 67, respectively.
126 Cf. para. 4.5.3, pp. 56-57.
127 Para. 3.8 Rec 3.9 & Rec 10, pp. 51 - 52.
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restrictions, including geographical restrictions, as the board may consider
128
necessary'. Most of the obligations outlined above in the introduction to regulation
of broadcasting, which may be employed to ensure universal access to broadcast
services, may be imposed on broadcasters by way of inserting conditions on their
licences.
The n eed t o e nsure u niversal a ccess t o b roadcast s ervices, even t hough not c learly
articulated in the Act, is clearly addressed in the draft broadcasting policy. The draft
policy notes that universal access to as many information services as possible is now
recognised as a basic human right in many countries around the world. It therefore
aims, among other things, to ensure universal access to broadcasting services for all
190 . ...
citizens. The draft policy addresses two aspects of universal access. Firstly, it
addresses the technical aspects. It argues that a signal distribution system should be
put in place, which will cover the entire country so that all citizens, including those in
the remote and rural areas could have access to broadcasting services. It further argues
that such a signal distribution system should be efficient, cost effective and give
universal access to all broadcasting operators.130 The draft policy therefore
recommends t hat t he s ignal d istribution s ection of t he D IB should b e privatised o r
transformed into a parastatal organisation that will provide services to all categories of
broadcasters at a reasonable cost. And for economic reasons, the draft policy also
argues for priority to be given to terrestrial signal distribution systems rather than
coverage by satellite.131
Secondly, in view of the fact that about one third of the population is illiterate, and
therefore rely exclusively on broadcasting services for their information needs, the
draft policy argues that programmes offered by broadcasters should be accessible in
1 ^9
terms of language. Consequently, PSBs would be expected to recognise the multi¬
lingual nature of Botswana by offering programmes in languages other than English
and Setswana, which are the only two languages currently used on the state owned
broadcasters. Community broadcasters will be required to reflect the language needs
128 Section 13(2).
129 Para. 1.2.4.1, p. 25.
130 Para. 6.4, p. 71.
131 Para. 6.1, p. 69.
132 Para. 1.2.4.1, p. 23.
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of their audiences. And private broadcasters, even though expected to reflect the
language needs of their target audiences, will in addition be encouraged to use other
languages.
d. Organisational Structure of the Broadcasting Regulator
As has been noted, the NBB is responsible for regulation of the broadcast media in
Botswana.133 The board is composed of eleven members. The minister of
communications directly appoints four members, being officers representing: the
office of the president;134 department of copyright in the ministry of commerce and
industry; the department of cultural and social welfare in the ministry of labour and
home affairs; and BTA. The remaining seven members are appointed by the minister
from a list of ten candidates presented to him/her by a nominating committee.135 The
committee nominates ten candidates for the NBB and submits the list to the minister
for appointments. The committee is required to invite candidates through adverts in
local newspapers and to interview applicants for nomination. The process must be
conducted in accordance with the principles of transparency and openness. Members
of the board are appointed for a renewable five-year term.136
The Act does not guarantee the independence of the NBB. The board is funded from
the ministry of communications, and is not allowed to retain any licence fees. All
licence revenue is to be deposited in government's central account. And the NBB is
accountable to the minister of communications. The draft national broadcasting policy
recommends that the Broadcasting Act should be amended in order to guarantee the
NBB both legal and financial autonomy.138 It further emphasises that the NBB should
act independently, objectively and professionally, free from any undue influence from
any interested sectors. To ensure this, the draft policy recommends the adoption of
rules that will ensure: (i) that the NBB will be free from political influences on its
133 Section 10(l)(b), Broadcasting Act.
134 With the transfer of the DIB from the office of the president to the new ministry of communications,
this officer will now be representing the latter ministry.
135 The nominating committee is comprised of a member of the Law Society ofBotswana, the Vice
Chancellor of the University of Botswana or his/her nominee and a representative of the Office of the
President. (Section 5.)
136 Sections 8 and 6(2), respectively.
137
Effective Regulation Case Study: Botswana!, n 84 above p. 5.
138 Para. 2.3 Rec 3, p. 33.
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decisions; (ii) that its members do not exercise functions or hold interests in
enterprises or other organisations in the media or related sectors, which might lead to
a conflict of interest; (iii) that members are appointed in a democratic and transparent
manner; and (iv) that the NBB does not receive any mandate from or take any
139
instructions from any person or body.
e. Evaluation ofthe Regulatory Structures
The regulation of the broadcast media in Botswana has hitherto failed to deliver both
external and internal pluralism in the sector, and to ensure access to broadcasting
services to all citizens. The sector is dominated by the state through its ownership of
the national radio and television stations. National broadcasters funded out of the
public purse have historically formed a vital component of the broadcast sector in
many countries around the world, and form the basis of the concept of PSB. It is only
when the independence of these broadcasters is guaranteed in law and practice that
they can operate as true servants of the public interest by providing diverse and
quality programming to the public. However, we saw that the publicly funded
broadcasters in Botswana do not enjoy editorial independence, as they are expected to
act as mouthpieces of the government by disseminating official information, and must
therefore toe the official line in their reporting. Consequently, these broadcasters have
not been able to perfonn their democratic mandate effectively.
The National Development Plan 8 recommends the transformation of the DIB into a
parastatal, independent from the government, in order to enhance the performance of
the state owned broadcasters' democratic mandate. The basis of the recommendation
was that the corporation status of public broadcasting would 'ensure diversity in
coverage and would avoid one way communication, which tends to be the norm with
wholly government controlled media'.140 The government has so far failed to
implement this recommendation. According to the minister of presidential affairs and
public administration, under whom the broadcasting portfolio fell before the creation
of the ministry of communications, the recommendation has not been implemented
Para. 2.2, p 33.
140 National Development Plan 8, n 21 above p. 448.
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because the government needs a medium that it can control and direct.141 This is
contrary to the widely acclaimed concept that publicly funded media should operate
as servants of the public interest.
The delivery by the publicly funded media in Botswana of their democratic role has
also been negatively affected by their narrow mandate. The broadcasters derive their
mandate from the DIB, which, as we saw, is generally to explain government policies
and actions to the people. The tendency therefore has been to concentrate on coverage
of official speeches, the comings and goings of top government officials, with no
critical commentaries.
Despite its dominance in the broadcast media, the g overnment has failed to ensure
universal access to citizens to broadcasting services. A large number of people still do
not have access to both radio and television services. An estimated 20% of the
population does not have access to radio signals, while the television signal is
accessible to less than 20% of the population. Furthermore, about 33% of those who
have access to radio signals, cannot afford the cost of buying and maintaining
receiving equipment, and only 21.1% of those who have access to television signals
own television sets.142 Broadcasting services by the state owned broadcasters are in
English and Setswana. While most of Botswana's citizens are members of Setswana-
speaking ethnic groups, there are minority groups such as Bakalanga, Basarwa and
Baherero.143 There are currently no programmes aired in these minority languages or
even those that might be seen as fostering belonging and counteracting segregation
and discrimination of these minority groups.
The liberalisation of the broadcast sector in 1998, resulting in the entry into the
market of the two private radio stations was a positive step towards ensuring diversity
and pluralism in the sector. These radio stations provide an alternative voice to the
state owned broadcasters. However, their impact is minimal due to their limited
geographic coverage and liberal conditions on programme content. Music dominates
the programmes of these radio stations. And apart from the obligation to devote thirty-
141 See 'RB Will Remain Under Government Control, Says Kwelagobe' Daily News, 28th June 2002.
142 Botswana Multiple Indicator Survey 2000 (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 2001).
14j National Development Plan 8, n 21 above, p. 10.
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six minutes per day of their programming time to the provision of news, the stations
have very few programmes that are educational and informative.
The regulation of the broadcast media in Botswana to ensure the fulfilment of their
democratic mandate has so far been a complete failure. This has been mainly due to
the absence of clearly set objectives for the sector, which made the task of the
regulator very difficult. The Broadcasting Act does not provide the mandates of the
different categories of broadcasters recognised under the Act. In the absence of clear
objectives, the regulator has generally been ineffective. It could not regulate the
existing broadcasters or license new ones to ensure a diverse and pluralistic
broadcasting landscape. Thus, since its establishment in August 2001, the NBB has
not been able to impose any specific obligations on the existing broadcasters or
license new players, in order to ensure the performance by the sector of their
democratic role.
In addition, the ability of the NBBeffbcfivel>^ regulate the sector has been
questioned in the light of the failure to guarantee the board both administrative and
financial independence. It is not yet clear whether the board enjoys administrative
independence. A11 he t ime o fw riting, t he b oard h ad n ot s tarted e xercising i ts v ital
functions. However, what has already emerged is that a guarantee of financial
independence will be necessary to enable the NBB to carry out its mandate
effectively. In its first year, the board received a government appropriation of
BWP250 000 through the OP to start its operations. The funding later proved to be
insufficient to meet the board's requirements, especially, the cost of the consultative
process in the drafting of a national broadcasting policy. Attempts to get additional
funding from the government were futile, until a donor came into the picture to rescue
the process. This should be a lesson that, unless transparent measures for the funding
of the board are put in place, its work will be seriously undermined.
The release of the draft national broadcasting policy should therefore be regarded as a
milestone in the history of the broadcast media in Botswana, as it fills the void that
has hitherto prevented the effective regulation of the sector. The document addresses
crucial issues that can enhance the broadcast media's performance of their democratic
role. In order to achieve this, we saw that the draft policy addresses a number of
139
issues. It identifies, among other things, the objectives for the regulation of the
broadcast sector, and sets out the mandates of the various categories of broadcasters.
This should now make the task of the NBB in regulating the sector clear and easier.
The document recognises the importance of external pluralism in ensuring diversity
and pluralism in the sector. It thus calls for the licensing of community broadcasters
and more private broadcasters. And, perhaps more importantly, it highlights the
crucial role that an independent publicly funded broadcaster plays in a democratic
society. Hopefully, this will finally convince the government of Botswana to
transform the DIB into an independent entity. The need to ensure internal pluralism in
the programmes offered by all broadcasters is also clearly articulated in the draft
policy. This should enable the NBB to impose obligations on broadcasters so that they
provide internal pluralism in their programming. The draft policy further underscores
the importance of ensuring universal access to citizens to broadcasting services and
recommends the imposition of obligations on all broadcasters to ensure access by
citizens to their services. The other crucial issue addressed by the draft policy is the
need to have an adequately funded, independent and accountable sector regulator.
The draft national broadcasting policy, however, does not adequately address, or does
not address at all, certain issues that are crucial for ensuring a diverse broadcasting
landscape. The policy recommends that the available frequencies for private
broadcasting services should be tendered publicly, and that the criteria in awarding a
licence should be based, inter alia, on the applicant's capability, expertise and
experience in broadcasting and business matters, and the availability of sufficient
means.144 In view of the fact that one of the objectives of private broadcasting
identified in the draft policy is the provision of sustainable investment, there is a
danger t hat financial requirements for allocation o f a 1 icence m ay b e p itched h igh,
thereby marginalizing many potential citizen investors. This actually happened in
1998 when BTA issued tenders for the first private radio licences. Out of the eight
licences tendered, only two were awarded because many applicants failed to satisfy
the financial requirements set by BTA.143 Diversity in the ownership and control
structures of a broadcasting entity may promote internal pluralism in its programming.
Thus, where financial requirements for the award of a broadcasting licence are high,
144
Para. 4.7 Rec 4.2, p. 58.
145 See Balule, n 16 above.
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only the more affluent members of the society will be able to invest in the sector,
resulting in broadcasters without broad-based ownership and control structures. In the
interest of pluralism and diversity, it is submitted that one of the criteria for awarding
a licence should be evidence that the ownership and control structures of an entity are
composed of people from a diverse range of backgrounds.
The poorer sections of the society's chances of investing in private broadcasting will
further be compounded by the absence of government financial assistance
programmes for those who wish to invest in the sector. The same argument goes for
community broadcasting. While the draft policy argues for priority in the awarding of
licences to be given to community radio stations in order to provide for a plurality of
players in the market, this may be frustrated by the inability of communities to raise
enough funds to start operations. A corollary to ensuring a diversity of players in the
market would therefore entail the provision of assistance to enter the market. The
draft policy should have recommended to the government the setting up of a special
fund to assist those who wish to invest in the sector in order to promote a diverse
broadcasting landscape.
The draft policy also fails to address the issue of qualifications and composition of the
NBB. The composition of the current board has been criticised for its failure to be
representative of all interests of the Botswana society, and for the members' lack of
expertise in broadcasting and related fields. The policy should have recommended
that the composition of the NBB should represent a cross-section of the population,
and that members should possess certain qualifications that can enable them to
perform their duties competently and effectively. Further, the draft policy does not
address how the NBB will be accountable to the public for the performance o f its
public mandate. The question is whether the board will account to the minister of
communications or to parliament. It is submitted that, consistent with the principle of
guaranteeing the independence of the board, it is preferable to have the board
accounting to parliament.
Despite some omissions, the draft national broadcasting policy is a progressive
document. Its adoption and implementation would be a watershed in the
transformation of the broadcast media in Botswana. Proper implementation of the
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policy should ensure pluralism and diversity in the broadcast sector, thereby
enhancing its democratic role.
5.3.2 South Africa
The legal framework for regulation of broadcasting is provided in three statutes:
Independent Broadcasting Act 1993U6 (IBA Act 1993), Independent Communications
Authority of South Africa Act 2000147 (ICASA Act 2000) and Broadcasting Act
1999.148 The IBA Act 1 993 was enacted during the transition to democracy and its
primary object is to provide for regulation of broadcasting in the public interest.149
The Act established an independent broadcasting authority (the IBA) to regulate the
sector.150 In 2000 the government decided to merge the broadcasting and
telecommunications regulators into one regulator called the Independent
Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA). The ICASA Act 2000 dissolved
the IBA, established a new regulator, ICASA, and transferred the functions of the IBA
to the new regulator.151 The Broadcasting Act 1999 repealed the Broadcasting Act
1976!52 in order to establish a new broadcasting policy for South Africa. Under the
latter, broadcasting was monopolised by the then apartheid state. The new Act
ushered in a new broadcasting environment underpinned by the constitutional
principles of freedom of expression, equality, equality of all languages, multi-
culturalism, choice and diversity within a framework of national unity.153
146
Act no. 153 of 1993, available at: [http://www.iba.org.za.actaa.htm],
147
Act no. 13 of 2000, available at: [http://www.gov.za/acts/00index.html].
148 Act no. 4 of 1999, available at: [http.V/www.parliament.gov/acts/1999/act4-99.html\. The
Broadcasting Act 1999 has been amended by the Broadcasting Amendment Act No. 64 of 2002,
available at: [http://www.gov.za/acts/02index.html]. References to the former Act in this chapter
therefore refers to the amended Act.
149 Section 2, IBA Act 1993.
150
Ibid., section 3.
181 Section 4(l)(a), ICASA Act 2000.
152 Act no. 73 of 1976.
1,3 White Paper on Broadcasting Policy, n 64 above p. 1.
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a. Regulating for External Pluralism
In order to ensure a plurality of players in the broadcast sector, the regulator is
required to promote the provision of a diverse range of sound and television services
on a national, regional and local level.154 No person is allowed to provide
broadcasting services unless the regulator, in accordance with the IBA Act 1993, has
licensed such.155 When awarding licences, the regulator is required to: ensure that
licences, viewed collectively, are controlled by persons or groups from a diverse
range of communities, impose limitations on cross-media control of private
broadcasting services and protect the integrity and viability of public broadcasting
services.156
The Broadcasting Act 1999 provides for a three-tier system of broadcasting licences,
namely: public, commercial and community broadcasting services.157 PSB is defined
as any service provided by the South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited
(SABC) or any other statutory body or by a person who receives his/her revenue
either wholly or partly from licence fees or from the state.158 At the moment, the
SABC is the only provider of PSB.159
The SABC is a public company with a share capital, and is subject to the Companies
Act. The state is its sole shareholder.160 The governing structure of the corporation
consists of a Board and an Executive Committee. The Board is composed of twelve
non-executive members, and three executive members - the corporation's Group
Chief Executive Officer, ChiefOperations Officer and Chief Financial Officer.161 The
non-executive members are appointed by the President on the advice of the National
Assembly in a manner that ensures transparency, openness and public participation in
the nominations process, after publication of a shortlist of candidates.162 Viewed
collectively, members of the Board must have suitable qualifications, expertise and
134 Section 2(a), IBA Act 1993.
155 Section 39.
156 Section 2(d), (i) & (j).
157 Section 5(1).
158 Section 2, Broadcasting Act 1999.
159 For services provided by the SABC, see chapter 3 at 3.3.2.
160 Section 8A(1) & (2), Broadcasting Act 1999.
161 Section 12.
162 Section 13(1) & (2).
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experience in various broadcasting areas, be committed to fairness, openness and
accountability, freedom of expression, the objects of the SABC, and must represent a
broad cross-section of the population.163 The Executive Committee consists of the
Board's three executive members and not more than eleven other members appointed
by the Board.164
The SABC Board is the accounting authority of the corporation. Consequently, it is
granted the power to control the affairs of the corporation and to protect the
corporation's freedom of expression and journalistic, creative and programming
independence as enshrined in the constitution.163 The Executive Committee on the
other hand perfonns such functions as may be determined by the Board and is
accountable to the Board through the Group Chief Executive Officer.166 The Board is
entrusted with the general supervision of the corporation to ensure that it adheres to its
mandate, leaving the day-to-day operations of the corporation to the Executive
Committee. The Board is accountable to the minister of communications through
annual reports, which must be tabled before the National Assembly.167
The objects of the SABC are provided for in a charter that is drawn up by parliament
as part of the broad national policy framework.168 The objectives of the SABC in
general are to provide services that cater for the needs and aspirations of all sections
of the society, particularly the underprivileged and historically disadvantaged. Such
services should be available and accessible and meet the education, information and
entertainment needs of all South Africans.169 To attain these objectives, the
corporation is divided into two operational entities, a public and a commercial service,
which are administered separately.170 The latter is to be treated like any other
commercial broadcasting operation, but must comply with the values of PSB in the




165 Section 13(11) & (12).
166 Section 14(2), (3) & (4).
167 Section 28.
168
Chapter III Part II of the Broadcasting Act 1999 constitutes the charter of the SABC.
169 Section 8.
170 Section 9.
171 Section 11. (See chapter 3 at 3.3.2 for details of services provided by the SABC.)
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The mandate for PSB in South Africa was identified by the IBA after a public inquiry
under the provisions of the IBA Act 1993.172 It identified the following obligations:173
i. Universality: the public broadcaster should strive to provide a truly
national coverage, reaching all South Africans, even in the more
remote areas of the country;
ii. Accessibility: provision ofprogramming that people find interesting,
relevant and enjoyable, in the languages they choose;
iii. National and provincial identity: PSB has a particular responsibility to
promote national culture and create a sense of identity that reflects
common experience;
iv. Diversity and choice: PSB should provide a wide range of
programming which meets the education, informational, spiritual and
entertainment needs of the public as a whole;
v. Quality: PSB should promote quality in all its s ervices by providing
new and innovative programming which encourages new talent and
ideas;
vi. Independence: the public broadcaster should assert its autonomy from
control by vested interests, whether political or financial;
vii. Accountability and efficiency: financial costs should be linked to
public interest value and traceable to enhanced delivery of services.
These obligations are consonant with the general core criteria of PSB highlighted
above in the introduction to regulation of the broadcast media. Various obligations, to
be discussed later, are imposed on the SABC to ensure that it carries out its PSB
mandate. The corporation is further guaranteed programming independence in the
pursuit of its mandate.174 The regulatory authority monitors and enforces compliance
with the charter and PSB obligations by the corporation.175 The corporation is funded
172 Section 28 of the IBA Act 1993 allows the regulator to conduct an inquiry into any matter relevant to
the achievement of the objects of the Act.
I7j
Report on the Protection and Viability ofBroadcasting Services, Cross-Media Control of
Broadcasting Services and Local Content and South African Music (IBA, 1995) pp. 34 - 35. (The
Triple Inquiry Report 1995), available at: [http://www.icasa.org.za\.
174 Section 6(3), Broadcasting Act 1999.
175 Section 6(2).
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from a combination of advertising revenue, sponsorship, grants, donations, licence
fees levied in respect of television sets and grants from the state. The SABC however
relies heavily on advertising revenue for its funding, which is estimated to account for
up to 80% of its income. Licence fees account for a mere 13%.176
Commercial broadcasting is simply defined as a service operating for profit or part of
177
a profit entity but excludes any service provided by a public broadcasting licensee.
In licensing commercial broadcasters, the regulator is under an obligation to ensure
that licensees provide a diverse range of programming addressing a wide section of
the public.178 In order to achieve this goal, the regulator tries to ensure that persons
from a diverse range of communities control licences. In evaluating applications for
licences, the regulator therefore takes into account, among other factors, the extent to
which the financial interests in the application reflects inclusion of the historically
disadvantaged and the nature and extent of decision-making by the historically
disadvantaged in the business venture.179
The regulator has also consistently refused to approve applications by licensees for
amendments of shareholding structures diminishing shareholding or decision-making
180
powers by people from historically disadvantaged backgrounds. In rejecting one
such application, the IBA held:
"... in the decision making process which resulted in the licence being
awarded to the licensee, the Authority gave preference to applicants who
demonstrated that their ownership and control structures included a diverse
range of people, especially persons from historically disadvantaged
communities. One of the advantages which the licensee had over the other
applicants in the competitive application process, was its broad-based
ownership structure. If the Authority were to approve the proposed
176
Duncan, n 67 above p. 114.
177 Section 2, Broadcasting Act 1999.
178 Section 30(l)(a).
17l)
Position Paperfor the Introduction of the First Free-to-Air Private Television Station Service in
South Africa (IBA, 1997) para. 8, available at: [http://www.iba.org.za/qtvl,htm\ and Position Paper on
Private Sound Broadcasting Services (IBA, 1996) para. 7, available at:
[http.V/www. iba. org.za/pvs 1.htm].
180 Under section 52(1 )(c) of the IBA Act 1993, the regulator may amend a broadcasting licence upon
application by a licensee, which will be granted provided it does not negate the objects of the Act.
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amendments to the licensee's shareholding structure, this characteristic of the
„18ilicensee would be negated to a certain extent. "
A community broadcasting service is one that is fully controlled by a non-profit entity
and carried on for non-profit purposes, serving a particular community and
encouraging members of the community it serves to participate in the selection and
provision of programmes.182 Community is defined to include a geographically
founded community or any group of persons or sector of the public having a specific,
1 R^
ascertainable common interest. The latter includes services catering for institutional
communities such as communities made up of persons associated with an institution
of learning, labour or any institutional formation, services catering for religious
• • 184communities and services catering for cultural communities. Donations, grants,
sponsorship, advertising and membership fees may fund community broadcasting
services.185 Community broadcasters have the potential to contribute significantly to
external pluralism, as they are required to provide a distinct service dealing
specifically with community issues that are not normally dealt with by any
broadcasting service covering the same area.186
Limitations on ownership of broadcasting licences imposed by the IBA Act J993 is
another measure to try and ensure the establishment and existence of a range of
services across the country. The Act limits the control of broadcast services to two
FM and two AM radio licences, but prohibits the control of two stations with
187
substantially overlapping coverage areas. No person is allowed to exercise control
1 RR
over more than one private television licence. A person is deemed to be in control
or being in a position to exercise control over a licensee if he/she has equity
lsl
Decision of the IBA in, Application for Amendment ofShareholding Structure ofKaya FM, 1st
September 1999, at 14 para. 22, available at: [http://www.iba.za/prvradio.htm]. See also the decision of
ICASA in East Coast Radio (Pty) Ltd, Jacaranda FM (Pty) Ltd and Radio Oranje (Pty) Ltd:
Application for Amendment ofShareholding Structure, 25th January 2002, available at:
[http://www. icasa. org.za].
182 Section 2, Broadcasting Act 1999.
183 Ibid.
184
Community Sound Broadcasting Services: Position Paper on Four-Year Licences (IBA, 1997) p. 3
para. 2.1.2.1, available at: [http://www.iba.org.za/cornpos.htm\.
185 Section 2, Broadcasting Act 1999.
186 Section 32(4)(a).
187 Section 49, IBA Act 1993.
188 „•<
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shareholding in the licensee exceeding 25% or has other financial interests therein
equal to at least 25% of the licensee's net assets.189
The regulator may however exempt an applicant from the ownership limitations on
good cause shown.190 ICASA has held that the test applied in considering applications
for exemptions from ownership limitations is two-pronged. First the regulator must be
satisfied that an applicant has shown good cause for departing from the limitations
imposed by the section, and secondly, that such departure would not amount to a
negation of the objects and principles of the Act.191 From the only decision that the
regulator has hitherto made on this point, it appears an applicant will only succeed in
establishing a good cause if the exemption will significantly empower persons from
historically disadvantaged backgrounds and in addition, offer local content which
192exceeds significantly the quotas set by the regulator.
Foreign ownership of broadcasting licences is limited to 20%.193 The intention behind
the provision was to allow South Africans to establish themselves in the sector before
large international communications companies were able to dominate the market.194
The regulator is prohibited from granting a licence to party political entities.195
Cross-media control between the broadcast and print media is controlled, to avoid
domination of both sectors by a few players. Limitations on cross-media control are
determined by parliament on the recommendation of the regulator.196 Under the
current regulations, no person who controls a newspaper may acquire or retain
financial control in both radio and television licensees.197 A person is deemed to be in
control or in a position to exercise control over a newspaper, if such a person is the
publisher of the newspaper or where such a person is in a position, either alone or
189 Schedule 2, IBA Act 1993, section 2.
190 Section 49(6).
191 East Coast Radio (Pty) Ltd and others, n 181 above at 11 para.26.
192
Ibid., at 16 para. 31.4.
193 Section 48, IBA Act 1993.
194 M. Langa, 'Competition and Ownership in the Media and Broadcasting Sector' a paper presented at
a conference on Regulation and Competition - the Role of a Competition Authority in a Developing
Economy, 18th April 2000, Johannesburg South Africa at 5, available at:
[http://www.iba.org.za/chairperson.htm], (Langa is the former IBA and current chairperson of
ICASA.)




together with an associate, to exercise control, either directly or indirectly, over a
significant proportion of the operations of the publisher in publishing the newspaper
or exercise control over the selection or provision of a significant proportion of the
198material published in the newspaper. Where the newspaper is published by a
company, control is deemed where the person, either alone or together with an
associate, is in a position to exercise control over such company.199 On the other hand,
a 20% shareholding in a radio or television licence is deemed to constitute control.200
In a ddition to limiting control over both sectors, no person who is in a p osition to
control a newspaper may control a radio or television licence in an area where the
newspaper has an average circulation of 20% of the total readership in the area, if the
licence area of the broadcast licensee overlaps substantially with the circulation area
201of the newspaper. The effect of this provision is that a newspaper will still be able
to acquire or retain a financial interest in a radio or television licence but cannot be in
a position of control over such licence if its readership exceeds the prescribed
figure.202 Commercial broadcasting licensees are required to fully disclose their
shareholding and financial structures in their annual reports to assist the regulator in
the enforcement of the cross-media ownership rales.203
Competition law principles are also applied to the broadcast industry in an attempt to
ensure external pluralism. In issuing and amending licences, the regulator is required
to ensure fair competition in the sector.204 The regulator however does not have
exclusive competition jurisdiction over the licensees it regulates. The Competition Act
1998 applies to all economic activity within or having an effect in the country,205 and
section 3(lA)(a) provides that in so far as the Act applies to an industry, or sector of
an industry that is subject to the jurisdiction of another regulatory authority, the Act
must be construed as establishing concurrent jurisdiction. The manner in which the
198 Schedule 2, section 2(1), IBA Act 1993.
199 Ibid. Control is deemed where a person holds at least 25% of the equity shares of the company.
(Schedule 2, section 3)
200 Section 50(2)(d).
201 Section 50(2)(b). A substantial overlap is interpreted to mean an overlap by 50% or more. (Section
50(2)(c).
202
Triple Inquiry Report 1995, n 173 above p. 75.
203 Section 50(2)(e), IBA Act 1993.
204 Section 2(h), Broadcasting Act 1999 and sections 2(o) & 52(1 )(d), IBA Act 1993.
205 Section 3(1), Competition Act 1998.
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concurrent jurisdiction is exercised must be managed, to the extent possible, in
accordance with any applicable agreement concluded between the Competition
Commission and ICASA.206 The Commission is responsible for negotiating an
agreement with ICASA to co-ordinate and harmonise the exercise of jurisdiction over
competition matters within the broadcast sector, and to ensure the consistent
application of competition principles.207
The envisaged agreement must: identify and establish procedures for the management
of areas of concurrent jurisdiction, promote co-operation between the Commission
and ICASA, and provide for the exchange of information and the protection of
TOO
confidential information. A memorandum of agreement between the Commission
and ICASA was signed in September 2002 establishing the manner in which the
parties will interact with each other in respect of the investigation, evaluation and
analysis of mergers and acquisitions and complaints involving broadcasting
matters.209 The agreement is designed to assist the two regulators to form a working
partnership. The two regulators will continue to make independent determinations on
the basis of the criteria and mandates of their respective legislation and none of their
respective powers will be waived. The Commission will evaluate a proposed merger
or acquisition in terms of the objects of the Competition Act 1998, while ICASA will
also consider applications to transfer licences from one entity to the merged or
210
acquiring entity in terms of the Broadcasting Act 1999 and IBA Act 1993.
In the first case to come before the regulators after the establishment of concurrent
jurisdiction, the two regulators arrived at different determinations. The Commission
approved a proposed merger between New Africa Investment Limited (Nail) and
Kagiso Media that would have given Nail control over three FM radio stations. The
Commission found that the transaction would not lessen competition. Flowever,
ICASA rejected an application to amend the licences involved, holding that the IBA




209 The memorandum is available at: [http://www.compcom.co.za].
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East Coast Radio (Pty) Ltd and others, n 181 above and 'Kagiso Nails Media Merger', Business
Report lllh December 2001, p. 2, available at: [http://www.businessreport.co.za].
150
and that there was no good cause shown to justify departure from the limitations
imposed by the Act.
b. Regulatingfor Internal Pluralism
Internal pluralism in the context of broadcasting is concerned with the content of
programmes provided by licensees, whether the programmes offered provide diverse
views, opinions and perceptions to the public they serve. In pursuit of this objective,
both the IBA Act 1993 and Broadcasting Act 1999 have provisions intended to secure
internal pluralism in programming. In terms of the latter, programming provided by
the country's broadcasting system must be varied and comprehensive, by providing a
balance of information, education and entertainment meeting the entire needs of the
population in terms of age, race, gender, interests and backgrounds. Programmes must
give citizens an opportunity to receive a variety of points of view on matters of public
211
concern. Broadcast services are therefore required to provide regular news services,
actuality programmes on matters of public interest, programmes of political issues of
public interest and programmes on matters of international, national, regional and
local significance.212
Specific obligations are imposed on each of the three categories of licensees to ensure
pluralism in their programming. Public broadcasters must strive to provide high
quality programmes that reflect the diverse cultural and multilingual nature of the
country and of all its cultures and regions to audiences.213 They must provide
educational programming including both curriculum based and informal educative
topics from a wide range of social, political and economic issues.214 Public
broadcasters are also required to provide news and public affairs programming which
meets the highest standards of journalism, as well as fair and unbiased coverage,
impartiality, balance and independence from government, commercial and other
71 S
interests.
211 Section 3(5)(a) & (d).
2,2 Section 2(c), IBA Act 1993.




Programmes provided by public broadcasters must be made by the SABC as well as
those commissioned from the independent production sector.216 The independent
production quota requirement is an important mechanism for achieving diversity in
programming for it encourages a wide range of views and experiences to be reflected
on air, and creates opportunities for a great number of people to enter the broadcast
production industry, particularly those from the historically disadvantaged
backgrounds. Under the current regulations, public television licensees are under an
obligation to ensure that at least 40% of their local content programming consists of
programmes that are independent television productions.217 The commissioning
procedures for independent productions must be fair, transparent and non-
218
discriminatory. The above obligations in respect of public broadcasters apply to
both the public and commercial services of the SABC.
Programming by commercial broadcasters must, as a whole, provide a diverse range
219of programming addressing a wide section of the South African public. In as far as
content obligations are concerned, a distinction is made between free-to air broadcast
services and subscription services. The government recognises that the former, by
their nature, are more accessible to a greater number of the public and therefore can
220
meet public policy goals in a way that the subscription sector cannot. Free-to-air
services are required to provide programming that reflects the culture, character,
221needs and aspirations of the people in the regions that they are licensed to serve.
They must include news and information programmes on regular basis, including
discussion on matters of national and regional significance and must meet the highest
standards of journalist professionalism.222 Free-to-air commercial television licensees
are also subject to similar independent production requirements as public television
licensees.
216 Section 10(h).




219 Section 30(1 )(a), Broadcasting Act 1999.
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221 Section 30(2)(a), Broadcasting Act 1999.
~22 Section 30(2)(c) & (d).
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The regulator determines the content of programming by commercial subscription
223
broadcasting services. At the moment, there is only one subscription service
provider. Save that it must ensure that a weekly average of 8% of its programming
224
must be local content, the service provider is not subject to similar content
obligations that apply to free-to-air broadcasters, which seek to ensure internal
pluralism.
Community broadcasters must focus on the provision of programmes that highlight
grassroots community issues such as developmental issues, basic information, general
education and the reflection of local culture. Programmes offered must promote the
development of a sense of common purpose with democracy and improve quality of
life.225
In addition to content obligations imposed by the Broadcasting Act 1999, the IBA Act
1993 also imposes some content obligations on broadcasters. Licensees are required
to give equal treatment to political parties during election period. If during an election
period the coverage of any broadcasting service extends to the field of elections,
political parties and issues related thereto, licensees shall afford reasonable
opportunities for the discussion of conflicting views and shall treat all parties
equitably.226 In the event of any criticism against a political party being levelled in a
particular programme without such party having been afforded an opportunity to
respond or without the view of such political party having been reflected, a licensee
shall be obliged to afford such party a reasonable opportunity to respond to the
• • • 227
criticism. The regulator issues regulations and guidelines during an election period
that seek to ensure that all parties are treated equitably by the broadcast media. The
regulations address, inter alia: (i) the monitoring and regulation of editorial coverage
of the election through assessment and adjudication of complaints by the public and
political parties; (ii) implementation of a system to allocate party election broadcasts
equitably to political parties; and (iii) implementation and regulation of a system to
223 Section 30(3).
224 Television Content Regulations 2002, n 217 above para. 5.
225 Section 32(4)(c) & (d), Broadcasting Act 1999.
226 Section 61, IBA Act 1993.
227 T, • ,
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ensure that all political parties have a like opportunity to book political
advertisements.228
All broadcasting licensees must adhere to a Code of Conduct for Broadcasting
229Services drafted by the regulator. A licensee may be exempted from the application
of the code if he/she is a member of a body that has proved to the satisfaction of the
regulator that its members subscribe and adhere to a code of conduct enforced by that
body, provided the code and disciplinary mechanisms in such code are acceptable to
the regulator.230 Regarding the issue of internal pluralism, the code provides that news
shall be reported truthfully, accurately and fairly. News shall be presented in the
correct context and in a balanced manner, without intentional or negligent departure
from the facts. Where it subsequently appears that a broadcast report was incorrect in
231
a material respect, it shall be rectified forthwith, without reservation or delay.
Licensees shall be entitled to comment on and criticise any actions or events of public
232
importance. The provision guarantees licensees editorial independence and is
important, especially, in respect to public broadcasters. In presenting a programme in
which controversial issues of public importance are discussed, a licensee shall make
reasonable efforts to fairly present significant points of view either in the same
programme or in a subsequent programme forming part of the same series of
programmes presented within a reasonable period of time and in substantially the
same time slot. Further, any person whose views have been criticised in a programme
on a controversial issue of public importance shall be given a reasonable opportunity
by the licensee to reply to such criticism, should that person so request.233
Compliance with the code of conduct, provisions of theIBA Act 1 993 and 1 icence
conditions by broadcasting licensees is monitored by the Broadcasting Monitoring
228 Cf. 1999 Elections Regulation and Guidelines, available at: [http://www.icasa.org.za].
229
A new code of conduct replacing section 56( 1) and Schedule 1 of the IBA Act 1993 came into effect
on 4th February 2003, available at: [http://www.icasa.org.za].
230 Section 56(2), IBA Act 1993. There are no self-regulatory broadcasting structures recognised by
ICASA at the moment, but at the time ofwriting, ICASA was considering the recognition of the
Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa, a self-regulatory organisation established by
the National Association of Broadcasters, which includes the SABC, M-Net and other broadcasters.






and Complaints Committee (BMCC), a committee of ICASA.234 The committee
consists of five members, a chairperson who must be a judge or a former judge of the
Supreme Court, or an advocate or attorney of at least ten years' standing or a
magistrate or retired magistrate with at least ten years experience, an ICASA
councillor, and three other members.235 The BMCC receives and adjudicates
complaints from the public with regard to licence conditions, and is also entitled to
initiate its own investigation into suspected non-compliance by a broadcaster. Upon
making a finding that any complaint adjudicated by it is justified, the committee
makes recommendations to ICASA as to the remedial measures to be taken.236
Measures that can be taken against a recalcitrant licensee, which will have a bearing
on the programme content, include an order to broadcast a particular programme, or
another version of the programme complained of or directing a licensee to publish the
237
findings of the committee.
The BMCC must keep a record of all complaints received by it and of all its
proceedings, rulings and findings. These are public documents and should be kept at
TTO
....
ICASA's offices. It appears the enforcement of provisions relating to internal
pluralism in programming have not been as contentious as those relating to 'taste and
7 3Q
decency'. The regulator has observed that the provisions of the old code relating to
news and current affairs were one of the most detailed and comprehensive.240 These
provisions have therefore been retained in the new code. The only change relates to
the replacement of the concept of objectivity in the old code with the notion of
fairness in the presentation of news and current affairs. All complaints relating to
these provisions of the code have hitherto either been settled or withdrawn before
determination by the committee, and have also not yet been subjected to scrutiny by
1 241
the courts.





2j9 Cf. The Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority and others 2002 4 SA 294.
240 Position Paper on the Revision of the IBA's Code ofConductfor Broadcasters 1999 (IBA, 1999),
available at: \http:///www.iba.org.za/broad.htmlH9].
241 ICASA Annual Report: Is' July 2000 - 31s' March 2001 (ICASA, 2001) p. 14, available at:
[h ttp ://www. icasa. org.za].
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c. Regulating for Access
The number of broadcasting services provided by public, commercial and community
broadcasters appear to offer real choice to South Africans. But large sections of the
population still have no choice of services and programming, and some do not even
receive services at all. There are several reasons for this anomaly, and here I highlight
242
only those relevant to the question of access. Most of the services avadable,
especially those offered by commercial broadcasters, prefer to use English language,
which is not the language of communication and interaction in the daily lives of the
majority o f S outh A fricans. M any p eople d o n ot h ave a ccess tot elevision b ecause
they cannot afford the financial resources to purchase either terrestrial or satellite
television services, while many of those who can afford the cost, cannot carry the
extra burden of paying subscription fees for the services. The broadcast network
leaves major gaps in the provision of free television services to the country at large.
The regulatory framework under the Broadcasting Act 1999 is therefore underpinned
by a desire to overcome some of these problems in order to ensure access to
broadcasting services by the greatest possible number of the citizens. It does so
mainly by imposing specific obligations on licensees.
Universal access or availability of broadcasting services, as observed earlier, is one of
the core criteria of PSB and is recognised in the South African broadcasting
regulatory legal framework. The SABC is under an obligation to make i ts services
available throughout the country in all the official languages.243 In 1995 the IBA set a
target for national public broadcasters to reach 80% of the population, increasing to
90% within five years for radio and that at least one of the public television station
services reach 75% of the population.244 The SABC was therefore called upon to
extend its transmitter network to meet the targets. PSB has to operate its services in
the interest of the broader public, which means its services should be available to each
and everyone without discrimination on the basis of the recipient's ability to pay for
the service. The policy on broadcasting, consistent with this ideal, is for services
242 See generally, White Paper on Broadcasting Policy, n 64 above.
243 Sections 8(a) & 10(l)(a), Broadcasting Act 1999.
244
Triple Inquiry Report 1995,n 173 above p. 46.
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provided by public broadcasters to be free at the point of delivery.245 The
Broadcasting Act 1999 does not expressly provide for public broadcasting services to
be free at the point of delivery, but that this is so can be inferred from section 10(2).
The provision does not empower the SABC to draw revenues from subscription fees.
In an effort to ensure universal access to commercial broadcasting services, the
regulator is required to see to it that, when viewed collectively, commercial
broadcasters provide programming in all South African official languages, within a
reasonable time extend their services to all parts of the country and provide
comprehensive coverage of the areas which they are licensed to serve.246 The
regulator is granted powers to impose licence conditions or obligations appropriate to
a given licence in order to promote the objects of both the IBA Act 1993 and
Broadcasting Act 1999.247 The regulator has, in some cases, used this power to
impose obligations on commercial broadcasters intended to ensure that the latter's
services are accessible to the majority of the citizens. For example, when inviting
applications for a licence for the free-to-air commercial television station, the IBA, in
the light of the fact that such service was likely to provide the only accessible
alternative to the public broadcaster for the majority of South Africans for some time,
set a minimum coverage of at least 50% of the population from the time it went on air,
948
increasing to 75% within three years. The regulator also indicated that even though
it will not predetermine the languages on the private television station, it would favour
applicants who intend to include languages that were not official during the apartheid
249
era.
The South African broadcasting policy argues for priority to be given to free-to-air
commercial b roadcasting s ervices, e specially r adio, g iven t hat m any o f t he c itizens
cannot afford costs associated with receiving television services. It also calls for the
imposition of public service obligations on all distribution services, including in
particular, carriage of public service channels.250 The first argument has not found its
245 White Paper on Broadcasting Policy, n 64 above para. 5.3.1.
246 Section 30(1 )(b) & (d), Broadcasting Act 1999.
247 Section 43(2), IBA Act 1993.




250 White Paper on Broadcasting Policy, n 64 above paras. 3.1 & 5.3.3.
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way into the Broadcasting Act 1999. As regards the second, the regulator is required
to conduct an inquiry to determine licence conditions for multi-channel distribution
251
services. The regulator has already published a discussion paper on satellite
broadcasting that, among others, solicits views on whether 'must carry' obligations of
public service channels must be imposed on satellite broadcasters.252 M-Net, the only
multi-channel distributor at the moment, is therefore not obligated to carry public
service channels.
Another hurdle to universal access is the uneven distribution of broadcasting network
in the country. By the end of the year 2000, approximately 18% of South Africans,
especially those in the poor remote areas, did not have the necessary terrestrial
infrastructure to receive free-to-air broadcasting signals.233 During the apartheid era,
signal distribution was monopolised by the SABC, through its wholly owned
subsidiary, Sentech (Pty) Ltd. The restructuring of the signal distribution sector to
make it more competitive was, during the transition to democracy, seen as necessary
to achieve universal access goals to broadcasting services. The IBA Act 1993 therefore
provided for three categories of signal distribution licences: a common carrier who
shall be obliged, subject to its technological capacity, to provide broadcasting signal
distribution to broadcasting licensees upon their request on an equitable, reasonable,
non-preferential and non-discriminatory basis; a person who is to provide
broadcasting signal distribution for broadcasting licensees on a selective and
preferential basis; and a broadcasting licensee who chooses to provide, either wholly
or partly, broadcasting signal distribution for himself/herself but does not provide the
same for any other broadcasting licensee.234
In 1996 the government converted Sentech (Pty) Ltd into a public company with the
state as the sole shareholder. The main objects of the company is to provide, as
common carrier, broadcasting signal distribution to licensees, in accordance with the
255IBA Act 1993. The company was charged with the responsibility of establishing a
network covering the whole country. Today the company claims that it is able to
251 Section 33(1), Broadcasting Act 1999.
232 Discussion Paper on Satellite Broadcasting 1999 (IBA, 1999) para. 9.5.3, available at:
[http.V/www. iba. org.za/satellite.htm #1 ].
253 MDDA Position Paper, n 49 above p. 15.
254 Sections 33(1) and 37, IBA Act 1993.
2,5 Sentech Act no. 63 Of 1996, available at: [http://www.gov.za.gazette/acts/1996/a63-96.htm\.
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distribute broadcasting signals to every corner of the country, however, its coverage is
determined by the coverage obligations of the broadcasting licensees on whose behalf
it distributes broadcasting signals.236
Further to solving problems of network coverage, the regulator allows for the erection
257of self-help stations. These are community owned relay stations funded by
communities which transmit signals of broadcasters within the latter's respective
licence areas in cases where, for technical reasons, the broadcasters' signals cannot be
received. Self-help stations are considered to be extensions to broadcasters'
networks, and accordingly, an application for such stations must be made to the
regulator by the broadcaster concerned or his/her appointed agent. Self-help stations
do not absolve broadcasters of their coverage obligations, broadcasters are still
expected to extend their networks to areas where there are such stations.
(I. Structural Organisation of the Broadcasting Regulator
Regulation of broadcasting in South Africa was undertaken by the IBA from 1994 to
June 2000, when the IBA was dissolved and its functions transferred to ICASA. A
brief history of the origins of the IBA is essential for understanding the nature and
attributes of the current regulator. During South Africa's transition to democracy, it
became apparent that free and fair elections would not be possible without an
impartial broadcasting sector. Broadcasting was then tightly controlled by the
apartheid state. It was therefore agreed at the multi-party negotiations that led to the
first democratic elections to establish an independent broadcasting regulator.
Legislation was drafted and agreed to at the negotiations, culminating in the
enactment of the IBA Act 1993, which provides for regulation of broadcasting in the
public interest and established an independent broadcasting regulator. The first IBA
Council was appointed in 1994 after a public process of nominations and hearings.
256 See [http://www.sentech.co.za/profile/coverage/htm\.
257
Discussion Paper on Self-Help Stations (IBA, 1999), available at: [http://www.iba.org.za].
258 There currently about 720 television self-help stations in operation.
There was consensus during the drafting of the IBA Act 1993 that, in order to fulfil its
mandate, the regulator's independence had to be inviolable. Section 3 of the IBA
Act 1993 therefore guaranteed the independence of the IBA against political or other
bias or interference and provided that the regulator was to be wholly independent and
separate from the state. At its inception, the IBA had both regulatory and policy¬
making powers, as this dual role ensured it as much independence as possible
throughout the transitional period.260
The independence of the broadcasting regulator was considered so important that the
Constitutional Assembly that drafted South Africa's final constitution saw fit to
include a provision guaranteeing its independence in the constitution. Section 192 of
the constitution thus requires national legislation to establish an independent authority
to regulate broadcasting in the public interest, and to ensure fairness and a diversity of
views broadly representing South African society. The provision is in chapter 9 of the
constitution, which establishes a number of institutions said to be supporting
constitutional democracy.261 These institutions are supposed to be independent,
subject only to the constitution and the law, and must be impartial and exercise their
powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice.26z Although not
expressly stated in section 181(1) of the constitution, the broadcasting regulator is
widely accepted to be one of the institutions supporting constitutional democracy.263
There have been attempts by the Constitutional Court to give legal meaning to the
independence of the chapter 9 institutions. In the first decision, the court held that
factors that are relevant to the determination of the independence and impartiality of
chapter 9 institutions include provisions governing appointment, tenure and removal
of members of the institution as well as those concerning institutional
239
Duncan, n 66 above p. 165.
260 White Paper on Broadcasting Policy, n 64 above para. 1.3.5.
261 Section 181(1) of the constitution lists the Public Protector, Human Rights Commission,
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic
Communities, Commission for Gender Equality, Auditor General and Electoral Commission, as
institutions that support constitutional democracy.
262 Section 181(2) of the Constitution.
263 See Duncan, n 66 above p. 171; M. Langa, 'Independently Regulating the Broadcasting Market in
South Africa', at 4, available at: [http://www.iba.org.za/regulating.htm\ and Schedule 1 of the Public
Finance Management Act 1999.
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independence.264 In a subsequent case, the court noted two factors that impact on the
institutional independence of chapter 9 institutions: financial independence and
administrative independence.265 The first implies the ability to have access to funds
reasonably required to enable an institution to discharge the functions it is obliged to
perform under the constitution and relevant legislation. The court explained that
parliament must consider what an institution reasonably requires and deal with
requests for funding rationally, in the light of other national interests. It is for
parliament, and not the executive arm of government, to provide for funding
reasonably sufficient to enable an institution to carry out its mandate. An institution
must, accordingly, be afforded an adequate opportunity to defend its budgetary
requirements before parliament or its relevant committees. The second factor implies
that there will be control over those matters directly connected with the functions that
an institution has to perform. The executive cannot therefore instruct a chapter 9
institution how it should carry out its mandate.
The IBA has a unique history. Unlike regulatory bodies in mature democracies, it was
established as an expression of a political struggle that sought to free broadcasting and
render it accessible to all South Africans. It is therefore not surprising that the
guarantee of i ts i ndependence found i ts way into the constitution and also enjoyed
both regulatory and policy making powers at its inception. These factors ensured the
regulator maximum administrative independence. The policy-making powers of the
IBA were later to be the subject of controversy in the white paper on broadcasting.
The government felt that the dual powers enjoyed by the IBA were not in accordance
with best international practices, obscured the different roles and responsibilities of
the players involved in the regulatory process and fundamentally undermined public
accountability.266 In the government's view, policy-making should be a shared
responsibility of public authorities and institutions, parliament, government and the
regulator.267 The government's position was fully supported by the constitution,
which assigns policy-making powers to the executive. The IBA Act 1993 was thus
264 Ex Parte Chairperson ofthe Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification ofthe Constitution of the
Republic ofSouth Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 at 823.
263 New National Party ofSouth Africa v Government ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa 1999 (3) SA 191
at 231.
266 White Paper on Broadcasting Policy, n 64 above para. 1.3.5.
267 Ibid.
268 Section 85(2) of the Constitution.
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amended in 1999 to give the minister the power to issue to the regulator policy
directions of general application on matters of broad national policy, which must be
consistent with the objects of the Act and the Broadcasting Act 19992b9
While the IBA enjoyed administrative independence, the same could not be said of its
financial independence, its budget was appropriated through the department of
communications as a line item in the latter's budget and not directly by parliament.
The IBA was not in a position to approach the ministry of finance directly to press for
270its own budget. The arrangement came under attack from various quarters as it was
seen as a subtle tool by the government to exert control over the regulator. The IBA
was always allocated lower figures than requested, and such cuts in its budgets were a
serious blow to its independence as it prevented it from pursuing its mandate as
intended.271
In the light of the experiences and developments during the IBA's era, I now turn to
the new regulator. ICASA is a merger between the IBA and the telecommunications
regulator. The merger was necessitated by convergence of telecommunications,
272
broadcasting and information technologies. While the regulatory functions over
broadcasting and telecommunications were merged into a single regulator, the
underlying legislation regulating the two sectors was left intact. So, in effect,
broadcasting and telecommunications are still operating separately, but under a single
structure. ICASA has two departments, one responsible for regulating broadcasting in
accordance with the IBA Act 1993 and Broadcasting Act 1999 and another regulating
telecommunications in accordance with the Telecommunications Act 1996.
ICASA acts through a council of seven members appointed by the president on the
advice of the National Assembly. The manner of appointment must ensure
participation by the public in the nomination process and be open and transparent.274
The councillors must be people who are committed to freedom of expression, fairness
and accountability, and when viewed collectively, should represent a cross-section of
269 Section 13A, IBA Act 1993.
270
Langa, n 263 above at 5.
271
Duncan, n 66 above p. 173.
272 White Paper on Broadcasting Policy, n 65 above para. 11.3.
273 Section 3 (2), ICASA Act 2000.
274 Section 5(1).
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the population and should possess expertise in the fields of broadcasting and
telecommunications policy, engineering, technology, frequency b and planning, law,
economics, business practice and finance.275 The chairperson of the council holds
office for a period of five years, while the other councillors are appointed for four-
year terms. Councillors are eligible for reappointment after the expiration of their
terms.276 A councillor may be removed from office by a resolution of the National
Assembly to that effect on grounds of misconduct, incompetence, absenteeism from
277three consecutive council meetings without good cause and for conflict of interests.
ICASA's administrative independence is expressly guaranteed. The regulator is
independent and subject only to the constitution and the law, and must be impartial in
the performance of its functions. The regulator must further function without any
. . 978
political or commercial interference. It has been argued that section 13A of the IBA
Act 1993, which empowers the minister to give policy directives and to direct the
regulator to undertake certain investigations or inquiries or to consider any matter
which the minister places before it, undermines the regulator's administrative
279 • ■
independence. Such fears however seem ill founded. Even though the regulator is
required to consider any policy directive issued by the minister, the minister cannot
issue a directive regarding the granting of a licence or amendment, suspension or
980
revocation of a licence. No directive shall also be made which interferes with the
independence or affects the powers of the regulator.281 Furthermore, even though
ICASA no longer has policy-making powers, the minister is required to consult the
989
regulator before issuing any policy directive.
The regulator's financial independence has been enhanced following the decision in
New National Party of South Africa v Government of the Republic of South Africa
283
(supra). ICASA is now financed from money appropriated directly by parliament.




278 Section 3(3) & (4).
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Langa, n 263 above at 5.
280 Section 13A(5)(c), 1BA Act 1993.
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282 Section 13A(6).
283 Section 15(1), ICASA Act 2000.
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predecessor, ICASA submits its budget directly to the national treasury in accordance
with the Public Finance Management Act 1999.2M When the annual budget is
introduced in the National Assembly, the regulator's chief executive officer is
required to submit to parliament the regulator's budgetary application.285 The new
procedure introduces a measure of transparency in the funding of the regulator thus
excluding the possibility of using budget cuts by the executive to undermine the
independence of the regulator. The regulator is however not allowed to retain any
revenue received in a manner other than appropriation from parliament. Revenue
286received from other sources must be paid into the national revenue fund.
287ICASA is accountable to parliament through the minister of communications. The
regulator is required to prepare annual reports, which should provide information
relating to licences granted, renewed, amended, suspended or revoked. The minister
may also require other information to be included in the annual reports. In addition,
the regulator must also prepare its annual financial statements. These are then
288submitted to the minister who must table them before parliament within thirty days.
e. Evaluation of the Regulatory Structures
The South African broadcasting industry has been fundamentally transformed since
1994. Much of the transformation was overseen by the IBA, which w as c reated to
ensure the democratisation and diversification of broadcasting. With the dissolution of
the IBA in 2000, the process is continuing under ICASA. The process was and still is
mainly guided by the IBA Act 1993, which establishes an institutional framework
aimed at securing a plurality of independent broadcasters. To attain this objective, the
Act emphasises regulating the market for broadcasting services in the interest of
viable competition and diversity by limiting cross-media ownership and encouraging
ownership of broadcasting services by historically disadvantaged groups. There is an
assumption that greater diversity of ownership will lead to greater pluralism of
opinions and programming. Democratisation of the media is therefore equated with
284
Act no. 1 of 1999, available at: [http://www.gov.za/acts/99index.html\.
285 Section 27(4).
286 Section 15(3), ICASA Act 2000.
287 Section 16(1) & (2).
288 Section 16(4).
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the introduction of more competition and the entry of 'black empowerment' capital
289
into the media market. In addition to opening the broadcasting industry to
competition, the IBA Act 1993 also called for the transformation of the SABC into a
true public broadcaster.
The first step the IBA took towards the transformation of the SABC was to conduct
an inquiry that, among other things, identified the mandate and obligations of public
broadcasters.290 After identifying these, the inquiry further found that radio was likely
to remain the medium most accessible to the vast majority of the citizens because it
was cheaper than television, and also in the light of the high levels of functional
illiteracy in the country, the majority of the citizens rely on radio than the print media
for information.291 The SABC, accordingly, was required to restructure its radio
services in order to provide full-spectrum public service radio stations in all eleven
official languages.292 These stations today reach over 80% of their target audiences,
293and in most rural areas, these are the only services that people have access to.
Public television services were also restructured in order to fulfil their overall public
service obligations. Rather than separating white and black audiences on separate
channels as in the past, the new portfolio combines and mixes different language
groups in different proportions in the SABC's three channels.294 SABC2 has the
largest footprint covering over 80% of the country, followed by SABC1 with over
50% and SABC3 is largely restricted to metropolitan areas.295 The latter is meant to
cross-subsidise the public service programming which is mainly concentrated on the
other two channels with the more extensive broadcast footprints.
The board of the SABC is appointed in an open and transparent manner and the public
broadcaster is guaranteed editorial independence. There is no evidence of the
government directly interfering with the editorial policy of the public broadcaster.296
Commercial interests pose the greatest threat to the public broadcaster's independence
289 See generally, C. Barnett, 'The Contradictions of Broadcasting Reform in Post-apartheid South
Africa' (1998) 78 Review ofAfrican Political Economy 551 at 553.
290
Triple Inquiry Report 1995, n 173 above.
291
Ibid., p. 41.
292 See chapter 3 at 3.3.2 for details of the public radio stations.
293 MDDA Position Paper, n 49 above p. 22.
294 See chapter 3 at 3.3.2 for the language combinations and target audiences of the SABC's channels.
295 This is the SABC (SABC Corporate Communications Department, 2000) p. 15.
296
Burns, n 24 above p. 320.
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and delivery of its public service obligations. As observed earlier on, the SABC relies
heavily on advertising revenue. Advertising has an impact on the form and content of
programming in that it ensures that programming is geared to delivering audiences to
advertisers. The restructuring of the SABC's television services resulted in the loss of
many of its white audiences, who are the main target for the advertising industry. The
loss of these audiences meant that advertisers had fewer opportunities to reach
affluent consumer audiences through the SABC's television services. The changes in
television audience profile led to changes in the distribution of advertising
expenditure across different media forms. Television's share of advertising
expenditure declined relative to other media outlets in 1996, mainly due to a shift to
707
newspapers, especially the Afrikaans language press.
The loss of advertising revenue caused a financial crisis at the SABC that forced a
resources review. The consultants who undertook the review recommended wide
ranging cuts to programming and services, resulting in a redefinition of the SABC's
core mandate as being news and information, rather than full-spectrum
programming.299 In essence, these recommendations advocated the SABC should stop
being a programme-producer (except for news), and instead become a publisher-
producer. The latter was seen to be in line with a popular perception in the
broadcasting industry that outsourcing programming could foster content diversity in
ways that were not simply possible if all programmes were to be made on an in-house
basis. The SABC management accepted these recommendations and implemented
them in 1997. This resulted in the restoration of some degree of financial stability to
the corporation.300 The restructuring led to the SABC cutting back on local content
levels and the increased usage of English language in place of multi-lingual
programming. The predominant use of English language in the SABC's television
services poses the risk ofmarginalizing an estimated 3,5 million illiterate adult South
Africans, the majority of whom are based in the rural areas where the only accessible
broadcast signals are those of the public broadcaster.
~
Barnett, n 289 above at 559.
298 The review was done by international change management consultants, McKinsey and Associates.
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Duncan, n 66 above p. 128.
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In order to ensure the sustainability of the public service mandate, the Triple Inquiry
had recommended that the SABC derive its funding from a mix of sources, including
advertising, licence fee and government grants. Parliament was further required to
provide funding on a triennial basis for the cost of provincial split time radio stations,
the cost of increasing African languages and local content television programming on
the SABC and the cost of educational programming.301 At about the same time, the
government adopted a new macroeconomic policy that seeks to achieve social
reforms by adjusting the economy to the needs and priorities of global markets. The
plan shifts the bulk of service delivery onto the private sector through privatisation
302and other business friendly policies. The government, consistent with its new
economic policy, had to find ways of reducing the dependency of the SABC on state
funding.
The resources review exercise had recommended the corporatisation of the SABC to
make it self-sufficient. The recommendation became the government's solution to
gearing the SABC to self-sufficiency. It was subsequently adopted and implemented
through the Broadcasting Act 1999. The SABC was reorganised into two arms, a
public and commercial one. The two are to be administered separately, with the latter
to be operated in an efficient manner so as to maximise revenues to the state. The
commercial arm is to subsidise the public services to the extent recommended by the
SABC's governing board and approved by the minister of communications. The
arrangement gives the minister extraordinary powers of control over the SABC's
finances. The minister has power to veto the amount set aside by the board for cross-
subsidisation and at the same time, the minister must receive a dividend from the
commercial arm on behalf of government. This makes the minister both a player and a
referee. As a player, the minister will need to ensure that a high dividend is returned
to make the SABC's services attractive to potential investors, and as a referee, the
minister has to adjudicate on the amount that is needed by the public services from the
profits o f the commercial services. If the amount proposed by the board for cross-
subsidisation threatens the minister's interests, the minister can veto the board's
301
Triple Inquiry Report 1995, n 173 above p. 9.
302 See chapter 3 at 3.3.3.
j03 Section 11(1 )(e), Broadcasting Act 1999.
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recommendation.304 The arrangement seriously undermines the power of the board to
improve the quality of PSB. The board may wish to invest more of the commercial
arm's profits into public service programming, while the minister on the other hand
may w ant to pay a high dividend to the state, to be used in the provision of other
services, thus creating a conflict. It would have been preferable to leave the final
decision to the board, which at the end of the day, is accountable to the public for the
performance of the public broadcaster's mandate.
The overall effect of the implementation of the recommendations of the resources
review exercise has been to further entrench\he SABC's dependence on commercial
revenue resources, a dependence that has significant practical and political
implications for the public broadcaster's public service mandate. Reliance on
advertising revenue inevitably leads to commodification of programming. The ruling
party has recently accused the SABC of failing to meet its mandate as it was biased
towards entertainment instead of programmes on information and education and the
use ofmore African languages.305 Ironically, the government's economic policies are
largely to blame for the failure by the SABC to fulfil its public service mandate.
Reduced public funding led to the commercialisation and hence the commodification
of the SABC's programming.
The requirement of outsourcing programmes has not been very successful in bringing
about diversity in programming as was originally envisaged. A recent survey shows
that out of over 150 production companies registered in South Africa, only 15 produce
more than 90% of all South African feature films and television productions.306 Most
of these production companies are concentrated in three of South Africa's nine
provinces, which lead to serious questions about the ability of the independent
production sector to produce representative programming. Some observers have
argued that production houses need to be based in areas that they are making
programmes about in order to reflect local needs correctly.307 The public broadcaster
should, ideally, utilise production companies from a range of different provinces. It
j04
Duncan, n 66 above p. 149.
jlb Freedom ofExpression News: Weekly Reports, 14th May 2002, available at:
[.http://www.fxi. org.za/2002/14-5-2002.0. htm],
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Position Paper South African Content on Television and Radio (ICASA, 2002) p. 18, available at:
[http://www. icasa.org.za].
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must especially be encouraged to commission productions from companies which are
controlled by previously disadvantaged communities. Commissioning procedures
must be fair and transparent in order to have the public's confidence.
The ability of outsourcing programmes to ensure diversity and pluralism, especially in
commercial broadcasting, is further undermined by a developing trend of re-
concentration of the media, especially that involving the broadcast media and
production companies. Media conglomerates are either buying up existing production
308
companies, ore stablishing e ntirely n ew o nes u nder t heir c ontrol. T he p rovisions
limiting cross-ownership between various media sectors, unfortunately, are not
designed to deal with this new development. There is therefore an urgent need to
review provisions on cross-media control in order to extend them to the independent
television production sector, if outsourcing of programmes is to deliver diverse
programming.
The IBA introduced diversification of both radio and television in terms of ownership
and programming, increasing choice for audiences and facilitating the entry of
previously marginalized groups into structures of ownership. Following a
recommendation o f the Triple Inquiry to sell six o f the S ABC's radio stations, the
IBA ensured that these stations were not simply sold to the highest bidders, but
consistent with the objectives of the IBA Act 1993, to bids from groups composed of
diverse range of communities. Private groups, including black empowerment groups,
now own these stations.309 In 1997 the IBA licensed a further eight new commercial
radio stations. Many new media owners have emerged through the licensing process,
with strong black economic empowerment participation.310 The free-to-air
commercial television station, e-tv, is 80% owned by a local company that is
dominated by the investment vehicles of workers' unions. Disabled and youth groups,




309 See table 4(b) in chapter 3. Some of the prominent black empowerment groups that have stakes in
these radio stations include Kagiso Media and New Africa Investment Limited (Nail).
310 MDDA Position Paper, n 49 above p. 15.
311 Ibid.
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Public service obligations are imposed on commercial broadcasters to ensure that
their services provide choice to citizens. Unfortunately the current commercial radio
stations are unevenly distributed and s erve mostly the lucrative metropolitan areas.
For example, out of the fifteen commercial radio stations in operation, seven operate
in one province alone.312 The Triple Inquiry recommended that in licensing private
radio, the regulator must ensure that services are evenly distributed to serve both
TIT
metropolitan and rural areas. The recommendation was made after the commercial
radio stations were already in operation. ICASA has resolved to correct this
imbalance by licensing more commercial radio services to cover areas currently not
serviced by private radio.314 The fact that none of these commercial radio stations
broadcasts in an African language means that their services are not accessible to a
majority of South Africans who are not competent in English and Afrikaans. The
situation is contrary to the objects of the Broadcasting Act 1999, which, among other
things, requires commercial broadcasting services as a whole to provide programming
in all official languages.313 The regulator therefore has an obligation to try and
increase services that will provide programming in African languages, alternalively,
to persuade the current services to provide multi-lingual programming.
The IBA was also able to provide diversity and choice to a large number of South
Africans through community radio. Over 80 community radio stations have been
licensed, serving mainly geographic communities and communities of interest.
Flowever, it has become evident that the distribution of community radio stations
within the country's nine provinces is unequal, and reflects uneven historical
developments in the country as a whole. The least developed provinces have fewer
community radio stations, with the majority of the stations concentrated in the highly
industrialised p rovinces. ICASA h as r ecently noted t hat i t h as 2 32 applications for
community radio licences, but many are competing for the same frequencies in the
urban areas. The regulator therefore said it could not on its own address the need to
312 The distribution of commercial radio services in South Africa's nine provinces is: Gauteng 7,
Western Cape 4, Kwazulu-Natal 2, Eastern Cape 1 and Free State 1. Four provinces, which happen to
be the poorest, do not have commercial radio services.
313
Triple Inquiry Report 1995, n 173 above p. 29.
314 M. Langa, 'The Challenges Ahead: Regulating in 2002 and Beyond' a paper delivered at the
National Association of Broadcasters Annual General Meeting, 27th February 2002, available at:
[http://www. icasa.org.za].
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promote community radio licensing in under-serviced areas.316 In view of this,
ICASA welcomes the establishment of the MDDA.317 The agencywill provide for
community and small commercial media projects, and should therefore address
exclusion and marginalisation of disadvantaged communities from access to the
media and media industry.
The provisions of the IBA Act 1993 on limitations on ownership of broadcasting
licences have been successful in preventing the domination of the broadcast sector by
a few players, a feature that characterises the print sector. These provisions have
consequently been severely criticised by media conglomerates that harbour
expansionist ambitions as insufficient to allow a company to achieve critical mass in
T1 R
the broadcasting marketplace. In September 2002 the regulator released a
discussion paper that reflects on the failures and successes of the last six years of
commercial broadcasting. The paper invites comments from the public with a view of
re-evaluating existing policies.319 The process is expected to culminate in the adoption
of a position paper and recommendations to parliament for the amendment of the
relevant legislation. Provisions on limitations on ownership of licences are some of
the issues to be evaluated to determine whether they are still relevant or need
amendment in order to ensure that ICASA meets its mandate to regulate broadcasting
in the public interest. The consultative process is also evaluating the question of what
constitutes control of a broadcasting licensee. The regulator has however hinted that
the principles of diversity of ownership and black economic empowerment are 'not up
for sale'.320
The question of cross-media control is also important for democratic communication.
The IBA Triple Inquiry observed that control of a number of media outlets in both the
print and broadcast sectors by one entity has the objective of subjecting the spreading
of ideas and views to the control of one person.321 In the view of the inquiry,
316
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multiplying the number of media owners or controllers in both the broadcast and print
sectors, coupled with structural independence or autonomy, would increase the
probability of diversity of information. And further that, effective competition
amongst controllers or owners may lead to quantitative differentiation between the
322
products offered by each of them and thereby favour editorial diversity.
As soon as the broadcasting sector was opened up to competition, there were
immediately some developments towards domination of both sectors by certain media
groups. For example, the black empowerment company, New Africa Investment
Limited (Nail), owns the biggest daily and Sunday circulations, the Sowetan and
Sunday Times through its subsidiaries, New Africa Publications and Times Media
Limited, respectively. These papers have over 50% of their circulation in the Gauteng
province. Nail, through another subsidiary, New Africa Media, hold a controlling
stake in Jacaranda FM, which also broadcasts in the Gauteng province. The company
also controls about three leading television production companies, which have done
significant productions for the SABC." The scenario places Nail in a position where
it can significantly control the dissemination of information in the Gauteng province,
which according to the Triple Inquiry is undesirable as it threatens editorial diversity.
The provisions of the IBA Act 1993 on cross-media control were drafted with the
intention of prohibiting domination of both the broadcast and print media sectors by a
single or few players. What is important about the provisions is that they not only
prohibit developments towards domination of both sectors, but also require entities
that are now in a dominant position in both sectors to relinquish control over one
sector. The provisions have been in operation for close to two years, but the regulator
has not yet called upon Nail to relinquish its control over Jacaranda FM. It was
expected that the issue would have been brought up in October 2002 when the
licensee was due to apply for renewal of its licence. However, it seems the issue has
not yet been raised. The regulator is perhaps waiting for the outcome of the
consultative process on the review of the provisions on limitation of ownership of
licences.
, J
Duncan, n 66 above pp. 144 - 5.
The government of South Africa is committed to making universal access to
broadcasting services a reality to all its citizens. It has argued for priority to be given
to free-to-air services, and more importantly, it approved the Triple Inquiry's
recommendation to convert Sentech (Pty) Ltd into a public company with signal
distribution common carrier obligations. The company now has an obligation to
develop a network that covers the whole country and must ensure that various
categories of broadcasting licensees have access to signal distribution at a tariff
appropriate to and commensurate with the service. The challenge is now on the
regulator to allocate licences in such a manner that the whole country will have access
to a reasonable number of broadcasting services offering citizens diversity and choice.
The requirement that broadcasting services be provided in all of South Africa's
official languages has greatly improved the accessibility of services to most people,
especially the illiterate rural population.
Improvements to signal distribution, provision of free-to-air services and increased
use of African languages will, unfortunately, not guarantee access to broadcasting
services to all South Africans. There are many citizens who, due to socio-economic
problems such as poverty and unemployment, would not afford the cost ofbuying and
maintaining receiving equipment for broadcasting services. Failure to address the
needs of these unfortunate citizens will further marginalize and exclude them from the
whole society.
There is no doubt that since the democratisation of the media in South Africa in 1994,
great strides have been made towards ensuring pluralism in the sector. The concept of
pluralism in the country derives from section 2 of the IBA Act 1993, which identifies
three facets of diversity: diversity based on editorial content, diversity based on the
number of channels and diversity based on media owners or controllers. The
regulatory framework embraces all the three facets on the basis that their combination
is more likely to bring greater diversity in the provision ofprogramming.
Diversity of editorial content is achieved by imposing programme obligations on
broadcasters. These obligations derive from the public service obligations identified
by the regulator and the Code of Conduct for Broadcasting Services. Despite
commercial pressures discussed above, especially with regard to the SABC, these
173
obligations have ensured the provision of a diverse range of programming possible
under the c ircumstances. A three-tier system of broadcasting licences coupled with
limitations on the number of licences that an entity may hold guarantees diversity of
channels. Even though public broadcasting services still dominate the broadcast
sector, commercial and community radio stations have emerged to give choice to
many citizens. The licensing process has enabled the representation of historically
disadvantaged communities in the ownership of the broadcast media. Today black
empowerment groups and workers' unions hold substantial stakes in media
companies. However, other segments of the historically disadvantaged communities
have not yet been able to have access to ownership of the broadcast media. Hopefully,
the newly established MDDA, whose primary objective is to assist community and
small-scale commercial media will play a significant role in empowering those that
have been left out.
The success of the regulation of the broadcast media in South Africa is arguably due
to two factors. First, the government has provided a fairly detailed legal framework
setting out the objectives for regulation of the industry and how to attain them. And
secondly, the now defunct IBA and its successor, ICASA, have shown commitment to
the objectives of regulation set out in the relevant legislation and have also maintained
their independence from both the government and commercial pressures in the
performance of their functions.
5.4 Conclusion
The regulatory framework and situation o f the print media in B otswana and S outh
Africa is almost identical. There are no licensing requirements and newspapers are
generally free to publish what they want, subject only to the general law. However,
this has not led to greater diversity and pluralism. Botswana has fewer publications
mainly due to its small population size which cannot support a media network of
scale. South Africa on the other hand, despite its reasonably healthy economy, also
has few titles compared to its population size. Entry costs into the newspaper industry
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in South Africa are high due to concentration of ownership in the sector.324 Even
though mergers and acquisitions in the sector have been subject to competition law
since 1979, this has not been able to prevent the development of an oligopoly that
characterises the sector today. In Botswana, the absence of control measures over
ownership of newspaper titles is slowly leading towards domination of the sector by a
few players.
Distribution of newspapers in the two countries is biased in favour of urban
audiences. Advertisers significantly influence content of newspapers due to the
latter's dependency on advertising revenue. Newspapers therefore find themselves
under pressure to provide content that will deliver affluent audiences to advertisers. It
is for this reason that the content of newspapers in the two countries caters mainly for
the needs of middle to upper income urban audiences neglecting the needs of poor,
mostly rural audiences. Cultural and regional diversity and promotion of titles in
indigenous African languages, the ideals of democratic communication, are thus
sacrificed in the pursuit of commercial imperatives. Furthermore, newspapers often
have to compromise their duty to disseminate information to the public by avoiding
reporting on issues that may annoy or embarrass major advertisers, resulting in loss of
patronage. For example, the government of Botswana instructed all its departments
and parastatal bodies to withdraw advertising from the Guardian and Midweek Sun
after a series of articles published by the two papers critical of both the president and
his deputy.325 The government and the public sector in Botswana are the major
advertisers in the press as the private sector is relatively small. Threats by major
advertisers to starve a newspaper of advertising inevitably induce self-censorship to
avoid losing advertising revenue, which may result in the closure of the paper.
Concentration of ownership and commercialisation of the press are serious threats to
pluralism and diversity in the press sectors of both countries. There is an urgent need
to promote a multiplicity of autonomous and independent newspaper titles at national,
regional and local levels, and titles in indigenous African languages in both countries
that will offer diverse political and cultural content. South Africa relies on
324 Media Concentration and its Impact in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, n 47 above
P.15-
325 For a detailed discussion of the case and the resulting litigation, see chapter 3 at 3.2.3.
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competition law to provide for a multiplicity of autonomous and independent titles.
The ability of competition law to guarantee external pluralism in the press is doubtful.
In nearly all countries that rely on competition law in order to ensure pluralism in the
press industry, a dramatic increase in concentration of ownership has been noted over
the past ten years.326
Competition law is a weak instrument to secure a multiplicity of autonomous players
in the press because it is generally concerned with securing economic objectives and
T97
is not designed to deliver diversity and plurality in the media. The East Coast
Radio (Pty) Ltd and others (supra) case demonstrates the inadequacy of competition
law in this regard. The case shows that competition law is concerned primarily with
the operation of economic markets rather than with the distinctive wider needs of
public policy in relation to the media, especially, the need to ensure diversity of views
and opinions from autonomous outlets.
In the UK the press is subject to special ownership rules over and above competition
law in order to address the special needs of the sector that general competition law
often overlooks. Under the Fair Trading Act 1973, most newspaper mergers are
subject to a stricter regime than general mergers. Mergers involving newspapers with
an average circulation of 500 000 copies (including the paper to be acquired) must
have the consent of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. Such consent must
be given after a report from the competition authority. The minister, however, has
discretion to give consent to a proposed merger under certain circumstances without a
report from the competition authorities. Newspaper transfers are judged against a
public interest test, which specifically requires the competition authorities to take into
account the need for accurate presentation of news and free expression of opinion by
avoiding concentration of ownership in a few hands. The statutory provisions do not
prescribe any particular limit on concentration. Unfortunately, the special regime has
326 S. Coliver, 'Comparative Analysis of Press Law In European and Other Democracies' in S. Coliver
(ed) Press Law and Practice: A Comparative Study ofPress Freedom in European and Other
Democracies (Article 19, 1993) 255 at 260.
",27 See Department ofNational Heritage, Media Ownership and Control: The Governments Proposals,
Cm 2872 (1995) paras. 1.4 & 5.8, and Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Consultation on
Media Ownership Rules (2001) para. 1.10, available at:
[http.V/www. culture.gov.uk/creative/index.html].
j28 Section 58, Fair Trading Act 1973.
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failed to secure external pluralism in the print media.329 The procedure is said to have
not proved capable of resisting commercial responses to loss-making ventures such as
quality newspapers.330 Other commentators attribute the failure of the regime to the
wide discretion given to the Secretary of State which, they argue, has not noticeably
been used to further media pluralism, and hence the undesirability of having a
politician making important decisions in such a sensitive area as media regulation.331
An alternative to competition law in the endeavour to guarantee a plurality of players
in the press is to limit control by persons over titles in circulation. In France it is
unlawful t o b uy o r t ake o ver c ontrol o f a d aily n ewspaper i f, a s a result, a p erson
would own or control, directly or indirectly, daily newspapers whose combined
. . .
circulations would exceed 30% of the circulation of all dailies in the country. In
Italy, no one may control more than 20% of the total daily newspaper circulation, or
more than 50% of a total regional or inter-regional circulation.333
Competition law alone has so far failed to deliver external pluralism in the press in
South Africa or in any other country. A further weakness of competition law to ensure
pluralism in the sector is its inability to break existing monopolies unless it can be
proved that there is unfair competition. If competition law is to guarantee pluralism in
the press sector, there is need to refine its application. An arrangement similar to the
South African broadcasting regulatory framework whereby there is concurrent
jurisdiction between the Competition Commission and the regulator is appealing.
Botswana and South Africa should consider establishing entities, independent of both
governments and commercial interests, to work with competition authorities to
oversee mergers and acquisitions in the press. The mandate of such bodies would be
329
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to make sure that mergers and acquisitions are consistent with the public interest in
maintaining external pluralism in the press.
The other option will be to limit control by entities over newspapers in circulation.
This method probably has the potential of guaranteeing a greater number of players in
the market than competition law as it can also be used to break up existing
monopolies.334 It may be the best option for bringing about external pluralism in the
press in both Botswana and South Africa. Three groups dominate the South African
press industry and a law that can break up this oligopoly seems to be the only way to
create external pluralism in the sector. In Botswana one company is already
controlling over 65% of the private national newspaper circulation, and given the
unlikelihood of an emergence of a serious competitor, limiting control over titles in
circulation would appear to be the only way to guarantee external pluralism.
The press must provide the public with a variety of media content, reflecting different
political and cultural views. In Botswana and South Africa the press has not been able
to effectively provide such content due to concentrations in ownership and
commercial pressures. The dominant media houses in South Africa have developed a
tendency of centralising editorial content across titles by establishing a common pool
of reporters to cover different fields, who then supply all titles within the group with
copy.335 The arrangement has resulted in titles offering identical content.
Commercialisation, as discussed above, also dictates content of papers in that, for a
paper to survive, its content must appeal to audiences that will guarantee advertisers
the highest returns.
In broadcasting, positive obligations are imposed on licensees to provide diverse
programming to cater for the needs of all citizens, but such an intervention in the
press is considered a violation of press freedom.336 The constitutions of Botswana and
South Africa have adopted this worldwide double standard in the regulation of the
broadcast and print media such that imposing any positive content obligations on the
Such a law may be applied in a similar manner to the cross-ownership provisions in the South
African IBA Act 1993, which not only prohibits developments towards domination, but also requires
entities that are now dominant in both sectors to give up control over one sector.
333 Media Concentration and its Impact in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, n 47 above
p. 16.
336 See chapter 2 at 2.4.2.
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latter would be unconstitutional. Diversity of content in the press can be promoted by
reducing reliance of newspapers on advertising revenue, breaking up existing press
337
monopolies and encouraging greater diversity in the ownership of newspapers.
Reducing newspapers' reliance on advertising revenue would enhance their
independence from commercial interests when reporting on matters of public interest.
Breaking up monopolies may result in several players in the market thus maximizing
opportunity for diversity of viewpoint. And encouraging diversity of ownership of
newspapers, especially by those sections of the population who are excluded or
marginalized, can also promote diversity of content by providing content relevant to
these groups, which is usually not covered by mainstream newspapers.
Some countries provide government subsidies to certain newspapers experiencing
financial difficulties in order to preserve diversity in the sector. Such subsidies are
either direct cash grants or indirect, such as concessions on taxes and/or postal or
telephone rates. South Africa has recently established the MDDA to redress the
exclusion and marginalisation of a vast range of groups and interests from access to
the media. The agency is charged with the responsibility of promoting diversify in the
media by encouraging ownership and control of the media by historically
disadvantaged communities as well as by historically diminished indigenous language
and cultural groups. The agency should pave way for the emergence of small
commercial and community newspapers and, hopefully, titles in indigenous African
languages, thus providing an alternative to the mainstream newspapers thereby
promoting diversity of content in the press.
The government of Botswana does not have a mechanism in place to promote
diversity in the press. It has however maintained that the Daily News provides an
alternative to the private press. The major weakness of the Daily New, as an
alternative to the private press is that it does not enjoy editorial independence and it is
expected to communicate mainly government policies to the people. The government
should therefore consider introducing a policy, similar to the South African, which
will encourage the emergency of small commercial and community newspapers in
337
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order to enhance diversity of content in the press. The government could discontinue
the Daily News and divert funds that are currently used in its publication for the
assistance of community and small commercial newspapers.
The MDDA in South Africa is primarily to assist in the development of community
and small commercial media and does not include assistance to mainstream
newspapers facing financial difficulties. It is in the best interests of pluralism and
diversity in the press for governments to also assist mainstream newspapers that are
facing financial problems, especially where this is due to loss of advertising revenue
resulting from a publication's editorial policy. Such assistance may enhance the
independence of the press from commercial pressures when reporting on issues
affecting major advertisers or sponsors. Funding for such assistance maybe drawn
from the private sector in the form of a special levy, complimented with government
grants.
While the regulatory framework and experiences of the print media in Botswana and
South Africa have a lot in common, the broadcasting sectors are worlds apart. South
Africa has a comprehensive broadcasting regulatory framework, which aims at
guaranteeing diversity of channels, owners or controllers and content in the industry.
Botswana on the other hand is in the process of developing her own framework.
In the relatively short time that the South African regulatory framework has been in
place, it has arguably been successful in bringing about diversity and pluralism in
broadcasting. The post-democratic order facilitated the establishment of a public
service broadcaster, the SABC, whose independence is guaranteed by law.
Independence of PSBs is a principle now embraced by almost all modern
democracies. The Council of Europe urges all its members to enact laws to guarantee
the editorial and institutional autonomy of such broadcasters.339 In practice, the
promotion of a PSB's independence is usually guaranteed through a board of directors
"9 Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (96) 10: On the Guarantee of the Independence of
Public Service Broadcasting. The Supreme Court of Ghana has held: 'The state-owned media are
national assets: they belong to the entire community, not to the abstraction known as the state; nor to
the government in office, or to its party. Ifsuch national assets were to become the mouthpiece ofany
one or combination of the parties vyingfor power, democracy would be no more than a sham '. (New
Patriotic Party Ghana v Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, 30 November 1993, Writ No. 1/93, p. 17,
quoted in Mendel, n 72 above p. 8.)
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or governors, which acts as a shield against government interference and a mechanism
of accountability to the public. Given the role played by such boards, it is important
that they must be independent of political interference. The manner of appointment
and tenure of office of their members is therefore crucial. South Africa is one of the
few countries in the world where the governing board of its PSB is appointed in the
most d emocratic m anner.340 T he p resident o n t he advice o f t he N ational Assembly
appoints members of the SABC's board after an open nominations process. Members
of the board can only be removed from office by a resolution of the National
Assembly. The South African model of guaranteeing the institutional independence of
the PSB is worth emulating, especially, by developing democracies such as Botswana
where PSBs are prone to government interference.
South Africa has so far avoided concentration of ownership in the broadcast media
and domination of both the broadcast and print media by a few players. This has been
achieved through setting limits on the activities ofmedia operators according to media
reach and share ownership. An entity is only allowed to control one television licence,
two FM radio licences and two AM radio licences, and cannot control two radio
licences with substantially overlapping coverage areas. Further, an entity that controls
a newspaper cannot control both a television and radio licensees. An entity which
controls a newspaper may not have control over a radio or television licensee in an
area where the newspaper has an average circulation of 20% of the total readership in
the area, if there is a substantial overlap between the coverage area of the broadcast
licensee and circulation area of the newspaper.
An alternative method, which is used in Germany, to avoid the domination of both the
print and broadcast media by the same players, is the limitation of media ownership
on the basis of the audience share controlled by individual media owners.341 The
concept is premised on the argument that the similarity of functions which
newspapers and broadcasters undertake in terms of collecting, editing and
disseminating information, news and entertainment means that there are obvious and
j40
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natural synergies between companies within each sector, and that it is in the interests
of both the industry and the consumer to allow larger media companies to develop.342
While there is an acknowledgement that media power and its relationship with
pluralism is an appropriate issue for public policy, it is argued that a more
sophisticated way of squaring that power with the economic advantages of joint
ventures and mergers is necessary. The concept of 'market share' is therefore used for
purposes of determining an entity's influence in the media market. The basic idea that
underlies this concept is that media power should be assessed by reference to the
influence that it has on its readership and audience. Rather than regulating crudely in
terms of individual media sectors, there should be an attempt to quantify the relative
impact of different kinds of media on the individuals who use them.343 Market share is
calculated by adopting a measurement of audience share for television and radio, and
circulation figures for newspapers. The process involves detailed quantitative rules
governing the accumulation of mono-media and cross-media interests and the
prevention of entities from accumulating licences beyond certain limits.344
The market share approach has, however, resulted in increased concentrations and
cross-ownership between different media in Germany.345 The approach demonstrates
the tension between the public interest in having a multiplicity of autonomous voices
in the media and the economic imperative of encouraging larger media groups that
can compete on the global stage. It tends to favour economic imperatives at the cost of
the public interest in ensuring diversity and pluralism in the media industry.346 The
South African approach, which emphasises a multiplicity of autonomous players in
the media, is therefore attractive for purposes of ensuring democratic communication
and would be suitable for Botswana, as the draft national broadcasting policy
correctly recommends.
A further notable feature of the South African regulatory system that has prevented
the domination of the broadcast industry by a few players is the concurrent
342 Cf. Media Ownership and Control: The Governments Proposals, Cm 2872 (1995), n 327 above
para. 5.22.
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jurisdiction exercised by the competition authority and the regulator over mergers and
acquisitions. Competition law on its own, as noted above, is inadequate to secure
pluralism in the media. An arrangement whereby there is concurrent jurisdiction
between the competition authority and the broadcast regulator helps to ensure that
mergers that do not threaten competition, but pose threats to plurality, do not go
through as was demonstrated in East Coast Radio (Pty) Ltd and others (supra). A
reading of section 15 of Botswana's Broadcasting Act 1998 seems to imply that there
will bee oncurrent j urisdiction b etween t he p roposed c ompetition a uthority a nd t he
NBB as it requires changes in the proprietorship of broadcasting licensees to be
approved by the board.
Efforts by South Africa to ensure universal access by all its citizens to broadcasting
services should be another valuable lesson for Botswana. In addressing the problem of
uneven distribution of broadcasting infrastructure in the country, South Africa
converted the then SABC's signal distribution subsidiary into a public company with
common carrier obligations. The company has been able to develop a broadcasting
network covering almost the whole country, thus making broadcasting services
potentially available throughout the country. The company is required to provide
signal distribution services at an equitable and reasonable cost. This guarantees access
by broadcasters, especially community and small commercial broadcasters, who
would otherwise not afford the cost of signal distribution equipment, to have access to
the airwaves. In Botswana, the state owned broadcasters' signal distribution network
is currently not available to other broadcasters. In the light of the country's
economically weak media market, broadcasters will find it hard to invest in the costly
broadcasting infrastructure. The national broadcasting network is a public asset and it
is therefore in the public interest to allow other broadcasters use of the facilities at a
reasonable cost. Thus the recommendation in the draft national broadcasting policy
for the privatisation or transformation of the signal distribution section ofDIB into an
independent entity that will provide services to all broadcasters is welcome. There is
also a need for the network to be improved so that it covers the entire country.
The achievements in the regulation of South Africa's broadcast media are attributable
to a large extent to the qualities of its sector regulator. The regulator enjoys both
institutional and financial independence consistent with internationally recognised
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standards.347 Botswana's NBB unfortunately does not enjoy the same independence,
especially financial independence. The NBB is funded through an executive arm of
government. The Constitutional Court of South Africa rejected a similar arrangement
with regard to the ICASA on the basis that it compromised the independence of the
regulator. The funding arrangement for the NBB has already exposed the vulnerability
of the regulator to manipulation by the executive. The executive refused to provide
adequate funding for the broadcasting policy consultative process. A donor
subsequently provided funding. Had the donor not stepped in, the mandate of the
NBB would have been seriously undermined because it would not have been able to
engage in a comprehensive policy development process.
Internal pluralism in broadcasting in most countries is ensured by the imposition of
positive programme requirements on licensees. South Africa has adopted the same
approach. One of the core criteria of PSB is the provision of high quality programmes
in all genres. A PSB must be a benchmark for quality programming. To achieve this, a
PSB must be well resourced in order to maintain high ethical, technical and
production standards. Traditionally, PSBs have been largely funded through public
allocations, either from general government resources as in Australia and Canada, or
through the collection of a broadcasting fee, as in France and the UK. In recent years
governments have been adopting neo-liberal policies that emphasise government
downsizing. The move has resulted in reductions in public financial support for public
services, including public service media. As an alternative to full government funding,
many PSBs now look to commercial activities, mainly advertising, to generate
supplementary funding. The danger of PSBs' reliance on advertising revenue is that
commercial imperatives may cause them to simply mimic commercial broadcasters by
basing their programming choices on popularity rather than quality.
The SABC is funded through a mix of advertising, licence fee and government grants.
The corporation however relies heavily on advertising revenue and this has resulted in
the commodification of its programmes, thus resulting in low quality programming as
most of its programmes are designed to appeal to advertisers. In Botswana state
owned broadcasters are funded through government grants. It has been argued that the
347 Cf. Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec (2000) 23: On the Independence and Functions of
Regulatory Authorities for the Broadcasting Sector.
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danger with this method of funding is that it tends to create broadcasters inextricably
linked to prevailing political climates and could lead to loss of management or
editorial independence.348 The argument correctly reflects the situation of the state
owned broadcasters in Botswana, where the government has turned them into its
mouthpieces. The challenge in both countries is to secure adequate funding for PSB
that will not compromise the quality of programming.
The licence fee has been successful in guaranteeing the independence of the BBC
from both political and commercial pressures and in delivering high quality
programmes in the UK.349 A broadcasting fee is relatively insulated from government
interference and provides consistent levels of funding over time. The UK model has
faired much better because the BBC enjoys high levels of credibility and a much
larger number of people own television sets and can afford to pay licence fees. While
this method is appealing, it will not be able to provide adequate funding for PSB in
Botswana and South Africa. Many people are poor and cannot afford to pay a licence
fee. For this reason, it will be in the best interests of the PSBs in the two countries to
supplement the licence fee with either advertising revenue or government grants or
both, as this will assure them adequate funds to execute their mandates effectively.
Botswana should therefore consider introducing a licence fee for television sets. The
government in consultation with the NBB should set the fee.
The risks of relying on government grants and advertising have been noted, but in the
case of Botswana and South Africa, these appear to be the only workable alternatives
or supplements to the licence fee. What is important is to put in place measures that
will ensure that these forms of funding do not interfere with the independence and/or
quality of programming o f PSBs. In the case of government funding, a transparent
framework must be put in place to guard against government's undue control or
interference with the PSB's editorial independence. Funding for PSBs should be
directly appropriated by parliament, with the governing board allowed to defend
budgetary requirements before a committee of parliament. The board should have the
exclusive right to decide the budget of the PSB and be accountable to the public
",4S
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through parliament. Where the governing board enjoys institutional independence,
this should be able to insulate the PSB from government interference. A limited
amount of commercial advertising should be allowed on PSBs. Resources from public
sources should form the bulk of funding for PSB. This should protect the broadcasters
from commercial pressures and lead to high quality programming instead of mass
appeal, and often low quality, programming.
The South African regulatory framework compares favourably with frameworks in
mature democracies. It has been relatively successful in creating both external and
internal pluralism in the sector and laying a foundation for achieving universal access
to broadcasting services. There is, however, still a lot to be done to perfect the system
and prospects in this regard are promising. Botswana has j ust recently published a
draft national broadcasting policy that will form the framework for the regulation of
the broadcast sector. The principles embodied in the draft policy, if implemented
properly, should be able to enhance the sector's democratic mandate and ensure
universal access to citizens to broadcasting services. The South African experience in
the regulation of the broadcast sector should be a valuable point of reference for
Botswana in the development and implementation of her own regulatory framework.
There are some socio-economic aspects relating to access, which the governments and
sector regulators of both countries need to address in order to ensure access by all
citizens, especially the poor, to broadcasting services. In chapter 3,1 observed that
broadcasting is the most accessible media to the majority of the citizens of Botswana
and South Africa. Because of the low literacy rates in both countries, many people
depend on the broadcast media, in particular radio, for essential information.
Unfortunately, a number of people in both countries cannot afford the cost of buying
and maintaining radio sets, while many more cannot afford televisions. Economic
circumstances therefore deprive a large number of people access to an essential
facility. The g overnments of the two states should assist the poorer sections of the
society to gain access to broadcasting services. This can be achieved by setting up
centres in villages and towns where the public can access radio and television
services. Priority in the granting of licences should be given to free-to-air services as
many people cannot afford subscription fees.
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Public broadcasters, who in some areas are the only available services, currently
dominate the broadcast media in Botswana and South Africa. More services should be
encouraged to enter the market in order to provide for diversity of viewpoints. The
MDDA in South Africa will hopefully lead to the emergence ofmore community and




MEDIA FREEDOM AND ACCESS TO OFFICIAL INFORMATION
6.1 Introduction
Information is important for the maintenance of modem democracies. In terms of the
democracy argument for freedom of speech, citizens in a democracy, as the ultimate
decision-makers, need extensive information to make intelligent political choices.1 In
consequence, one safeguard that is increasingly seen as necessary to enhance
participatory democracy is the principle of access to official documents, in whatever
form they are kept. The principle guarantees that the citizen can follow and participate
in the decision making process undertaken by political bodies and administrators.
Access by the public to official documents also makes administrators more efficient,
as transparency means that civil servants know that they are in the public eye and that
their work is subject to public scrutiny and comment.2 The importance of the public's
right to access official information in modem democracies is evidenced by the
growing number of statutory enactments in all regions of the world requiring
disclosure of official documents.3
The democracy argument for freedom of speech identifies two key functions for the
media in a democracy. First, the informative function, i.e., facilitating the flow of
information necessary for citizens to make informed decisions. Second, the watchdog
function, i.e., ensuring independent criticism and evaluation of the established power
of government or other institutions that may usurp democratic power. In order to
effectively perform these functions, the media must have access to infomiation,
1 See chapter 2 at 2.2.3.
2
M. O'Neill, 'The Right of Access to Community-Held Documentation as a General Principle of EC
Law' (1998) 4 European Public Law 403 at 406. See also the preamble to Recommendation Rec (2002)
2: On Access to Official Documents of the Council ofEurope.
3 Sweden was the first country to enact legislation giving effect to the public's right to access official
documents in 1766 and was followed by Finland in 1951, Denmark in 1964, USA in 1966, Norway in
1970 and Australia, Canada and New Zealand in the early 1980s. Many other countries have now
enacted similar legislation. The Council of Europe in fact urges all its member states to enact laws
giving the public a right of access to official documents in line with Recommendation Rec (2002) 2.
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especially government documents. In the USA, it has been observed that when
Congress enacted the federal Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) in 1966, its primary
users were expected to be journalists. Journalists were alarmed at the growing trend
towards government secrecy and took the lead in lobbying for its passage.4 However
the federal FoIA, like many other countries' Fol laws does not expressly guarantee the
media the right of access to official documents. Fol laws generally guarantee the
public a right of access to official documents and do not expressly cite the right of the
media. Media representatives share the right of access with the general public."7
Fol laws address similar issues. In general, such laws guarantee the public a right
(subject to certain exceptions) to access official d ocuments. The similarity of these
laws reflects the commonality of the problems that any such law must consider.
Common issues addressed by Fol laws include: the scope and coverage of the law;
exemptions from disclosure; obligations of government officials in ensuring access by
the public to official documents; methods of enforcing the right to access official
documents by the public and the rights of those persons and groups that submit
information to the government.'' The experience of countries with Fol legislation is
varied, but since the laws address similar issues, over time, authoritative statements
by international bodies, court decisions and national practices have elaborated certain,
arguably minimum, standards which such laws and policies must meet.7
In this chapter I briefly look at the minimum standards on which any law or practice
intended to give a meaningful right to the public to access official documents should
be premised. Discussion of these minimum standards acts as a prelude to a more
detailed examination of the laws and practices in both Botswana and South Africa,
which give the public a right to access official documents. In examining the laws and
practices in the two countries, the aim will be to determine the extent to which these
compare with the minimum standards alluded to above. To the extent that the laws
4 W. Overbeck, Major Principles ofMedia Law (Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994) p. 270.
s
M.E. Price & P. Krug, The Enabling Environment For Free and Independent Media (Centre for
Socio-Legal Studies, Wolfson College, Oxford, 2000).
6 R.G. Vaughn, Freedom ofInformation (Dartmouth, 2000) p. xi.
7 See generally, Report ofthe United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
the Right to Freedom ofOpinion and Expression, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/63 para. 44 (18th January
2000); The Public's Right to Know: The Principles on Freedom ofInformation Legislation (Article 19,
1999); Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2002)2, n 2 above and J. Doyle, 'Freedom of
Information: Lessons from the International Experience' (1996 - 7) 44 (4) Administration 64.
189
and practices in the two countries fall below the minimum standards, suggestions will
be made as to how the public's right, especially the media's right, to access official
documents in the two countries can be enhanced.
6.2 Minimum Standards on Access to Official Documents
The right to information is guaranteed in international law as part of the guarantee of
freedom of expression.8 The content of the right to information mainly gives the
public an enforceable legal right to access official documents held by public bodies
upon submission of a request. International human rights instruments that guarantee
the right to information however do not stipulate standards that states should adopt in
order to give practical effect to the right. Many countries around the world have
therefore enacted varying laws giving effect to a right of access to official documents.
International and intergovernmental bodies such as the UN, European Community
and Article 19: the Global Campaign for Free Expression have drawn up sets of
principles, which they recommend to states to adopt in order to give effect to the right
to information.9 Some of the principles recommended by these organisations are
already reflected in access to information laws of a number of states around the world.
From the laws and regulations adopted by various countries, and international and
intergovernmental organisations, one can identify four minimum requirements that
must be met in order that the right to information be realised.10 These requirements
include:
i. A legal presumption that all information held by specified public
bodies is subject to disclosure;
8 Article 19(2) ICCPR; Article 9(1) ACHPR; Article 13(1) ACHR and Article 10(1) ECHR. This is
more fully discussed in chapter 4 at 4.2.1 - 4.2.5.
9
Report ofthe United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom ofOpinion and Expression, n 7 above, The Public's Right to Know: The Principles on
Freedom ofInformation Legislation, n 7 above and Council of Europe Recommendation Rec (2002) 2,
n 2 above.
10 For various formulations of these common features of Fol laws, see Doyle, n 7 above at 80, The
Public's Right to Know, n 7 above and Global Trends on the Right to Information: A Survey ofSouth
Asia (Article 19, 2001) p. 8.
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ii. An obligation that those public bodies covered by the law publish and
disseminate key categories of information about themselves;
iii. A requirement that exceptions to disclosure of information are clearly
and n arrowly d rawn a nd s ubject t o a h arm t est a nd a p ublic i nterest
override; and
iv. A requirement that requests for information are processed rapidly and
fairly and an appeals system established to review cases where access
is refused."
Each of these requirements is considered in more detail below.
6.2.1 Presumption ofDisclosure
Fol legislation is generally guided by the principle ofmaximum disclosure. Access to
official documents is the rule and confidentiality the exception, in cases where other
legitimate interests take precedence. The term 'official documents' is given a broad
definition to include all records held by public bodies regardless of the form in which
the information is stored and covers documents produced by public bodies and
12
documents emanating from third parties that have been received by public bodies.
There is no universally accepted definition of a 'public body' for the purposes of the
scope of Fol laws. It has been argued that for the purposes of disclosure of
information, the definition of a public body should focus on the type of service
provided by a body rather than on formal designations. Thus, public bodies should
include all branches and levels of government, elected bodies, bodies that operate
under statutory mandate, public corporations, judicial bodies and private bodies that
carry out public functions.13 The Council ofEurope recommends that the definition of
public bodies should cover government and all administrative bodies at national,
11 For various formulations of these common features of Fol laws, see Doyle, n 7 above at 80, The
Public's Right to Know, n 7 above and Global Trends on the Right to Information: A Survey ofSouth
Asia (Article 19, 2001) p. 8.
12 See The Public's Right to Know, n 7 above, principle 1 and Explanatory Memorandum to the
Recommendation Rec. (2002) 2 of the Committee ofMinisters to Member States on Access to Official
Information, para. 7. In the US, Congress passed the Electronic Freedom ofInformation Act
Amendments of 1996 in order to expand the scope of the Fol Act of 1966 to cover electronic records.
13 The Public's Right to Know, n 7 above, principle 1.
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regional or local level, with the term 'government' covering both political bodies and
administrative bodies.14 It further recommends that natural or legal persons who
perform public functions or exercise administrative authority as provided by the law
should also be regarded as public bodies.15 Fol legislation in many countries today
applies to government departments and most government agencies including the
security intelligence services and the police.16
6.2.2 Obligation to Publish and Disseminate Key Information
There is little benefit in having a right to information if that right cannot be exercised
due to practical difficulties in acquiring it. Where the public does not have the means
of knowing what information a public body holds, it will be difficult for them to
exercise their right to information. Most Fol laws therefore commit public bodies to
conduct active communication policies to ensure that they make available to the
public any information that is deemed useful in a transparent democratic society. Such
information includes: operational information about how a public body functions;
guidance on processes by which members of the public may provide input into major
policy or legislative proposals and the content of any decision or policy affecting the
public, along with reasons for the decision and background material of importance in
17
framing the decision.
In o rder toe nable t he p ublic t o k now w hat d ocuments a re i n t heir p ossession, F ol
laws require public bodies to maintain registers of documents drawn up or received by
18them. These registers provide the public with general information on documents
kept by a public body and also indicate where the document is located.
14
Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation Rec. (2002) 2, para. 5.
15
Ibid., para. 6.
16 For example, see Fol laws of Canada, New Zealand and USA. However, in a number of countries,
among them the UK and Australia, security intelligence services are excluded from the ambit of the
law.
17 See The Public's Right to Know, n 7 above, principle 2; USA Freedom ofInformation Act, section
552 (1)(D) and Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and ofthe Council of30lh
May 2001 Regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents,
Article 12 (2) & (3).
18 For example see, USA Freedom ofInformation Act section 552 (a)(2)(E); Chapter 15 of the Swedish
Secrecy Act and Article 11 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.
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6.2.3 Exceptions to Disclosure ofInformation
Birkinshaw argues that the term 'freedom of information' is something of a misnomer
for it does not mean free unrestrained access to all information or documents held by
public bodies. Freedom of information, in his view, means access to information held
by public bodies as a presumptive right for citizens and others, unless there are good
grounds for denying access because of exemptions, which the body denying has to
justify, or because information has been excluded on grounds that are accepted
politically.19 Without any doubt, this observation is correct, for even in international
human rights instruments freedom of information is not an absolute right as there are
qualifications in that the right must be reconciled with other social interests. These
instruments provide a list of interests that shall be protected by secrecy. A comparison
of the lists in the various instruments reveals that the content is largely the same. In
terms of the international human rights instalments, a right to official information or
documents may be restricted to protect: national security, law enforcement, individual
privacy, commercial secrecy, public safety and the integrity of government decision¬
making processes.20
In order to ensure that exceptions to freedom of information do not negate the essence
of the right, international human rights instruments require that exceptions to
disclosure of information should be clearly and narrowly drawn and subject to strict
21harm and public interest tests. A refusal to disclose information must meet the
following three-part test:
i. The information must relate to a legitimate aim listed in the law. Fol
laws must therefore provide a complete list of legitimate aims (similar
to exceptions recognised by international human rights instruments)
that may justify non-disclosure;
ii. Disclosure of information must threaten to cause substantial harm to
the legitimate aim identified. It is not sufficient that information simply
19 P. Birkinshaw, 'Open All Hours: The Impact of the Labour Government's Legislation on Freedom of
Information' (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 179.
20 See Articles: 19(2) - ICCPR; 13(2) - ACHR; and 10(2) - ECHR.
21 Articles: 19(2) ICCPR; 27 - 29 ACHPR; 13(2) ACHR; and 10(2) ECHR. For a detailed discussion
of this test, see chapter 4 at 4.3.
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fall within the scope of a legitimate aim listed in the law, a public body
must also show that the disclosure of the information would cause
substantial harm to that legitimate aim;
iii. The harm to the aim must be greater than the public interest in having
the information. Even where disclosure of information would cause
substantial harm to a legitimate aim, the information should still be
disclosed if the benefits of disclosure outweigh the harm.
Further to the strict harm test, it has also been argued that exceptions to disclosure of
information must be based on the content, rather than the type, of the document.
Consequently, no public body, even security agencies, should therefore be excluded
from the ambit of the law, even if the majority of its functions fall within the zone of
exceptions.22
A cursory survey of Fol laws of some mature democracies and regulations adopted by
some international bodies shows that these have adopted generally the same
exceptions to disclosure of information as those provided under international human
23
rights instruments. However, none of these laws or regulations goes as far as
embracing the strict harm test in whole. Fol laws of various countries provide for
mandatory and discretionary exemptions from disclosure of information.24 Mandatory
exemptions require the withholding of certain documents from the public. The
exemptions are class, rather than content based, contrary to the spirit espoused in
international human rights instalments. Mandatory exemptions relate mainly to
information i nvolving: i nternational r elations, m ilitary s ecrets, p ersonal i nformation
and information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters.
These exemptions are not subject to an overriding public interest disclosure test.25
22 The Public's Right to Know, n 7 above, principle 4.
2j See the Fol laws ofUSA, Canada, Australia, Sweden, New Zealand and UK and Regulation (EC) No
1049/2001 ofthe European Parliament and of the Council.
24 For example see Fol laws ofUSA, Sweden, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and UK.
25 For a brief discussion ofmandatory exemptions clauses of the Fol laws of the USA, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and the UK, see P. Birkinshaw, Freedom ofInformation: The Law, the
Practice and the Ideal (Butterworths, 2001) chapters 2 & 6. See also I. Osterdahl, 'Openness v.
Secrecy: Public Access to Documents in Sweden and the European Union' (1998) 4 European Law
Review 336.
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Discretionary exemptions only authorize, but do not require the withholding of
documents by a public body. It is probably in respect of this category of exemptions
that there has been willingness by a majority of jurisdictions to construe and apply
exemptions to disclosure of information strictly and in a manner that does not defeat
the general right of access to official information. Most Fol laws incorporate a harm
test and the proportionality principle, i.e., a principle of balancing the interests of
public access to documents against the interest protected by the limitations when
dealing with discretionary exemptions.26 In addition, the fact that a document contains
information which would be exempt from disclosure is an insufficient basis for a
public body to withhold the entire document, public bodies are obligated to release all
portions of a document that can be reasonably segregated from those portions of the
27document that are exempt.
6.2.4 Requests for Information and Review ofRefusals
News is a perishable commodity. Delay in the dissemination of information may well
rob it of its value to the public. In recognition of this fact, it has been argued that
requests for information, especially by representatives of the media, should be
processed rapidly and fairly. Fol laws around the world generally require requests
for information to be submitted in writing, but more importantly, the exercise of the
right to official information does not require individuals to demonstrate a specific
interest in the information sought. A period ranging from fifteen to thirty working
days is given in the laws of various countries to public bodies to respond to requests
for information. Journalists tend to need information too quickly to wait for formal
requests to be honoured by slow moving bureaucracies. In the light of the periods that
public bodies are given under Fol laws to respond to requests, it would appear that
representatives of the media would rather rely on leaks from public officials rather
than use Fol laws, in order to avoid delays in responses to their requests. In the early
nineties in the USA, it was observed that due to delays in releasing information under
the FoIA, the main users of the Act had turned out to be corporations, academic
26
J. Wadham, J Griffiths & B. Rigby, Blackstone's Guide to the Freedom ofInformation Act 2000
(Blackstone Press Limited, 2001) p. 67.
27
Vaughn, n 5 above p. xii.
28 The Public's Right to Know, n 7 above, principle 5.
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researchers and private individuals with special interests in particular topics.29 The
1996 amendments to the Act therefore introduced an expedited procedure for
accessing official information by, among others, media representatives. Under this
procedure an agency is required to respond to a request within ten days where a
requester is a person primarily engaged in the dissemination of information to the
public and can show that the request involves matters on which there is an urgent
need to inform the public concerning actual or alleged federal government activity.30
Fol laws provide that once a public body has received a formal request for a particular
official record, the body must respond by either providing the record or denying the
request. When granting access to a record, public bodies normally charge a fee
intended to compensate it for the actual costs incurred in finding a record.31 In the
event of a refusal, public bodies are required to give substantive written reasons for
the refusal. If a request is denied, the requester is granted a right to appeal the
denial. Fol laws ofmost countries make provision for internal appeals to a designated
higher authority within a public authority, with the power to review the original
decision. Decisions of higher authorities can be appealed to independent
administrative bodies and, in some countries, directly to courts of law. 3
In some jurisdictions, notably the USA, when a person appeals against a refusal by a
public body to the courts, no deference is given to the public body's decision or
findings of fact. The court conducts a de novo review of the public body's decision
and the public body bears the burden of proving that its withholding of the requested
documents is authorized by the law.34 However, it appears that in other jurisdictions,
administrative tribunals and courts of law reviewing refusals by public bodies to
disclose documents do not have the power to review the case on the merits but are
only limited to the question of whether a public body has acted reasonably. In Heidi
Hautala v E. U. Council, the Court of First Instance of the European Communities
held that:
29
Overbeck, n 4 above p. 270.
30 Section 552(a)(6)(B).
31
Explanatoiy Memorandum to the Recommendation Rec. (2002) 2 para 50.
j2
Report ofthe United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection ofthe Right to
Freedom ofOpinion and Expression, n 7 above.




...review by the Court ofFirst Instance must be limited to verifying whether
the procedural rules have been complied with, the contested decision is
properly reasoned, and the facts have been accurately stated, and whether
there has been a manifest error of assessment of the facts or a misuse of
, 35
powers .
The former approach is more attractive as it subjects decisions ofpublic bodies to
scrutiny by independent entities such as courts of law. The involvement of the courts
in reviewing the merits of decisions by public bodies may ensure that due attention is
given to resolving difficult questions and that a consistent approach to freedom of
expression issues is promoted.
6.3 Accessins Official Information In Botswana
6.3.1 Background to the Right ofFol in Botswana
Fol is guaranteed under the constitution of Botswana.36 The constitutional provision
guaranteeing the freedom is modelled on Article 10 of the ECHR. In Leander v
Sweden37 the ECtHR held that the right of access to information basically prohibits a
government from restricting a person from receiving information that others wish or
may be willing to impart to him/her. The constitution of Botswana, like the ECHR,
therefore guarantees a passive right to receive information. It does not impose positive
38
obligations on the state to gather and disseminate information. Despite the
importance of the right ofFol in the maintenance of democracy, and a general trend in
most modem democracies where access to information laws have been enacted giving
the public an active right of access to official documents, Botswana has not yet
enacted a law giving the public an active right to official documents.
35
[1999] 3 CMLR 528 at 540 para 72.
36 Section 12(1). -
37
(1987) 9 EHRR 433. See further, O'Neill, n 2 above at 419 for a discussion of Article 10 of the
ECHR and the right of access to official documents.
See chapter 4 at 4.4.1 for a detailed discussion of this point.
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In 1997 a Presidential Task Group for a Long Term Vision for Botswana
recommended to the government the introduction of a Fol Act that will protect the
rights of citizens to have access to information, and to ensure the accountability of all
public and private institutions.39 The government responded the following year by
inviting media stakeholders to submit proposals for such a law. The latter duly
submitted their proposals in mid 2000. The government is now consulting with media
stakeholders and the process is expected to culminate in the publication of a Fol
Bill.40
The constitutional guarantee aside, Botswana's past association with Britain has had
an influence on the status and the government's attitude to the right to Fol in the
country. In 1885 Botswana, then Bechuanaland became a British Protectorate. In 1966
when it was granted independence, the new state of Botswana inherited from Britain a
legacy of a culture of secrecy in government and the common law. A hallmark of the
traditional Westminster style of government was that all official information was
secret unless the g overnment chose to disclose it. Openness and transparency were
alien concepts in British government administration.41 Civil servants justified the
secrecy of their service by reference to the theory ofministerial responsibility, which
requires information requested by representatives of the public to be forthcoming only
from, or with the approval of, ministers responsible for Whitehall departments.42 In
practice, however, ministerial involvement in departmental decisions occurs only at
levels of high policy. Ministers neither control nor are answerable for thousands of
decisions made by middle-ranking departmental officers. The secrecy ethos of British
governments was enforced on civil servants by the criminal law through the Official
Secrets Act and other supporting legislation.43
39
Long Term Vision for Botswana: Towards Prosperityfor All (Government Printer, 1997) p. 35.
40 Interview with Ms Segakweng Tsiane, Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President.
(Gaborone, 01st November 2001).
41 S. Palmer, 'Freedom of Information: The New Proposals' in J. Beatson & Y. Cripps (eds.) Freedom
ofExpression and Freedom ofInformation: Essays in Honour ofSir David Williams (Oxford
University Press, 2000) 249 at 250
42 G. Robertson & A. Nicol, Media Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) p. 553.
43 Ibid.
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In Botswana civil servants are subject to the National Security Act 1986,44 a law that
governs national security and other activities prejudicial to the interests of the nation.
This position is apparently sanctioned by the constitution, which provides that nothing
contained or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent or in
contravention of both the rights to freedom of expression and Fol to the extent that the
law in question makes provision that imposes restrictions upon p ublic officers and
employees of local government bodies. Such restrictions must however be shown to
be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.45 In terms of the General Orders
Governing the Conditions of Service of the Public Service 1987 (General Orders
1987),46 all civil servants upon appointment must sign a declaration acknowledging
their obligations under the National Security Act 1986. An officer is however bound
by the Act whether or not he/she has signed the declaration.47 In terms of section 4(1),
it is unlawful for any person who had obtained official information (in whatever form)
as a result of his/her present or former position as a civil servant to reveal that
information without authorisation. The prohibition is enforced by the possibility of up
to thirty years imprisonment, applied indiscriminately to all government information,
AC
regardless of subject or triviality.
The ambit of the section is very wide, and as shall be demonstrated later, it renders all
government information, save information on established policies, not subject to
disclosure to the public. The subjection of civil servants to the National Security Act
1986 has fostered a culture of secrecy in government making it difficult for the public
and media representatives to access official documents.49 The position is aggravated
by the fact that there is no protection given to whistleblowers. Section 4(1 )(b)
provides that in the absence of authorisation, a person may escape liability for
disclosure of official information by demonstrating that the disclosure was made to 'a
person to whom it is in the interest of Botswana his duty to communicate it'. While
44
Cap. [23:01],
45 Section 12(2), constitution of Botswana.
46 General Orders 1987: General Orders Governing the Conditions of the Public Service (Government
Printer, 1987).
47 General Order 206(1).
48 Section 4(1), National Security Act 1986, is a catch-all provision modelled on the infamous section 2
of the UK Official Secrets Act 1911. See Departmental Committee on Section 2 ofthe Official Secrets
Act 1911, Crnnd. 5104 (1972) para. 17.
49 S.T. Sechele, 'The Role of the Press in Independent Botswana' in W.A. Edge & M.H. Lekorwe
(eds.) Botswana: Politics and Society (J.L. Van Schaik Publishers, 1998) 412 at 417.
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there is a view that the phrase 'interest of Botswana' is synonymous with the 'public
interest' and that the clause provides an exemption from liability in exceptional cases
of disclosures in the public interest, this view was rejected by the UK courts when
interpreting a similar provision. It would appear that 'duty' means an official duty and
not a moral or civic duty.50 A civil servant who thus leaks information on government
wrongdoing to the media faces the threat of prosecution under the National Security
Act 1986 or the danger of disciplinary sanction, which may result in a transfer,
demotion or even dismissal.
The notion that the operations of government should be secret had a pervasive
influence in the common law. Generally, information is not freely available unless the
person who has it is either willing to make it available or is subject to some kind of
enforceable d uty torn ake i t a vailable. T he common 1 aw i mposed nod uty torn ake
information available except in particular situations where a right of access to
information of a particular kind or documents arose as a result of a specific
contractual, equitable or other legal relationship.51 The common law did not develop a
52
concept of Fol, let alone a body of jurisprudence based on such a concept. Under the
common law therefore, there was no general right of access to government
information, which was in conformity with the culture of secrecy concerning the
operations of government in Britain.
The denial by the common law of a general right to government information has
hampered the development of the right to Fol in Botswana. Even though many
people, especially media representatives, are aggrieved by the government's culture of
secrecy, no one has so far taken his/her grievance to the courts. The lack of precedent
recognising an enforceable active right to information in the common law is arguably
one of the reasons for the reluctance of aggrieved parties to take the matter before the
courts.
50
R v Ponting [1985] Crim. I.R. 318. For a discussion of the case see: R.M. Thomas, 'The British
Official Secrets Acts 1911 - 1939 and the Ponting Case' (1986) Criminal Law Review 491 at 499.
51
A. Mason, 'The Relationship Between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information' in
Beatson & Cripps (eds.), n 41 above 225 at 233.
52 Ibid.
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Even though an active right to official documents is currently not recognised in
Botswana, there are some measures in place aimed at enabling the public to have
access to official information. A vast quantity of official information is released
through various radio and television programmes carried over state owned media and
publications issued by various ministries and departments.53 The problem with
disseminating official information in this manner is that it enables the public access to
'authorised' or 'vetted' information and does not give the public a right of access to
the actual official documents. The consumer of information has a right to a free flow
of information rather than information that is tainted at its source and selectively
channelled to suit the interests of the information supplier. State owned m edia and
official government publications are expected to toe the official line in their reportage,
thus the information that they disseminate turns out in most cases to be designed to
support a particular government position instead of presenting the full facts to the
public.54 Official information is also released to the public in the form of press
releases from press officers attached to government departments. Disclosure of
information by press officers is however tightly controlled under the General Orders
1987 to ensure that it conforms to the country's ethos of secrecy in government.
6.3.2 Disclosure ofOfficial information Under General Orders 1987
General Order 207 prohibits a public officer from revealing, directly or indirectly any
information or knowledge that he/she has acquired or the contents of any documents
to which he/she has had access in the course of his/her official duties. The prohibition
extends to communications to the media on questions of government policy or
business. The expression 'communications to the media' is given a wide meaning to
include not only formal written communications or formal interviews, but also casual
conversations with members of the media.55
For purposes of making communications to the media, heads of government
ministries and heads of non-ministerial departments are required to nominate press
53 It would appear that the government is fully convinced that this is the most effective way of
disseminating official information. This view is based on the writer's interview with the Deputy
Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, n 40 above.
34 The question of the editorial independence of state owned media is treated in chapter 3 at 3.2.
35 General Order 207(5).
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officers authorised generally or specifically to disclosure official information to the
media. Press officers are only allowed to release information relating to government
policy that has been established and made public."6 General Order 207, which is
supposed to give the media a right of access to official information, has, ironically,
turned out to be more of an impediment to the exercise of the right. A comparison of
the provisions of the General Order with the minimum standards on access to official
information discussed above reveals the inadequacies of the former.
The minimum standards on access to official information support a principle of
maximum disclosure of official documents. General Order 207 on the other hand
incorporates a presumption of secrecy. It makes provision for the disclosure of a
limited category of official information, i.e., information relating to established
government policies that have been made public. Information from other government
documents i s n ot s ubject tod isclosure u nder t he G eneral O rder. T he s filiation t hus
created is unsatisfactory as many decisions that vitally affect individuals and
communities are taken by civil servants and are found in documents that do not
necessarily deal with policy matters. It is in the public interest to allow the public to
inspect information accumulated and acted upon by administrators. The General
Order does not give the public a right of access to official documents, rather, to
information contained in the documents. The position is objectionable as it presents
the government with an opportunity to 'doctor' information to suit its own needs. It is
desirable that access should be allowed to the actual official documents.
While the minimum standards on access to official information encourage public
bodies to publish and disseminate key categories of information about themselves,
General Order 207 does not impose any equivalent obligations on ministries and
government departments. There is therefore no obligation on public bodies to make
important information about themselves available to the general public, nor is there a
duty to keep registers of information received and kept. Under these circumstances,
the public cannot fully exercise the right to Fol, as it is almost impossible to know
what information a public body holds.
56 General Order 207(2) & (3).
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The constitution of Botswana permits restrictions on the exercise of the right to Fol in
the interests of: national defence; public safety; public order; public morality; public
health; protection of reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons or private lives
of persons concerned in legal proceedings; prevention of disclosure of infonnation
received in confidence; maintenance of the authority and independence of the courts
and regulation of educational institutions in the interests of persons receiving
instruction therein. Further, as noted above, restrictions may be imposed on the right
of freedom of expression of public officers, which has an effect on the exercise of the
right to Fol by the general public. Although the restrictions under the constitution are
broader than those permitted under international human rights instruments, the
constitutional provision incorporates the harm and public interest tests. Restrictions to
the right to Fol must be done under the authority of law and shown to be reasonably
justifiable in a democratic society.58
General O rder 2 07 i mposes b lanket se crecy o n a 11 government i nformation, e xcept
infonnation on policies that have been established and made public. The General
Order does not embrace the hann and public interest tests in the disclosure of
infonnation. Access to information, especially official documents, is now regarded as
essential in modern democracies as it encourages informed participation by the public
in matters of common interest. A presumption of secrecy over all government
information or documents can therefore not be justifiable in a democracy, a condition
that the constitution of Botswana imposes on restrictions to the exercise of the rights
of freedom of expression and Fol. In the light of this observation, the constitutionality
ofGeneral Order 207, in as far as it imposes a general presumption of secrecy over all
government information, is in serious doubt.
An access to infonnation regime must provide for requests to be processed rapidly
and fairly and further provide for an appeals system where access is refused. General
Order 207 does not provide for time limits within which press officers should respond
to requests, nor does it provide for appeals against refusals to disclose information.
The absence of time limits is compounded by bureaucratic rules and arrangements.
57 Section 12(2)(a) & (b).
58 See chapter 4 at 4.5.1 for a detailed discussion of section 12(2) of the constitution and how it
incorporates the harm and public interest tests.
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The style of administration of the civil service is hierarchical and strangled with red
tape, with long reporting lines and top-heavy management. Even though each
government ministry or department is supposed to have a press officer to handle
requests for information, the officers have not been empowered to release information
without authorisation from their heads of departments. There have been instances
where press officers have incurred the wrath of their superiors for releasing official
information without first seeking clearance with them.59 In most cases, those who
submit requests for information are therefore told to wait while press officers consult
their superiors, resulting in unnecessary delays in the disclosure of information.
It has been observed that a culture of secrecy in government seems to foster a sense of
self-importance in the civil service.60 In the opinion of the editor of Mmegi, the
observation is true in the case of Botswana. He notes that:
'...it is common to come across arrogant and rude senior government officials
who will either refuse to answer legitimate questions from the private media
or askfor a list ofquestions to be sent and then sit on them until the paper has
gone to press or not answer them at all '.61
One is inclined to concur with the editor's observation given the acrimonious
relationship that exists between the private media and government officials arising
from the media's critical style of reportage of government activities.62 Government
officials are more likely to be difficult and arrogant when dealing with representatives
of the media under the prevailing circumstances. The attitude of government officials
to the media is aided by the fact that they are not bound to give reasons for their
refusal to disclose information. The lack of transparency in the process means
decisions of government officials are not subject to public scrutiny and comment.
Since government officials do not have to account to the public for their actions, this
has resulted in inefficiency in the administration of the access to information regime
under General Order 207. The plight of information seekers is further worsened by the
59 Information supplied to the writer by some press officers who wished to remain anonymous for fear
of reprisals from their supervisors.
60 Robertson & Nicol, n 42 above p. 554.
61 S.T. Sechele, Deepening Democracy or Creeping Authoritarian Rule? Media/Government Relations
in Botswana in Historical Perspective (Unpublished Master ofPublic Administration dissertation,
University of Botswana, June 2000) p. 120.
62 See chapter 3 at 3.2.3.
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absence of an appeals process against refusals to disclose information. The status quo
allows government officials to unjustifiably withhold official information from the
public especially representatives of the media with impunity.
The above discussion of regulations and practices that have been adopted by the state
ofBotswana in order to enable the public and media representatives to have access to
official information shows that the measures in place are hopelessly inadequate to
ensure the full enjoyment of the right to Fol. In fact, the measures adopted by the state
do not come anywhere near the minimum standards on which any law or practice on
access to information should be premised. The government's willingness to consider
enacting a F ol A ct s hould t herefore b e w elcomed. It i s a lso c ommendable t hat t he
government has seen it fit to involve media stakeholders in the formulation of the law.
At the moment we can only wait for the publication of the Bill and hope that the
proposed law will be premised on the minimum standards on access to information
outlined above.
While a Fol Act based on these standards will no doubt improve the enjoyment of the
right of Fol, its implementation will be difficult under the prevailing culture of
secrecy in government. There is an urgent need to do away with bureaucratic
bottlenecks that impede the free flow of information without having to wait for the
enactment of the proposed law. The government should immediately discard its
culture of secrecy and become more open and transparent in the conduct of its
business. Relaxing the application of the National Security Act 1986 to public
officers, and introducing some measure of protection for public officers who leak
information to the media on government wrongdoing, are necessary steps towards
openness and transparency. Government ministries and departments should be
encouraged to engage in active disclosure, in the normal course of their activities, of
information and documents containing information relating to: key operational
information; types of information that the public body holds; information on how to
submit requests for information and the content of decisions or policies affecting the
public. Such preparatory steps would ensure that when the proposed Fol Act is
eventually passed, it does not simply become a potentially confrontational
arrangement under which nothing is released unless someone has specifically asked
for it.
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6.4 Accessing Official Information in South Africa
6.4.1 Background to the Right ofFol in South Africa
The pre-democratic South Africa had inherited from Britain the Westminster system
of parliamentary sovereignty and responsible government that, as has been observed,
tended to be secretive.63 The situation got worse after the minority Afrikaner ruling
party adopted a policy of racial segregation, otherwise known as apartheid.
Successive apartheid governments passed a battery of national security laws designed
to shroud the conduct of the executive and administrative branches of government in
secrecy in order to conceal atrocities committed by its agents on opponents of the
system.64 The apartheid government was thus characterised by a culture of secrecy,
disinformation and restrictions on media freedom.65 Consequently, opponents of the
apartheid state came to see unrestricted access to official information as a cornerstone
of transparent, participatory and accountable governance.
The preamble to the 1996 constitution declares, inter alia, that it sets a foundation for
a democratic and open society. One way in which the constitution seeks to ensure an
open and democratic society is by guaranteeing the public a right to any information
held by the state.66 The importance of this right was highlighted by the High Court in
Phato v Attorney General, Eastern Cape 67 The court held that the constitutional right
of access to official information excluded the perpetuation of the old apartheid system
of administration in which it was possible for government to escape liability by
63 G.E. Devenish, A Commentary on the South African Bill ofRights (Butterworths, 1999) p. 437.
64 Such laws include: Defence Act 44 of 1957; Armaments Development and Protection Act 57 of 1968;
National Supplies Procurement Act 89 of 1970; Petroleum Products Act 120 of1977; National Key
Points Act 102 of 1980 and Protection ofInformation Act 84 of 1982.
65 Communications 2000: A Vision for Government Communications in South Africa (COMTASK)
(Report of the Task Group on Government Communications, 1996) para. 2.1, available at:
[http://www.gcis.gov.za/ourdept/comtaskl .htm],
66 Section 32(1) provides:
'Eveiyone has the right ofaccess to -
(a) any information held by the state; and
(b) any information that is held by another person and that is requiredfor the exercise or
protection ofany rights.'
67 1995 1 SA 799.
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refusing to disclose information, and that it also promotes public confidence in the
administration of public affairs.68
The constitution protects an 'unqualified' right of access to information held by the
state,69 which can be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent
that the limitation is reasonable in an open and democratic society.70 Parliament was
required to enact legislation giving effect to the constitutional right and to provide for
reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burden of the
exercise of the right on the state. In February 2000 the Promotion of Access to
Information Act7' (hereinafter referred to as AIA) was enacted and came into operation
on 9th March 2001. Its objects, among others, are to:72
i. Give effect to the constitutional right of access to any information held
by the state;
ii. Subject the exercise of the right to justifiable limitations aimed at the
reasonable protection of privacy, commercial confidentiality and
effective, efficient and good administration;
iii. Establish voluntary and mandatory mechanisms or procedures to give
effect to the right of Fol swiftly, inexpensively and effortlessly as
reasonably possible; and
iv. Promote transparency, accountability and effective governance of all
public bodies.
A question arises from the enactment of the AIA. What is the status of the right of
access i n s ection 3 2(1) of t he c onstitution? D oes t he A ct r eplace t he c onstitutional
68
Ibid., at 815. (The court was then making reference to section 23 of the South African Interim
Constitution of 1993, which provided that: 'Eveiy person shall have the right ofaccess to all
information held by the state or any of its organs at any level ofgovernment in so far as such
information is requiredfor the exercise or protection ofany ofhis or her rights.' The decision is also
relevant to section 32(1), which is wider in application than section 23 of the Interim Constitution.
While the latter protected a 'need to know' in that information must be required for the exercise or
protection of a right, the former protects a 'right to know', i.e., reasons for requiring access to the
information are irrelevant).
69 The right is unqualified in the sense that unlike access to information held by a private person, where
the requester need to prove that the information is required for an exercise or protection of rights, there
is no equivalent qualification to requests for official information.
70
Limitations to fundamental rights guaranteed under the Bill ofRights must conform to the limitation
clause in section 36 of the constitution. See chapter 4 at 4.5.2.
71
Act no. 2 of 2000, available at: [http://www.gov.za/acts/00index.htmT\.
72 Section 9, AIA.
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right or does the constitutional right still stand and can be directly relied on? The issue
has not yet come before the courts, but commentators on the situation appear to be in
agreement that the AIA merely provides an elaborated and detailed expression of the
access right and remedies to vindicate it, but does not replace the constitutional
7-3
right. The argument is persuasive for if the Act was to be seen as replacing the
constitutional right, one would reach the absurd situation where a right entrenched in
the Bill of Rights could be simply amended by ordinary legislation. There still
remains a freestanding constitutional right of access to information even after the
commencement of the AIA. In practice it appears that direct reliance on the
constitutional provision will only be allowed in exceptional cases due to the doctrine
of a voidance, w hich d ictates t hat r emedies s hould b e found i n the c ommon 1 aw o r
legislation before resorting to constitutional remedies.74
The constitutional provision can arguably be directly relied on in three
circumstances.75 First, it could be relied on to challenge the AIA itself. For example,
the Act exempts cabinet documents from its ambit.76 The blanket exemption of
cabinet documents may be challenged as contrary to section 32(1) of the constitution.
Secondly, the constitutional right may be relied on to challenge any legislation passed
subsequent to the AIA that infringes on the right of access to state information. And
thirdly, to the extent that the AIA's scope is narrower than the constitutional right (e.g.
it does not cover cabinet documents), the latter can be directly relied on to seek access
to information that would not be available under the former.
6.4.2 Accessing Official Information Under the AIA
The AIA overrides any other legislation dealing with disclosure of official
information. The Act applies to the exclusion of any provision of other legislation that
prohibits or restricts the disclosure of a record of a public body or that is materially
7j
J. de Waal et al, The Bill ofRights Handbook (Juta & Co Ltd, 2001) p. 530, and C.V. Burgess,
'Accessing Official Information and Access to Private Information: A South African Overview' paper
presented at the Fourth Southern African Media Lawyers' Conference, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, 30th
November - 1st December 2001, at 2.
74
In S v Dlamini 1999 4 SA 623 at para. 27, the Constitutional Court held that: 'as a matter ofjudicial
policy, constitutional issues are generally to be considered only ifand when necessaiy to do so
Further, see de Waal, n 72 above, chapter 3, on the doctrine of avoidance.
75
Ibid., p. 531.
76 Section 12(a), AIA.
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inconsistent with the objects or specific provisions of the Act.77 Thus national security
legislation such as the Protection ofInformation Act 1982, which prohibits disclosure
of a wide-range of security related information, no longer applies to requests for
information made under the AIA. On the other hand, the AIA and other legislative
measures providing for access to official information are to be read as supplementary
78
to each other. Given that the AIA is the main law giving effect to the right of access
to official information, I examine below certain provisions of the Act to determine to
what extent it compares with the minimum standards on which an access to
information law should be premised.
a. Scope ofApplication ofthe AIA
The AIA gives effect to the constitutional right of access to information held by the
state by guaranteeing the public a right to request access to records of public bodies.
Public bodies have a concomitant duty to allow access to requested records unless a
record is exempted from disclosure under the provisions of the Act.79 The public has a
right of access to 'records' as opposed to 'information' held by public bodies. The
concept of a 'record' is preferable to that of 'information' as access to actual records
containing the information required reduces the temptation by government officials to
doctor information to suit their own needs. It is an offence under the Act for a person,
with intent to deny a right of access to a record, to destroy, alter, damage, conceal or
• 80
falsify a record. The AIA defines the t erm ' record' as ' any recorded l nformation,
81 • •
regardless of form or medium' in which it is stored. The definition is broad and it is
significant, especially in the electronic age that the definition is based on the concept
of 'recorded information' rather than that of a written document.
The AIA applies to records of public bodies regardless of when the record came into
existence.82 To qualify as a 'record of a public body', a record must either be in the
77 Section 5.
78 Section 6(a). An example of a provision that is supplementary to the AIA is section 32 of the
National Environment Management Act 107 of 1998, which gives the public a right of access to
information held by the state and its organs relating to the environment.





possession or under the control of the body at the time of the request. In other
jurisdictions with Fol legislation such as the US, the test for determining whether a
record is an 'agency record' is restrictive. The US Supreme Court has held that the
determination of the issue involves a two-pronged test: First, a federal g overnment
agency must either have created or obtained the record and have possession of it at the
time of the request. Secondly, the agency must be in control of the requested record at
the time of the request in the sense that the record must have come into the agency's
possession in the conduct of its official duties.83 The AIA opts for a wider application
84in that possession or control will suffice.
The Act also defines a 'public body' broadly by focusing on both formal designations
and type of service provided by an entity. A public body is thus defined as either 'any
department of state or administration in the national, provincial or municipal sphere of
government', or 'an entity exercising a power or performing a duty or public function
in terms of the constitution or any legislation'. 5 It is instructive to note that this
definition is similar to the definition of an 'organ of state' in the constitution.86 The
jurisprudence of the courts concerning the constitutional provision should therefore be
of assistance in interpreting the definition of a public body in the AIA. Courts
distinguish between two types of organs of state: the public service and institutions
outside the public service that are controlled by t he state. The latter includes those
entities where the majority of the members of the controlling board are appointed by
the state or where the functions of a body and their exercise is prescribed by the state
to such an extent that it is effectively in control.87 Parastatals, partially privatised
parastatals and non-governmental institutions performing public functions in terms of
88the constitution or legislation have been held to be organs of state under this test.
These institutions are arguably covered by the AIA, in addition to entities in any
branch of the state at any of its three levels, legislature, judiciary and executive.
83 United States Department ofJustice v Tax Analysts 492 US 136 (1989).
84 See I. Currie & J. Klaaren, The Promotion ofAccess to Information Act Commentary (Siber Ink,
2002) pp. 43 - 42, para. 4.4.
85 Section 1, AIA.
86 Cf. Section 239 of the constitution of South Africa 1996.
87
Directory Advertising Costs Cutters CC v Ministerfor Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting
1996 3 SA 800 at 810.
88 For example see: Goodman Bros (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 1998 4 SA 989; Inkatha Freedom Party v
Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2000 3 SA 119 and Lebowa Mineral Trust v Lebowa Granite
(Pty) Ltd 2002 3 SA 30.
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Despite the generosity of the scope of its application, the AIA does not apply to certain
OQ
public bodies. It does not apply to records of cabinet and its committees. It would
appear that the exemption of cabinet records is one of the surviving legacies from the
Westminster tradition of government, based on the doctrine of ministerial collective
responsibility.90 The blanket exemption of cabinet records from the application of the
AIA is clearly a limitation of the constitutional right of access to information and
arguably places its constitutionality in doubt. However, the exemption of cabinet
records from the scope of the AIA does not exclude them from the direct application
of the constitutional provision.
Records o f the j udicial functions o f a court or a special tribunal are also excluded
from the operation of the AIA.91 The exemption is designed to ensure that the rules
and procedures developed to facilitate the efficient functioning of the courts, the
fairness of litigation and the finality of judicial decisions are not affected by the
92
access to information procedures of the AIA.
b. Publication Obligations
The AIA establishes an almost entirely request-based system of access to records held
by public bodies. There are no mandatory provisions in the Act requiring proactive
disclosure of documents of significant public interest. However, every public body is
required to publish a manual (to be updated at intervals of not more than one year)
that provides, inter alia:93
i. Sufficient information to facilitate a request for access to records of
the body by giving a description of the subjects on which the body
holds and the categories of records held on each subject; and
89 Section 12(a), AIA.
90 The UK Fol Act does not apply to cabinet. (See Schedule 1, which specifies public bodies subject to
the Act.) And of the leading Westminster forms of government, Australia and Canada also exempt
cabinet records from the jurisdiction of their access to information legislation. See sections 34 and 26
of their access to information legislation, respectively.
91 Section 12(b), A/A.
92 Currie & Klaaren, n 84 above p. 57 para. 418.
93 Section 14(l)(d) & (e),
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ii. Categories of records of the public body which are available
without a person having to request access in terms of the Act.
The first requirement is very important, as it requires every public body to create a
form of index of records it holds. Indexes make the exercise of the right of access to
information easier as they give the public an idea of what records a particular body
holds. The absence of mandatory provisions in the Act requiring disclosure of
documents of significant public interest is a serious loophole that may lead to a
situation where records of public bodies are not released to the public unless
specifically requested. Such a scenario will be highly regrettable, as it will negate the
very essence of an access to information legislation - the promotion of openness and
transparency in government.
Government departments are encouraged under a separate system to make their non-
secret documents available to the public via government technology network as well
as public libraries and other information centres throughout the country.94 The second
requirement that manuals should provide a list of records that have already been made
available to the public presupposes that government departments will publish the
majority of their documents under the GCIS arrangement.
c. Exemptions
The AIA gives a list of twelve grounds for refusal of access to records of public
bodies. In general, these grounds seek to protect interests relating to: privacy,
individual safety, public safety, national security, commercial and other
confidentiality, law enforcement and integrity of government decision-making
94
Following a recommendation of the COMTASK, the government established a Government
Communications and Information System (GCIS) in May 1998. The main aim of the GCIS is to take
responsibility for communication between the government and the public. In order to foster a more
positive communication environment, GCIS encourages government departments to make available to
the public their non-classified documents through its technology network. It maintains a website at:
[http://www.gcis.gov.za].
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processes.9""1 Some of these exemptions are mandatory while others are discretionary.
The Act uses the terms 'must refuse' and 'may refuse' to indicate a compulsory and a
discretionary ground, respectively.96 Generally, where rights or interests of third
parties are implicated, the Act grants a mandatory exemption to disclosure, and where
rights or interests of a public body that holds a record, or the public interest are
implicated refusal to disclose is usually discretionary.97
The AIA provides a mandatory public interest override with respect to all the grounds
of refusal that may be used by a public body except one - the one relating to certain
records of the revenue service.98 For the override to apply, two conditions must be
satisfied.99 First, disclosure of a record should reveal evidence of substantial
contravention of, or failure to comply with the law; or an imminent and serious public
safety or environmental risk.100 And secondly, the public interest in the disclosure of a
record should clearly outweigh the harm contemplated in the provision in question. A
number of commentators have suggested that where the first condition is satisfied, the
second would necessarily also be satisfied.101 However, the wording of section 46
contemplates a two-part test, which suggests that the public interest in the disclosure
of a record that reveals evidence of an imminent and serious public safety or
environmental r isk o r c ontravention o f t he 1 aw may n ot c learly o utweigh t he h arm
contemplated. In applying the override, public bodies are therefore required to strike a
balance between the harm that may result from disclosure of a record and the public
interest in making a disclosure.
9" The specific grounds of refusal in brief relate to: Privacy of third persons (section 34); certain
records of the South African Revenue Service (section 35); commercial information of third party
(section 36); confidential information of third party (section 37); safety of individuals and protection of
property (section 38); bail proceedings, law enforcement and legal proceedings (section 39); legal
privilege (section 40) defence, security and international relations (section 41); economic interests and
financial welfare of the Republic and commercial activities ofpublic bodies (section 42); research
information (section 43); operations of public bodies (section 44) and frivolous or vexatious requests or
requests that will require substantial and unreasonable diversion of resources (section 45).
96 Section 33 of the AIA provides that the mandatory grounds of refusal are those in sections 34; 35; 36;
37; 38; 39; 40 and 43.
97 Currie & Klareen, n 84 above p. 106 para. 7.7.
98 Section 46, AIA.
99 Ibid.
100 Section 1 defines 'public safety or environmental risk' to mean 'harm or risk to the environment or
the public (including individuals in their workplace)' associated with a publicly available product or
service, a substance released into the environment or intended for human or animal consumption, a
means ofpublic transport, or a manufacturing process or substance.
101 Currie & Klaaren, n 84 above p. 109 para. 7.13 and de Waal et al, n 73 above p. 545.
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The override applies differently to mandatory and discretionary grounds of refusal.
Where it affects a discretionary ground, in essence, it denies public bodies discretion
to refuse disclosure of a record. In the case of mandatory grounds, the override
authorises disclosure, notwithstanding the fact that the ground prohibits disclosure.
1 09
The override is therefore so properly described in the case ofmandatory grounds.
Exemptions to disclosure of records of public bodies are limitations to the
constitutional right of access to information. In terms of the general limitation clause
on rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights,103 limitations to rights must be read as
narrowly as possible, consistent with their purpose of protecting specific rights.104 The
burden of justifying a limitation of a fundamental right rests with the party seeking to
limit the right.105 Public bodies therefore bear the burden of proving that a requested
record falls within one of the exemptions listed in the Act, and must also justify a
refusal to disclose.
The AIA adopts the three-part test in order to ensure that exemptions to disclose of
records of public bodies are clear and narrowly applied. First, as the AIA prevails over
any other legislation relating to disclosure of official information, the Act provides a
complete list of legitimate aims that may justify non-disclosure of a record. No other
ground will be valid for refusing access to a record covered by the Act. The list of
exceptions to disclosure in the Act, with the exception of certain records of the
revenue service and frivolous and vexatious requests, correspond with the list of
social interests identified in international human rights instruments that must be
reconciled with the exercise of the right of Fol. One may therefore observe that the
scope of the exceptions in the AIA are reasonable in the light of the minimum
standards that such a law must be based.
Secondly, it has been argued that a narrow interpretation of exemptions to disclosure
of official information demands that information should not simply fall within the
scope of a legitimate aim listed in the law, but that a public body must also show that
the disclosure would cause substantial harm to that legitimate aim. The AIA takes this
102
Ibid., p. 109 para. 7.11.
103 Section 36, constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.
104 See chapter 4 at 4.5.2.
105 Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 1 SA 984.
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approach with respect to the majority of its exemptions. Most exemptions have a two-
part structure. First, the content of the information in a requested record must fall
within a specified category or class for the exemption to be applicable. Secondly,
there must be a connection between disclosure of the information and a particular
adverse consequence to the particular rights or interests that are protected by the
exemption.106 The need to demonstrate a basis for concluding that the rights or
interests protected by the exemption will be adversely affected to the degree specified
is a necessary condition for invoking that ground.
The AIA uses two distinct phrases, 'likely' or 'reasonably expected', to describe the
degree of connection that must exist between the content of a record and the harmful
consequence of release that the exemption aims to prevent. Courts in the country have
not yet adjudicated upon the meaning of these two phrases. The Australian and
Canadian access to information legislation uses the phrase 'reasonably expected', and
has been subject to judicial interpretation by their respective courts. The phrase in
both countries has been held to mean that for an exemption to apply, a public body
must prove that there are real and substantial grounds for the expectation that harm
will occur..107 Thus grounds that are merely speculative, imaginable or theoretically
possible will not be enough to justify an exemption. This strict approach in
establishing a connection between the content of a record and the harmful
consequence that an exemption aims to prevent no doubt narrows the scope of
application of exemptions to disclosure. Courts in South Africa are more likely to
adopt a similar approach in interpreting the phrase 'reasonably expected' in the AIA.
The question that remains is what degree of connection does the 'likely' test require?
It has been argued that the test is more stringent than the 'reasonably expected' test,
i.e. a lesser degree of probability is required for the latter than for the former test. In
backing the argument, an observation is made that the phrase 'likely' is used in
relation to the lesser important rights or interests that the exemptions seek to
1 OR
protect. The argument is persuasive as it is consistent with spirit of the general
limitation clause that exemptions to rights be interpreted narrowly. It is conceivable
106 See Currie & Klaaren, n 84 above p. 99 para. 7.2.
107 See Canada Packers lnc v Canada (Minister ofAgriculture) 53 DLR (4th) 246 at 255, and Searle
Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre & another (1992) 108 ALR 163 at 175 - 176.
108 Currie & Klaaren, n 84 above p. 102 para. 7.3.
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that the legislature deliberately used the two sets of standards to demonstrate the
difference in the importance of the rights and interests involved.109
In the case of those exemptions where a public body only need to prove that a record
falls within the scope of a legitimate aim listed in the law, the AIA tries to limit the
scope of application of the exemptions by laying down objective jurisdictional facts,
i.e., a state of affairs that must exist in an objective sense before a power can be
validly exercised. The Act does so by avoiding the use of subjective terminology such
as 'in the opinion of or 'is satisfied that'.110 This approach ensures that the
categorisation of records is subject to review proceedings.111
And thirdly, regarding the three-part test, the AIA incorporates a public interest
override in the disclosure of information. As discussed above, the override will allow
disclosure of information even where such disclosure will cause substantial harm, if
the benefits of disclosure outweigh the harm.
Further, in ensuring that any derogation from the right of Fol remains within the
limits of what is appropriate and necessary in achieving its aims, the AIA obligates
public bodies to sever from a record any information that is subject to refusal and to
119
disclose the remainder of the information. The obligation to sever protected
information from disclosable information arises where the latter may 'reasonably' be
severed from the former. While courts in the country are still to expound what the test
entails, jurisprudence from other jurisdictions with Fol laws which use a similar
phrase to the AIA's suggest that severance will be reasonably possible where a
113document with deletions remains meaningful and does not distort the original text.
109 The more stringent 'likely' test applies to exemptions aimed at protecting the following rights and
interests: commercial information other than trade secrets (section 36(1 )(b); information likely to
prejudice or impair safety of property (section 38(b); economic interests and financial welfare of the
state and commercial activities of public bodies (section 42(1) and research information (section 43).
And the more lenient 'reasonably expected' test is used in relation to the more important rights and
interests such as privacy, security of individuals, national security and integrity of government
decision-making processes.
110 Currie & Klaaren, n 84 above p. 100 para 7.2.
'"By contrast, subjective jurisdictional facts entrust to the repository of the power the sole and
exclusive function of determining whether in its opinion the prerequisite facts exists. See South African
Defence and Aid Fund v Minister ofJustice 1967 1 SA 31.
112 Section 28(1), AIA.
'13 Ottawa Football Club v Canada (Minister ofFitness and Amateur Sports) [1982] 2 FC 480 (TD).
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In addition, severance will not be reasonable if the disclosure of what remains
provides clues to the contents of the deleted portions.114
d. Requests, Access andAppeal Procedures
The officials entrusted with the duties imposed on public bodies by the AIA to ensure
access by the public to o fficial information are information officers. These are the
most senior employees of public bodies such as director-generals in government
ministries and chief executive officers of parastatals.113 Information officers are
allowed to designate and delegate their duties to deputy information officers, whose
number in each public body will be such as is necessary to render the body as
accessible as reasonably possible for those requesting its records.116 The AIA, like Fol
laws in other countries does not expressly cite the right of the media to access records
of public bodies. Media representatives therefore share the right of access with the
general public."7
A request for access to a record of a public body must be made in the prescribed form
. 118 • -i
to the information officer of the body. The form requires a requester to provide,
among other things, sufficient particulars to identify the record, particulars of the
requester and the manner of access preferred.119 Information officers are under a
general duty to assist requesters to comply with the requirements of the Act in lodging
1 70
requests. The AIA does not require a requester to justify his/her request for access
to a record of a public body.121
114 Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Solicitor General) [1988] 3 FC 557 (TD).
115 Section 1, AIA. (The decision that implementation of the Act should be the responsibility of such
senior officials was intended to ensure that the Act would be taken seriously and treated as a
mainstream responsibility of public bodies. See Currie & Klaaren n 84 above p. 73 para. 6.1.)
116 Section 17, AIA. (In practice, heads of public bodies tend to appoint and delegated their duties and
powers to deputy information officers, as the nature of their jobs does not allow them enough time to
attend to requests for information by the public.)
''7 Media representatives are however required to submit proof of the capacity in which they are
making a request, when representing their media organisations. Section 18(2)(f), AIA.
118 Section 18(1).
119 Section 18(2). See Form A, Regulations Relating to the Promotion ofAccess to Information No. R.
223 (Government Gazette No. 22125, 9th March 2001) available at:
[http://www.gov.za.gazette/regulations/2001/22125/pdf\.
120 Section 19(1), AIA.
121 Section 11(3).
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Information officers are required to respond to requests as soon as reasonably
possible, but within 30 days after receipt of a request.122 The Act does not provide for
an expedited access procedure especially by media representatives to information
relating to news items of pressing public importance. The omission has raised fears
among media practitioners that the time limits set in the Act may be used to prolong
1
the supply of information. Where an information officer decides to allow access to
a requested record, the forms of access available are: (i) for written or printed records
- a copy of the record or an opportunity to inspect the record, and (ii) for records
stored in other forms - an opportunity to view, record or hear the record or a copy of
the record in electronic form.124 Where a requester has indicated a particular form of
preferred access in his/her request, access must be granted in that form unless to do so
would either interfere unreasonably with the administration of the public body, or
would be detrimental to the preservation of the record or will amount to an
infringement of the copyright of someone other than the public body.125 The Act
provides for payment of two types of access fees.126 There is a standard request fee,
and an access fee intended to compensate a body for the costs ofmaking a copy of a
127record and the time spent searching for, and preparing a record.
Where a body refuses a request for access to a record, it must give notice of its
decision to the requester within 30 days from the date of receipt of the request. Such
notice must provide adequate reasons for the refusal, including the provision in the
128Act relied upon, and must also advise the requester of his/her right of appeal. What
will amount to adequate reasons will depend on the nature of the exemption relied
upon. Some exemptions offer a categorical basis for refusal of access, therefore, to
justify refusal on such an exemption, it will be enough for a public body to state that
122 Section 25(1). In order to avoid over burdening public bodies, the Act provided for extended periods
for dealing with requests during the first two years of the operation of the Act. From March 2001 to
March 2002, information officers had 90 days to respond to a request and from March 2002 to March
2003, they had 60 days. Thereafter the 30 days period came into operation. (Section 87( 1), AIA).
12j R. Louw, 'Goals and Expectations of the Media Lawyers' Conference' a paper presented at the
Fourth Southern Africa Media Lawyers' Conference, held in Flarare, Zimbabwe, 30th November - 1st
December 2001.
124 Section 29(2), AIA.
125 Section 29(7).
126 Section 22(2).
127 The request fee is R35.00 and access fees range from R0.40 for a copy of an A-4 size page to
R60.00 for copies of visual images. See Regulation 3(1), Regulations Relating to the Promotion of
Access to Information, n 119 above.
128 Section 25(3), AIA.
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the record requested falls within a particular category that is protected. There is no
need to prove that harm will flow from disclosure of the record. On the other hand,
some exemptions have a two-part structure. First, the content of a record must fall
within a specified exemption, and secondly, there must be a connection between
disclosure of the record and a particular adverse consequence to the rights or interests
protected by the exemption. In this case, reasons will have to be given to justify the
categorisation of the record and the basis for concluding that disclosure will adversely
affect the rights or interests protected to the degree specified by the Act.
The AIA provides two dispute resolution mechanisms for refusals of access to records
of public bodies. There is a limited system of internal appeals to a higher authority
within certain public bodies and a system of judicial review. Internal appeals are
available only where the request was for information held by a 'department of state or
administration in the national or provincial sphere of government or any municipality
in the local sphere of government'.129 An internal appeal is made from a decision of
an information officer to a higher authority within or responsible for the same public
body. In the case of government departments, decisions of information officers can be
appealed to ministers responsible for those departments or a person designated by the
minister to act as a higher authority within a public body under his/her control.130 The
internal appeal procedure is established to challenge the merits of decisions of
information officers. A person to whom an internal appeal is made therefore steps into
131the shoes of the original decision-maker and decides the matter de novo.
A r equester who h as b een u nsuccessful i n an i nternal a ppeal, o r i s a ggrieved b y a
decision of an information officer of a public body that does not have an internal
1 T9
appeal procedure, can make an application to a court for appropriate relief. An
application can only be made if an aggrieved party has exhausted available internal
appeal procedures.133 The court hearing an application under the Act may grant, inter
alia, an order confirming, amending or setting aside the decision that is the subject of
129 Section 74(1).
130 Section 1.
1,1 See Currie & Klaaren, n 84 above p. 203 para. 9.9.
Ij2 Section 78(2), AIA. (The courts that have jurisdiction to entertain applications under the Act are the
Constitutional Court, High Court and some Magistrates Court designated by the minister responsible
for the administration of justice. (Section 1, A/A).)
133 Section 78(1), AIA.
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the application.134 It is not clear from the AIA what powers a court will be exercising
when entertaining an application under the Act. Will the court be exercising judicial
review or an appellate jurisdiction? It is also not clear whether a court hearing an
application under the Act has power to consider the matter de novo or if it is confined
to the existing record. If the court will be exercising its judicial review powers when
hearing an application under the AIA, it will be concerned only with the legality of the
decision. Judicial review in South Africa now has a constitutional basis.135 The
common law principles that previously provided grounds for judicial review of
administrative action have been subsumed under the constitution.136 In terms of the
constitution, a challenge to the validity of administrative action must be based on an
allegation that one or more of the constitutional rights to lawful, procedurally fair and
reasonable administrative action has been violated. In general, these principles require
that: administrative decisions must be duly authorised by law; there must be no errors
of fact or law contributing to the making of the decision; and the decision-maker must
not abuse his or her discretion by acting for an ulterior purpose, in bad faith or by
failing to consider the matter properly.137 On the other hand, if the court will be
exercising an appellate jurisdiction in an application under the AIA, it will be looking
at the merits of the decision in question. Judicial review is therefore narrower than an
appeal.
In the light of the uncertainty surrounding the role that a court will be playing when
hearing an application under the AIA, some commentators argue that the court will be
exercising a form of statutory judicial review. The argument is based on a convention
in the country that courts only have appellate jurisdiction when it has specifically
134 Section 82(a).
133 Section 33(1), constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 provides: 'Everyone has the right
to administrative action that is lawfid, reasonable andprocedurally fair.' Parliament has enacted a law,
The Promotion ofAdministrative Justice Act No. 3 of2000 to give effect to the constitutional right.
This Act however does not apply to decisions taken under the AIA, which means that decisions taken
under the AIA are governed directly by the constitutional provision.
Ij6 See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association ofSA: In re ex parte President of the Republic of
South Africa 2000 2 SA 674. (The leading authority on the ambit of the common law power of judicial
review is the case of: Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company v Johannesburg Town Council
1903 TS 111, where it was held that: 'Whenever a public body has a duty imposed on it by statute, and
disregards important provisions of the statute, or is guilty ofgross irregularity or clear illegality in the
performance ofthe duty, this court may be asked to review the proceedings complained ofand set aside
or correct them'.)
137 See de Waal et al, n 73 above, chapter 29.
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138been granted to them. Assuming this argument to be correct, in an application
under the AIA, a court will only be concerned with the legality of a decision of a
public body and will give deference to the body's findings of fact. In such an
application, the court may examine any record of a public body, and no record may be
held from the court on any grounds.139 However the court may not disclose to any
person other than the public body concerned in the proceedings any record of the
body which on request, may or must be refused in terms of the Act.140
Judged against the minimum standards on which an access to information law should
be premised, the AIA provides a fairly reasonable legal environment for the exercise
of the right of access to information held by the state. The most outstanding parts of
the Act are those relating to its scope of application and treatment of exemptions to
disclosure of information. The Act supports the principle of maximum disclosure by
establishing a presumption that all information held by public bodies is subject to
disclosure unless specifically exempted under the Act. The Act adopts broad
definitions of both the terms 'record' and 'record of a public body', thus ensuring that
a wide range of information and entities within and outside the public service are
covered by the Act. The AIA's scope of application makes it one of the most liberal
Fol laws in the world. However it is disappointing to observe that the Act fails to
impose mandatory disclosure obligations on public bodies to publish and disseminate
information of significant public interest.
The manner in which the AIA treats exemptions to disclosure of information is
consistent with the principle that exemptions are limitations to rights and should
therefore be clearly and narrowly drawn. The Act employs the three-part test to ensure
that exemptions are clear and narrowly interpreted. The list of legitimate grounds in
the AIA for refusing disclosure of information is not overbroad and compares
favourably with the lists in international human rights instruments.
One of the objects of the AIA is to establish voluntary and mandatory mechanisms to
give effect to the right of Fol as swiftly and inexpensively as reasonably possible. A
138 Currie & Klaaren, n 84 above p. 203 para. 9.9.
139 Section 80(1), AIA.
140 Section 80(2).
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closer look at the Act however shows that the enforcement mechanisms in the Act are
inadequate, rather weak and expensive. From the point of view of the media, the Act
fails to provide expedited access to information, which does not suit the media's
special needs. The internal appeal process is not available in all public bodies, this
deprives those aggrieved by decisions of public bodies without internal appeal
processes an opportunity to have such decisions reviewed on their merits. Where there
is no internal appeal, an aggrieved party's only available remedy is an application to
court, and as observed above, the remedies available on review are narrower than
those on appeal. Moreover, the internal appeal procedure, even where it is available,
is not wholly satisfactory because of the proximity in the relationship between
information officers and higher authorities. It is highly questionable whether higher
authorities are sufficiently independent from information officers to provide a
satisfactory remedy. An application to court is therefore arguably the only
independent enforcement mechanism available to an aggrieved party. Enforcing the
right of access to information directly through the courts is not satisfactory for two
reasons. First, the power of the court in reviewing a decision of a public body is rather
limited. A court will be confined to the question of the legality of a decision in
question and is not free to review the merits of the decision. And secondly, litigation
tends to be expensive and time-consuming and may therefore discourage the public
from pursuing their rights. The enforcement mechanisms for the right of Fol in the
AIA fail to match the minimum standards on access to information legislation.
6.5 Conclusion
Political experiences have influenced attitudes to the right of access to information
held by the state in Botswana and South Africa. A culture of secrecy, disinformation
and restrictions on media freedom during the apartheid era resulted in some of the
worst human rights abuses in South Africa. Access to information held by the state is
therefore seen as necessary to avoid the ills of the apartheid era, hence the prominence
that transparency and openness are accorded in the constitution and laws of the new
South Africa. Botswana, on the other hand, adopted a Westminster model of
government at independence and has since been committed to multiparty democracy,
periodic elections and has a fair track record on respect for human rights. In the
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Westminster tradition, the right of access to information held by the state was not
considered important until recently. The government now accepts that access to
official information by the public is essential for the maintenance of a modern
democracy.141 While the right is important to the public in general, it is perhaps more
important to the media for the performance of their informative and watchdog roles. A
Fol law should therefore be supportive to the media's role in a democracy.
Due to its unique political history, the AIA is one of the most liberal and
comprehensive Fol laws in the world, in particular, with regard to its scope of
application and exemptions. Although still new and untested in litigation, the AIA
should serve as a useful template for any country that wishes to give a meaningful
effect to the right of Fol. The AIA covers a wide range of public bodies, which gives it
a comprehensive scope of application compared with Fol laws of other countries.142
The blanket exemption of cabinet from the scope of the AIA is however objectionable.
The traditional rationale behind cabinet secrecy in Commonwealth jurisdictions is the
protection of ministerial collective responsibility.143 Disclosure of cabinet records
could undermine the convention as it might reveal differences in cabinet, but does the
convention really justify a blanket exemption for all cabinet records from disclosure?
Certainly not all cabinet records will reveal differences among cabinet members.
Records that are unlikely to undermine the convention should therefore be made
available to the public unless exempted under the provisions of the Act. If there is a
need to maintain the convention, this can be properly accommodated under the
exemption protecting the integrity of the government decision-making processes.144
The AIA's approach in regard to exemptions to disclosure of information is worth
emulating. Exemptions are based on the content rather than the type or origins of a
record. Save for records of the revenue service, there are no class exemptions; non¬
disclosure of records is therefore justified on a case-by-case basis. Even though the
AIA distinguishes between mandatory and discretionary exemptions, there is little
141 This is evidenced by the government's acceptance of the recommendations of the Presidential Task
Group for a Long Term Vision for Botswana to pass a Fol law. See 6.3.1 above.
142
For example, Fol laws of Australia and UK do not apply to security intelligence services and the
USA law does not cover the judicial and legislative branches of government.
143 See Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] QB 752.
144 Section 42,AIA.
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practical difference between the two as records falling under mandatory head can still
be disclosed if this will benefit the public interest.14"
While the scope of application and treatment of exemptions in the AIA create a
favourable environment for the media to perform their democratic role, they need to
be supported by effective enforcement mechanisms. A Fol Act must recognise that
the media tend to need information too quickly to wait for formal requests to be
honoured by slow moving bureaucracies. The law should therefore provide an
expedited access procedure for the media to accommodate their particular needs.146
To avoid abuse of such a procedure, the law should clearly stipulate when it can be
resorted to.
A Fol law should offer independent, cheap and informal means of resolving disputes.
In the USA disputes under the Fol Act are resolved directly by the courts. The
arrangement has been criticised for failing to serve the best interests of the users of
the law due to the expense, delay and formality associated with the courts.147 The
leading commonwealth jurisdictions have opted tor independent administrative
1 48
dispute resolution mechanisms such as Ombudsmen or Appeals Tribunals. The
latter are obviously attractive as they offer an informal and inexpensive means of
settling disputes and have the potential of doing so more expeditiously than the courts.
An ideal Fol law should combine the two dispute resolution mechanisms. First, an
appeal against a decision of a public body should be made to an independent
administrative body, which must have the power to review the merits of the decision.
And secondly, any party aggrieved by a decision of an administrative body should be
able to appeal to the courts, which must also have the power to review the merits of a
decision of the administrative body. The involvement of the courts is crucial for
ensuring that due attention is given to resolving difficult legal questions.
145
Mandatory exemptions in most countries with Fol laws are not subject to a public interest override.
146 For example, in 1996 the USA amended its Fol Act in order to provide an expedited request
procedure by requesters who are primarily engaged in the dissemination of information to the public
where it can be shown that a request involves matters on which there is an urgent need to inform the
public concerning actual or alleged federal government activity. Section 552(a)(6)(B).
147 P. Birkinshaw, 'Freedom of Information: The US Experience', Hull University Law School, Studies
in Law (1991) at 23.
148 See Fol laws ofAustralia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK.
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The UN has observed that the right of access to information implies by its nature, a
positive obligation on the state, not only to refrain from hindering access to
information, b ut a lso t o encourage t he p ublic i n exercising t heir r ight o f a ccess b y
informing them of their activities.149 Public bodies must therefore be obliged to adopt
active communication policies by disseminating widely documents of significant
public interest. Further, there must be provision for public education and
dissemination of information regarding the right of access to information. While the
AIA does not have mandatory disclosure provisions, it does provide for a guide on
how to use the Act, aimed at the public and information officers.120
Enforcement mechanisms aside, the AIA is one of the most progressive Fol laws in
the world. Some countries have adopted a more conservative approach, a classic
example being the UK, which has maintained class exemptions and rejected a serious
harm test in favour of a simple prejudice test for the determination of exemptions.151
Botswana is more likely to take a conservative approach similar to that of the UK
because of its historical links with the latter. It is, however, submitted that the South
African approach offers a better framework for ensuring the full enjoyment of the
right of access to official information. Anything short of the radical approach adopted
in the AIA is unlikely to succeed in breaking up the prevailing culture of secrecy in
government.
149
Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion ofthe Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, n 7 above para. 44. See also O'Neill, n 2 above at 425.
150 Section 10, AIA. The task of compiling the guide is delegated to the South African Human Rights
Commission. The first edition was published towards the end of 2001. See The Promotion ofAccess to
Information Act No 2 of2000: A Resource Manual (South African Human Rights Commission, 2001).
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Birkinshaw, 'Open All Hours: The Impact of the Labour Government's Legislation on Freedom of
Information', n 19 above.
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PART IV
CHILLING THE MEDIA: TWO KEY RESTRAINTS ON MEDIA FREEDOM
CHAPTER 7
IMPACT OF NATIONAL SECURITY ON MEDIA FREEDOM
7.1 Introduction
All major human rights treaties permit restrictions on the freedoms of expression and
information in the interest of protecting national security.1 However, n one of these
treaties identifies precisely those state interests that will give rise to genuine national
security concerns. Generally, states are accorded wide latitude in determining when
national security is threatened. Recourse to national jurisprudence to assist in
understanding what the concept encompasses is therefore not very helpful either as
the concept, together with the related concepts of 'state security', 'internal security',
'public security' or 'public safety', tends to be vague at the municipal law level.
It has been observed that national security is a compound of two complex ideas1 the
state or nation and security.3 At least four indispensable elements of the state have
been developed within the framework of international relations: physical base of
population and territory; governing institutions; sovereignty, in the sense of self-
government; and compliance with certain values, such as the respect for democracy,
which confer legitimacy on the state.4 All states in the international order that are
comprised of these basic elements share certain fundamental concerns and values.
These include: continued existence of the state; maintenance of its territorial integrity;
survival of its governing institutions; independence from dictation by other states; and
1 See Articles: 19(3)(b) ICCPR; 27(2) ACHPR; 13(2)(b) ACHR and 10(2) ECHR.
2 See generally, S. Coliver, 'Commentary to: The Johannesburg Principles on National Security,
Freedom of Expression, and Access to Information' (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 12 at 13 and
R.G. Atkey, 'Reconciling Freedom of Expression and National Security' (1991) 41 University of
Toronto Law Journal 38 at 50. The problem of defining national security is also demonstrated in one of
the USA's leading judicial analysis of the concept in: New York Times Co. v United States 403 US 713
(1971) at 719, where Black J observed: 'the word security is a broad, vague generality whose contours
should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment'.
3 L. Lustgarten & I. Leigh, In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentaiy Democracy




physical survival of its citizens.5 Any act that threatens to violate any of the above
concerns or values will be considered a threat to the well-being and thus the security
of a state. However national security cannot be defined or even discussed in the
abstract. It is a complex and contentious concept. In the arena of world politics, in
which co-operation, rivalry, law and anarchy coexist and overlap, the character,
interests and vulnerability of each state will vary. The operative meaning of national
security will therefore vary correspondingly for each state.6
In the Commonwealth, national security laws in most cases are based on the UK
Official Secrets Act of 1911, and are notorious for their ambiguity. The primary focus
of these laws is the proscription of conduct prejudicial to the safety or interests of the
state or the communication or reception of secret information that is calculated to be
or might be useful to a foreign power.7 The terms 'interests of the state' and 'secret'
are commonly used in these laws, but no attempt is made to define them. The
ambiguity surrounding the concept of national security is further exacerbated by the
fact that governments have a tendency to misuse the concept by identifying their
interests as political actors with the greater interests of the state. They fail to
distinguish the security of the state from the. security of their particular government or
political party such that more often than not, national security is invoked to protect
governments from inconvenient or embarrassing revelations that have nothing to do
o
with the security of the state.
Where the legislature has failed to provide for clarity in a law, it is normally left to the
judiciary to fill the vacuum by interpreting the law to provide for certainty.
Unfortunately, courts in countries around the world demonstrate the least
independence and greatest deference to claims of government when national security
5 Ibid.
6 The ECtHR recognises these variations by allowing states a margin of appreciation in dealing with
national security issues. Deference is given to local conditions and standards on certain issues for
reasons of flexibility and in recognition of the diversity of the political, social, economic and other
conditions in the various countries in the world. See Handyside v UK (1976) 1 EHRR 737 para. 24.
7
For a discussion of the UK Official Secrets Acts, see G. Robertson & A. Nicol, Media Law (Sweet &
Maxwell, 2002) chapter 11. See also Atkey, n 2 above at 44, for the Canadian situation.
8 For example, in February 1996, the democratic government of South Africa forced employees of the
ministry of health to sign declarations of secrecy under an apartheid era piece of legislation, The
Protection ofInformation Act of 1982, in order to prevent the leaking of information in the wake of a
scandal involving a government tender. See D. Sibongo & D. Lush, So this is Democracy? Report of
the Media in Southern Africa 1996 (MISA, 1997) p. 33.
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is invoked. The source of this deference seems to be two-fold: (i) constitutional; that
in terms of constitutional allocation of functions, the courts are not the proper forum
to deal with the matter given the policy-oriented nature of the decisions involved, and
(ii) practical; that judicial scrutiny is inconsistent with maintaining secrecy, especially
within an adversarial system of justice.9
The ambiguity surrounding the concept of national security and the reluctance of the
courts to scrutinise executive action where the concept is invoked has a chilling effect
on media freedom. First, confidential sources become reluctant to make information
available to the media for fear of personal consequences. And secondly, newspapers
also become reluctant to make secondary disclosures for fear of prosecution.10 This is
anomalous because under international law exemptions to fundamental rights and
freedoms m ust bee onstrued n arrowly soasnottod efeat t he p urpose o f t he r ights
protected.11
Even though international human rights treaties do not give precise definitions of
national security, international bodies, together with international law experts, have
made attempts to define legitimate national security interests that should justify
exemptions to the exercise of the freedoms of expression and information. On the
other hand, the main human rights treaties adopt the three-part test in order to ensure
that exemptions are construed narrowly. In this chapter I look at the international law
definition of national security and the mechanisms in place to guard against its abuse.
I then proceed to examine the concept of national security in the municipal laws of
Botswana and South Africa and its impact on m edia freedom. The examination of
national security in the laws of the two states will inevitably involve a comparison of
the approaches taken in these laws to international law, which provides the minimum
standards below which no member of the international community should fall. If the
9 The House of Lords has observed that: 'National security is the responsibility of the executive arm of
government; what action is needed to protect its interests is ... common sense itselfdictates, a matter
upon which those upon whom the responsibility rests, and not courts ofjustice, must have the last
word. It is par excellence a non-justiciable question. Thejudicial process is totally inept to deal with
the type ofproblems which it involves'. Per Lord Diplock in Council ofCivil Service Unions v Minister
ofthe Civil Service [1985] AC 399 at 412. For similar sentiments see: Stewart J in New York Times Co.
v United States, n 2 above at 728 - 30.
10 Cf. Secrets, Spies and Whistleblowers: Freedom ofExpression and National Security in the United
Kingdom (Article 19 & Liberty, 2000) chapter 6. Available at:
[http.V/www.arictleI9.org/docimages/794. htm\.
'1 See chapter 6 at 6.2.3.
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laws in the two states do not measure up to the international law standards,
suggestions will be made on how the situation can be improved in order to enhance
the enjoyment ofmedia freedom.
7.2 National Security under International Law
7.2.1 Defining Genuine National Security Interests
The ambiguity surrounding the concept of national security is partly due to failure by
international human rights treaties to provide a definition of what the concept
comprises, against which national interpretations may be compared. A uniform
interpretation of limitations on rights guaranteed under international human rights
treaties is important for the protection of human liberties. Today some of the most
serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms are justified by
governments as necessary to protect national security. This is due to the elasticity of
the concept and the absence of clear principles that adequately safeguard the freedoms
of expression ana information as well as the prerogative of governments to limit the
freedoms when necessary to protect legitimate national security interests.
In an attempt to fill the vacuum resulting from the failure by human rights treaties to
give a definition of national security, significant contributions have been made by
experts in international law. In 1985 a group of experts convened by the International
Commission of Jurists and partner organisations drafted the Siracusa Principles on
the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (hereinafter Siracusa Principles)}2 These Principles are aimed at
promoting a uniform interpretation of limitations on rights in the Covenant. Principles
29 - 32 address national security in the following terms:
12 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex no. 30 (1985). The Principles are reprinted in: 'The Siracusa
Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights' (1985) 7 Human Rights Quarterly 3.
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29. National security may be invoked to justify measures limiting certain
rights only when they are taken to protect the existence of the nation or its
territorial integrity orpolitical independence against the use offorce.
30. National security cannot be invoked as a reason for imposing limitations
to prevent merely local or relatively isolated threats to law and order.
31. National security cannot be used as a pretext for imposing vague or
arbitrary limitations and may only be invoked when there exist adequate
safeguards and effective remedies against abuse.
32. The systematic violation ofhuman rights undermines true national security
and may jeopardize international peace and security. A state responsible
for such violation shall not invoke national security as justification for
measures aimed at suppressing opposition to such violation or at
perpetrating repressive practices against its population.
In defining 'security' the Siracusa Principles draw a parallel to the use of 'security' in
the UN Charter.13 The Charter is dedicated to the maintenance of peace between
nations and the security of each nation. Article 2(4) of the Charter forbids the use of
force or the threat of force against the political independence or territorial integrity of
another state. The Siracusa Principles are thus premised on the basis that this
prohibition implies that national security entails protection of territorial integrity and
political independence of a state against force or the threat of force.14 In terms of
Principles 29 and 30, national security interests can only justify the limitation of rights
guaranteed under the Covenant to protect the existence, the territorial integrity or the
political independence of a nation. Consequently, it has been argued that genuine
national security interests would justify the adoption of laws concerning treason,
espionage, sabotage, sedition, terrorism, the protection of military secrets or the
imposition of special limits on members of the armed forces.15
Principles 31 and 32 stress the need to avoid vague or arbitrary limitations and for
states to have adequate safeguards and effective remedies against abuse. A further
important qualification is the link that the Principles establish between national
security and the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. The security of a state is
13
B.B. Lockwood, J. Finn & G. Jubinsky, 'Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on Limitation
Provisions' (1985) 7 HRQ 35 at 71.
14 Ibid.
15 A. Kiss, 'Commentary by the Rapporteur on the Limitation Provisions' (1985) 7 HRQ 15 at 22.
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worthy of protection in a derivative sense, i.e., because of its purported necessity for
the well being of its citizens. Respect for basic human rights is therefore an important
component of national security.16
A further attempt to define national security was undertaken by a group of experts in
international law, national security and human rights convened by Article 19, the
International Centre Against Censorship, through the adoption of the Johannesburg
Principles: National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information
17
(hereinafter Johannesburg Principles). Principle 2 provides:
(a) A restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is
not legitimate unless its genuine purpose and demonstrable effect is to
protect a country's existence or its territorial integrity against the use of
force, or its capacity to respond to the use of threat offorce, whether
from external source, such as a military, or an internal source, such as
incitement to violent overthrow ofthe government.
(b) In particular, a restriction sought to be justified on the ground of
national security is not legitimate if its genuine purpose or demonstrable
effect is to protect interests unrelated to national security, including, for
example, to protect government from embarrassment or exposure oj
wrongdoing, or to conceal information about the functioning of its
public institutions, or to entrench a particular ideology, or to suppress
industrial unrest.
Principle 2(a) envisages that legitimate national security interests should be limited to
preventing violence aimed at changing a country's government, institutions, or
borders; prevention of espionage; and protecting genuine military secrets, such as the
movement of troops and details of weapons design.18 The Johannesburg Principles
expand on the Siracusa Principles in two ways. First, the former refers to protection
of the existence of a 'country' rather than a 'nation'. The drafters did not use the term
'nation' because of the too frequent abuse by governments of their authority to defend
the 'nation' to justify measures aimed at the hegemony of the majority national group
16 The relationship between national security and the respect for human rights is best illustrated in the
speech of Lord Donaldson MR in: R v Secretaiy ofState ex parte Cheblak [1992] 2 ALL ER 319 at
334, where he observed: although they give rise to tensions at the interface, national security and
civil liberties are on the same side. In accepting as we must, that to some extent, the needs ofnational
security must displace civil liberties, albeit to the least possible extent, it is not irrelevant to remember
that the maintenance ofnational security underpins and is thefoundation ofall our civil liberties'.
17 The Johannesburg Principles were adopted on 1st October 1995, and are reprinted in Media Law and
Practice in Southern Africa, Vol. 3 (Article 19, 1996).
18
Coliver, n 2 above at 22.
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or heritage.19 And secondly, Principle 2(a) requires that, not only must the genuine
purpose of the restriction be to protect national security, but also, the restriction must
have the 'demonstrable effect' of doing so.
Both the Siracusa and Johannesburg Principles reveal an arguably broad consensus
among international law experts that any restriction justified on national security
grounds must be necessary to protect a country's political independence or territorial
integrity from the use, or threatened use, of force.20 The Principles recognise that
states need to have effective tools to combat the threat posed to their democratic
institutions and population by violent and subversive forces. They further recognise
that secrecy and non-disclosure o f sensitive information are essential to ensure the
effectiveness of those tools. Although these Principles are not binding on states, the
21 ...UN has endorsed them. If states were to be guided by these Principles in
determining genuine national security interests, a measure of certainty may be
achieved in defining what the concept encompasses. Certainty in what national
security entails is crucial for establishing a proper balance between the exercise of the
freedoms of expression and information and the protection of national security.
7.2.2 Legitimacy ofRestrictions Based on National Security
Due to the ambiguity of national security, governments are often tempted to use the
pretext of the concept to place unjustified restrictions on the exercise of the freedoms
of expression and information to suppress embarrassing disclosures. The main human
19
Ibid., at 20.
20 See: UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion's 1995 Report, where he wrote:
'Forpurposes ofprotecting national security, the right to freedom ofexpression and information can
be restricted only in the most serious cases ofa direct political or military threat to the entire nation '.
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/32 para. 48 (14th December 1994), Nowak also wrote: restrictions on
freedom ofexpression and information to protect national security are permissible only in serious
cases ofpolitical or militaiy threat to the entire nation. For instance, the procurement or dissemination
ofmilitary secrets may be prohibitedfor this reason. Publication ofa direct call to violent overthrow of
the government in an atmosphere ofpolitical unrest or propagandafor war ...as well falls within this
groundfor restriction '. M. Nowak, UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary
(N.P. Engel, 1993) p. 355; and E. Evatt, 'The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Freedom of Expression and State Security', in S. Coliver et al (eds.) Secrecy and Liberty: National
Security, Freedom ofExpression and Access to Information (Kluwer Law International, 1999)
(hereinafter Secrecy and Liberty) 83 at 84.
21 For the Johannesburg Principles, see, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and
Opinion's 1995 Report, n 20 above, and the Siracusa Principles were endorsed by the UN Sub-
Commission Special Rapporteurs, Mssrs. Danilo Turk and Louise Joinet in: 'The Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression: Final Report', UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/9 (14th July 1992).
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rights treaties adopt the three-part test to assess the legitimacy of restrictions on
22fundamental freedoms to guard against abuse. In this part, I briefly examine how the
organs charged with interpreting and applying these treaties apply the test. In
particular, whether the test is adequate for ensuring that exemptions based on national
security are construed narrowly so as not to negate the essence of the freedoms of
expression and information.
First, the three-part test requires that a restriction must be prescribed by law. To
satisfy this requirement, a restriction must have some basis in, and comply with, the
law of the country concerned, which may be a statute but also unwritten laws such as
the common law.23 The law must be adequately accessible and formulated with
sufficient precision to enable a person to regulate his/her conduct. A person must
know with reasonable certainty what the law is and what actions are in danger of
breaching the law.24 An inadequate demarcation of an area of risk affords neither
notice to a person of conduct that is potentially criminal or an appropriate limitation
upon the discretion of the authorities seeking to enforce the law . If a law is too vague
or general, the restriction may not satisfy the requirement 'prescribed by law'.
However, due to variances in the operative meaning of national security, the ECtHR
recognises the difficulty of framing laws addressing the issue with absolute precision.
A certain degree of flexibility is therefore allowed to enable national courts to assess
25whether genuine national security interests are at stake on a case-by-case basis.
Similarly, the UN Human Rights Committee (hereinafter HRC) will not find a
violation of the Covenant in an individual case if a law which may be too broad in
22 See chapter 4 at 4.3.
2j The Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights (IACtHR) in: The Word Laws in Article 30, Advisory
Opinion OC-6186 of 9 May 1986, Series A No. 6, has however held that the word Taws' refers to
formal laws passed by the legislature and promulgated by the executive branch, pursuant to the
procedure set out in the domestic law of each state. And this has led some commentators to argue that
rules of the common law cannot lawfully restrict the right of freedom of expression under the ACHR.
See V. Krsticevic et al. 'The Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection: Freedom of
Expression, "National Security Doctrines" and the Transition to Elected Governments' in Secrecy and
Liberty, n 20 above 161 at 173.
24
Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245 at para. 49. The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights has also observed that, "When freedom ofthe press is at stake, any restrictions must be clearly
established so that anyone may know precisely what activities are prohibited or may be subject to
censorship. " Report on the Situation ofHuman Rights in Nicaragua, Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53, doc.25 (1981) at 118, para. 6.
25
Baskaya and Okuoglu v Turkey (App. nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94, 8th July 1999) para. 39.
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scope to be a justifiable restriction in itself, is nevertheless applied compatibly with
the Covenant in the particular case.26
Laws restricting the freedoms of expression and information must themselves be
compatible with the minimum standards of the rule of law. The HRC in fact requires
laws restricting fundamental freedoms to be in accordance with the provisions, aims
and objectives of the Covenant.27 There must be some measure of legal protection in
the domestic law against arbitrary interference by public authorities with fundamental
freedoms.28 If a law confers discretionary power on public authorities, the law must
indicate the scope and manner of exercise of any such discretion with sufficient
clarity to protect individuals against arbitrary interference with their rights and must
29afford adequate safeguards against abuse. The guarantee of adequate legal
protection in relation to the freedoms of expression and information under the human
rights treaties takes on further significance when taken together with the Articles that
guarantee a person the right of access to domestic courts in the determination of one's
civil rights and obligations.30
Secondly, the purpose of any law restricting the freedoms of expression and
information must be legitimate in accordance with the human rights treaty in question.
All the main human rights treaties recognise the protection of national security as a
permissible ground for restrictions on the two freedoms.31 To be legitimate, not only
must the purpose invoked by a government be one that falls within the limitation list,
but also, the concrete measures taken by the government must have been genuinely
directed towards achieving that aim.32 Consistent with this approach, to satisfy the
HRC that restrictions based on national security are legitimate, a state must establish
26 Faurisson v France, Communication No. 550/1993 views adopted 8th November 1996. (Summary in
Evatt, n 20 above at 94 -95.)
27 Toonen v Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, views adopted 8th March 1994. (Summary in
Evatt, n 20 above at 87)
28 The IACtHR has held that each state must provide 'an effectivejudicial remedyfor violations of
fundamental rightsSee: Judicial Guarantees in States ofEmergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 of the
American Convention), OC-9/87 of 6th October 1987, Series A, No. 9, at para. 23. (Cf. Malone v U.K.
(1984) 7 EHRR 14 at para. 67.)
29
Tolstoy Miloslavsky v U.K. (1995) 20 EHRR 442 at para 37.
30 Articles: 26 ICCPR; 8 ACHR and 6 ECHR, and P. Mahoney & L. Early, 'Freedom of Expression
and National Security: Judicial and Policy Approaches Under the European Convention on Human
Rights and Other Council of Europe Instruments' in Secrecy and Liberty, n 20 above 109 at 113.
jl See n 1 above.
32 The ECtHR has held that its supervision of a state's margin of appreciation concerns both the aim of
the measure challenged and its necessity. See Handyside v U.K. n 6 above, para 49.
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that: (i) there exists a threat to the nation as a whole; and (ii) the expression at issue
has caused or contributed to that threat.33 It is however disappointing to note that in
practice the international human rights treaty bodies have rarely challenged a
government's assertion that a restriction was genuinely aimed at protecting national
security.34 The reluctance is perhaps due to the absence of a clear definition of what
the concept of national security entails, offering a basis for the international bodies to
define limits to conduct of states where the concept is invoked.
Thirdly, the three-part test requires that a restriction must be necessary to protect the
interest claimed. To satisfy this requirement, the restriction in question must be: (i)
necessary and (ii) proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Necessity requires a
government to adduce sufficient and relevant evidence showing that there is a
pressing social need for the restriction.35 International human rights treaties
enforcement bodies judge restrictions to fundamental rights and freedoms against the
needs o f a democratic so ciety, i .e. restrictions must b e shown to b e necessary in a
democratic society.36 Restrictions must also be proportionate to the public interest
served. The public ends served by the restriction must be weighed against its
detrimental e ffects o n t he i ndividual's r ights and freedoms. The application o f this
balancing test in cases involving national security claims is demonstrated in two cases
that came before the ECtHR. Both cases involved attempts by the governments of the
UK and Netherlands to suppress dissemination of information claimed to be inimical
to the national security of the two states. The information was already in the public
domain at the time the governments were seeking the suppression of its
dissemination. In both cases the court found that legitimate national security interests
Evatt, n 20 above at 88.
34
Coliver, n 2 above at 27 and A. Nicol, G. Millar & A. Sharland, Media Law and Human Rights
Blackstone Press Limited, 2001) p. 180.
j5 Cf. Handyside v U.K., n 6 above, para. 49.
36 Article 10(2) ECHR. While the ICCPR and ACHR do not expressly provide that restrictions to the
freedoms of expression and information must be necessary in a democratic society, the HRC and
IACtHR, respectively, have held that restrictions on the two freedoms must be judged against the
legitimate needs of democratic societies and institutions: M.A. v Italy, Communication No. 117/1981,
Selected Decisions Under the Optional Protocol, Vol. 2, 17th to 32nd Sessions (1990) at 31 and
Compulsoiy Membership in an Association Prescribed by Lawfor the Practice ofJournalism (Articles
13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Series A, No. 5 para.
42 (13 November 1985j
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were at stake, but that the restrictions sought were no longer necessary as the
information was already in the public domain.37
In the determination of the issue of 'necessity in a democratic society', the ECHR and
ACHR allow states a margin of discretion or appreciation. Deference is given to local
conditions and standards on certain issues for reasons of flexibility and in recognition
of the diversity of the political, social, economic and other conditions in the various
to
. _ t ...
countries of the world. This is especially important in cases involving national
security, given that the concept varies depending on the character, interests and
vulnerability of each state. The ACHR however provides for a narrower margin of
39
appreciation by specifying that states may not use prior censorship. The HRC on the
other hand does not apply the margin of appreciation in relation to national security
restrictions to freedom of expression. The Committee requires states to establish the
circumstances said to make a restriction on the freedom necessary and reserves for
itself the determination of whether the particular restriction is compatible with the
Covenant.40 -
The margin of appreciation is however subject to supervision by the international
bodies charged with the enforcement of the treaties.41 Whilst all restrictions to the
freedoms of expression and information have to be justified as necessary in a
democratic society, the level of protection afforded to the individual, and conversely,
the area of discretion open to the state will vary according to the context. International
bodies apply a sliding scale of protection. Political speech and political comment by
the media enjoy the highest level of protection because of the critical role political
dialogue plays in a democratic society.42 A state is required to adduce convincing
j7 Guardian and Observer v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 153 and Vereniging Bluf! v The Netherlands (1995)
20 EHRR 189.
38
Handyside v U.K, n 6 above at para. 24 and Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction,
American Convention on Human Rights Articles 14(1), 1(1), Advisory Opinion OC-7/86 ofAugust 29,
1986, Series A, No. 7, para.27.
39 Krsticevic et al., n 23 above at 178.
40
Evatt, n 20 above at 90.
41 The ECtHR in Baskaya and Okuoglu v Turkey, n 25 above at para. 61 held: ' The adjective
"necessaiy", within the meaning ofArticle 10(2), implies the existence ofa "pressing social need".
The Contracting States have a certain margin ofappreciation in assessing whether such need exists,
but it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions
applying it, even those given by independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final
ruling on whether a "restriction " is reconcilable with freedom ofexpression ...'.
42
Erdogdu v Turkey (2002) 34 EHRR 433 para. 62, and Mahoney & Early, n 30 above at 116.
237
evidence to justify restricting the flow to the public of information and opinion on
matters in the political arena.
The issue of national security has not often been litigated before international human
rights treaties enforcement bodies. A combination of this fact, together with the
reluctance of the bodies to challenge governments' claims of national security have
stunted the development of jurisprudence that can guide national courts in the
determination of what the genuine concerns of the concept encompass. However, the
international bodies' application of the three-part test presents some valuable lessons
for states that, if heeded to, could enhance the enjoyment of the freedoms of
expression and information. In examining the impact of national security on media
freedom in Botswana and South Africa, this chapter looks at three issues arising from
the requirements of the three-part test that are critical to the media in the performance
of their democratic role and how they are addressed in the laws of the two states.
First, any encroachment on media freedom that is based on national security grounds
must be authorised under a law that meets the minimum standards of the rule of law.
This entails that a law must provide for legal certainty. Thus, this chapter looks at
how national security is defined in the laws of the two states. Secondly, a restriction
must be shown to be genuinely aimed, both in theory and practice, at protecting
national security, and adequate, legally binding safeguards against abuse must be
available. Courts play a prominent role in the protection and enforcement of civil
liberties. Uncritical deference of national courts to governments' claims of national
security therefore places the adequacy of legal protection afforded to media freedom
in municipal courts in serious doubt. This chapter will examine the attitude of the
courts of Botswana and South Africa to their governments' claims of national
security.
And finally, the requirements of necessity in a democratic society entails that the mere
principle of protection of state secrets will not suffice to justify in all circumstances
prevention of and punishment for disclosure of information. The necessity of a
restriction must always be evaluated in the light of the fundamental values
underpinning a d emocratic s ociety. T his i s important i n r egard t o t he p rotection o f
public servants who blow the whistle on government wrongdoing. As observed in the
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introduction to this chapter, where whistleblowers and the media are not granted
immunity from prosecution for disclosures that are in the public interest, they become
reluctant to communicate important information to the public for fear of prosecution.
This chapter also examines whether the laws of the two states give any protection to
whistleblowers and the media for disclosures that are in the public interest.
7.3 Media Freedom and National Security in Botswana
The National Security Act 1986 (hereinafter NSA)43 is the main statute dealing with
national security matters in Botswana. The Act was enacted in response to
destabilising violence directed at the country by the South African apartheid regime in
the 1980s, and contains features of the UK Official Secrets Act 1911 (hereinafter
OSA).44 At the time ofwriting, there were still no prosecutions under the Act.45 Courts
in Botswana therefore have not yet had opportunity to expound the provisions of the
Act. Thus guidance in interpreting the Act will be sought from the jurisprudence
developed by other jurisdictions with similar provisions.46
The Act is however occasionally invoked either as a threat or an excuse by public
officers who are unwilling to answer questions from the media. An example of the
extent to which public officers would go in using the Act to scare the media can be
demonstrated by an incident in March 1996. The police threatened to bring a charge
under the Act against an investigative journalist who had sourced a transcript in which
a parent had confessed to having played a part in the murder of his daughter, which
was being investigated by the police at the time, unless the journalist disclosed his
47
source.
43 Act no. 11 of 1986 [Cap. 23:01],
44 For a brief background to the Act, see J.J. Zaffiro, 'The Press and Political Opposition in an African
Democracy: The Case ofBotswana' (1989) 27 Journal ofCommonwealth and Comparative Politics 51
at 66.
45 There was however an attempt to prosecute a journalist and Mmegi newspaper in 1992 for 'unlawful
receipt of an official document marked secret and publication of classified information' under section
4(3), but the charges were dismissed by the High Court in February 1996 after the State had failed to
proceed with the prosecution. See Sibongo & Lush, n 8 above, p. 5.
46 For example, in S v Harrington 1989 2 SA 348, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court when interpreting
the country's Official Secrets Act Chap. 97(Z) held that since the Act was based on the UK Official
Secrets 1911, it should derive assistance from the latter in construing the provisions of the former.
47 See Sibongo & Lush, n 8 above p. 5.
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7.3.1 Definition ofNational Security in the Act
The aim of the NSA is to make provision for 'national security' and 'other activities
prejudicial to the interests of the nation'. Following from its objects, one would have
expected the Act to make a clear distinction between those acts that are a threat to
national security and those that are merely prejudicial to the safety and interests of the
nation. Unfortunately the Act does not categorise offences in accordance with its
objects. The terminology employed in all the offence creating sections is the
prevention of acts prejudicial to the safety and interests of the nation. The expression
is not defined in the Act. Further, the Act also does not explain the relationship
between this concept and that of national security. The two concepts are not
synonymous. While a threat to a state's national security is certainly prejudicial to the
nation's interests, the reverse is not always true.
The Act offers a definition of the expression 'security or defence of Botswana', albeit,
in a narrow sense regarding disclosure of information relating to the army and police
4R
sendees. 'Information relating to the defence or security of Botswana' is defined as
including (but without derogation from the generality of the ordinary meaning of the
expressions) information relating to the movements or locations of the defence force
or police force, the steps taken to protect any vital installations or prohibited places
and the acquisition or disposal of munitions of war.49 The provision refers to the
'defence' or 'security' of Botswana. The question that arises is: what is the
relationship between these two concepts? The Flouse of Lords has held that the two
concepts are the same. Lord Diplock observed that the early terminology of 'defence
of the realm' has been replaced in many countries by the expression 'national
security' due to the influence of the ECHR, which employs the latter terminology.50
48 Section 4(4) of the NSA provides: 'Any person who communicates any information relating to the
defence or security of Botswana to any person, other than a person to whom it is in the interest of
Botswana his duty to communicate it shall be guilty of an offence and liable to conviction to
imprisonmentfor a term not exceeding 25 years
49
Ibid., section 4(5).
50 Council ofCivil Service Unions vMinister of the Civil Service, n 9 above at 410. For a more detailed
discussion of the use of the terms, see I. Cameron, National Security and the European Convention on
Human Rights (Kluwer Law International, 2000) pp. 39 - 56.
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For purposes of the discussion of the NSA, the terms 'defence' and security' are
therefore treated as the same, and that they refer to the concept of national security.
The definition of national security in the NSA makes the assumption (by referring to
the 'general' or 'ordinary' meaning of the expressions) that there is a universally
agreed definition of the concept of national security. On the contrary, as has been
observed above, national security is a contentious concept. State practices differ in
their determination of the components of national security matters. For example, there
are those whose definition of the concept is closer to the one put forward by
international law experts such as Australia31 and Canada32, while other states, such as
the USA, extend the ambit of the concept to economic interests.53 An attempt at
defining national security by reference to its 'ordinary' or 'general' meaning thus does
not provide for clarity that is required in a law limiting important freedoms.
Not only is the definition of national security in the NSA vague, it is also narrower
than the one by international law experts. The former is primarily concerned with
protection of military secrets and acts of sabotage against essential services and
protected places, and does not cover offences relating to espionage or leakage of other
official information that may harm genuine national security interests. These latter
offences are covered elsewhere in the Act. It will therefore be absurd to come to the
conclusion that section 4(4) is the only provision dealing with national security
matters especially in the light of the definition of the concept in section 4(5), which
expressly provides that it does not derogate from the general or ordinary meaning of
the term. To the extent that the definition of the term 'security' in the Act is expressly
limited to an offence under section 4(4), the definition cannot be extended to the
interpretation of these other provisions. The NSA therefore does not give an
exhaustive definition of the concept of national security.
The failure to provide clear definitions of the concepts of national security and actions
prejudicial to the interests of the nation, and to distinguish b etween acts that are a
threat to each of these concepts in the NSA gives the impression that the concepts are
51 Section 4, Australian Security Intelligence Organization Act of 1974.
52 Section 2, Canadian Security Intelligence Services Act of 1985.
See W.C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, 'Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance' (2000)
50 American University Law Review 1 at 8.
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used synonymously. The government seems to be subscribing to this view. Public
officers are operating under the mistaken view that any conduct prohibited under the
Act relates to national security.
Media freedom faces a serious threat from some provisions of section 4. In general
terms, the provision makes it unlawful for any person who has obtained any official
information as a result o f his/her present or former position as a public servant or
government contractor to reveal that information without authorisation. With the
exception of subsections (4) and (5), section 4 is a replica (with minor changes) of
section 2 of the OSA.34 The latter provision was notorious for its vague language and
its almost unlimited breadth in its scope of application,55 and these are replicated in
Section 4 of the NSA. The most notorious provision, as far as the media is concerned,
is section 4(1 )(b), which reads:
4. (1) Any person, having in his possession, or control, any secret official
codes, password, sketch, plan, model, note, document, article or information
that relates to or is used, in a prohibited place or anything in such a place, or
that has been made or obtained in contravention of this Act, or that has been
entrusted in confidence to him by any person holding office under the
Government, or as a person who is or was party to a contract with the
Government or a contract the performance of which in whole or in part is
carried out in a prohibitedplace, or as a person who has been employed by or
under a person who holds or has held such an office or is or was a party to
such contract -
(a) ...
(b) communicates the codes, password, sketch, plan, model, article,
note, document or information to any person other than a person to
whom he is authorised to communicate with, or to a person to
whom it is in the interest ofBotswana his duty to communicate it;
(c) ...
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding 30 years.
The above provision impacts negatively on media freedom in that it prohibits a public
servant from communicating official information to any person other than a person to
whom he/she is authorised to communicate with, or to a person to whom it is in the
interest of Botswana his/her duty to communicate it. The crucial words: 'authorised',
54 The section has now been repealed and replaced by the Official Secrets Act 1989.
55 The provision generated a lot of literature in the UK. See; inter alia, Departmental Committee on
Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, Vol. 1, Cmnd. 5104 (HMSO, 1972) (Franks Committee
Report) and Reform of the Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, Cm. 408 (HMSO, 1988).
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'interests of Botswana' and 'duty' are however not defined in the Act. In relation to
the former, the Franks Committee observed that, in the UK, the actual practice within
government rests heavily on a doctrine of implied authorisation, flowing from the
nature of each Crown servant's job.56 Thus communication of official information is
proper if such communication can be fairly regarded as part of the job of the officer
concerned. In Botswana, for a communication to be 'authorised', there must have
been specific express authorisation from the head of a government department. The
General Orders Governing the Conditions of Sendee of the Public Service 1987
prohibits public servants from disclosing official information unless specifically
authorised.57 The doctrine of implied authorisation does not seem to be applicable in
Botswana.
English law has developed some jurisprudence under the OSA that will be useful in
attempting a definition of the words 'duty' and 'interests of Botswana' (or state), used
in section 4 of the NSA. The definition of these temis in the UK has, however, been
SR • •
controversial. In Chandler v D.P.P., the majority of the House of Lords defined
'interest of the state' as identical with whatever the government of the day lays down
as public policy.59 Courts in South Africa and Zimbabwe have cited with approval this
view when interpreting their respective laws, which are modelled on the OSA.60
Zimbabwe's Official Secrets Act refers to the 'interests of Zimbabwe', and its
Supreme Court appears to have concluded that this expression is synonymous with
'interest of the state'. The fact that the provision is moulded on the OSA seems to
have been enough to convince the court to come to this conclusion without even
scrutinising the particular wording of the Zimbabwean Act.61 It is however debatable
whether the two expressions have the same meaning.
56
Ibid., Franks Committee Report, para. 18.
37 The issue is more fully discussed in chapter 6 at 6.3.2.
58
[1962] 3 ALL E.R. 142
39 Ibid. See the speeches of Lord Devlin and Lord Pearce at 156 and 160, respectively.
60 S v Marais 1971 1 SA 844 at 850 and S v Harrington, n 45 above at 357, respectively.
61 The Zimbabwean Supreme Court concluded by implication that 'interest of the state' and 'interest of
Zimbabwe are the same from the following passage in the judgment: 'If the provisions ofthe statute
sought to be construed have nothing to do with common law, the interpretation rendered to similar
provisions in a foreign statute cannot bejustifiably ignored. There is no common law involved in the
English Secrets Act and its Zimbabwean counterpart'. Ibid., at 356.
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Lord Reid in the Chandler case observed that the question of what is in the interest of
the state is posed more frequently in terms of what is in the public interest and, as a
general rule, he did not subscribe to the view that the government or a minister must
always have the final word on what is in the public interest.62 Professor MacCormick
supports Lord Reid's opinion in an article where he argues that a primary interest of
any state is an interest in the integrity of its constitution.63 The argument is premised
on the fact that states exist in virtue of constitutions and bodies of law so that a state
can have no higher interest than that its constitution be sustained and upheld, and that
this interest is fundamentally beyond any interest in securing the implementation of
the policies of a government, however democratically elected.64 He concludes that a
state has an interest in the successful pursuit of government policies within the range
of discretions constitutionally allocated to the executive branch under a given
constitution.66 The latter view is preferable over the majority view in the Chandler
case because it is consistent with the concept of the 'rule of law', a hallmark of
democratic society. However, it is doubtful whether courts in Botswana will be
persuaded to adopt the minority view in light of a trend towards the majority view in
countries s uch a s Z imbabwe t hat h ave p revisions s imilar t o t hose o f the NSA. T he
idea that the interests of the state is identical with whatever the government of the day
lays down as public policy is highly objectionable given the propensity of
governments to identify their interests as political actors with the greater interests of
the nation.
The definition of 'interests of the state' has a bearing on the meaning to be ascribed to
the word 'duty' as used in section 4 of the NSA. An argument was made during the
trial ofClive Ponting in the context of section 2 of the OSA that the words 'interest of
the state' should be treated as synonymous with the 'public interest'.66 The idea
behind the argument was to make a case for public servants who disclose official
information to escape liability in exceptional cases where the communication was in
the wider public interest. It was further argued that, if 'interest of the state' is treated
62 Chandler v D P.P., n 58 above, at 146.
63 N. MacCormick, 'The Interest of the State and the Rule of Law' in P. Wallington & R.M. Merkin





65 R. v Ponting [1985] I.R. 318. The case is discussed in: R.M. Thomas, 'The British Official Secrets
Act 1911 - 1939 and the Ponting Case' (1986) Criminal Law Review 491.
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as synonymous with the 'public interest', the word 'duty' should be interpreted to
mean a moral or civic duty by a public servant to act in the public interest if he/she
should find the government acting improperly. The court rejected the argument and
opted for a narrow meaning of the word to mean 'official duty'.67 Courts in Botswana
are more likely to follow this precedent.
The NSA penalises the disclosure of official information obtained by a public servant
in the course of his/her duties, however trivial the information and irrespective of the
harm likely to arise from the disclosure. It would appear that the offence is one of
/-o
strict liability. Section 4(1 )(b) is bolstered in its prohibition of disclosure of official
information by section 5. The latter prohibits communication of 'classified'69
information unless such communication has been authorised or is to a person whom it
is in the interest of Botswana to make the communication. Section 5 has the trappings
of section 4(1 )(b) in that it employs vague language, has a wide scope of application
and is also a strict liability offence.70
A further inhibition to media freedom is posed by section 4(3). The provision makes
receipt and retention of information obtained in contravention of the Act an offence
punishable by imprisonment of up to 30 years. The provision is concerned with
secondary disclosures of official infonnation and specifically targets the media.71 The
offence under this section however requires proof of mens reci and an accused person
may escape liability by p roving that a communication to him/her was done against
his/her wish.
The provisions of the NSA relating to disclosure of official information are very broad
and vague. Ambiguous legislation conflicts with the concept of the rule of law, as it
67
Ibid., at 499 - 500.
68 See the case of Fell [1963] Crim. L. R. 207, 107 S.J. 97 summarised in, Thomas, n 66 above, at 494
— 5, where the English Court ofCriminal Appeal held, regarding section 2 of the OSA : 'it is absolute
and is committed whatever the document contains, whatever the motivefor disclosure is and whether
or not the disclosure is prejudicial to the stateThe Franks Committee also observed that there was
nothing showing that mens rea was an ingredient of the offence. Franks Committee Report, n 55 above,
para. 20.
69 In terms of section 2, classified matter means any information or thing declared to be confidential.
Classification is an administrative procedure done by authorised officers in government departments.
70
Ignorance by an accused person of the fact that the information communicated was classified is not a
defence to a charge under section 5(1). See section 5(2).
71 Cf. Robertson & Nicol, n 7 above p. 556.
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does not afford adequate notice to a person of conduct that is potentially criminal. The
rule of law is a component of 'prescribed by law' test. However, in the light of
standards set by international human rights treaties enforcement bodies, it is unlikely
that the NSA will be found to be in violation of this test on account of its ambiguity.
But its application in a particular case may be found to be in conflict with the test. For
example, the Act prohibits disclosure of all official information irrespective of
whether harm to national security or interests of the nation is likely to arise from the
disclosure, which is in conflict with the general rule that exemptions to fundamental
freedoms must be construed narrowly so as not to defeat the essence of the rights
protected. The NSA is used to deny citizens access to any information on the defence
72
force, i t i s h owever i nconceivable t hat a n i nternational h uman r ights b ody w ould
sanction its use to suppress information on gross human rights violations by the force.
7.3.2 Safeguards and Remedies Against the Abuse ofthe NSA
International law requires that restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms on
national security grounds must be shown to be genuinely aimed, both in theory and
practice, at protecting national security. In addition, there must be adequate and
legally binding safeguards against the abuse of the concept. Heads of government
departments classify information under the NSA.73 Information is classified into three
categories: (i)open; (ii) confidential; and (iii) secret. Information falling under the
latter two categories is known as 'classified information' and access to it must be
authorised by the head of the relevant department. In deciding whether or not to allow
access to classified information, heads of departments exercise administrative
discretion. There are no guidelines for the exercise of the discretion.74
The Court of Appeal has held that where the exercise of discretion affects rights of
citizens, the exercise of such discretion should be subject to the supervision of the
72 See S. Grant & B. Egner, 'The Private Media and Democracy' in J. Holm & P. Molutsi (eds.)
Democracy in Botswana: The Proceeding ofa Symposium Held in Gaborone 1 — 5 August 1998
(Macmillan Botswana Publishing (Pty) Ltd, 1989) 247 at 250.
7"' The Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President is the 'authorised officer' under section 2
tasked with the responsibility of administering the NSA. He in turn has appointed heads of government
departments to exercise or perform duties conferred or imposed by the Act. (Interview with Ms S.
Tsiane, then Acting Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, Gaborone, 30th January 2003).
74 Interview with Ms Kgabi, Director, National Archives and Records Services. (Gaborone, 31st
January 2003).
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courts.73 The Court has also held that if power is conferred on a public authority to do
an act in the public interest, the use of that power for a purpose other than in
furtherance of the public interest would render that act a nullity. And where the use of
a power has been exercised by a public authority for an improper purpose, that act is
reviewable by the High Court.76
Judicial review is available as a safeguard against the abuse by heads of departments'
powers under the NSA. However, while judicial review may be legally binding, its
adequacy is questionable because of its inherent limitations. Traditionally, review
entails only an examination of the form and legality, but not the substance and merits
of an administrative decision.77 Further, a reading of the NSA suggests that where
information is withheld from disclosure on national security grounds, the state is not
required to give specific reasons for the refusal, instead, a general claim of harm to
national security will suffice. But where an administrative authority is not required to
give specific reasons for his/her decision, it is difficult for an aggrieved person to
challenge the decision on review, especially where the person is alleging that the
decision was taken for an improper purpose.
The position of a person aggrieved by the exercise of discretion under the NSA is
further worsened by the application of a presumption that executive action is
■jo . . t
presumed right until rebutted by solid evidence. Displacement of this presumption is
a burden that the challenger of an administrative action is made to bear, and in the
absence of detailed reasons for the decision, it will be difficult to displace. The Court
of Appeal has observed that since this presumption puts a government in a position of
great advantage, the requirements of democracy give a reciprocal expectation to the
people that when the government acts, it should act correctly and should not take
advantage of, or hide its own mistakes behind a shroud of silence when its actions are
questioned.79 Unfortunately, it seems heads of departments are not paying heed to this
75
Attorney-General and another v Kgalagadi Resources Development Company (Pty) Ltd [1985] BLR
234 at 238.
76 The President ofthe Republic ofBotswana and others v Bruwer and another [1998] BLR 86 at 90.
77 See generally, J. Jowell, 'Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review' [2000]
Public Law 671.
78 Peloewetse v Permanent Secretary to the President and others, Civil Appeal No. 26/99, Court of
Appeal (Unreported) p. 13.
79 Ibid.
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caution. There remain strong allegations by the media that the NSA is being used to
keep a wide range of official information secret under the pretext of protecting
national security and that no satisfactory reasons are given to justify the claims.
The adequacy of judicial review as a safeguard against the abuse of the NSA is further
compounded by a general attitude of courts around the world where national security
matters are involved. It is extremely rare for courts t o o rder d isclosure of national
security information over the objection of the government.80 In Botswana, there are
strong sentiments within the government that the security of the c ountry c annot be
determined in a court of law.81 The courts have not yet had opportunity to deal with
cases involving disclosure of information relating to national security. It is therefore
difficult to say with certainty what their attitude will be when the issue finally comes
before them. However, it is unlikely that they will adopt a radically different approach
from the practice already set by courts in other countries of giving deference to the
state's assertions of national security.
International law also requires restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms to be
shown to be necessary in a democratic society. The mere protection of information
relating to national security is therefore not sufficient to justify prevention of, and
punishment for, disclosure of such information in all circumstances. The necessity of
a restriction must be evaluated in the light of the fundamental values underpinning
that society. The constitution of Botswana, consistent with international law, adopts
the principle of proportionality with regard to limitations on the freedoms of
expression and access to information. Restrictions may be imposed on the two
freedoms in the interest of national security provided such limitations are shown to be
0-3
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. This requires the state to: (i) give
relevant and sufficient r easons 10 j ustify a r estriction; (ii) p rove t hat t he d isclosure
corresponds to a pressing social need; and (iii) demonstrate that the restriction is
80 See P. Birkinshaw, Freedom ofInformation: The Law, the Practice and the Ideal (Butterworths,
2001) chapter 9.
81 In response to concerns by the private press in the 1980's over deportations of foreign journalists for
national security reasons, and that the deportations should be challenged in the courts, the then minister
of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration, Mr P.H.K. Kedikilwe, responded by pointing out
that the security of the country will not be determined by the courts, but by the executive. See 'Press
Freedom Won't Be Above National Security' Daily News, 19th September 1985 No. 179.
82 Articles: 19(3) ICCPR and 10(2) ECHR.
8j Section 12(2)(b), Constitution ofBotswana. For a further discussion see chapter 4 at 4.5.1.
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proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.84 The application of this principle
involves a question of balance between competing interests.
The NSA does not impose a complete ban on the disclosure of information relating to
the security of the state, such information can be disclosed with the consent of the
state. However, where disclosure is not authorised, the Act creates strict liability
offences for the disclosure. A person will thus not be able to escape liability by
proving that a disclosure was in the public interest. The Act also does not require the
state to give sufficient and relevant reasons to justify the withholding of information.
The regime provided for under the NSA is not consistent with the principle of
proportionality because it does not provide for a balancing of the competing interests
in a given situation. The Act's attempt to exclude, or its failure to i ncorporate the
principle of proportionality therefore places its constitutionality in serious doubt. An
appropriate approach is one that calls for a balancing of the different competing
interests, i.e., harm to the security of the state and the public's right to know. Such an
approach would enable a person charged under the Act to, inter alia, escape liability
where a disclosure o f information i s proved to be in the public interest, oblige the
state to give sufficient reasons to justify the withholding of information, and also
ensure that a restriction is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
The strict liability regime under the NSA is mitigated by the fact that the Attorney
General (AG) must give consent to all prosecutions under the Act.86 The AG enjoys a
wide discretion in the exercise of this power. For example, even though an accused
person may not raise a defence of public interest, the AG will normally not give
consent to prosecute where the disclosure of information is in the public interest.87
Furthermore, consent will not be granted where the disclosure of information does not
harm the security of the state or is of a trivial nature. There are no guidelines on how
the AG exercises his/her discretion. The discretion is exercised on a case-by-case
basis in the light of the facts of the case at hand.88
84 Cf. Sunday Times v UK n 24 above, at 277 - 278 (para. 62).
85 See discussion under 7.3.1. Compare with the speech of Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R v Shayler
[2002] 2 All ER 477 at 492 para. 20, when dealing with the nature of offences under the UK Official
Secrets Act 1989, which are similar to those created by the NSA.
86 Section 15(1), NSA.
8' Interview with Mr A.B. Tafa, then Acting Attorney General (Gaborone, 11th December 2002).
88 Ibid.
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The involvement of the AG does provide a safeguard against the abuse of the Act, but
it is not sufficient. A refusal to give consent to prosecute will only protect a person
from criminal prosecution. In the case of public servants, even though the refusal will
save them from criminal prosecution, they will still be liable for disciplinary action
for breach of the General Orders. There are no formal or informal structures in the
89
public service for reporting wrongdoing or suspected wrongdoing within the service.
Further, there is no protection against work-related victimisation such as dismissal or
demotion for those officers who blow the whistle on government wrongdoing.
The ambiguity of the NSA, its failure to embrace the principle of proportionality,
together with the inadequacy of safeguards against its abuse, entrenches the culture of
secrecy in government. This culture of secrecy impacts negatively on media freedom
and the public's right of access to official information. Public servants, who are an
important source of information for the media, are reluctant to disclose information
out of fear of criminal and/or work-related sanctions, and the media self-censor
themselves in order to avoid prosecution under the vague provisions of the NSA.
7.4 Media Freedom and National Security in South Africa
Media freedom and access to information were among the greatest casualties of the
apartheid state.90 A number of laws were enacted by successive apartheid
governments restricting the two freedoms with the object of protecting state or
national s ecurity.91 P erhaps t he m ost r epressive oft hese 1 aws o n t he t wo freedoms
were the Internal Security Act, Protection ofInformation Act and Defence Act. On the
one hand, the Internal Security Act, among others, permitted the state to prohibit the
printing, publication or dissemination of any material which expressed views or
89
Corrupt practices may however be reported to the Directorate of Crime and Economic Corruption, an
anti-corruption institution formed under the Corruption and Economic Crime Act No. 13 of 1994.
90
See generally, G. Marcus, 'Freedom of Expression and National Security: The South African
Experience' in Coliver et at (eds.) Secrecy and Liberty, n 20 above at 389.
91 These include: Internal Security Act 74 of 1982; Defence Act 44 of1957; Protection of Information
Act 84 of1982; National Key Points Act 102 of 1980; Armaments and Production Act 57 of1968;
National Supplies Procurement Act 89 of 1970 and Petroleum Products Act 120 of 1977. For a detailed
discussion of the impact of these laws on the freedoms of expression and access to information, see Y.
Bums, Media Law (Butterworths, 1990) Part II, Chapter 1.
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conveyed information calculated to endanger the security of the state. The
Protection of Information Act on the other hand prohibited the disclosure of official
information unless the disclosure was authorised by the state.93 In addition, the
Defence Act created a presumption that any information relating to the defence of the
Republic or military equipment was secret unless publication of such information was
authorised.94
The apartheid government used these national security laws to censor the media by
denying them access to information and preventing them from commenting on
matters of public interest. Many publications were banned for being critical of the
apartheid policy and the public was generally kept in the dark regarding political
matters.95 The use of these laws was compounded by the fact that none of them
provided a clear definition of the concept of state or national security. In determining
state or national security interests, the apartheid state relied on the principle of salus
reipublicae suprema lex est, i.e., the state has the right to protect its own safety and a
corresponding duty to protect its subjects from d isorder, revolution and violence.96
National security laws were however used to maintain apartheid by serving the
interests of the minority white population. Security organs established by the
97
apartheid state to administer national security laws were granted sweeping powers.
These organs gave national security laws a very wide scope of application to cover
not only what were legitimate national security interests, but also, to suppress
criticisms of apartheid and revelations of human rights violations by the state and its
agents.
The lack of a clear definition of the concept of national security under the apartheid
state enabled the government to use national security laws for improper purposes.
With the introduction of a new constitutional order, one of the challenges facing the
new democratic government was the need to ensure that the actions it will undertake
in self-preservation, will not fundamentally traduce the values which makes it worth
92 Section 5(1). This provision has now been repealed.
9j Section 4, which is similar to section 2 of the UK Official Secrets Act of 1911.
94 Section 118.
95
Marcus, n 90 above at 395.
96 See Burns, n 91 above p.71.
97 C.A. Ford, 'Constitution-Making in South Africa: Symposium Article: Watching the Watchdog:
Security Oversight Law in the New South Africa' (1997) 3 Michigan Journal ofRace & Law 59 at 63.
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preserving. The laws that the government inherited from the apartheid state made
serious erosions on media freedom and access to information, two freedoms that are
arguably among the most important in a democratic society. Immediately after
assuming office, the g overnment embarked on a wide-ranging legislative reform to
ensure, inter alia, the compatibility of security laws with the new order. Many
statutory provisions that made profound incursions into media freedom and access to
information such as the Internal Security Act were repealed. However, some
provisions that impact negatively on the two freedoms, especially access to
information, have not yet been amended or repealed. The democratic government has
invoked some of these laws to censor the media.98 The chilling effect of these laws on
media freedom is now alleviated by the application of the Promotion of Access to
Information Act (AIA)99 which applies to the exclusion of any other legislation that
prohibits or restricts the disclosure of official information.100
7.4.1 Definition ofNational Security in the AIA
National security was invoked by the apartheid state to inhibit public debate on
political and social problems. The tendency to misuse the concept is not only peculiai
to the apartheid state, national security has been, and is still being used in some
modern states to inhibit free political activity and to suppress embarrassing
revelations about governments.101 Given the propensity to misuse the concept, and
especially in the light of South Africa's authoritarian past, it was perhaps inevitable
for the democratic government to attempt a definition of national security in order to
safeguard the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms. It is also not surprising
that the concept is defined in an access to information legislation. Under the apartheid
state, the media were often denied access to state-held information under the guise of
98 For example, in November 1994, the then Minister ofDefence invoked the Defence Act to try and
force a Commission of Inquiry appointed by the State President to investigate illegal arms dealings to
have its proceedings held in camera: see L. Johannessen, 'Arms and the Right to Know: The Cameron
Commission of Inquiry' (1996) 1 Southern Africa Media Law Briefing 3; and in July 1997 the state
arms manufacturer, Denel, tried to use the Armaments and Production Act to interdict the media from
publishing the name of a client involved in a multi-billion rands arms deal. See J. Minnie & B. Mwape,
So this is Democracy? Report on State of the Media in Southern Africa 1997 (MISA, 1997) pp. 86 -88
& 91.
99
Act No.2 of 2000.
100 Section 5, AIA. For a detailed discussion of this section, see chapter 6 at 6.4.2.
101 A typical example is the current situation in Zimbabwe where opposition politicians are constantly
being harassed and detained under national security legislation for criticizing president Robert Mugabe
and his ruling party.
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the protection of national security, hindering them from facilitating the free flow of
information and performing their watchdog role.
The AIA allows the state to refuse a request for access to official information if the
disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause prejudice to the defence or security
of the Republic.102 The terms 'defence' and 'security' are not specifically defined in
the Act. However, section 41(2) specifies public records that fall within the ambit of
subsection 1. The relevant parts of the subsection read:103
(2) A record contemplated in subsection (1), without limiting the generality of
that subsection, includes a record containing information -
(a) relating to military tactics or strategy or military exercises or operations
undertaken in preparation of hostilities or in connection with the
detection, prevention, suppression of hostilities or curtailment of
subversive or hostile activities;
(b) relating to the quantity, characteristics, capabilities, vulnerabilities or
deployment of—
(i) weapons or any other equipment usedfor the detection, prevention,
suppression, or curtailment ofsubversive or hostile activities; or
(ii) anything being designed, developed, produced or considered for
use as weapons or such other equipment;
(c) relating to the characteristics, capabilities, vulnerabilities, performance,
potential, deployment or functions of-
(i) any militaryforce, unit orpersonnel; or
(ii) any body or person responsible for the detection, prevention,
suppression or curtailment ofsubversive or hostile activities;
(d) heldfor the purpose ofintelligence relating to -
(i) the defence ofthe Republic;
(ii) the detection, prevention, suppression or curtailment of subversive or
hostile activities; ...
(e) on methods of, and scientific or technical equipment for, collecting,
assessing or handling information referred to in paragraph (d);
(f) on the identity of a confidential source and any other source of
information referred to in paragraph (d); ...
,u" Section 4l(l)(a)(i) & (ii).
103 Section 41(2).
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Even though the terms 'defence' and 'security' are not defined in the Act, an
examination of the above subsection reveals that the two terms are used to refer to the
concept of national security.104 Section 41(2) provides a set of definitions to be used
in determining legitimate national security interests. The provision seeks to exempt
from disclosure information held by the state relating to the protection of its political
or territorial integrity from the use, or threatened use of force. It does so by
recognising that the state needs to have effective tools to combat the threat posed to
its democratic institutions and citizens by violent and subversive forces. The provision
thus protects military secrets such as the movement and deployment of troops, and
details, such as capabilities, design and vulnerabilities of weapons used by the
military in combating or preventing hostilities or subversive activities. In addition, the
provision also protects intelligence work relating to the detection or prevention of
subversive or hostile activities against the state. The Act defines subversive or hostile
activities against the state as including: (i) sabotage or terrorism against the people of
the Republic or a strategic asset, whether inside or outside the Republic; (ii) an
activity aimed at changing the constitutional order of the Republic by the use of force
or violence; and (iii) a foreign or hostile intelligence operation.105
National s ecurity is given a n arrow d efmition i n t he AIA, w hich i s c onsistent w ith
international law. It appears the South African legislature drew inspiration from both
the Siracusa and Johannesburg Principles in defining the concept. While it may be
too early to judge its success, it seems that in its relatively short existence, the Act has
been successful in thwarting the threat of censorship from the state under the guise of
protection of national security. Since its enactment in 2000, MISA, which has been
monitoring media violations in the Southern African region since 1994, has yet to
record an action alert on censorship of the media by the government on national
security grounds. South Africa is thus currently looked at as the shining light ofmedia
freedom in the region and in Africa as a whole.106
104 Cf. Council ofCivil Service Unions vMinister of the Civil Service, n 9 above at 410.
105 Section 2, A1A.
106 J. Minnie, 'A Game of Snakes and Ladders' Freepress, September 2002, p. 29. (Freepress is a
MISA quarterly publication).
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7.4.2 Safeguards and Remedies Against the Abuse ofNational Security
In most countries around the world, national security remains an excessively broad
area of restriction on the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms. Many states
have hitherto failed to provide specific guidance on the key issue of: what information
is it legitimate to withhold from the public on the grounds of national security? The
uncertainty surrounding what the concept encompasses leaves governments around
the world with very wide discretionary powers that enables them to withhold a wide
range of information from the public under the pretext of protecting the security of the
state. This uncertainty is also said to be the source of the courts' traditional deference
to assertions by governments that something pertains to national security because
courts do not have clear standards ofwhat the concept entails against which executive
action can be judged.107
The AIA brings about some measure of certainty to the concept of national security by
identifying types of information that the state may legitimately withhold from the
public in the interest of the security of the state. Section 41(2) contains a
comprehensive list of types of information that are prima facie protected from
disclosure in the interest of national security. The list serves at least two useful
purposes. First, it sets limitations upon the discretion of executive authorities seeking
to withhold information from the public in the interest of national security. And
secondly, i t p rovides a benchmark u pon w hich courts c an j udge w hether e xecutive
authorities have exercised their discretionary powers properly in withholding
information from the public. The demarcation of the area of risk by way of identifying
types of information, the disclosure of which will cause prejudice to the security of
the state, provides for some measure of certainty and thus serves as an important
safeguard against the potential abuse of national security.
Information relating to the defence or security of the state does not constitute a
108
mandatory ground of refusal to disclose information under the AIA. It remains
within the discretion of an information officer to disclose information even if it
107
Atkey, n 2 above at 48.
108 Contrast this approach with the position under the Fol laws of countries such as the UK, Australia
and New Zealand where information relating to national security is automatically excluded from
disclosure to the public.
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concerns national security. To justify the withholding of information, the state is
required to prove that the disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause prejudice
to national security. The South African courts have not yet pronounced on the
requirements of this standard. However, from comparative jurisprudence, it would
appear t hat t he s tate w ould b e r equired top rove t hat t here are r eal a nd substantial
grounds for the expectation that the security of the state will be harmed.109 This is a
strict approach in establishing a connection between the disclosure of information and
harm to national security, which minimises the scope for the state to invoke national
security for improper purposes.
Further, even if the disclosure of information would harm national security, the Act
provides for mandatory disclosure of information in the public interest.110 The public
interest is determined through a two-step test. First, the disclosure of information
should reveal evidence of either substantial contravention of the law or an imminent
and serious public or environmental risk. Secondly, the public interest in the
disclosure of information must clearly outweigh the harm to national security.111 The
provision incorporates the principle of proportionality in accordance with the
constitution.112
The limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms for a purpose that is reasonable
and justifiable in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values,
and ultimately an assessment of proportionality.113 Where the state intends to
withhold information from the public in the interest of national security, it must give
109 Cf. Canada Packers lnc v Canada (Minister ofAgriculture) 53 DLR (4th) 246 and Searle Australia
Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre & another (1992) 108 ALR 163. See also discussion in
chapter 6 at 6.4.2 (c).
110 Section 46, AIA.
111 See J. de Waal, I. Currie & G. Erasmus, The Bill ofRights Handbook (Juta & Co Ltd, 2001) p. 550.
112 Section 36(1) of the Constitution of 1996 provides:
'The rights in the Bill ofRights may be limited only in terms oflaw ofgeneral application to the extent
that the limitation is reasonable andjustifiable in an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality andfreedom, taking into account all relevantfactors, including:
(a) the nature ofthe right;
(b) the importance ofthe purpose ofthe limitation;
(c) the nature and extent ofthe limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose
113 For an excellent formulation of the principle of proportionality in South Africa, see the decision of
the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 at 436. See also discussion in chapter 4 at
4.5.2 on the application of the limitation clause in South Africa.
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consideration to the public's constitutional right to know and the constitutional value
of an open society. These should then be weighed against any harm to national
security that may result from the disclosure of the information. In South Africa, this
balancing exercise is best illustrated in the approach taken by the Commission of
Inquiry into Alleged Arms Transactions Between Armscor and One Eli Wazan and
Other R elatedMatters, otherwise known as the Cameron Commission after Justice
Edwin Cameron who chaired it.114 The Commission was appointed to inquire into
alleged illegal arms sales by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).
During the course of the Commission's work, reference was made to a document that
contained a list of countries that the SANDF was allowed to sell arms to and those
that it could not. The SANDF was anxious about the contents of the document being
made public as they felt diplomacy in arms transactions required a measure of
secrecy. T hey t herefore a pplied t o t he C ommission t o h ave t he d ocument w ithheld
from the public. The Commission ruled against SANDF holding that:
'Reasonableness as a standard ofpublic conduct in South Africa now requires
that decision-makers should have due regard to appropriate constitutional
standards and principles. These include in the present case the value of
openness and visibility in government and official processes. In other words,
an assessment whether the reasonable justification test has been fulfilled may
include in the weighing process giving consideration to the public's
constitutional right to know and the constitutional value ofan open society. To
put the matter differently, the public's right to know should not be omitted
from an assessment whether the reasonable justification standard has been
fulfilled'."5
The Commission acknowledged that the decision to allow the disclosure of the
contents of the document was not without a risk of harm to national security.
However, it concluded that the risk in the case was not sufficient to entitle it to bar
from the media and the public their important right to examine South Africa's past,
including its past armaments dealings. The fact that the disclose could cause
embarrassment and even complexity to other governments or indeed the government
of South Africa was not sufficient to justify the withholding of the information from
the public. Fessons from the Commission demonstrate the importance of the
114 The Commission was appointed on 14th October 1994 pursuant to Government Notice R 1801,
published in Government Gazette 16035. The report of the Commission is available at:
[http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/commissions/cameron. html\.
115
Paragraph 1433, Cameron Commission.
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proportionality principle as a procedural safeguard against the abuse of national
security. The principle, when properly applied, strikes an equitable balance between
media freedom and the public's right of access to official information on the one
hand, and genuine national security interests on the other hand.
No matter how well an access to information law is designed, there will still be cases
where disclosure of information will be refused on bogus national security grounds. It
is only through a leak that such information may become public. Leaking information
is however dangerous because it exposes the leaker to criminal sanctions and/or
occupational detriment. Under the Protection ofInformation Act 1982, a person, who
without authorisation, discloses information obtained or which he/she has had access
by virtue of his/her employment with the government, commits an offence.116 And
any person who receives information knowing or having reasonable grounds to
believe that the information is being disclosed to him/her in contravention of the Act
also commits an offence.117 The latter prohibits the media from publishing leaked
information. In some instances, the unauthorised release of classified information
serves as an important safety valve for ensuring the free flow of information to the
public, especially where such disclosure exposes some wrongdoing in government. It
is in this vein that the Johannesburg Principles provide that:
'No person may be subjected to any detriment on national security groundsfor
disclosing information that he or she learned by virtue ofgovernment service
if the public interest in knowing the information outweighs the harm from
>118disclosure
The South African legislature has recognised the value to an accountable and
transparent society played by those public servants who blow the whistle on unlawful
or irregular conduct in government by enacting the Protected Disclosures Act of
2000n9 The Act provides protection against criminal and employment-related
sanctions for disclosures that reveal various types of wrongdoing in government.
Disclosures are protected if they are made to legal advisers, or through formal
116 Section 4(l)(iv). The stipulated penalty for the offence is a fine not exceeding RIO 000 or an
imprisonment term not exceeding 10 years.




Act No. 26 of 2000, available at: [http://www.gov.za/gazette/acts/2000/a26-00.pdf].
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employment complaints procedures or certain high-level officials such as ministers,
120the Public Protector or Auditor General. Public servants are also protected if they
make w ider d isclosures, for example t o t he p olice, m embers o f p arliament and t he
121media. The latter protection applies where the whistle-blower honestly and
reasonably believes that the information and any allegation contained in it are
substantially true, and the disclosure is not made for personal gain. Further the
disclosure must also be for a good cause and reasonable. The Act recognises four
good causes, which are that: (i) a concern was raised internally or with a prescribed
regulator, but was not properly addressed; or (ii) the concern was not raised internally
or with a prescribed regulator because the whistle-blower reasonably believed he
would be victimised; or (iii) the concern was not raised internally because the whistle-
blower reasonably believed a cover-up was likely and there was no prescribed
122
regulator; or (iv) the concern was exceptionally serious.
The withholding of information from the public under bogus national security
grounds constitutes a serious breach of the constitutional principle of accountable and
transparent government. Where this breach occurs, public servants would be able to
leak it to, among others, the media, under the protection of the Protected Disclosures
Act. The Act therefore provides another safeguard against the abuse of national
security by the state. The fact that there remains a possibility of exposing their true
intentions, if they invoke national security for improper purposes, should be able to
keep information officers on the straight when exercising their discretion to withhold
information under the AIA.
The main remedy of a person aggrieved by a decision to withhold information on
national security grounds is judicial review.123 However, it has been observed that the
highly deferential stance adopted by courts where national security matters are
involved places the adequacy of the remedy in serious doubt. The lack of clear
standards o n what p ertains ton ational s ecurity is p artly r esponsible for the c ourts'
attitude. In the case of South Africa, this should not be the case as the AIA clearly
identifies legitimate national security interests. There are currently no decided cases
120 See sections 5-8.
121 Section 9.
122 Section 9(2).
123 For a more detailed discussion of remedies offered by the AIA, see chapter 6 at 6.4.2 (d).
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involving national security under the democratic era in South Africa, from which one
can ascertain the attitude of their courts. The South African constitution requires its
courts to apply the principle of proportionality in cases involving a limitation of
fundamental rights and freedoms. The principle requires a court to engage in a
balancing exercise of competing interests in a given case, therefore if the courts were
to adopt an uncritical and deferential stance to the state's assertions of national
security, this will amount to a failure of a proper application of the principle.
From the trend thus established by the courts in their protection of fundamental rights
and freedoms in the country, there is hope that they will not adopt a highly differential
attitude. In one of the leading decisions involving an attempt by the state to withhold
information from the public, the High Court held that:
'The judiciary as guardian of the constitution must be astute in determining
the full ambit of the rights enshrined in the constitution and be vigorous in its
7 rt 124
protection thereof .
The Cameron Commission is, for now, the leading authority on the application of the
principle of proportionality in cases involving national security in South Africa. Even
though the Commission's findings are not binding on the courts, it should serve as a
useful point of reference in the application of the principle. If courts were to adopt the
same attitude as the Cameron Commission in dealing with matters of national
security, then judicial review would be an adequate remedy in the context of South
Africa, given that national security interests are clearly defined and courts are obliged
to apply the principle of proportionality.
7.5 Conclusion
In a democratic society, the protection of national security is a genuine and legitimate
interest, not just of the state or the government of the day, but of the public at large.
The security of a state is essential for ensuring the well-being of its citizens.
Democratic societies guarantee their citizens certain fundamental rights and freedoms,
124 Government of the Republic ofSouth Africa v Sunday Times Newspaper and another 1995 2 SA 221
at 225.
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which are crucial for the maintenance of the values of that society. One such right is
the freedom of expression. The proper protection of this right, and the related right of
access to official information, leads to an open and accountable government. The
overall public interest therefore requires a proper balance to be struck between
measures undertaken by the state in the protection of national security and the
exercise of the freedoms of expression and access to information by its citizens.
Unfortunately, most states around the world fail to provide this balance. The failure
stems mainly from the fact that national security in these states remains an
excessively broad area of restriction, thus effectively precluding proper judicial
scrutiny of executive action taken, purportedly, in the interest of national security.
The ambiguity and breadth of national security in these states also encourages abuse
of the concept.
Botswana is one of those countries that fail to provide a proper balance between the
freedoms of expression and access to information, and national security interests. The
NSA is skewed in favour of the protection of national security. The Act fails to
provide a clear definition of legitimate national security interests, and it gives the state
almost unlimited powers to keep a wide range of information secret under the pretext
of protecting the security of the state. The failure to indicate the scope of the state's
discretionary powers under the NSA leaves citizens vulnerable to arbitrary
interferences with their fundamental freedoms, especially the freedoms of expression
and access to information. Occasionally, the state invokes the Act to justify the
withholding of embarrassing or inconvenient information that has nothing to do with
1 7 5
national security.
South Africa is one of the few countries that have brought a measure of certainty to
the concept of national security by identifying interests that justify the withholding of
infonnation in the interest of the security of the state. National security was abused by
the apartheid state to deny the majority citizens access to information and from taking
125 For example, in November 1991 a journalist and Mmegi newspaper were charged under the NSA for
'unlawfully receiving an official document marked secret' and publishing classified information. The
charges related to Mmegi's publication of information contained in a document outlining government
policy on workers' demands made during a general strike. The charges were however subsequently
dismissed by the High Court in Febmary 1995 because the state had failed to obtain the consent of the
AG to prosecute. See A. Schoeman & D. Lush, So this is Democracy? Report on Media Freedom in
Southern Africa 1995 (MISA, 1996) pp. 10 - 11.
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part in public discourse. The democratic government therefore found it important to
limit the state's discretionary powers to withhold information from the public in the
name of national security by defining the concept. The definition draws heavily from
international instruments such as the Siracusci and Johannesburg principles. Botswana
must also define legitimate national security interests that will justify the withholding
of information in order to strike a balance between the exercise of the freedoms of
expression and access to information, and protection of national security. A definition
based on international law will limit the scope of the state's discretionary powers.
The task of striking a balance in situations where the freedoms of expression and
access to information, and national security, appear to conflict should be a matter for
independent judiciaries. The task cannot be left to those who exercise executive
power because they may act in their own political interest rather than the broader
public interest and abuse restrictions to conceal their wrongdoing. The courts'
traditional deference to states' assertions of national security must therefore be
discarded. Courts need to be more rigorous and intrusive than was once thought to be
permissible in order to strike a balance between the preservation of free expression
and the interests of national security.126 At least two things are necessary to achieve
this. First, states must adopt a narrow definition of national security that is consistent
with international law so that courts can have a basis on which they can judge the
legality of executive action. And secondly, courts should apply the principle of
proportionality in the determination of the legality of restrictions to the freedoms of
expression and access to information.
There is an overlap between the traditional grounds of review such as reasonableness
and the approach of proportionality, but the intensity of review under the latter is
greater.127 The proportionality principle requires the reviewing court to assess the
balance that the decision-maker struck, not merely whether it was within the range of
rational or reasonable decisions. Further, the proportionality test also go further than
~ Cf. R v Shayler, n 85 above, at 497 (para. 33)
127 See Jowell, n 77 above, and R. Clayton, 'Regaining a Sense of Proportion: The Human Rights Act
and the Proportionality Principle' (2001) 6 EHRLR 504.
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the traditional grounds of review in as much as it requires attention to be directed to
1 ?R
the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations in the case.
In terms of international law, striking a balance between freedom of expression and
national security also means there should be no sweeping blanket bans on disclosure
of information relating to national security. No one should be subjected to criminal
penalty for disclosure of information unless the disclosure poses a real risk of
substantial harm to the security of the state. Furthermore, even where disclosure
causes harm, the requirements of necessity in a democracy require that the leaker
should not be punished where the public interest in receiving the information
outweighs the harm to national security. In the same vein, protection should be
extended to those public officials who blow the whistle on government wrongdoing.
The above measures, together with the desirability of a narrow definition of national
security, and the adoption of the proportionality principle in the determination of
legality of limitations to fundamental rights and freedoms constitutes international law
minimum standards, which states must adopt in order to balance the exercise of
freedom of expression and the protection of national security. The regime offered in
Botswana under the NSA falls far below these standards. South Africa on the other
hand, has incorporated these standards into its municipal law. The latter therefore
provides a suitable environment for the maintenance of a proper balance between
media freedom and national security. There is an urgent need for Botswana to review
the NSA to bring it into line with international law standards.
128 See speech of Lord Hope of Graighead in R v Shayler, n 85 above, especially para. 75.
263
CHAPTER 8
IMPACT OF THE CIVIL LAW OF DEFAMATION ON MEDIA FREEDOM
8.1 Introduction
In democratic societies, reputation is an integral and important part of the dignity of
the individual.1 The legitimate purpose of the civil law of defamation is therefore to
protect the reputation of individuals or legal persons against injury through
publication ofmatter that tends to lower the esteem in which they are held within the
community, or by exposing them to public ridicule or hatred, or by causing them to be
shunned or avoided. At the same time, in modern representative democracies, there is
a profound commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open. Conflict between these two important interests -
protection of reputation and the promotion of freedom of expression, frequently arise
when individuals or the media, exercising their right to speak freely, make false
statements about others, injuring their reputation.
In jurisdictions based on the traditional English common law, in an action for
defamation against the mass media, the plaintiff only needs to prove evidence of a
statement that tends to harm his/her reputation by lowering him/her in the estimation
of the community, or which deters third parties from associating or dealing with
him/her, and prove that the defendant was responsible for uttering or publishing it to
others. The plaintiff is not required to prove fault on the part of the defendant nor
actual injury to reputation.3 This strict standard holds liable both the malicious and the
innocent who merely repeat in good faith what they have heard from reliable sources.
1 Per Lord Nicholls in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [ 1999] 4 ALL ER 609 at 619 - 622. Se also
Barendt, E. 'What is the Point of Libel Law?' [1999] 52 Current Legal Problems 110 and R.C. Post,
'The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution' (1986) 74 California
Law Review 691.
2 A. Nicol, G. Millar & A. Sharland, Media Law and Human Rights (Blackstone Press Limited, 2001)
p. 65.
3 E. Barendt, Freedom ofSpeech (Clarendon Press, 1985) pp. 178 - 80.
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The common law has over the years influenced other jurisdictions to adopt this strict
liability regime with respect to the mass media.4
A defendant in a defamation suit can generally plead three defences to justify the
publication of a defamatory statement: truth, fair comment and privilege.3 Where truth
is pleaded, the defendant bears the burden of proving the truth of the statement.
Similarly, the defence of fair comment demands that a defendant show the factual
basis of the comment to be true. The difficulty in proving the truthfulness of an
alleged defamatory remark is that, quite often the facts that would justify defamatory
publication are known to be true, but admissible evidence capable of proving those
facts is not available.6 The defence of qualified privilege is not dependent on proof of
truth, but it requires what was said to serve 'the common convenience and welfare of
society'.7 However what is requisite for the public benefit has been narrowly
construed and has not been extended to cover political dialogue that was honest but
erroneous.8
The fear that material intended for publication might contain falsehoods that may
damage t he r eputation o f o thers c auses m uch o fw hat wer ead, v iew o r h ear t o b e
trimmed before it reaches us. Those exposed to damages awards and legal costs as
publishers under the law of defamation often want to side-step the financial risks
altogether by withholding material which may turn out to be defamatory. The climate
thus created impacts negatively on investigative and polemic writing or broadcasting,
which constitutes one of the most potent mechanisms for ensuring accountability in a
representative democracy. This 'chilling effect' of the law of defamation on freedom
of expression resulted in calls for the recognition of the important role of the media in
informing the public on matters of public interest and in acting as a public watchdog,
and that this requires that the media be accorded some privilege when commenting on
4 Under Roman-Dutch law, defamation is based on the actio iniuriarum, which requires, among other
things, proof of an intention to injure. However, courts in Botswana (and at one point, South Africa)
both Roman-Dutch jurisdictions, hold the media strictly liable for defamatory statements due to the
English common law influence. See Attorney General v Ghanzi Hotel [1985] BLR 452 and Pakendorf
& others v De Flamingh 1982 3 SA 147, respectively.
5 K. Williams, 'Defaming Politicians: The Not So Common Law' (2000) 63 Modern Law Review 748.
6 Cf. Lord Keith in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534 at 538. (Such
difficulties may arise in cases involving the confidentiality of journalists' sources.)
7
Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 CM & R 181, 193.
8 Cf. Blackshaw v Lord [1984] 1 QB 1.
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matters of political interest. The US Supreme Court obliged in the celebrated case of
New York Times Co v Sullivan 9 Founding on the First Amendment, it laid down that
when allegations which would ordinarily be defamatory were made of a public
official in relation to his/her official conduct, an action by him/her would not succeed
unless he/she prove that the defamatory statement was false, and prove with
convincing clarity that it was made by the defendant with the knowledge of its falsity
or reckless disregard as to whether it was false or not.
The Sullivan case, although a welcome development in freedom of expression circles,
has been criticised for its failure to give sufficient weight to an individual's right of
reputation. A person who goes into public life must expect robust and often unfair
criticism. Although this may be part of the price of going into public life, it does not
follow that it is necessary to deprive him of any right to reputation.10 The case also
sets a d ifficult s tandard for t he p laintiff t o sa tisfy. A p laintiffm ust o btain d etailed
information about what the defendant actually knew or presumably did by way of
investigation to prove that he/she published the statement knowing it to be false or
with at least reckless disregard for the truth. This rigorous standard provides little
protection for the reputation of the plaintiff because it imposes a difficult standard of
proof upon the plaintiff and does not require the defendant to act reasonably to verify
the truth of the statement before publication.11
Many jurisdictions have declined to adopt the Sullivan case, opting instead for a fault-
based regime. In terms of this approach, publication of defamatory matter in the
media is protected provided that it was reasonable in the circumstances, i.e., the
defendant was not at fault. This approach provides a better environment for the search
for an appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the protection of
reputation. The reputation of individuals is not left unprotected, while at the same
time, political debate and discussion can take place in relative freedom.
9 376 US 254(1964).
10 S. Kentridge, 'Freedom of Speech: Is It the Primary Right?' (1996) 45 ICLQ 261 at 267.
" J.E. Schaffner, 'Protection of Reputation Versus Freedom of Expression: Striking a Manageable
Compromise in the Tort ofDefamation' (1999) 63 Southern California Law Review 435 at 444.
12 These include Australia, Canada and UK. See C. Forsyth, 'The Protection of Political Discourse:
Pragmatism or Incoherence?' in J. Beatson and Y. Cripps (eds.) Freedom ofExpression and Freedom
ofInformation: Essays in Honour ofSir David Williams (Oxford University Press, 2000) 87.
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The potential conflict between freedom of expression and the protection of reputation
requires the law to strike an appropriate balance between the two rights. This chapter
examines t he c ivil 1 aws of d efamation o f Botswana a nd S outh A frica t o d etermine
how they attempt to strike this balance. In particular, it seeks to determine the impact
of the laws on media freedom. Before examining the laws of the two states, I briefly
examine how international law attempts to strike a balance between the two rights.
The municipal laws of the two states will then be discussed in the light of
international law and how they compare with it.
8.2 Striking a Balance Between Media Freedom and Protection of Reputation
Under International Law
The rights of freedom of speech (especially media freedom) and access to information
are accorded an extremely high value in international law as cornerstones upon which
the very existence of a democratic society rests.13 All major international human
rights treaties therefore guarantee them.14 As we have seen, the ECtHR has in a
number of cases consistently acknowledged the essential function the media fulfils in
a democratic state. It has held that the media have not only a right but also a duty to
impart information on all matters of political and public interest, which the public has
a corresponding duty to receive.15 It has also held that the media plays a watchdog
role.16 Because of these important roles, international law requires restrictions on
freedom of speech to be construed strictly and the need for any restriction to be
established convincingly.17
13 See generally, Lord Lester and N. Schiffrin, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and Media
Law' (1999) 4 The Yearbook ofCopyright and Media Law 353, and Report on the Compatibility of
"Desacato " Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights, Annual Report of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 1994, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88 Doc. 9 rev. (17 February 1995) at
202.
14 See chapter 4 at 4.2.
13
Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245 at para. 65 and Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407 at
para. 41.
16 De Haes &GijseIs v Belgium (1997) 25 EHRR 1 at para. 37.
17 Tammer v Estonia (App. No. 41205/98, 6th February 2001) at para. 59. See also M. Nowak, UN
Convention on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Engel, 1993) p. 353 at para. 40.
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Protection of the reputation of individuals is also one of the rights guaranteed under
international law. It is expressly guaranteed in the ICCPR18 and ACHRV) as part of the
right to privacy. The EHCR does not expressly guarantee the right, but Article 10(2)
provides that the right to freedom of expression may be restricted in the interest of the
protection of the reputation of others. The ACHPR on the other hand provides that the
rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights
90
of others. It can thus be inferred from this provision that the right of freedom of
expression must be exercised with due regard to the reputation of others.
Protection of reputation may undermine freedom of expression, particularly in the
political arena, if every attack on reputation is penalised. Freedom of expression could
be stripped of its fundamental importance in the process of formation of political
opinion and as a watchdog over those entrusted with the management ofpublic affairs
if that was the case. Likewise, an absolutist approach to the protection of freedom of
expression exposes individuals to unwarranted attacks on their reputation. The media
may have a vital public interest role, but they are also profit dependent enterprises in
an environment where the commercial marketplace in sensationalism often assumes
greater importance than the intellectual marketplace in ideas.21
International law attempts to resolve the classic human rights conflict between the
guarantee of freedom of expression and the protection of reputation by providing that
the former right may be limited in the interest of the latter.22 However, because of the
importance of freedom of expression in the maintenance of democracy, restrictions
are to be construed narrowly in terms of the three-part test. A restriction sought on
freedom of expression in the interest of the protection of reputation must: (i) be
prescribed by law; (ii) be genuinely aimed at protecting reputation; and (iii)





21 S. Tierney, 'Press Freedom and Public Interest: The Developing Jurisprudence of the European Court
ofHuman Rights' (1998) 3 EHRLR 419 at 420. See also, Forsyth, n 12 above, at 98.
22 Articles: 19(3)(a) - ICCPR,- 13(2)(a) - ACHR and 10(2) - ECHR.
23 Cf. Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 245 at para. 62 and Compulsory Membership in an
Association Prescribed by Lawfor the Practice ofJournalism, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Series A,
No. 5 (13th November 1985) at para. 79.
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Proof of the first two elements of the three-part test is usually not problematic in cases
involving restrictions based on the law of defamation. The word 'law' has been
interpreted as covering not only statute, but also common law.24 And reputation is one
of the legitimate aims recognised under international law that justifies restrictions on
freedom of expression. It is the requirement of necessity that plays a crucial role in the
endeavour to strike an appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the
protection of reputation. Unfortunately, this is not a simple or uniform concept. The
application of the concept involves the weighing and balancing of different competing
interests. The public interest ends served by restrictions on freedom of expression
must be weighed against their detrimental effect on democracy.
The ECtHR is so far the only international human rights treaty enforcement organ that
has generated some easily accessible case law from which guidance may be sought on
how the principle of necessity should be applied in an attempt to strike a balance
between the two rights. Other international human rights treaties enforcement organs
have to a large extent endorsed the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.26 The discussion of
international law principles that follows therefore draws heavily from the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The discussion proceeds on the assumption that the
position proclaimed by the ECtHR, unless otherwise stated, reflects the status of
international law.
In its attempt to strike a balance between freedom of expression and the protection of
reputation, the ECtHR's approach has centred around the role the media plays in
reporting on matters of public interest. The requirements of protection of reputation
have to be weighed in relation to the interest of the media in imparting information
and ideas on matters of public concern.26 The court has established a number of
24
Tolstoy Miloslavsky v UK (1995) 20 EHRR 442 at para. 37.
23 See: Declaration ofPrinciples on Freedom ofExpression in Africa (Adopted by the African
Commission on Human and People's Rights at its 32nd Ordinary Session, 17th -23rd October 2003);
Inter-American Declaration on Freedom ofExpression (Approved by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights at its 108th Regular Session, 20th October 2000), and Report of the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection ofthe Right to Freedom ofExpression and Opinion 1999,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/63 (18 January 2000) at para. 52.
26 Tammer v Estonia, n 17 above, at para. 65.
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principles that national courts are to consider in their attempts at striking a balance
between the two rights.27
First, the ECtHR has held that the important role of the media in informing public
opinion on matters of public interest and in acting as a public watchdog requires that
the media be accorded particular latitude when commenting on matters of political or
other public interest.28 The court attaches the highest importance to the protection of
speech in the context of political debate and very strong reasons are required to justify
29restrictions on political speech. The concept ofpolitical speech is not clearly defined
in the case law of the court, but it has been suggested that it relates to the electoral
process and to day-to-day matters of public concern.30 Even though the court
emphasises the protection of political speech, in practice, it gives strong protection to
expression of matters of public interest in general.31 The term public interest is
interpreted in a fairly open-ended way and is not only restricted to political speech,
but covers publication of material that can be shown to possess public interest
content.32 Protection is thus given to the media when they seek to draw popular
attention to matters of legitimate public concern. The court recognises that media
freedom covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation,
and has shown willingness to protect political commentators' use of insulting
language where it is part of a reasoned critique.33 While vigorous protection is given
to the media when commenting on matters of public concern, the media must not
overstep certain set bounds, inter alia, for the protection of the reputation of others.34
Secondly, freedom of expression provides an important tool for exercising democratic
control over those responsible for matters of public interest. International law
therefore requires defamation laws to reflect the principle that persons in charge of the
27 See S. Coliver, 'Defamation Jurisprudence of the European Court ofHuman Rights' (1992) 13
Journal ofMedia Law and Practice 250 and K. Starmer & I. Byrne, Blackstone's Human Rights Digest
(Blackstone Press Ltd, 2001) at section 32.
28
Lingens v Austria, n 15 above at para. 41.
29 Feldek v Slovakia (App. No. 29032/95, 12th July 2001) at para. 83.
0
D.J. Harris, M. O'Boyle & C. Warbrick, Law ofthe European Convention on Human Rights
(Butterworths, 1995) p. 397.
31 See Thorgeirson v Iceland, n 23 above at para. 64, where the court refused to distinguish between
protection given to political expression and to discussion of other matters of public concern.
~'2
Tierney, n 21 above at 421.
33 Oberschlick v Austria (No. 2) (1997) 25 EHRR 357 at para. 38.
34
Lingens v Austria, n 15 above at para. 41.
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management of public affairs can claim less protection from criticism than the
average private person not involved in public affairs. Those who are involved in the
management o f p ublic affairs are e xpected t o t olerate a greater d egree o f c riticism
than the private citizen.35 The ECtHR gives differing levels of protection from
defamation to the government qua corporate body, politicians, public servants and
private citizens. The limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the
government than in relation to a politician acting in his/her capacity as such.36
Similarly, politicians are subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism than civil
servants acting in an official capacity, and civil servants must in turn tolerate more
criticism than a private c ltizen. The UN endorses the general position that public
officials must tolerate a greater degree of criticism than private citizens, but goes
further tor ecommend t hat government b odies and p ublic a uthorities s hould n ot b e
allowed to bring defamation suits to protect their governing reputations. The
rationale seems to be that allowing government b odies to bring defamation actions
could undermine the vital importance of open criticism in a democracy.39
Third, a distinction is drawn between expression in the form of statements of fact and
the expression of value judgments or opinions. The existence of fact can be
demonstrated, whereas the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof.40
Where a defamatory statement is considered to be a fact, the media must be permitted
to call relevant evidence to try to prove truth.41 The requirement to prove the truth of
the allegations as a defence to a defamation action, which is an elementary feature of
defamation proceedings in most legal systems, is not incompatible with the right to
freedom of expression.42 The UN and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACmHR) however consider this standard to be a hindrance to the free flow of ideas
33 Ibid. Further, see Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection ofthe Right
to Freedom ofExpression and Opinion 1999, n 25 above, para. 52; Declaration ofPrinciples on
Freedom ofExpression in Africa; n 25 above at Principle XII (1) and Inter-American Declaration on
Freedom ofExpression, n 25 above at Principle 11.
36 Castells v Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 445 at paras. 42 — 46.
j7 Thoma v Luxembourg (App. No. 38432/97, 29th March 2001) at para. 47.
jS
Report ofthe UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Expression and Opinion 1999, n 25 above at para. 52
39 Cf. Lord Keith's speech in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers, n 5 above at 547: "It is
of the highest public importance that a democratically elected governmental body should be open to
uninhibitedpublic criticism
40
Lingens v Austria, n 15 above at para. 43.
41 Castells v Spain, n 36 above at para. 48.
42 Feldek v Slovakia, n 29 above at para. 57.
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and opinions, particularly in the political arena, where it is argued that political
criticism is often based on value judgments or opinions rather than purely fact-based
statements. The two bodies recommend that the plaintiff should bear the burden of
proving the falsity of any statements of imputations of fact alleged to be defamatory.43
A d efendant i s n ot r equired top rove t he t ruth o f o pinions o r v alue j udgments, b ut
there must be some established or undisputed factual basis for the expression of the
opinion, which must be made in good faith.44 To satisfy this requirement, media
defendants m ust p rove t hat t hey a cted i n a ccordance w ith t he e thics o fj ournalism,
especially the obligation to verify factual statements that are defamatory of private
individuals.45
Fourth, international law recognises that media defendants can raise a defence of
'reasonable publication'. Even where a statement of fact on a matter of public concern
has been shown to be false, liability can be excluded if the defendant can establish
that it was reasonable in all the circumstances for a person in his/her position to have
disseminated the material in the manner and form that he/she did.40 In determining
whether a publication was reasonable, account is taken of the importance of freedom
of expression with respect to matters of public concern and the right of the public to
receive timely information relating to such matters.47 The media's right to disseminate
information on issues of general interest will be protected provided they act in good
faith and on accurate factual basis and provide reliable and precise information in
accordance with the ethics of journalism. One of the fundamental ethical principles
of journalism is that the defendant should have carried out an adequate and diligent
previous search before publication of the offending statement.49 This would ordinarily
require defendants to prove proper steps to verify any allegations, an opportunity for
4j
Report ofthe UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Expression and Opinion 1999, n 25 above at para. 52 and Report on the Compatibility of "Desacato "
Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights, n 13 above at 208.
44
Lingens v Austria, n 15 above at para. 46.
45 Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (1999) 29 EHRR 125 at paras. 65 - 66.
46 Ibid. The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression endorsed the above case in his 1999
report, n 25 above, para. 52. See also Declaration ofPrinciples on Freedom ofExpression in Africa, n
25 above at Principle XII (1).
47 The ECtHR has held that news is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication may deprive it
of its value and interest. See The Observer and The Guardian v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 153 at para. 60.
48 Cf. Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Noi~way, n 45 above at paras. 65 - 66.
49 Decision of the European Commission on Human Rights No. 18902/91, H.N. v Italy, decision of 27th
October 1998, D.R. 94 at 21.
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the person potentially defamed to respond, and an honest and reasonable belief in the
truth o f t he s tory.50 T he E CtHR t akes a r elaxed attitude t o t his s tandard where t he
media are relying on official reports. It has held that where the media contributes to a
public debate on questions of legitimate public interest, it must be able to rely on
official reports without having to carry out independent research.51 The IACmHR, on
the other hand, favours the approach that the media should incur liability only in cases
where it is proved that they acted with actual malice. This means that the author of the
statement in question must have acted with an intention to cause harm, or was aware
that the statement was false or acted with gross negligence in efforts to determine the
truth or falsity of the statement.
Fifth, sanctions for defamation should not be so large as to exert a chilling effect on
freedom of expression and information.53 The overriding goal of providing a remedy
for defamatory statements should be to redress the harm done to the reputation of the
plaintiff. An award of damages must therefore bear a reasonable relationship of
proportionality to the injury to reputation suffered.54 International law however does
not provide guidance on the quantum of damages to be awarded. The difficulty stems
from the fact that perceptions as to what would be an appropriate response by society
to a defamatory statement will differ from one state to another. National authorities
are thus better placed than international bodies to assess the matter. It is also
important for municipal laws concerning the calculation of damages for injury to
reputation to be flexible, to enable the assessment of damages tailored to the facts of a
particular case. While flexibility is required in the assessment of quantum of damages,
international law also emphasises that there must be adequate and effective safeguards
against disproportionately large awards.55
30 See Williams, n 5 above at 749. It would appear that this is also the standard recommended by the
UN in terms ofGeneral Assembly Resolution 59(1). One of the responsibilities attached to the exercise
of the freedoms of expression and access to information is the 'moral obligation to seek facts without
prejudice and to spread knowledge without malicious intent'.
31 Colombani and others v France (App. No. 51279/99, 25th June 2002) at para. 65.
32
Inter-American Declaration on Freedom ofExpression, n 25 above at Principle 10.
53 Declaration ofPrinciples on Freedom ofExpression in Africa, n 25 above at Principle XII (1) and
Tolstoy Miloslavsky v UK, n 24 above at para. 49.
54 Ibid.
55
Ibid., at para. 50.
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And finally, sixth, international law also recognises that prior restraints to publication
in the media constitute an extreme restriction on freedom of expression. It has been
observed that news is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication, even for a
short period, may well deprive it of all its value and interest.56 International human
rights treaties, however, adopt different approaches to the question of the
compatibility ofprior restraints to publication in the media and the right to freedom of
expression. The ACHR expressly prohibits any form of prior censorship of the media.
57Restrictions are only permitted by way of subsequent imposition of liability. Under
the ECHR, there cannot as yet be said to be a clear rule against prior restraint,
however it seems that prior restraints are viewed as pernicious and that, to be upheld
as justifiable, their use will have to be viewed as appropriate, proportionate and
absolutely necessary.38 The ECtHR has held that the ECHR does not prohibit the
imposition of prior restraints on publication, but the dangers inherent in them are such
that they call for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the court.59 The court has
found some interdicts to be a justifiable interference with freedom of expression for
the protection of reputation.60
The principles discussed above demonstrate that, in its attempt to strike a balance
between the exercise of freedom of expression and the protection of reputation,
international law tilts the scales in favour of freedom of expression. The approach is
not surprising g iven international law's firm belief that the freedoms of expression
and access to information are essential for the maintenance of democracy, and for
guaranteeing respect of other basic rights.
56 The Observer and The Guardian v UK, n 47 above at para. 60.
57 Article 13(2) and Inter-American Declaration on Freedom ofExpression, n 25 above at Principle 5.
38 C.R. Munro, 'Prior Restraint of the Media and Human Rights Law' (2002) Juridical Review 1 at 23.
59 The Observer and The Guardian v UK, n 48 above at para. 60.
60 For example, Wabl v Austria (2000) 31 EHRR 51 at para. 45, where an interdict against repetition of
an insulting comment levelled at a newspaper was held to be a justifiable interference for the protection
of a newspaper's reputation.
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8.3 A Synopsis of the Civil ofDefamation in Botswana and South Africa
As observed in chapter 4, freedom of expression (including media freedom) is
expressly guaranteed in the constitutions ofBotswana and South Africa.61 The right to
reputation is however not expressly guaranteed in either of the two constitutions. The
constitution of Botswana adopts the ECHR's approach to the protection of reputation
in that the exercise of freedom of expression may be restricted for the purpose of
protecting the reputation of others.62 The constitution does not provide detailed rules
on how the exercise of freedom of expression and the protection of reputation should
be reconciled. It simply provides that restrictions on the former right must be done
under t he a uthority o f 1 aw, a nd s hown t o b e reasonably j ustifiable i n a d emocratic
society.63 It is then left to the law of defamation to strike an appropriate balance
between the two rights.64
In South Africa, the right to reputation is protected as part of the right to human
dignity.66 The Constitutional Court has held that in the new constitutional order, the
value of human dignity is not only concerned with an individual's sense of self-worth,
but also constitutes an affirmation of the worth of human beings in society. Human
dignity, the court concluded, includes the intrinsic worth of human beings shared by
all people as well as the individual reputation of each person built upon his/her own
individual achievements.66 The value of human dignity therefore values both the
personal sense of self-worth as well as the public's estimation of the worth or value of
an individual. The limitation of rights clause in the constitution thus provides that law
of general application may limit entrenched rights to the extent that the limitation is
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom.67 Because reputation is an aspect of human dignity, the exercise
of freedom of expression may be restricted in the interest of the protection of the
61 Sections 12(1) and 16(1), respectively.
62 Section 12(2)(b).
63 Ibid.
64 Media Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Attorney General and another Misca 229/2001, High Court
(Unreported) at 22-23.
65 Human dignity is guaranteed under section 10.
66 Khumalo and others v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 at 418- 419 para. 27.
67 Section 36(1).
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reputation of others. The task of striking a balance between the two rights is also left
/CO
to the rules of the common law.
The common law of defamation thus plays a crucial role in the endeavour to strike an
appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the protection of reputation in
Botswana and South Africa. It may be noted that both states are Roman-Dutch
common law jurisdictions. The civil laws of defamation of the two states should, in
principle, be the same. South African jurisprudence has an immense influence on the
law in Botswana. Case reporting in Botswana is poor, and there is generally a lack of
scholarly literature on the law of defamation in the country. Judges, legal
practitioners, academics and law students therefore tend to rely heavily on South
African jurisprudence. Though not binding on courts in Botswana, South African
jurisprudence is of a high persuasive value because the two countries share the same
common law background.69 Since South Africa embraced democratic rule, there have
been some changes in its common law that have been influenced by its new
democratic ethos. One of these changes relates to the liability of the mass media for
defamatory statements. These changes are however not automatically applicable in
Botswana unless expressly adopted by the courts.
In examining how the law of defamation attempts to strike a balance between media
freedom and the protection of reputation, and also to appreciate the impact that the
law has on media freedom, it is essential to briefly discuss liability, defences and
remedies for defamation under the common law. The discussion proceeds on the
assumption that the major principles of the law of defamation in Botswana and South
Africa, unless stated otherwise, are the same.
Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Esselen's Estate 1994 2 SA 1 at 25.
69 The High of Botswana in Attorney General v Ghanzi Hotel, n 4 above at 457, held that authoritative
decisions on the common law by South African courts should be followed unless good cause can be
shown why they should not.
8.3.1 Elements of the Iniuria ofDefamation
Under Roman-Dutch common law, every person has a natural right to the possession
of an unimpaired reputation, i.e.,fama or good name.70 A person's fama is the respect
and status he/she enjoys in society. Thus any action that has the effect of reducing a
person's status in the community infringes his/her fama and constitutes an iniuria.11
Defamation is therefore d efined as the intentional infringement of another person's
72
right to good name. The Roman-Dutch common law of defamation is based on the
actio iniuriarum, and affords a right to claim damages to a person whose right to fama
has been impaired intentionally by the unlawful act of another.73 The elements of the
iniuria of defamation are: (i) publication of words or behaviour; (ii) injury to
personality; (iii) wrongfulness; and, (iv) an intention to injure.
The good name that a person enjoys in society relates to the opinion of others
concerning him. Defamation will only arise if a defamatory act has been published or
disclosed to some person or persons other than the person defamed.74 Once
publication has been proved, the plaintiff must go on to establish that the defendant
was responsible for the publication. As a general rule, publication is attributed to the
defendant if he/she was aware or could reasonably have expected that an outsider
would take cognisance of the defamation.73 Every person who has contributed to the
publication of a defamatory statement is liable. The editor, proprietor, printer and
publisher of a newspaper or other publication circulated generally may be liable for
defamatory statements appearing in the newspaper or publication.76
The element of injury to personality relates to the defamatory effect of the words or
behaviour in question. In general, defamatory conduct consists of the written or
spoken word. It may also include conduct or any means of communication such as
70 Mulwa v Mosienyane (Judgment on exception) CT 398/83, High Court ofBotswana (Unreported).
The judgment is reproduced in B. Otlhogile, The Law ofDefamation: Cases and Materials (University
of Botswana, 1992) 32 at 38 - 39.
71 Karim v Weterings [1974] 2 BLR 34.
12
J. Neethling, J.M. Potgieter & P.J. Visser, The Law ofDelict (Butterworths, 1999) p. 339.
7j
Ibid., at chapter 10 and W.A. Jourbert (ed.) The Law ofSouth Africa, Vol. 7 (Butterworths, 1995) p.
266 para. 245.
74 Rivett-Carnac v Wiggins 1997 3 SA 80 at 88.
73 Pretorius v Niehaus 1960 3 SA 109 at 112 - 113.
76 Moodie v Fairbairn 1837 3 Menz 14. See also Joubert, n 73 above p. 235 para. 254.
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gestures or pictorial representations.77 Not every statement or conduct that makes
one's fellow men unwilling or less inclined to associate with one is defamatory. For
example, it is not defamatory to impute to a person conduct that makes him/her
unpopular, or which incurs the disapproval of a certain section of the public even if it
70
causes him/her real prejudice. Acts that are usually regarded as defamatory are those
that injure the reputation of the person concerned in his/her character, trade, business,
79
profession or office, or which expose him/her to ridicule or contempt.
Wrongfulness lies in the infringement of a person's right to his/her good name. The
test for wrongfulness is an objective one. The relevant question is whether in the
opinion of the reasonable man with normal intelligence and development, the
OA
reputation of the person concerned has been injured. The test is based on
considerations of fairness, morality, policy and the court's perception of the legal
8 1
convictions of the community (boni mores). In each case, the court has to determine
whether public and legal policy requires the particular publication to be regarded as
lawful. The application of the test for wrongfulness involves a balancing of competing
interests. The court, in the light of the specific circumstances and all other relevant
factors, must weigh the interests of the perpetrator and the prejudiced person in order
to determine if there has been a reasonable or unreasonable infringement of the
interests of the prejudiced party.82
Finally, a person who commits a delict is liable for damages only where the act and
the damage can be attributed to him/her, i.e. he/she is at fault. Traditionally the form
83of fault required for the actio iniuriarum is intention or animus iniuriandi. Intention
has two elements: the will to cause a result (the violation of reputation) and
77
Golding v Torch Printing & Publishing Co (Pty) Ltd 1948 3 SA 1067 at 1087.
78 Good v Smith 1964 4 SA 374 at 376.
79 Marruchi v Harris 1943 OPD 15 at 22. For example, see: Mulwa v Mosienyane (No. 2 - judgement
on merits) [1984] BLR 138, where plaintiff, a medical doctor was accused of being a 'dangerous
doctor' who impregnated young nurses and then carry out illegal abortions on them; Mosieman v
Maswabi [1979] BLR 92, plaintiff, a government pharmacist, was accused of being a drug addict and a
thiefwho stole government drugs to sell them in private; and SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Yutar
1969 2 SA 442, a newspaper had accused the plaintiff, then Deputy Attorney General of South Africa,
for having misled the court in a criminal trial.
80 SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Yutar, n 79 above at 451.
81 National Media Limited and others v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 at 1204.
07
Y. Burns, Communications Law (Butterworths, 2001) p. 170.
8j Marias v Groenewald and another 2001 1 SA 634.
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knowledge of wrongfulness (awareness of the unlawfulness of conduct). Intention
84
may be in the form of dolus directus or dolus eventualis.
It is not an element of the delict of defamation in the Roman-Dutch common law that
the alleged defamatory statement be false.85 The publication of a defamatory
statement that refers to the plaintiff gives rise to two separate and distinct
presumptions, namely a presumption of wrongfulness and a presumption of a
deliberate intention to injure the plaintiffs reputation.86 In striving to achieve an
equitable balance between the promotion of freedom of speech and the protection of
reputation, the law has devised some defences, which if successfully invoked, renders
07
lawful the publication ofmatter that is prima facie defamatory.
8.3.2 Defences Excluding Wrongfulness
A defendant can rebut the presumption of wrongfulness by providing a ground of
justification for his/her conduct. The defendant carries a full burden of proof of
circumstances justifying his/her conduct, and must rebut the presumption on a balance
88 • • •
of probabilities. Saddling the defendant with the overall onus of averring and
proving justification for his/her otherwise unlawful conduct is based on considerations
of policy, practice and fairness inter partes. Usually the circumstances justifying
his/her wrongdoing are peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge, thus fairness
dictates that the defendant should bear the onus of proving any justification of his/her
80
conduct. The most common grounds of justification in defamation proceedings are:
(i) truth and public interest; (ii) fair comment; and, (iii) privilege.90
84 Ibid. (Dolus directus means that a person foresees the consequences of his/her act and desires that
these consequences ensure. And dolus eventualis means that a person does not have the direct aim of
impairing another's reputation, nor is he certain that the result will accompany the desired
consequences, but foresees that his/her statement could have the effect of so impairing the plaintiff s
reputation, and nevertheless persists in his/her action.)
83 Khumalo v Holomisa, n 66 above at 414 para. 18.
86 National Media Limited and others v Bogoshi, n 81 above at 1202.
87
Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Esselen's Estate, n 68 above at 25.
88
Neethling v Du Preez; Neethling v The Weekly Mail 1994 1 SA 708 at 770.
89 Mabaso v Felix 1981 3 SA 865 at 857. See also National Media Limited and others v Bogoshi, n 81
above at 1215.
90 The list of defences excluding unlawfulness is not closed; a defendant may further plead, inter alia,
self-defence, consent, jest, etc. See Jourbet, n 73 above pp. 248 - 250 paras. 263 - 265.
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The prima facie wrongfulness of a defamatory publication will be set aside if the
defendant proves that the defamatory statement is true, and that the publication is for
the benefit of the public.91 The defendant is not required to prove the literal truth of all
statements of fact contained in the defamatory matter. What must be proved true is the
sting of the charge or the gist of the defamation. The fact that there is some
92
exaggeration in the language used does not deprive the defence of its effect.
The public interest involved in a defamatory statement will depend on the specific
circumstances as well as the convictions of the community (boni mores). Thus factors
such as the time, manner and occasion of the publication will play an important role.93
The publication of true statements about public officials and figures is generally
regarded to be in the public interest. However, past transgressions are not necessarily
relevant to a person's present character and should not be raked up after a long lapse
of time.94 Public interest in itself without the defamatory statement also being true,
may not justify a defamatory publication.94
Wrongfulness will also be excluded upon proof by the defendant that a defamatory
statement constitutes a fair comment upon facts that are true and matters of public
interest. This ground of justification rests upon the right of every person to express
his/her judgment or opinion honestly and fairly upon matters of public interest.99
There are four requirements for this ground of justification. First, the allegation
concerned must amount to comment and not to the assertion of an independent fact.
The test for what constitutes fair comment is that of the reasonable man: the statement
must be recognisable to the ordinary reasonable man as comment and not as a
statement of fact.97 The comment must be based upon facts expressly stated or
98referred to in the defamatory matter, or generally known to the relevant audience.
Second, the comment must be fair. What is fair is ascertained by reference to the
91
Crawford vAlbu 1917 AD 102 at 117.
92
Attorney General v Glwnzi Hotel (Pty) Ltd, n 4 above at 458 and Johnson v Rand Daily Mails 1928
AD 190 at 205-207.
93 Patterson v Engelenburg and Wallach's Ltd 1917 TPD 350 at 361.
94
Kemp v Republican Press (Pty) Ltd 1994 4 SA 261 at 265 - 266.
95
Neethling v Du Preez; Neethling v The Weekly Mail, n 88 above at 777.
96
Marais v Richard 1981 1 SA 1157 at 1166 - 1167.
97
Crawford v Albu, n 91 above at 114.
98
Moyse and others v Mujuru 1999 3 SA 39 at 49.
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convictions of the community (boni mores)." The comment must be relevant to the
facts to which it relates and must be the honest and bona fide opinion of the
commentator. Third, the facts on which the comment is based must be true and
correctly stated.100 And, four, the comment must refer to matters of public interest.
Matters of public interest include not only the conduct of public officials and figures,
but also matters submitted for public criticism such as speeches made in public, public
performances, works of art and literary works.101 The defence of fair comment may be
defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defamatory statement was published with an
102
improper motive.
The presumption of wrongfulness will also be rebutted where the defendant proves
that the defamatory matter was made on a privileged occasion. Privilege exists where
a person has a right, duty or interest to make specific defamatory assertions and the
person or persons to whom the assertions are published have a corresponding right,
duty or interest to learn of such assertions. The common law makes a distinction
between absolute and qualified privilege. Absolute privilege protects the defendant
completely from a ny 1 iability for d efamation. T he p rivilege i s u sually regulated b y
statute and is generally enjoyed by members of parliament so that they have fufi
freedom of speech during debates in parliament.103
In the case of qualified privilege, the defendant must prove that he/she had an interest
in m aking t he s tatement t o s omeone w ho w as interested i n h earing i t, and t hat t he
communication was relevant to the matter under discussion.104 The common law
recognises three main categories of occasions that attract qualified privilege. The first
category relates to statements published in discharge of a duty, the exercise of a right,
or the furtherance of a legitimate interest. The privilege arises where a person has a
legal, moral or social duty or a legitimate interest in making defamatory assertions to
another, who has a corresponding duty or interest to learn of the assertions.103 The
determination of a moral or social obligation or justifiable interest is based on the test
99 Marais v Richard, n 96 above at 1167 - 1168.
100
Moyse and others vMujuru, n 98 above at 47.
101 Le Roux v Cape Times Ltd 1931 CPD 316 at 327.
102 Marais v Richard, n 96 above at 1170.
103 Cf. section 58(1) of the Constitution of South Africa.
104 Baird v Pretorius 1996 2 SA 825.
105 Ehmke v Grunewald 1921 AD 575 at 581 and Borgin v De Villiers 1980 3 SA 556 at 577.
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of the reasonable man. The relevant question is whether the circumstances created a
duty or interest, in the eyes of the reasonable man, which entitled the defendant to
have made the defamatory statement.106 Once it has been proved that both parties had
a corresponding duty or interest (i.e., a privileged occasion existed), the defendant
must further p rove t hat he/she a cted w ithin t he scope o r 1 imits o f t he p rivilege. In
order to do this, the defendant must prove that the defamatory assertions were relevant
to, or reasonably connected with the discharge of the duty or the furtherance of the
interest.107
The second category of occasion that enjoys qualified privilege relates to statements
made during the course of, or in connection with, judicial or quasi-judicial
108
proceedings, and applies to all participants therein. In this case, the defendant is
required to prove that the defamatory statements were relevant to the matter at
issue.109 And the third category relates to privileged reports. Reports of the
proceedings o f c ourts, p arliament a nd c ertain p ublic b odies a re p rotected, p rovided
they are fair and reasonable or substantially accurate or correct.110 Where a report is
summarised, it must be substantially correct and a reasonable reproduction of the
events for it to enjoy qualified privilege.111 The justification of wrongfulness based on
qualified privilege will be defeated where the plaintiff proves that the defendant
112
published the offending statements with an improper motive.
8.3.3 Defences Excluding Intention
As observed above, animus iniuriandi has two elements: direction of the will and
consciousness (or knowledge) ofwrongfulness. If any of these two elements is absent,
there is no liability for defamation. However, since publication of defamatory matter
gives rise to a presumption that the defamation was committed intentionally, the
defendant bears the burden of rebutting the presumption. The defendant can adduce
106 De Waal v Ziervogel 1938 AD 112 at 123.
107
Ibid., at 122.
108 The privilege applies to litigants, witnesses, legal representatives and judicial officers.
109 Jourbertv Venter 1985 1 SA 654.
110 Van Leggelo v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd 1935 TPD 230 at 337 and 241 and Argus
Printing & Publishing Co Ltd v Anastassiades 1954 1 SA 72.
111 Van Leggelo v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd, n 110 above at 241.
112 McPhee v Hazellurst 1989 4 SA 551 at 555 and May v Udwin 1981 1 SA 1.
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evidence that demonstrates that either direction of the will or consciousness of
wrongfulness or both, are lacking on his/her part.113 There are two common grounds
that a defendant may plead to exclude fault, namely mistake and jest.
Where a person is unaware of the wrongfulness of his/her defamatory conduct
because, for whatever reason, he/she bona fide thinks or believes that his/her conduct
is lawful, consciousness of wrongfulness and intent are absent as a result of such
mistake.114 The kind of mistake that will enable a defendant to satisfy the court that
he/she published defamatory matter without animus iniuriandi has not yet been
clearly defined in the common law.115 However, it seems that a mistake that was made
recklessly will not be able to rebut the presumption of fault. 1
If a defendant proves that the defamatory matter was published in jest, this will also
exclude fault. For the plea to be successful, the court requires the defendant to prove
that the reasonable man would regard the defamatory matter as nothing else than a
joke.117 If the defendant fails to satisfy the court that the reasonable man will regard
the matter as a mere joke, the defendant is held liable irrespective of the actual
absence of animus iniuriandi.
8.3.4 Remedies for Defamation
The common law provides two types of remedies for defamation: the interdict and
damages. An interdict is used to avert an impending wrongful act or to prevent the
continuation of a wrongful act that has already commenced.118 The interdict is usually
resorted to as an interim remedy pending final determination of the main action. In
defamation cases, a person may apply for an interdict to restrain the publication or
continued publication of matter allegedly defamatory of him/her pending a
determination by a court whether or not the matter is indeed defamatory. The common
113 SAUKv O'Mally 1977 3 SA 394 at 403.
'14 See Maisel v Van Naeren 1960 4 SA 836, where it was held that the defendant's mistaken belief that
an occasion was privileged effectively rebutted the presumption of animus iniuriandi.
115 See generally, Neethling, Potgieter & Visser, n 72 above at p. 125 and Jourbert, n 73 above p. 250
para. 266.
116 Kennel Union ofSouthern Africa v Park 1981 1 SA 714 at 728.
117 Masch v Leask 1916 TPD 114 at 117.
118
Neethling, Potgieter & Visser, n 72 above pp. 260 - 261.
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law requires an applicant for an interim interdict to satisfy four requisites on a balance
of probabilities before it can grant the remedy.119 The applicant must show: (a) that
the right which is the subject matter of the main action and which he/she seeks to
protect by means of interim relief is clear or, if not clear, is prima facie established,
though open to some doubt; (b) that if the right is only prima facie established, there
is a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable h arm to the applicant if the interim
relief is not granted and he/she ultimately succeeds in establishing his/her right; (c)
that the balance of convenience favours the granting of interim relief; and (d) that the
applicant has no other satisfactory relief
An applicant for an interdict restraining publication of a defamatory statement must
generally prove that the respondent is about to publish or continue the publication and
distribution of a statement defamatory of him/her;120 that respondent has no valid
defence to defamation proceedings;121 and that he/she will suffer irreparable harm if
an interdict is not granted. If the full extent of the publication has already taken place,
an interdict will serve no useful purpose and the applicant's remedy would be an
action for damages.122
123A person who has been defamed is presumed to have suffered general damages. An
award of general damages under the actio iniuriarum for defamation is intended to
provide satisfaction (in financial terms) to assuage a person for wounded feelings
arising from an unlawful impairment of his/her reputation.124 In addition to general
damages, a person may also recover any patrimonial loss (special damages) suffered
as a result of the defamation. Special damages, unlike general damages must be
proved.12:1 A trial court has a wide discretion in determining an award of damages.126
'19 LF BoshoffInvestments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1969 2 SA 256 at 267; Hix Networking
Technologies v System Publishing (Pty) Ltd 1997 1 SA 391 at 398 and Media Publishing (Pty) Ltd v
Attorney General and another, n 64 above at 7 - 8.
120 Buthelezi v Poorter 1974 1 SA 831.
121 Ibid. The respondent is required to state sufficient particulars of his/her defence to enable the court
to evaluate it.
122
Cleghorn and Harris Ltd v National Union ofDistributive Workers 1940 CPD 409.
123 Mulwa v Mosienyane (No. 2), n 79 above at 146 and Die Spoorbond and another v South African
Railways; Van Heerden and others v South African Railways 1946 AD 999 at 1005.
124 Van Der Berg v Coopers & Lybrand Trust (Pty) Ltd and others 2001 2 SA 242 at 260 para. 48.
125 Walton v Cohn 1947 2 SA 225 at 229.
126
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There is no fixed formula in terms of which awards are made. The South African
Supreme Court best sums up the position, observing:
"The award in each case must depend upon the facts of the particular case
seen against the background of prevailing attitudes in the community.
Ultimately a court must, as best as it can, make a realistic assessment ofwhat
it considers just and fair in all the circumstances. The result represents little
more than enlightened guess. "I27
In assessing the quantum of damages, a court will have to take into account a number
of factors. Some of these factors are aggravating and attract a higher award. These
include: an improper motive on the part of the defendant; the exceptionally serious or
insulting nature of the defamation; reckless or irresponsible conduct on the part of the
defendant; extensive distribution of the defamatory publication and the position and
1 78 . .
status o f t he p laintiff i n t he c ommunity. O n t he o ther h and, t here a re mitigating
factors, which will lower the amount of the award. These include: the bad reputation,
character or conduct of the plaintiff; the truth of the defamatory allegations;
provocation on the part of the plaintiff; the restricted extent of publication and an
apology by the defendant.129
8.4 Striking a Balance Between Media Freedom and the Protection of
Reputation: Common Law Principles
The common law acknowledges that freedom of expression and media freedom are
potent and indispensable instruments for the creation and maintenance of a
democratic society.130 At the same time, the law also recognises that the right of free
expression enjoyed by all persons, including the media, must yield to the individual's
right, which is just as important, not to be unlawfully defamed.131 In striving to strike
an appropriate balance between the two rights, we saw that international law gives
127 Per Smalberger JA in Van Der Berg v Coopers & Lybrand Trust (Pty) Ltd and others, n 124 above
at 260 para. 48.
128
Jourbert, n 73 above p. 252 para. 269. For a recent restatement of these factors, see Dibotelo v
Sechele & others, Civil Case 1511/2000, High Court ofBotswana, at 9 - 10 (Unreported). A summary
of the case appears in: (2002) 3 Commonwealth Human Rights Law Digest 265.
129 See generally, Neethling, Potgieter & Visser, n 72 above p. 257.
Ij0 See Media Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Attorney General and Another, n 64 above at 21 and National
Media Limited and others v Bogoshi, n 81 above at 1209.
131
Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Esselen's Estate, n 58 at 25.
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prominence to freedom of expression. The common law on the other hand does not
1 T 9
regard either of these rival interests as more important than the other. It does not
recognise a general privilege for the media when reporting on matters of the public
interest. The law regards the freedom of the journalist as part of the freedom of the
subject, and to whatever lengths the subject in general may go, so also may the
journalist.133
The Supreme Court of South Africa set out the status of the media in Neethling v Du
Preez; Neethling v The Weekly Mail.134 The court held:
(a) At common law there is no general media privilege, and there is no
defence of fair information on a matter of public interest. A journalist who
obtains information reflecting on a public figure has no greater right than
any other private citizen to publish his/her assertions to the world;
(b) The law does not recognise a duty-interest relationship between the media
and its audience sufficient to support a general qualified privilege.
Publication in the media is publication to the world, and not everyone can
be regarded as having a sufficient interest in the subject matter;
(c) Although privilege is based on the publication in question being in the
public interest, there is a palpable difference between that which is
interesting to the public and what is in the public interest to be known;
(d) Publication in the media is not subject of qualified privilege merely
because it gives the public infonnation concerning a matter in which the
public is interested. Qualified privilege requires publication pursuant to a
duty, whether legal, moral or social, and the existence on the part of its
audience of a corresponding interest to receive the defamatory
communication;
(e) The existence of a duty to publish is an objective one, based on the
standards of the community concerned; and
lj2 National Media Limited and others v Bogoshi, n 81 above at 1207.
133




(f) In deciding whether a defamatory publication attracts qualified privilege,
the status of the matter communicated (i.e., its source and intrinsic quality)
is of critical importance.135
Thus where media defendants plead the defence of qualified privilege, they must
prove that the publication was in furtherance of a right, duty or interest, and that the
audience had a corresponding right, duty or interest to learn of the alleged defamatory
matter. Privilege will not be inferred from the media's recognised role in democratic
societies.
Even though the common law of defamation does not recognise a general media
privilege, it does provide a wide scope for expression of matters that are in the public
interest, particularly political expression.136 In the application of the test for
wrongfulness, courts allow greater latitude in the criticism of acts of public officials
137and figures for the manner in which they conduct public affairs. It has been held
that the character of a public official or figure is not only a possession to
himself/herself, but also a public asset. Therefore, if any person knows of anything
about the character of a public official or figure that makes him/her unfit for the
position he/she occupies, such a person is not only justified, but bound, to inform the
public of the facts, and to substantiate them for the public benefit if necessary.138
However attacks upon the private character of public officials and figures are not to
be lightly made, and if they are made, they must be justified.139
While the common law expects public officials and figures to tolerate a greater degree
of criticism than private citizens, politicians in particular are expected not to be
overhasty to complain about being defamed unless it is really serious. A distinction is
135 The examples given by the court in the examination of the status of the matter communicated
includes: does the matter emanate from an official and identified source or does it spring from a source
that is informal and anonymous? Does the matter involve a formal finding based on reasoned
conclusions, after the weighing and sifting of evidence, or is it no more than ex parte statement or mere
hearsay?
136
Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 3 SA 579 at 591.
137 "Those that govern usually stand more scrutiny in the carrying out oftheir responsibilities than the
ordinary member ofsociety. For that reason and because ofthe position they hold, those who hold
power should be more tolerant ofsuch criticism ..." Per Lesetedi J in Media Publishing (Pty) Ltd v
Attorney General and another, n 64 above at 23.




drawn between an attack against the dignity and reputation of a politician, on one
hand, and an attack upon his/her political views, policies and conduct, on the other
hand. When it comes to the latter, courts are slower to come to the assistance of a
politician. But if a defendant oversteps the bounds permissible, he/she will be
liable.140 If there is an unwarranted defamation which lowers a politician in the esteem
of his/her community, which is not at all necessary in commenting upon his/her policy
or conduct, a court will be more readily inclined to protect his/her dignity and
141
reputation.
The common law denies the state a right to sue for defamation. It is not that the state
has no reputation; the principle is based on policy considerations. It is argued that the
normal means by which the state protects itself against attacks on its management is
political action and not litigation, and that citizens should be free to express opinions
upon the management of their country's affairs without fear of legal consequences.142
The concern is that if the state were to be allowed an action in defamation, this will
seriously interfere with freedom of expression. The term state does not only refer to
organs of central government, it includes all organs that are part of the governance of
a country such as local authorities and other organs and institutions exercising
governmental powers.143
The fact that the common law regards media freedom as part of the freedom of the
individual arguably means there should be no fundamental differences in determining
their liability for defamation. For example, all the four elements of defamation,
including intention, should be established whether the defendant is an individual or
the media. South African case law prior to the decision in Pcikendorf & others v De
Flamingh (supra) demonstrates that intention in the form of animus iniuriandi was a
requirement for defamation.144 In the Pakendorfcase, the Supreme Court took a major
deviation from the common law principle that in a case of defamation involving the
mass media fault in the form of intention is required. The court held that the owner,
publisher, printer and editor of a newspaper were liable without fault (i.e., strictly
140
Mangope v Asmal and another 1997 4 SA 277 at 287.
I4' Ibid.
142 Die Spooi'bond andAnother v South African Railways; Van Heerden and others v South African
Railways, n 123 above at 1013.
14j Posts and Telecommunications Corporation v Modus Publications (PVT) LTD 1998 3 SA 1114.
144 Cf. Hassen v Post Newspapers (Pty) Ltd 1965 3 SA 562.
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liable) for defamatory statements published in their newspaper. The result was that in
cases involving the media, a plaintiff was not required to allege or prove fault, and
only a rebuttable presumption of unlawfulness arose from the publication of
defamatory matter. Media defendants could therefore not raise defences rebutting the
fault element of defamation.
Strict liability of the mass media for publication of defamatory matter seems to have
been influenced by the English common law.145 In importing the principle into the
common law of South Africa, the court held that it was inequitable to allow the mass
media to plead absence of animus iniuriandi. Two policy reasons were advanced for
this position: the difficulty of proving intent on the part of persons involved in the
publication of the defamatory material, and the protection of the defenceless
individual who finds himself/herself in a vulnerable position vis-a-vis the all powerful
mass media.146 Strict liability was also imported into the common law of Botswana by
the High Court in Attorney General v Ghanzi Hotel (supra). The court observed that
the weight of judicial authority then in South Africa was firmly on the side of holding
the mass media strictly liable for the publication of defamatory matter, and concluded:
"No argument has been addressed to me why O'Mally's case and De
Flamingh's case, both authoritative decisions of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of South Africa, should not be followed by the courts of
Botswana and I respectfully accept them as correctly stating the law on the
point in question. "147
Imposing liability for defamation on the media without fault has a chilling effect on
media freedom because the media tends to shy away from getting involved in
controversial matters in order to avoid liability, which ultimately undermines the
media's informative and watchdog roles.148
After South Africa adopted a democratic constitution, strict liability was seriously
questioned in light of the constitutional provision guaranteeing both freedom of
expression and media freedom. For this reason, it was perhaps not surprising when the
145 See Wilson v Halle 1903 TH 178 at 201.
146
Pakendorf& others v De Flamingh, n 4 above.
147
Attorney General v Ghanzi Hotel, n 4 above at 457.
148 Cf. National Media Limited and others v Bogoshi, n 81 above at 1210. It was held: "... nothing can
be more chilling than the prospect ofbeing mulcted in damages for the slightest error. "
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Supreme Court made an about turn on the principle in National Media Limited and
others v Bogoshi (supra). This case overruled Pakendorf & others v De Flamingh
(supra), and held that strict liability was in conflict with the democratic imperative
that the public interest is best served by the free flow of information and the role of
the media in that process.149 The court also observed that the law of defamation
requires a balance to be struck between the right to reputation, on one hand, and
freedom of expression, on the other. In Pakendorf & others v De Flamingh (supra),
there was no indication that a weighing of interests and in particular, freedom of
expression, received any attention.130
In overruling strict liability, the court did not revert back to the common law position
of liability based on intention, which allowed media defendants to rely on absence of
consciousness ofwrongfulness to escape liability. Instead, the court made yet another
deviation from age-old principles of the common law by basing liability of the media
for defamation on negligence.151 In the process, the court adopted a new defence for
rebutting unlawfulness that allows media defendants to establish that publication of
defamatory matter, albeit false, was nevertheless reasonable in all the
1 S9 • •
circumstances. In determining the reasonableness of a publication, account must be
taken of the nature, extent and tone of the allegations. In this regard, factors to be
taken into account would include: that protection was afforded only to material in
which the public had an interest, as opposed to material which was interesting to the
public; that greater latitude is usually allowed in respect of political discussion; and
the tone in which a newspaper article is written, or the way in which it is presented.
What will also feature prominently is the nature of the information on which the
allegations were based and the reliability of their source, as well as the steps taken to





131 See J. Burchell, 'Media Freedom of Expression Scores as Strict Liability Receives the Red Card:
National Media Ltd v Bogoshi' (1999) 116 South African Law Journal 1. For a criticism of the court's
approach, see J.R. Midgley, 'Recent Cases: Media Liability for Defamation' (1999) 116 South African
Law Journal 211. And for a recent affirmation that negligence is now the basis for liability for
defamation by the media, see Marias v Groenewald and another, n 83 above.
152 "... the publication in the press offalse defamatoiy allegations offact will not be regarded as
unlawful ifupon a consideration ofall the circumstances of the case, it is found to have been
reasonable to publish the particular facts in the particular way and at the particular time. " Per Hefer
JA in National Media Limited and others v Bogoshi, n 81 above at 1212.
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the publication of untruths, and members of the media should not be left with the
impression that they have a licence to lower the standards of care, which must be
observed before defamatory matter is published.
The S upreme C ourt t hen w ent o n t o c onsider w hether m edia d efendants s hould b e
permitted to rebut the presumption of intentional harm by establishing a lack of
knowledge ofwrongfulness, even where that lack of knowledge was as a result of the
negligence of the defendant. The court concluded that a defence of absence of animus
iniuriandi w ould b e i ncompatible w ith t he n ewly introduced d efence o f r easonable
publication.154 In most cases the defence of lack of animus iniuriandi is concerned
with the defendant's ignorance or mistake regarding one or other element of
defamation. A subjective test is applied in determining whether the defendant made a
mistake.b5 Such an approach is obviously not consistent with the defence of
reasonable publication, which requires that a mistake should have been a reasonable
one. The court found that there were compelling reasons for not treating the media on
the same footing as ordinary members of the public by permitting them to rely on the
absence of intent.1'^6 Media defendants therefore cannot escape liability merely by
establishing an absence of knowledge of wrongfulness, they must in addition,
establish that they were not negligent in publishing defamatory matter.
As observed above, the right to protect one's reputation weighs no less than the
freedom of expression under the common law. But in the endeavour to strike an
appropriate balance between the two rights, the law takes special notice of the
important role the freedom of expression plays in the maintenance of democracy.
While a person whose dignity has been unlawfully impugned deserves an appropriate
remedy, courts carefully try to ensure that such remedies do not unduly inhibit
freedom of expression, especially media freedom.
Where the remedy sought is an interdict, the case is approached with caution and




Nydoo and others v Vengtas 1965 1 SA 1.
156 National Media Limited and others v Bogoshi, n 81 above at 1214.
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possible. The Supreme Court of South Africa has held that freedom of speech is a
right not to be overridden lightly. When determining the issue of whether the balance
of convenience favours the granting or refusal of an interdict, consideration should be
given to the fact that the person defamed would, if the interdict were refused,
nonetheless have a cause of action which would result in an award of damages. This
should be weighed against the possibility, on the other hand, that a denial of a right to
158
publish is likely to be the end of the matter as far as the media are concerned. In the
determination of the question of balance of convenience, factors to be taken into
account include: the strength of the applicant's case; the seriousness of the
defamation; the difficulty a respondent has in proving, in the limited time afforded to
it in cases of urgency, the defence which it wishes to raise; and the fact that the order
may, in substance though not in form, amount to a permanent interdict.159
The common law clearly tilts the scales in favour of a refusal to grant an interdict for
defamation. Courts have however warned that this should not be seen as a licence to
the media to publish and distribute any statement regardless of harm to others. Ir,
appropriate circumstances, courts will not hesitate to protect the dignity of those who
rightfully seek their protection.160
The common law also requires damages for defamation to reflect the delicate balance
between the promotion of freedom of expression and the protection of reputation. In
particular, c are must be t aken not to award large sums of damages too r eadily lest
doing so inhibits freedom of expression or encourages intolerance to it and thereby
opening floodgates to litigation.161 In South Africa, it has been observed that:
"An action for defamation has been seen as the method whereby a plaintiff
vindicates his reputation, and not as a road to riches. This is a further factor
which reduces the inhibiting effect of defamation on freedom of
,<162
expression.
137 Publications Control Board v William Heinemann Ltd and others 1965 4 SA 137 at 160.
138 Hix Networking Technologies v System Publishing (Pty) Ltd, n 119 above at 402.
159 Ibid.
160 Van Zyl v Jonathan Ball Publishers (Pty) Ltd 1999 4 SA 571 at 595.
161 Cf. Van Der Berg v Coopers & Lybrand Trust (Pty) Ltd and others, n 124 above at 260 para. 48.
162 Per Grosskopf JA in Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party, n 134 above
at 590.
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The amount of damages to be awarded for defamation is entirely in the discretion of
the trial court and an appeal court will not lightly interfere with the award. However, a
duty to interfere does arise where the trial court has failed to take into account
relevant factors in the quantification of damages.163 This should allow an appeal court
to interfere with an award, which is excessively high for failure to strike an
appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the protection of reputation.
Courts in Southern Africa (which includes Botswana and South Africa) have
generally not been generous in their awards of damages for defamation, which have
been termed comparatively low and sometimes almost insignificant.164
A question that as often been posed is whether the Roman-Dutch common law of
defamation achieves a proper b alance b etween t he right to protect one's reputation
and freedom of expression. The major concern appears to be whether the law gives
adequate protection to freedom of expression, especially media freedom. In the
opinion of the Supreme Court of South Africa, the common law does strike a proper
balance between the two rights.165 In overruling strict liability of the media for
defamation, the court emphasised that it was not revising the common law to conform
with constitutional values, but was merely correcting a common law principle
wrongly stated in Pakenclorf & others v De Flamingh (supra).166 International law is
regarded as providing minimum standards that any law aimed at giving meaningful
effect to the enjoyment of rights should be premised. International law principles on
the law of defamation should therefore be seen as providing minimum standards that
strike a proper balance between the promotion of freedom of expression and the
protection of reputation.
A comparison of the common law and international law principles on defamation
leaves one with no option but to concur with the Supreme Court's observation.167 The
discussion of principles relating to the liability, defences and remedies under the
163 SA Associated Newspapeis Ltd and others v Samuels 1980 1 SA 25.
164 See: Ramakulukusha v Commander, Venda National Force 1989 2 SA 813 at 847 and Argus
Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party, n 134 above at 590. (The recent award by
the High Court of Botswana in Dibotelo v Sechele and others, n 128 above, is however a bit generous
and therefore not consistent with the past general trend in the region.)
165 National Media Limited and others v Bogoshi, n 81 above at 1217.
166
Ibid., at 1213.
167 This argument is based on the view that strict liability was improperly incorporated into the
common law ofBotswana. See below at 8.3.6.
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common law demonstrate that these compare favourably with international law. The
common law accords the media wide latitude when commenting on matters of public
interest. Further, the role of the media as a tool for exercising control over those
responsible for matters o f public interest is recognised because public officials and
figures are expected to tolerate a greater degree of criticism than private citizens. The
defences available under the common law match those offered by international law.
The common law's adoption of the defence of reasonable publication is a welcome
move as the defence plays a crucial role in the endeavour to strike an appropriate
balance between media freedom and the protection of reputation. Finally, the common
law, in consonance with international law, requires that remedies for defamation
should not be so severe as to constitute a hindrance to media freedom. Courts are
therefore generally reluctant to grant interdicts against publication in the media and
also avoid awarding large sums in damages. In appropriate circumstances, the courts
will however act to protect the individual's right to reputation.
8.4.1 Impact ofthe Law ofDefamation on Media Freedom in Botswana
At the time of writing, the courts in Botswana have decided only two defamation
cases involving the media. First was Attorney General v Ghanzi Hotel (supra), which
established strict liability for the media. The second is Dibotelo v Sechele and others
(supra), where the court was concerned only with the issue of quantum of damages.
Thus since the Ghanzi Hotel case, courts in Botswana have not yet had the
opportunity to review principles relating to the liability of the media. The fact that
there have been few cases reaching the courts involving defamation by the media does
not mean the law of defamation does not pose a serious threat to media freedom. On
the contrary, the law of defamation is one of the major obstacles to the media's
democratic role in Botswana. As observed in chapter 3, the private media are
constantly harassed by threats to sue from public officials and figures.168 It appears
most claims against the media are settled out of court, a trend obviously influenced by
the fact that due to the principle of strict liability, the media stands little chance of
thwarting defamation claims.
168 See chapter 3 at 3.2.3.
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Strict 1 iability, a p rinciple t hat w as i ncorporated i nto B otswana from S outh A frica,
today constitutes a serious hindrance to media freedom. With the introduction of
democracy i n S outh A frica, w e sa w t hat t he p rinciple w as found w anting a nd was
overruled.169 But Botswana remains saddled with the principle. In overruling strict
liability in South Africa, the court held inter alia that Pakendorf & others v De
Flamingh (supra), which established the regime, failed to weigh competing interests
in order to strike a proper balance between freedom of expression and the protection
of reputation, and that strict liability was also not compatible with the media's
democratic role.170
It is perhaps important to note that South Africa had adopted strict liability during the
dark days of apartheid when the fundamental role of the media in informing society in
a democracy was seldom acknowledged, and the ideals of openness and
171
accountability were replaced by measures of censorship and suppression.
Botswana, on the other hand, was then regarded as the shining example of democracy
in the Southern African region, with a constitution that inter alia expressly guaranteed
both freedom of expression and media freedom. It was therefore wrong for the High
Court to import strict liability from South Africa (a state then with a repressive human
rights culture) without attempting to reconcile the principle with the constitution. The
172Bill of Rights provisions in the constitution were greatly influenced by the ECHR.
It would therefore have been appropriate for the court to examine the jurisprudence of
the E CtHR o n t he p oint b efore s ettling for a p rinciple. T he failure b y the c ourt t o
exercise caution in importing apartheid era jurisprudence in the area of human rights
casts a serious doubt on the correctness of the decision.
The principle of strict liability has no place in modern democratic societies. There is a
dire need to scrap it in order to enhance the media's democratic role in Botswana. The
principle must be replaced with a system that will allow media defendants to avoid
liability upon proof that publication of a statement of fact on a matter of public
concern, even though proved false, was nevertheless reasonable in the circumstances.
169 National Media Limited and others v Bogoshi, n 81 above.
170
Ibid., at 1210.
171 Cf. Burchell, n 151 above at 1.
172 Dow v Attorney General [1992] LRC (Const.) 623 at 654 - 655. See further discussion in chapter 4
at 4.5.1.
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This will not only be consistent with international law, but also with the new South
African common law approach.
Given that the common law principles, with the exception of strict liability, discussed
above provide a favourable environment for the protection of media freedom, the
abolition of strict liability should enhance media freedom in the country. The media
have hitherto been timorous to challenge strict liability in the courts. It will probably
take a bold one to take the matter up in the light of the consequences that may follow
a failure to persuade the courts to scrap the principle. It is submitted that this is a case
that calls for intervention by the legislature. Botswana should legislate for a defence
of reasonable publication for the media instead of waiting for the courts to rectify the
error since it may take a long time before the courts get an opportunity to fully review
the law and bring it to conformity with international law.
8.4.2 Impact of the Law ofDefamation on Media Freedom in South Africa
Before the Supreme Court's decision in National Media Limited and others v Bogoshi
(supra), two common law principles were singled out as imposing unjustified
1 fX . . .restrictions on media freedom. First, the principle of strict liability imposed a
chilling effect on the dissemination of information by the media because liability was
imposed even for the slightest error. Secondly, the principle that falsity of a
defamatory statement is not an element of defamation, leaving the defendant with the
burden of proving the truth of an alleged defamatory statement. The difficulty of
proving the truth of defamatory statements, especially in the absence of a defence of
reasonable publication, does cause a chilling effect on the publication of information.
A publisher will have to think twice before publishing a defamatory statement where
it may be difficult to prove the truth of that statement and where no other defence to
defamation would be available.174
The principle of strict liability has now been abolished and has been replaced by
liability based on negligence. But the ride that falsity of a defamatory statement is not
173 See generally, J.W.G. van der Walt, 'Freedom of Expression and Defamation: A Reflection on
Recent Developments' (1998) Journal ofSouth African Law 198.
174 Cf. Khumalo v Holomisa, n 66 above at 422 para. 39.
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an element of defamation remains in force. In one of the early post-democratic era
decisions of the High Court, it was held lhat the structure of the constitution required
a plaintiffwho sought to inhibit speech in the area of free and fair political activity to
bear the onus of proving that a defendant has forfeited entitlement to constitutional
17S • • 1
protection. The decision was based on the court's view that the constitution gives
primacy to freedom of expression over the protection of reputation. The court had
found the common law relating to the liability of the media for defamation
inconsistent with the constitutional protection of media freedom, arguing that the law
unjustifiable gave primacy to the protection of reputation.176 In requiring a plaintiff to
prove the falsity of an alleged defamatory statement, the court held, it was performing
its duty to develop the common law to conform to constitutional values.
Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Limited (supra) came under heavy criticism from the
Supreme Court in National Media Limited and others v Bogoshi (supra). As discussed
above, the latter held that the constitution has not altered the common law of
defamation, n or d oes t he 1 aw r egard either o f t he r ival i nterests asm ore i mportant
than the other, and therefore that the common law was adequate in striking an
appropriate balance between the promotion of media freedom and the protection of
reputation. The Supreme Court also rejected the High Court's argument that a
plaintiff must prove the falsity of a defamatory statement, holding that justice
demands that the defendant be saddled with the burden of proof.177
Any lingering doubts about the correctness of Supreme Court's decision on the latter
point have now been put to rest by the recent decision of the Constitutional Court in
Khumalo v Holomisa (supra). An argument was made to the court that, to the extent
that the common law of defamation does not require a plaintiff to allege the falsity of
a defamatory statement, it is inconsistent with the constitution. In considering the
constitutionality of the rule, the court first observed that it is often difficult, and
sometimes impossible to determine the truth or falsity of a particular statement. In not
requiring a plaintiff to establish falsity, but in leaving the allegation and proof of truth
to a defendant, the common law chooses to let the risk lie on defendants because, after
17~ Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Limited 1996 2 SA 588.
176 Ibid., at 611.
177 National Media Limited and others v Bogoshi, n 81 above at 1215.
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all, it is the defendant who published the statement and thereby causing harm to the
plaintiff.178 The court however acknowledges that the rule does cause a chilling effect
on media freedom.179
At the heart of the constitutional dispute, was the difficulty of establishing the truth or
falsehood of defamatory statements. The court held that individuals could assert no
strong constitutional interest in protecting their reputations against publication of
truthful but damaging statements. Similarly, the media have no strong constitutional
speech interest in the publication of false material. Burdening either plaintiffs or
defendants with the onus of proving a statement to be true or false, in the
circumstances where proof one way or the other is impossible, results in a zero-sum
game. Either the plaintiff will benefit from the difficulties of proof or the defendant
will win. In the court's view, such a zero-sum result, regardless of who benefits, fits
uneasily with the need to establish an appropriate constitutional balance between
180freedom of expression and the protection of reputation.
The court held that the defence of reasonable publication avoids a zero-sum result by
avoiding a winner-takes-all situation thereby striking a proper balance between
freedom of expression and the protection of reputation. Consequently, it reduces the
181
chilling effect of the common law rule on media freedom. The court went on to set
out some factors to be taken into account in the determination of the reasonableness of
a publication, which include:
a) The individual's interest in protecting his/her reputation in the context
of the constitutional commitment to human dignity;
b) The individual's interest in privacy. In this regard, persons in public
office have a diminished right to privacy, though of course their right
to dignity persists; and,
c) The crucial role played by the media in fostering a transparent and
182
open democracy.
178 Khumalo v Holomisa, n 66 above at 421 - 422 para. 38.
179
Ibid., at 422 para. 39.
180
Ibid., at 423-424 para. 42.
181
Ibid., at 424 para. 43.
182 Ibid.
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The court did not find the common law rule inconsistent with the constitution because
of the availability of the defence of reasonable publication. The defence encourages
editors and journalists to act with due care and respect for the individual's right to
reputation prior to publishing defamatory material, without precluding them from
publishing such material when it is reasonable to do so.
The abolition of strict liability and the adoption of the defence of reasonable
publication have enhanced media freedom in South Africa. Although, one common
law rule that imposes a chilling effect on the freedom remains in force, it cannot be
said to constitute an unjustifiable fetter on the media freedom. The rule is based on
sound policy considerations, and its chilling effect on media freedom is significantly
mitigated by the availability of the defence of reasonable publication.
8.5 Conclusion
Striking an appropriate balance between the promotion of freedom of expression and
the protection of reputation in democratic societies is a delicate exercise. Legitimacy
of government in a representative democracy requires the electorate to exercise
informed consent when casting their votes or when evaluating the adequacy of their
183
representatives' behaviour. From this requirement, it is indisputable that there is a
need to promote freedom of expression and the free flow of information on matters
that will enable citizens to effectively exercise their right to vote and scrutinise their
representatives' behaviour. It is for this reason that debate on political and other issues
of public interest are accorded special protection under international law.184 The
media in particular enjoy an elevated status under international law because of their
role as disseminators of information and watchdog over those responsible for the
management of public affairs.
183 I. Loveland, 'Reforming Libel Law: The Public Law Dimension' (1997) 46 1CLQ 561 at 572.
184
Lingens v Austria, n 15 above at para. 41.
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While the media may have these important duties, it should be noted that the media
185
are also profit dependant enterprises. As observed by Tierney, sensationalism in the
media aimed at capturing large audiences often eclipses their democratic role,
jeopardising, among others, t he p rotection o f the reputations of others. Thus at the
heart of the debate on how to strike an appropriate balance between the promotion of
media freedom and the protection of reputation, is the question: to what extent should
the media be protected when exercising their democratic role? At one extreme is the
US's absolutist approach where liability of the media for defamation only arises upon
proof of actual malice. At the other is the principle of strict liability that holds the
media liable for any defamatory matter they publish. The former approach does not
afford adequate protection to the right of reputation, while the latter does not give due
credit to the media's democratic role. An approach that will strike a proper balance
between these two rights is to be found somewhere between the two extremes.
International law has settled for a position that can arguably be said to meet this
requirement. The media will be protected when commenting on matters of political
and other public interest if publication of the matter is found to be reasonable in all
the circumstances. This approach strikes a delicate balance between the promotion of
media freedom and the protection of reputation as it gives due weight to both rights.
South Africa has rejected the two extreme approaches in favour of the position
adopted by international law. Botswana should do the same.
Even though it has been observed that the Roman-Dutch common law does not
recognise a general media privilege, courts in Botswana and South Africa
acknowledge the special role of the media in the maintenance of democracy. Flowing
from this, it should not be difficult for media defendants to raise and prove the
defence of qualified privilege where the alleged defamatory matter is a contribution to
public debate on political and/or issues of public interest. The defence requires one to
have been acting under a moral or social duty. It is submitted that the media have a
moral and social duty to inform the public on matters that are in the public interest,
185
Tierney, n 21 above at 420.
300
186and that the public also has a corresponding duty to receive such information. 1
Similarly, the common law defence of fair comment plays an important role in
enhancing media freedom. The defence recognises that the media not only
disseminate information, but also play the role of an interpreter of, or commentator on
such information. Thus comment by the media relating to matters of political and
public interest are protected provided the comment is made in good faith and is based
on facts that are substantially true. The latter condition is important for ensuring that
adequate protection is given to the reputation of others.
The discussion of the common law of defamation demonstrates that it is consistent
with international law. South African courts generally apply the common law in a
manner that promotes media freedom and freedom of expression. In Botswana, there
has not been much litigation in the area of defamation involving the media. However,
to the extent that the rules of the common law enunciated by the South African courts
in principle reflect the common law of Botswana, because both are Roman-Dutch
jurisdictions, the legal framework supports the promotion of media freedom. The
main obstacle to media freedom in Botswana remains the principle of strict liability. If
the principle can be replaced with a system that recognises a defence by the media of
reasonable publication, this should improve the situation of the media.
It is worth noting that while it has been observed that courts in Botswana and South
Africa have in the past been careful not to award large sums ofmoney in damages, the
award by the High Court of Botswana in Dibotelo v Secliele and another (supra) is
anomalous. The amount of BWP 250 000 awarded by the court is quite generous
when compared to awards in similar cases in South Africa. One can only hope that the
case does not establish a precedent for awarding excessively high damages in the
country. Perhaps the award can be justified by the peculiar facts of the case. The
defendants were found to have been grossly negligent and had refused to tender an
apology until after the close of pleadings.
186 For example, in Zillie v Johnson and another 1984 2 SA 186, the High Court of South Africa found
that a newspaper had a duty to inform the public, who also had a corresponding duty to receive
information relating to policies of a candidate in an imminent general election because it concerned




The central objective of this study has been to examine the legal environment in
which the traditional news media (i.e., the press, radio and television broadcasting)
operate in Botswana and South Africa. The main focus has been to determine the
extent to which the laws and official policies of the two states support the exercise of
media freedom and the media's performance of their informative and watchdog role
in democratic societies. It will be recalled that the study takes a comparative approach
in assessing the legal environment in the two states. The municipal laws of Botswana
and South Africa relating to the guarantee of media freedom and support for the
media's democratic role are compared with international law and standards. The latter
arguably constitute minimum requirements for ensuring an effective guarantee of
media freedom and the creation of an environment in which the media can perform
their democratic mandate.
The study approaches the inquiry by considering:
i) The nature of media freedom by examining the theoretical
underpinnings of the concept and its relationship to the right of
freedom of expression;
ii) The protection of media freedom in international human rights
instruments, the relevance and impact of these instruments in the
municipal laws of Botswana and South Africa;
iii) The guarantee of media freedom and freedom of information in the
municipal laws of the two states;
iv) The extent to which the regulation of the media in the two states
enhances d iversity o fm edia o utlets and t he d issemination o f diverse
viewpoints; and
v) The impact of the laws relating to the protection of national security
and the reputation of others on media freedom.
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A number of observations and conclusions on the above issues have already been
made in the preceding chapters. This chapter is not intended to be a repetition of
them, but seeks to note the salient points and highlight lessons that both states may
learn from international law, and from each other, regarding the protection of media
freedom and the enhancement of the media's democratic role.
The importance of the right of freedom of expression in modern representative
democratic societies is widely acknowledged in both international law and the
national laws of many states. Freedom of expression is integral to a democratic
society for many reasons. The right ensures inter alia that citizens are able to make
responsible political decisions and participate effectively in public life. A free flow of
information and ideas is therefore necessary in democratic societies to enable citizens
to make informed decisions. The media are key agents in ensuring that citizens have
access to diverse information and ideas. The role that the media is expected to play in
democratic societies has influenced the manner in which media freedom is perceived
and its relationship to freedom of expression. Media freedom is considered to be an
aspect of the general right of freedom of expression, and is expected to foster the
latter right by providing fora for vigorous and uninhibited public debate. Botswana
and South African courts seem to have generally endorsed the view that media
freedom is an instrumental freedom, and must serve the general interests of freedom
of expression.1
The effectiveness of the performance of the media's democratic role is intricately
linked to the right to freedom of information. If the media are to properly discharge
their obligation to provide citizens both with information and a platform for the
exchange of ideas, they must be guaranteed access to infonnation, particularly
information held by government bodies. The watchdog role also depends on the
extent to which the media have access to pertinent information. Media freedom and
freedom of information are therefore important aspects of the general right of freedom
of expression. A guarantee ofmedia freedom not coupled with a guarantee of access
to information will thus be meaningless.
' See Media Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Attorney General ofBotswana and others MISCA 229/2001, High
Court (Unreported) at 21 and Khumalo and others v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 at 416 - 417 para. 22.
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As we have seen, the study is premised on the assumption that international law
constitutes the minimum standards for guaranteeing media freedom and ensuring the
performance of the media's democratic role. However, none of the international
human rights treaties protecting freedom of expression and media freedom has direct
application in Botswana and South Africa. International treaties in the two states are
directly applicable in the municipal courts only where they have been ratified and
incorporated into the domestic law. But even though international treaties that have
not been incorporated into the municipal laws of Botswana and South Africa do not
have direct application, they do play a role in the interpretation of the municipal law.
In Botswana, the Interpretation Act authorises courts to construe national law on the
basis of treaties, while in South Africa, the constitution requires courts to consider
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights, and to interpret domestic
legislation in a manner that is compatible with international law.
Courts in South Africa have generally demonstrated an enthusiasm for drawing from
international and comparative law jurisprudence to enrich the national jurisprudence
when interpreting issues that affect rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights.2 For
example, in Khumalo and others v Holomisa (supra), which concerned an application
to declare the common law rule that requires a defendant in a defamation suit to prove
the truth of an alleged defamatory statement, the Constitutional Court considered the
position in a number of foreign jurisdictions before rejecting the application.3 By
contrast, even though the courts in Botswana have not had many opportunities to
adjudicate on matters relating to freedom of expression and media freedom, they have
conspicuously restrained themselves from actively invoking international law to
enhance domestic human rights protection when dealing with other rights issues such
as the constitutionality of corporal punishment and the death penalty.4 The attitude of
the courts in Botswana is disappointing especially in the light of the express provision
in the Interpretation Act that encourages them to use international law to interpret
2 See generally, R.C. Blake, 'The World's Law in One Country: The South African Constitutional
Court's Use of Public International Law' (1998) 115 South African Law Journal 668.
'' Khumalo and others v Holomisa, n 1 above at 423 para. 40.
4 O. Tshosa, National Law and International Human Rights Law: Cases ofBotswana, Namibia and
Zimbabwe (Ashgate Dartmouth, 2001) p. 202.
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domestic law. Perhaps the court's attitude as noted earlier, is attributable to the
uncertainty regarding the status of international law in the municipal law.
There is already in existence rich international law jurisprudence on the protection of
media freedom and the enhancement of the media's democratic mandate. The
jurisprudence is, however, not binding on Botswana and South Africa because the
treaties under which it has been developed have not been incorporated into their
domestic laws. A notable example is the ICCPR, which has been ratified by both
states but not incorporated into their municipal laws. If the jurisprudence on freedom
of expression and media freedom developed under the ICCPR were binding on the
two states, it would considerably enhance media freedom. Notice is taken of the fact
that South African courts are required, and have generally tried, to incorporate
international law standards into the domestic law when interpreting the Bill of Rights,
but it is submitted that the position of the media would be greatly improved if
Botswana and S outh A frica w ere t o i ncoiporate t he ICCPR a nd A CHPR i nto t heir
municipal laws.
While the incorporation of the treaties in South Africa is not likely to have much
practical impact as the courts there have already been importing international iaw
standards into the domestic law, at least it would demonstrate the state's willingness
to adhere to its international law obligations. Incorporation of the treaties in Botswana
should, however, make a significant difference. It would make the status of
international law in the domestic law clearer and hopefully this should give courts of
law the confidence to invoke international law when dealing with rights issues. An
alternative to the incorporation of the treaties in Botswana would be to enact a
constitutional provision or act that would oblige courts to consider international law
when interpreting the Bill of Rights. A provision to this effect should inspire the
courts to seek guidance from international law, as we have seen in the case of the
South African courts.
The constitutions of Botswana and South Africa both guarantee media freedom in
terms that are consistent with international law standards. The former guarantees the
freedom implicitly as p art o f t he g eneral r ight offreedom o f e xpression, w hile t he
latter gives an express guarantee. The constitution of South Africa also guarantees an
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active right to information held by the state, which plays an important complimentary
role to the media's democratic mandate. Further to the constitutional provision, South
Africa has also enacted an access to information law, the AIA, which, as observed in
chapter 6, is one of the most liberal and comprehensive access to infonnation laws in
the world. The AIA inter alia supports the principle ofmaximum disclosure of official
information and establishes a presumption that all information held by the state is
subject to disclosure unless specifically exempted under the Act. The Act further
gives an exhaustive list of legitimate grounds that would justify a refusal to disclose
information. The grounds of refusal are consistent with international law and the Act
adopts the three-part test to ensure that exemptions are narrowly interpreted. The
constitution and AIA seek to ensure transparent, participatory and accountable
governance in South Africa, and the climate that the law creates is favourable to the
exercise of the media's democratic mandate.
The South African scene in respect of access to official information contrasts sharply
with the position in Botswana. The constitution of Botswana only guarantees a
passive right to information. The exercise of the right of freedom of information is
further hampered by a culture of secrecy in the conduct of government affairs. This
culture of secrecy is further entrenched by a requirement that all public servants must
sign a declaration of secrecy under the National Security Act 1986 and the fact that
there is no protection for whistleblowers. The prevailing situation makes it very
difficult for the media to perform their democratic mandate because it is difficult to
access official information. The government's promise in 2000 to enact an access to
information legislation has so far not been fulfilled. There is no doubt that it is now
long overdue for Botswana to e nact an a ccess to information law because it is not
only necessary to ensure the media's performance of their democratic mandate, but is
also essential for the maintenance of a democracy by ensuring transparency and
accountability in government.
Perhaps the situation regarding access to information in Botswana would not be that
bad, even without an access to infonnation legislation, if the ICCPR and ACHPR
were directly applicable in the municipal law. We saw in chapter 4 that the ICCPR
protects an active right to information, which obliges states to actively disseminate
information of importance. Similarly, the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
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Expression in Africa (African Declaration), which is intended to inform and guide the
application of Article 9 of the ACHPR, provides that public bodies hold information
not for themselves but as custodians of the public good.3 The Declaration further
recognises that everyone has a right of access to information held by public bodies
subject to the exceptions recognised by international law. If Botswana had
incorporated both the ICCPR and ACHPR into her domestic law, the jurisprudence
developed under the ICCPR on the point and the African Declaration would enable its
courts to construe the constitutional provision as enshrining an active right to official
information in order to enhance the media's informative and watchdog roles. This
point emphasises the importance of incorporating international human rights treaties
into municipal law for bolstering the protection of rights in the domestic law.
We saw that the idea that the media sector should be diverse is underpinned by a
belief that, in a democratic society, it is important for its members to have access to a
broad range of views and opinions so that people can make informed choices on a
variety of public matters. The ideal legal environment, supportive to the media's
democratic mandate would therefore be one that permits and encourages entry into the
market of a diverse range of media outlets. The assumption is that a diverse range of
media outlets will maximise the dissemination of a wide range of views and opinions.
This seems to be the idea underlying the enabling legal framework for the print media
in Botswana and South Africa. The laws of the two states do not impose any
restrictions on entry into the market. Despite the liberal legal regimes in both
countries, this has not produced the desired diversity and pluralism in the print media.
The m ain o bstacles are not 1 egal, b ut e conomic. T hese i nclude: c ommercialisation,
which influences the content of newspapers; and concentration of ownership of media
outlets, which restricts entry into the market by new players.
Media companies are in essence economic entities and are not likely to be driven by
purely altruistic considerations in their reportage. First, the print media in Botswana
and South Africa rely heavily on advertisers for survival. Consequently, the content of
newspapers in both countries is often designed to deliver affluent audiences to
advertisers. The content and distribution of newspapers in the two states therefore
5 Article IV.
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targets the middle and upper income urban audiences. The poor and mostly rural
audiences are thereby marginalized. Secondly, allegedly due to globalisation, the print
media like other sectors in most countries around the world today, is characterised by
an increasing concentration of ownership aimed at the creation of larger companies
that can compete on the global market. There is a tension between these economic
factors and democratic ideals because the former seriously jeopardizes both external
and internal pluralism in the sector. Concentration of ownership ofmedia outlets leads
to monopolies or oligopolies and hence fewer players in the market, and stark
economic realities also suggest that the media, as commercial entities, will not always
pursue their democratic mandate in all circumstances. For example, where there is a
conflict between economic considerations and the performance of the democratic
mandate, such as a threat by a major advertiser to withdraw from a newspaper as a
result of unfavourable coverage, it is likely that the democratic mandate will be
subordinated to the interests of the newspaper as a commercial entity.
In South Africa, as is the case elsewhere in the world, competition law as failed to
deliver external pluralism in the print media, and, as observed in chapters 3 and 5, its
government has recently introduced a policy geared towards encouraging more
players into the market. While the policy will enable some new players to enter the
market, the major concern is whether the new players will be able to survive for long
in a market dominated by giant media houses in this age of globalisation. Botswana
can draw some useful lessons from South Africa in her attempt at ensuring external
pluralism in the print media. Competition law alone has proved inadequate and a
policy aiming at encouraging new alternative media outlets to enter the market can be
quite costly. Perhaps a viable option for both countries to ensure external pluralism in
the print media would be to limit control over titles in circulation along similar lines
to the French and Italian models.
A plurality of players in the market does not necessarily guarantee internal pluralism.
Commercial considerations often force newspapers to deliver content that is tailored
to attract audiences to advertisers rather than disseminate a wide range of views and
opinions to a diverse audience, thereby enabling citizens to participate in the
democratic process. In chapter 2, we saw that media freedom is an instrumental good
and that it is valued in so far as it promotes the goal of freedom of expression.
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Regulation of the media is thus justified if it aims to ensure that the media serve the
goals of freedom of expression. Content regulation of the broadcast media in many
countries around the world has furthered the provision of a plural and diverse range of
programmes.6 Arguably, the imposition of particular content obligations on the print
media could promote internal pluralism in the newspaper sector, as has been the case
in the broadcast sector.
Content regulation in relation to the print media is however generally considered an
anathema in democratic societies. But, as we saw in chapter 2, there are no
convincing arguments for the double standard in the regulation of the print and
broadcast media. If we accept that media freedom is an instrumental good, then, in
principle, there is nothing objectionable in regulating the content of newspapers if
such regulation would enhance the media's democratic role by ensuring that the press
disseminates a wide range of ideas and opinions to diverse audiences. The issue of
content regulation in the print media therefore needs further consideration,
particularly in the light of globalisation, which pushes states to encourage larger
media companies that can compete on the global stage, resulting in fewer players in
the market; and the fact that the media as economic entities do not act solely, or at all,
for altruistic purposes. Content regulation could ensure that newspapers strike a
proper balance between the pursuit of economic objectives and the performance of
their democratic mandate.
The study shows that the legal framework for the regulation of the print media in
Botswana and South Africa is mainly concerned with ensuring external pluralism. The
position contrasts sharply with the regulation of the broadcast media. Airwaves are
regarded a scarce resource in both countries, and the regulation of the broadcast media
is thus premised on the principle that the use of the airwaves is a privilege and that the
public interest requires that spectrum should be allocated so as to cater for the diverse
needs of all citizens. Regulation of the broadcast sector therefore emphasises both the
presence of a number of actors in the market and internal pluralism, which is
concerned with the diversity and quality of programming. The broadcast sector in
South Africa is more developed than that in Botswana, and we have seen that the
6 Cf. D. Ward, 'The Democratic Deficit and European Union Communication Policy: An Evaluation of
the Commission's Approach to Broadcasting' (2001) 8(1) Javnost 75 at 80.
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former has developed arguably one of the most detailed, comprehensive and
democratic legal frameworks for enhancing both external and internal pluralism in the
sector. Botswana is still in the process of developing a comprehensive legal
framework for the regulation of broadcasting. In May 2003 the NBB published a draft
national broadcasting policy for public consultation. If approved, the document will
form the basis for a regulatory framework for the broadcast sector. The draft policy,
among other things: identifies regulatory goals and how to attain those goals; sets out
the mandates of public, commercial and community broadcasters; recommends limits
over control of broadcasting licensees and cross-ownership between the print and
broadcast media; and makes recommendations for ensuring universal access to
broadcasting services to citizens.
Given the present state of affairs in Botswana, the country can learn some valuable
lessons from the South African experience. Here I highlight some of the important
principles embodied in the South African legal framework that are crucial for
enhancing diversity and pluralism in the broadcast sector. Any state that is seriously
committed to the democratisation of the broadcast media should consider
incorporating similar principles into its regulatory framework.
With regard to ensuring external pluralism, it is crucial that there should be: an
availability of different categories of broadcasting services; a guarantee of the
independence of public service broadcasters both in law and practice from
interference by the government; requirements to ensure that commercial broadcasters
are controlled by persons from a diverse range of communities; a limit on the number
of licences that any one entity may control; and limits to cross-media control between
the print and broadcast media, and between the broadcast media and content
production companies. It is encouraging to note that Botswana's draft broadcasting
policy embraces all but two of these principles. The draft policy does not expressly
recommend that commercial broadcasters should be controlled by persons from a
diverse range of backgrounds, and the recommendation on limits on cross media
control does not extend to content production companies.
In so far as the provision of quality programming in the broadcast media is concerned,
public service broadcasters, as public assets, are expected to establish a benchmark for
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quality. In order to do this, public service broadcasters must be independent from both
political and commercial influences, have sufficient resources to provide quality
programming and be accountable to the public for the manner in which they perform
their public mandate. Independence of public service broadcasters is now a concept
embraced by most democratic societies, as evidenced by the Council of Europe's
requirement that all its member states should guarantee the independence of such
broadcasters. The African Declaration also requires states to transform all state and
government controlled broadcasters into public service broadcasters, which should be
guaranteed editorial independence.7 In South Africa, the independence of the public
service broadcaster, the SABC, is guaranteed in law and practice. The SABC's
editorial independence is expressly guaranteed in law and the corporation also enjoys
both administrative and financial independence. The governing board of the SABC is
elected in a democratic manner and is accountable to parliament for the performance
of the corporation's public mandate.
In Botswana the draft broadcasting policy recommends the transformation of the state
owned broadcasters into PSBs in accordance with international law standards. The
approval of this recommendation by the government is, however, in doubt in the light
of a statement made by a senior cabinet member, when officiating at one of the of the
broadcasting policy formulation seminars. The official was quoted as saying that the
government was not yet ready to give up control of the state owned broadcasters, as
the government needs a medium that it can control.8 Should the state fail to transform
the state owned broadcasters into fully fledged PSBs and guarantee them editorial
independence, this will not only be in violation of international law standards, but also
the spirit of the government's own policy documents, such as the National
Development Plan 8 and Vision 2016.9
While the ideals of democratic communication require people from diverse
backgrounds to control broadcasting licences, people from disadvantaged
backgrounds are usually not able to enter the industry due to the costs involved. Thus,
the government of Botswana will have to put in place a policy to assist people from
7 Article VI.
8 See 'RB Will Remain Under Government Control. Says Kwelagobe' Daily News, 28th June 2002.
9
Long Term Vision for Botswana: Towards Prosperityfor All (Government Printer, 1997) p. 35.
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disadvantaged backgrounds to invest in the industry, otherwise only the affluent
sections of society will dominate the sector. South Africa has set up the MDDA to
assist the historically disadvantaged to play a part in the broadcasting sector.
Botswana should consider a similar policy and could learn some valuable lessons
from South Africa in this respect.
A significant number of the citizens of Botswana and South Africa are illiterate and
based in rural areas, and we saw that the distribution of the print media in both
countries is concentrated in the urban areas. These factors render the press
inaccessible to a large number of citizens, which makes the broadcast media all the
more important because of its capacity to reach a wide audience and its ability to
overcome barriers of illiteracy. Since a large number of the citizens of both countries
rely only on the broadcast media for their information needs, it is crucial that the
broadcast media provide high quality programming, addressing the diverse needs of
the population. The South African regulatory framework, in recognition of the
importance of the broadcast media in this regard, imposes extensive obligations on
each of the three categories of broadcasters to ensure internal pluralism in their
programming. In addition, broadcasters are required to include in their programming,
programmes produced by the independent production sector. These requirements go a
long way in providing for internal pluralism in the programmes provided by
broadcasters. Botswana's draft broadcasting policy should thus be applauded for
recommending the imposition of similar obligations on all broadcasters recognised
under its law.
The ideals of democratic communication demand that citizens should have access to a
diverse range of views and opinions in order to play an effective part in the
democratic process. The situation in both Botswana and South Africa is such that the
broadcast media is the most accessible media to the majority of the citizens. It is
submitted that this fact imposes an obligation on the governments of the two states to
endeavour to ensure the availability of broadcasting services to all their citizens. In an
attempt at providing broadcasting services to all its citizens, South Africa has
restructured its signal distribution sector. More importantly, the public service
broadcaster's signal distribution network has been converted into a common carrier,
and is obliged, subject to its technological capacity to provide broadcasting signal
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distribution to licensees on an equitable and reasonable basis. The move has enabled
more community and small commercial broadcasters, who would otherwise not have
been able to afford the costs of signal distribution equipment, to enter the market thus
offering choice to the citizens. Further to ensuring universal access to broadcasting
services, the South African regulatory framework requires broadcasters to provide
programming in all official languages in order to remove language barriers to access.
In Botswana, the signal distribution network of the state owned broadcasters is not
open to use by other categories of broadcasters. However, in the light of the costs of
acquiring signal distribution equipment, the draft broadcasting policy recommends
that the national signal distribution network should be opened up to other categories
of broadcasters at a reasonable cost. The national signal distribution network is a
public resource and must therefore be used in the public interest, i.e., furthering the
democratic ideal, by ensuring that citizens have access to a number of broadcast
services, which will hopefully provide them with a diversity of views and opinions. It
is also crucial for the government to extend the network to cover all parts of the
country. At the moment all broadcasters in the country broadcast in two languages,
English, the official language and Setswana, the national language. All citizens cannot
comprehend these languages, and there is a need to encourage the use of oxher
minority languages in order to make broadcast services more accessible to the
minority groups in the country. The draft broadcasting policy addresses this problem
by recommending the use of other languages by all broadcasters in the country.
The effectiveness of the regulation of a sector depends to a certain extent on the
qualities of the regulator. We saw that in South Africa, ICASA is expressly
guaranteed both administrative and financial independence in the performance of its
mandate. The successes in the regulation of the broadcast media there can in part be
attributed to the effectiveness and independence of the regulator. By contrast, the
regulator in Botswana is not expressly protected from interference by the government
and does not have financial independence. The law should be amended in order to
expressly provide for the administrative and financial independence of the regulator.
Such guarantees will not only enhance the status of the regulator, but the latter
guarantee in particular will also enable it to carry out its mandate more effectively.
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The publication of the draft national broadcasting policy in Botswana was a very
important event in the history of broadcasting in the country. The approval of the
document in its present form by the government, and its subsequent implementation
would certainly lead to major transformations in the broadcast sector, resulting in the
enhancement of the sector's democratic mandate. It is however submitted that the
draft policy needs to be amended in order to fill the gaps identified in chapter 5. Apart
from these gaps, the publication of the draft policy is a positive step in that it
addresses a number of crucial issues. It seems the South African regulatory
framework generally inspired the draft, although it does not cover all issues addressed
in South Africa. The manner in which the draft policy proposes to tackle most
regulatory issues arguably draws from the South African experience, and reflects the
approach currently in place there. South Africa would therefore be a crucial point of
reference for Botswana's implementation of her broadcasting policy.
The study demonstrates the importance that international law accords to the freedoms
of expression (including media freedom) and information as pillars of a democratic
society. Despite their importance, we saw that the freedoms are not absolute, as their
enjoyment must be reconciled with the protection of other equally important social
interests, such as the protection of national security and the reputation of others.
International law, however, requires a delicate balance to be struck between the
exercise of the freedoms of expression and information and any restrictions thereon.
In particular, the law requires restrictions on the two freedoms to be construed strictly
and the need of any restriction to be established convincingly.10 The question of
striking an appropriate balance between freedom of expression, media freedom and
access t o i nformation, a nd t he p rotection o f n ational s ecurity a nd t he r eputation o f
others, has proved to be one of the most contentious issues around the world.
With regard to restrictions based on national security, the major problem is that
national security remains, both in international law and the municipal laws of most
states, a vague concept. International human rights treaties and the organs entrusted
with the enforcement of these instruments have hitherto failed to provide a precise
definition of what constitutes genuine national security interests. The resulting
10 Cf. Tammer v Estonia (App. No. 41205/98, 6th February 2001) para. 59.
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vacuum means states have a wide discretion in determining what amounts to threats to
their security. The unfettered discretion that states generally enjoy in determining
national security interests has resulted in the concept becoming excessively broad,
resulting in occasional abuses. The uncertainty surrounding national security has an
impact on the ability of courts of law to perform their duty and provide adequate
safeguards against the abuse of the concept. Courts play an important role in
safeguarding civil liberties by scrutinising executive action in order to ensure its
lawfulness. In the absence of clear guidelines as to what constitutes genuine national
security interests, courts are reluctant to interfere with executive action taken,
purportedly, in the interests of national security. It is therefore critical for international
law to provide specific guidance on the key issue of what constitutes genuine national
security interests, and what information it would be legitimate to withhold for its
protection. The Johannesburg and Siracusa Principles have made significant
contributions towards the identification of genuine national security interests, and
international tribunals should thus be encouraged to endorse, incorporate and refine
these principles in their decisions. Such a step would help develop authoritative
international law jurisprudence on national security that would guide governments
and national courts in the interpretation of the concept.
South Africa has taken important steps towards striking an appropriate balance
between freedom of expression and the protection of national security. The AIA
provides a comprehensive list of types of information that the state may legitimately
withhold in the interests of national security. The list draws from both the
Johannesburg and Siracusa Principles. By listing the types of information that can be
withheld for the protection of genuine national security interests, the Act thereby
limits the discretion of the state in the determination of national security interests and
further provides the courts with a clear and solid basis upon which they can judge the
lawfulness of government action. The AIA further incorporates the three-part test in
the determination of the legitimacy of restrictions based on national security.
By contrast, Botswana is one of the many countries around the world where national
security remains a broad and vague concept. The ambiguity and breath of the concept
in the country is detrimental to the performance of the media's democratic mandate,
as we saw in chapter 7, in that national security is occasionally invoked by the
315
government to deny the media access to a wide range of infonnation. If Botswana is
truly committed to enhancing democracy, it should amend its laws relating to national
security, particularly the NSA, to ensure their compliance with international law
principles. It is recommended that Botswana adopt a definition of national security
that is consistent with both the Johannesburg and Siracusa Principles, and further
incorporate the three-part test for the detennination of the legitimacy of restrictions on
the freedoms of expression and information based on national security.
The Constitutional Court of South Africa has opined that the media, as primary agents
of the dissemination of information and ideas, are powerful institutions in a
democracy and thus have a duty to act with vigour, courage, integrity and
responsibility." One of the prominent issues in the debate on striking an appropriate
balance between media freedom and the protection of the reputation of others relates
to the question of how to ensure that the media do indeed act in this way in the
performance of their democratic mandate. If the media were to be held strictly liable
for any errors, this would impact negatively on their duty to act with vigour and
courage, as they may be forced to adopt a cautious approach in their reportage ir.
order to avoid liability. Similarly, if the media were to be held liable only upon proof
that they acted with malice or reckless disregard for truth, this may lower ethical
standards and thus fail to ensure that the media perform their democratic mandate
with integrity and responsibility.
International law resolves the tension between the above extreme approaches by
giving vigorous protection to the media when commenting on political and other
matters of public interest, but only where publication of defamatory matter is proved
to have been reasonable in the circumstances of a given case. These principles ensure
that the media perform their democratic mandate with vigour and courage, while at
the same time the requirement of reasonableness ensures that they act responsibly. In
the light of international law standards, a favourable legal environment to the striking
of the appropriate balance between media freedom and the protection of reputation
would be one that allows the media room for reasonable error, but simultaneously
requires maintenance of high ethical standards in the reporting of news.
11 Khumalo and others v Holomisa, n 1 above at 417 para. 24.
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The South African legal environment meets both of the above requirements. The
liability of the media for publication of defamatory matter is based on negligence,
which allows media defendants to escape liability if they prove that they acted with
due d iligence i n t he p ublication o f t he m atter. In a ddition, t he 1 aw i mposes o n t he
media a duty to act with care before publication of matter that is potentially
12
defamatory. Codes of conduct have been introduced in both the print and broadcast
media to establish and maintain high ethical standards in order to ensure the
observance of this duty of care. The print media have established a voluntary
regulatory regime by adopting a Press Code, which all newspapers in circulation have
elected to abide by. The code inter alia requires newspapers to report news truthfully,
accurately and fairly. In the broadcast media, the IBA Act 1993 obliges all
broadcasters to comply with a Code of Conduct drawn up by the regulator. The code
that has been drawn up by ICASA imposes similar obligations on broadcasters as
those imposed on the print media in the reporting of news. A proper enforcement of
these codes should not only ensure the observance of high ethical journalistic
standards in :the media, but also provide a quick and inexpensive way of settling
disputes between the media and members of the public aggrieved by reports in the
media.
In Botswana the media are strictly held liable for publication of defamatory matter.
This position is not only in conflict with international law standards, but also with the
recommendation of Vision 2016 that media freedom be guaranteed in law and
practice. As I argue in chapter 8, strict liability for the media was wrongly
incorporated into the law of Botswana and therefore should be replaced by the
principle of liability based on negligence. Vision 2016, in conformity with
international law, further requires that media freedom be balanced by sound media
ethics. Vision 2016 specifically provides that ethical standards must be spelt out in a
code of conduct that is enforced by the media sector itself.13 At the time of writing,
there were no codes for either the broadcast or print media in force in Botswana. With
regard to the broadcast media, the regulator will draw up a code once the process of
formulating a national policy for broadcasting has been finalised.
12 National Media Ltd and others v Bogoshi 1998 4 SA 1196 at 1212- 13.
13
Long Term Vision for Botswana: Towards Prosperityfor All, n 9 above at 35.
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The print media, which is normally associated with voluntary regulatory mechanisms,
has hitherto failed to establish any credible means of enforcing ethical standards in
Botswana. It will be recalled that the Mass Communications Bill 2001, which is yet to
come before parliament, proposed the setting up of a statutory press council whose
members would be appointed by the minister of communications. In response to the
government's efforts to legislate for a press council, the print media registered a
voluntary press council with the assistance of MISA-Botswana in October 2002.
However, the council has not yet adopted a code of conduct. It is indisputable that a
reputable mechanism in the print media in Botswana that can maintain high ethical
standards and ensure that newspapers perform their democratic mandate in a
responsible manner is now long overdue. It is therefore imperative for both the
government and the print media to work together in order to establish an institution
that can ensure the maintenance of high ethical standards in the sector.
This study clearly demonstrates that, despite affirmations by the state of Botswana on
the importance of the media in sustaining democracy, and the constitutional guarantee
of media freedom, the state has generally failed to take positive measures to ensure
the enjoyment of the right. However, notwithstanding this failure, Botswana is still
generally regarded as one of the countries in Africa where there is a relatively high
degree of media freedom.14 South Africa is regarded as offering the media the highest
degree of freedom in the performance of their democratic mandate in the whole of the
African continent. The position in South Africa is attributable to the fact that, the
state, in addition to its affirmations of the importance ofmedia freedom in democratic
societies, has also taken crucial measures to ensure its realisation. It is submitted that
if Botswana were to borrow from the South African experience in this regard, it
would significantly enhance media freedom in the country.
14 P.N. Takirambudde, 'Media Freedom and the Transition to Democracy in Africa' (1995) 7 African
Journal ofInternational and Comparative Law 18 at 46.
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